KINSHIP, POWER AND LEGITIMACY: A STUDY OF MARATHA CONFEDERATES IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

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DECLARATION

I declare that the thesis entitled "***Kinship, Power and Legitimacy: A Study of Maratha Confederates in the Eighteenth Century***", submitted by me for the award of the degree of **Doctor of Philosophy** of Jawaharlal Nehru University. The thesis is my own work and has not been previously submitted for any degree of this university or any other university.

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List of Maps and Tables

Table of Nature of State	13
Genealogy of the Family of Dabhade	51
Genealogy of the family of Babi	61
Table of Revenue of Surat Athavisi	65
Table of Distribution of Surat Athavisi Pargana	66
Map of Partition of territories of Gujarat between Peshwa and Gaekwad	68
Table of Revenue from Svarajya and Mughal Territories	72
Map of Holkar and Shinde Territories of Rajputana	99
Appendix: Distribution of the territories between the Gaekwad and Peshwa	112
Table of Name of the Agent and Leaders of Gaekwad family	169
Table of the Leaders and Supporters	170
Genealogy of the Phanse Family and Raoji Appaji	178
Genealogy of the family of Holkar	208
Map of Gaekwad of Baroda and Kadi and British Territories in Gujarat	245
Table of the Amount of Pension and Allowance	249
Table of the Division of Pension in the families of Malhar Rao and Khanderao	250
Table of the British demands in Memorandum to provide for regular payment of the subsidiary troops of Gaekwad	262
Table of the Reduction in Expenditure after British Instruction	263
Table of the Income and Expenditure of Gaekwad	264
Genealogy of the Gaekwads	317

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ALS. - Aitihasik Lekh Sangrah by Khare

AIT- Aitihasik Tipne by B. D. Parasnis

CPC- Calendar of Persian Correspondence

PRC - Poona Residency Correspondence

SPD. - Selection from the Peshwa Daftar

MIS- Marathainchya Itihasachi Sadhane

PAO- Poona Alienation Office

PRC- Poona Residency Correspondences

GOB- The Gaikwad of Baroda

HSBSR- Historical Selection from Baroda State Records

BISM- Bharat –Itihas –Samshodhak Mandal

BISMQ- Quarterly of BISM.

IHQ- Indian Historical Quarterly, Calcutta.

Contents

	Pages
**Acknowledgements.……..…….. **	**iii-iv**
**Abbreviation ……. **	**ix**
**Introduction: Kinship, Power and Legitimacy: A Study of Maratha Confederates in the Eighteenth Century..... **	**1-47**
A key concept of Kinship, Power and Legitimacy……..	2
Power and Legitimacy: A Conceptual Background……	7
The Families of the Shindes, Holkars and Gaekwads: Eighteenth Century Kinship and Politics…….	14
Family Background of three Confederates: Shinde, Holkar and Gaekwad	20
Historiography…….....	24
Primary Sources…….…….....**.**	29
Sources Relating to the Question of Loyalty of Shinde, Holkar and Gaekwad…….…….....**.....**	37
Chapterisation…….…….....**.**	42
**Chapter -1: Origin, Alliance, and Expansion of Gaekwad, Holkar and Shinde 1700-1760 C.E……..…… **	**48-113**
Origin of the Gaekwad: Emergence of Baroda as Power Centre……	48
The Siege of Ahmadabad and Dual Control of the Peshwa and Gaekwad	69
The Share of the Peshwa in Ahmadabad and Cambay……..…….	70
Origin, Alliances, and Expansion of Shinde and Holkar …….……..	74
Origin of Family of Holkar and Process of Domination in Malwa…..…...	74
Origin and Alliances of the Family of the Shinde…….……..	83
Period of Unity between the families of Shinde–Holkar, 1730-1740 C.E.	88
Malhar Rao Holkar and Jaipur-Kota Conflict: Beginning of the conflict among the Confederates……..	94

Third Conflict: Shinde and Holkar for Bakht Singh and Ram Singh of Marwar 1745-1766…….…… 98
Alliances with the Mughals at Delhi: Shinde –Holkar loyalties for Maratha Confederacy……..…… 101
Appendix…… 112

Chapter-2: Kinship and State Formation in Central and Western India 1761-1780s C.E. ……..... 114-159

Kinship and Polity of the Gaekwads: Family dispute in Post-Panipat Decades…… 114
Kin and Conflicts in the Households of Holkar and Shinde: 1761-1780s 126
Kinship and Politics of Holkar in Post-Panipat era……. 126
Kinship and Power of the Family of Shinde…… 137
Mahadji Shinde and North Indian Affairs, 1768- 1780s…… 138

Chapter -3: Sovereignty and Kin's Polity: Households and Policies of Gaekwad and Shinde, 1775- 1803 C.E. …….……... 160-206

Gaekwad and his Politics of Sovereignty…… **160**
Kin and Rival Parties……... **168**
Family of Shinde and Politics of Power…….. **179**
Power of Confederates and Kin of Shinde: Mahadji as Mutaliq……. **180**
Northern Confederacy and Supremacy of Mahadji's Kin…… **189**
Nana and Daulat Rao: Contestation for Power…… **197**

Chapter-4: Conflict of Power: Kin, Clan and Holkar Politics during 1795-1803 C.E. …… 207-239

Holkar and Kin: Political crisis at the House of Holkar……... 207
Escape of Yashwant Rao to Nagpur and his Diplomatic alliances: September 1797-June 1798 C.E. ……. 211
Re-creation of Holkar Identity under Yashwant Rao Holkar, 1798-1799 C.E. …….. 214
Contestation for Power amongst the Kin of the Confederates, 1800-1804.. 217

Negotiation and Association of two Houses: Politics of Kin and Peshwa .. 221
Holkar domination in Deccan…….. 223
Retaliation of Kin and Civil war of Maharashtra…… 224
Confiscating the Territorial Power of the Kin of Holkar……. 226
Coalition and Kinship Polity, 1802-1803 C. E. …….. 235

Chapter-5: Transition from Sovereign Confederates to Princely States: Last Phase of Kin Conflicts in the House of Gaekwad, 1800-1818 C. E. …… 240-283

Kin as a Tool of British Supremacy: Politics of Pension…… 246
Debt and Diwanship: Question of Prosperity and Kinship Polity…… 253
Administration and Politics of Kin…….. 268

Conclusion……..……..... 284-294

Bibliography……..……..... 295-316

INTRODUCTION

Kinship, Power and Legitimacy: A Study of Maratha Confederates in the Eighteenth Century

Kinship is an idiom in terms which other kind of social relations and functions are expressed, in which Kinship units are the medium through which economic, religious and political function are expressed.[1]

David M. Schneider.

The study of the kinship of the Maratha Confederates, who were controlling the different territories in northern and western India, and whose boundaries were not demarcated on the Indian map before becoming the princely states, had been kept on the margin of the historiography of the eighteenth century. The families of the Shindes, Holkars and Gaekwads, deployed in Malwa, Gujarat and the Rajputana region, were by no means negligible regarding size, military power and political affairs. It would, therefore, be inappropriate to generalize about the way the Maratha Confederacy was functioning in northern India with regards to their power, legitimacy and relationship with different families. This study is based on the notion of kinship as an idiom, and its relation or even the genealogical grid, as a central feature which constituted different groups, and categories of social units. As Schneider pointed out that kinship can provide a way of thinking relating to a large or small number of persons through formal cultural defined categories of the same kind.[2] Along with it, this study of kinship relation includes the political, social, cultural and economic relationship of the families of the Shindes, Holkars and Gaekwads as social

[1] David M. Schneider, *Critique of the Study of Kinship*, University of Michigan Press, New York, 1984, p. 48.

[2] Robert Parkin and Linda Stone (ed.), *Kinship and Family: An Anthropological Reader*, Blackwell Publishing, 2004, pp.267-268; D. M. Schneirder in his article, *What is Kinship all About?*explains the scope of the study of kinship and includes religion and politics as a domain of the study of kinship.

anthropologist studies the kinship relation of any society.[3] A plethora of regional studies have explored the role of Shinde, Holkar and Gaekwad in central and western India, but neglected the role of internal family disputes amongst the different Confederates of the Marathas and its significance for the British and other external powers during the eighteenth century. The power struggle within the families of the Shindes, Holkars and Gaekwads and their ways of success, which led towards the independent princely states[4] in the last decade of the eighteenth century and sovereign political entities even before the arrival of the British in their territories are highlighted on the basis of kinship relation.

I

A key concept of Kinship, Power and Legitimacy

Kinship or relatives are people who are related to each other through some combination of the principles of descent and marriage as applied to recognize familial ties socially. Such genealogically related individuals are addressed and referred to through the use of a set of kin terms collectively constituting a kinship.[5] The received wisdom in anthropology is that kinship represents the very essence of being human and that in all societies, 'network that connects the individuals as relatives are apparently universally recognized and universally accorded social importance.'[6] The most common mistake found among those commencing their study of kinship is to suppose that the term refers to the biological relation which necessarily exists between all human beings. "Kinship relations are not biological but that set of social relationship that is mapped on the biological relation."[7] Since each human individual is born into a web of biological relations, which can be used to establish both parentage and descent. However, these biological relations are not in themselves a social relation; their existence has no direct effect on human behaviour, and they are

[3] J. H. M. Beattie, 'Kinship and Social Anthropology', *Man,* Vol. 64, July-August 1964, p. 102. He pointed out that the whole point about kinship relation for the social anthropologists is that they must be something else, for expample political, jural, economic, or ritual etc… relations are talked and thought about in certain socities. It is not a further category of social relationship, which can be set beside a political relationship, economic relationship and so on.
[4] Waltraud Ernst and Biswamoy Pati (ed.), *India's Princely States: People, Princes and Colonialism*, Routledge, London, 2007, p. 9.
[5] Alan R. Beals, *Anthropology,* Macmillan Publishing Co., New York, 1976, p. 405.
[6] Ladisalav Holy, *Anthropological Perspectives of Kinship,* Pluto Press, London, 1996, p. 9.
[7] John Scott (ed.), *Sociology: A Key Concepts,* Routledge, London, 2006, p. 93.

not, therefore, an appropriate subject of historical study. The ongoing conflict over defining the kinship and its relation is whether the socio-cultural aspect can be set apart entirely from the biological element or not or whether any concern for socio-cultural dimension necessarily implies the biological aspect or not. We have the historiography of the definition of kinship based on this debate. First, Morgan[8], defines it as the mode of kinsmen and describes the own knowledge of the people of how they are actually, or most probably biologically related to each other.[9] Early authors[10] treated kinship as primarily a biological relationship with the cultural aspect the mere recognition of its existence with other features. Durkheim explains kinship and consganity (in real blood connection) are very different things, and as examples, Durkheim gives the fact that the natural child who is not recognised as such is not in the social sense of the world, kin to his ascendants and has no family ties with them. He gives an example of Rome where a child did not become a member of a family where he was born, but the father had to receive him with an appropriate ceremony. Durkheim then adds an example of adoption, saying that the adapter or adoptees are kin even though no consanguineal relationship obtained between them.[11] Therefore, according to Durkheim, kinship is constituted of the jural and moral obligations that society imposes, that these individuals belong to a group where the members believe that they have a common origin. Since it is clear that even birth alone is not adequate to make a child an integral member of a group, therefore, religious ceremonies or some social customs formalities must be added. The similar rule was applied for the Maratha families, and it was a privilege custom to adopt the child in the families of the Marathas, the kinds of ceremonial functions conducted at the time of adoption are mentioned explicitly in various documents. While the Marathi correspondence throw

[8]Lewis H. Morgan, *System of Consanguinity and Affinity of the Human Family,* Nibarka Press, Washington D.C., 1870, pp.12-13.
[9] David M. Schneider, *Critique of the Study of Kinship*, p. 98.
[10] Alan Barned, *History and theory in Anthropology,* Cambridge University Press, New York, 2004. In his essay 'Precursor of the anthropological tradition', he gives a detailed explanation of how anthropology becomes an academic subject, and critically examines the different philosophers since the seventeenth century. He begins with Hugo Grotious (1625), pp. 16-28.
[11] Steven Luckes, *Emile Durkheim, His Life and Work: A Historical and Cultural Studies,* Standford University Press, London,1973, p. 184.

the flood of light on the ongoing conflict between natural child and adopted one mainly in the families of the Peshwa (Bajirao-II), Holkars, Shindes, and Gaekwads.[12]

Due to disagreement among the family, Durkheim concludes that all kinship is social, for it consists essentially jural and moral relations, sanctioned by the society.[13] Sometimes historians use kinship and family in similar facet, therefore, it would be helpful at this point to clarify that how the term household is used in the thesis. A household is usually defined as a set of person who live in the same dwelling and share a common housekeeping. To be household, its members do not have to relate by blood. The criteria for household membership is residence, not kinship and its shared domestic activities. There is, however, a particular type of household whose members are kin, namely the family household. Families are a group of kin which is distinguished from the other types of a social group by their characteristic activities. The present work explains the kinship and household of the three important Confederates of the Marathas and uses the term 'House' as in the Houses of the Shindes, Holkars and Gaekwads which not only constitutes the socio-anthropological understanding of the household and the families but reflects specific set of identity and power of the families of these Confederates during the eighteenth century.

The significance of the study of kinship of the Shindes, Holkars and Gaekwads would be based on the considerable characteristics: first; the extent to which the genealogical relationship is recognized for social purposes and the way relatives are classified or grouped in the Confederacy. Second, particular customs by which the power of the Confederates and their relatives were regulated in daily life under the command of the Chhatrapati. Third, the various rights and obligations which were mediated through kinship of the families of the Shindes, Holkars and Gaekwads. This structure of understanding of the kinship and power of the Confederates would reflect a different sense of the study of kinship in which anthropologists are not interested. As Fox in 1967 pointed out that "kinship is to anthropology what logic is to philosophy or nude is to art; it is the basic discipline of the subject."[14] Though the cardinal focus of the

[12] Pratul C. Gupta, *Bajo Rao-II and the East India Company,* Oxford University Press, London, 1923, pp.5-12; G. H. Gense and D. R. Banaji, *The Gaikwad of Baroda: English Documents,* B. D. Taraporevela Co. Bombay, 1936, pp. x-xviii.
[13] Mary Ann Lamanna, *Emile Durkheim on the Family,* Sage Publication, New Delhi, 2004, p. 98.
[14] Ladislav Holy, *Anthropological Perspectives on Kinship,* Pluto Press, London, 1996, p.1.

anthropologist on kinship is based on its aspect of social life and the extent to which they denote the genealogical relationship, its categories and changing nature of the terminology of kinship.[15] The anthropological occupation of the kinship was not a haphazard result of peculiar interest and hobbies of the several generations of anthropologists. It was logically related to the way in which anthropology came to be constituted as a specialised subject on its own, in the early twentieth century.[16] Currently, the task of the anthropologists[17] is seen as the understanding of the studied society 'from the native point of views.' In an effort to gain that kind of understanding, actors model of kinship relation, working with their society, gained ethodological prominence logically. Despite all these realities, the study of kinship from anthropologist perspectives seems to decline during the last two-three decades due to the shifting of it to contextualization more.[18] The ongoing trends of research on kinship cover its diverse domains in which the main attention paid in the process of reproduction, the construction of gender and sexuality or self and personhood to understand the context of the process of kinship. This research breaks the traditional feature of the study of kinship and brings out a new dimension of its study that is based on polity, economy and rituals, which add a new insight into the study of kinship through the study of the families of the Maratha Confederates of the eighteenth century. It also includes a unique aspect of the study of the Maratha Confederacy which contributed to the fundamental change in the politics and society of the eighteenth century.

The increasing use of the anthropological concept in the history of the study of politics and society began with the founding of the journal *Annals* in France in 1929. The studies are not oriented towards humans as species, but towards the diversity of human life in the different historical periods, investing human feelings, experiences,

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[15] Robert Parkin, *Kinship: An Introduction to the Basic Concept,* Blackwell, London, 1997, p.124.

[16] Alan Barnard, *History and Theory in Anthropology,* explains the idea filtered in the late 1970s and 1980s and the development of post-modern ideas, pp. 159-163.

[17]James Clifford and George E. Marcus (ed.), *Writing Culture: The Poetics and Politics of Ethnography,* University of California Press, London, 1986; Allison James, Jenny Hockey and Andrew Dawson, *After Writing Culture: Epistemology and Praxis in Contemporary Anthropology,* Routledge, New York, 1997; Judith Okey and Helen Callaway, *Anthropology and Autobiography,* Routledge, London, 1992; Kirsten Hastrup and Peter Hervik, *Social Experience and Anthropological Knowledge,* Routledge, London 2003, pp. 2-7.

[18] Christoph Wulf, *Anthropology: A Continental Perspective,* University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 2013, p. 56.

thought, action, wishes, and aspiration. This has lead to a considerable expansion of the scope of issues, approaches, and methods. The Annals Journal brought together a group of historians who within a short span of time influenced the historical research in many countries and utilised the anthropological concept openly in the historical research. The most well-known members of this group include Lucien Febvre, Marc Bloch, Fernand Braudel, George Dubby, Jacques Le Goff, and others. These historians aimed to write a history in which problem-oriented, analytical history took priority over the conventional reporting over the event. Second, they aspired to arrive at a history of the full spectrum of human activities, rather focusing primarily on political history. Third, to achieve these two aims they needed to cooperate with other disciplines, such as Geography, Sociology, Psychology, Economics, Linguistic and Ethno-sociology and so on.[19] Many of the scholars accepted that the anthropological research in History needs to be transdisciplinary to handle the complexity of the problems and issues under scrutiny. Today Ethnology, Psychology, Sociology, Theology, Economics, and Geography all are needed in the investigation of the historical, anthropological issues. In this view, the history of the Maratha Confederacy also needs to be seen as extensive history. Therefore, this research differs from the approaches that regard the rise and fall of the Marathas based on the administrative failure which is the prevalent notion of the understanding of the history of any empire. My aim of the study of the decline of the Maratha Confederacy is based on kinship and power of the Confederates, who were operating in different parts of Upper India. It relies mainly on the role of individuality and subjectivity of families of the Shindes, Holkars, and Gaekwads which are very much in the center of attention.

However, from the anthropological perspectives and dominant political theories, the major limitation of this research is the lack of analysis of the issue of reproduction and genetics, sexuality and the biological relation between the generations of the families of Shindes, Holkars, and Gaekwads and the question of legitimacy during the eighteenth century. In fact, the aim is not to explain the biological factors but to highlight the life and career of some of the individuals of the families of these Confederates who had expanded the territories of the Maratha Confederacy in different parts of India. It also highlights the multilateral realities of the life of the

[19] Peter Burke, *The French Historical Revolution: The Annals School, 1929-89*, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1990, p. 12.

various Maratha Sardars and their personal economic and political power relation, the role of the families of the Shindes, Holkars and Gaekwads in the creation of the clans and groups in the Maratha Confederacy and how the individual character constitutes the 'historical time'.[20] This historical time which is based on the life of the family members of the Shindes, Holkars, and Gaekwads who later played a significant role in the declining the Maratha Confederacy during the last decade of the eighteenth century and served as brokers between the Mughals and English provide the base for understanding the political and social change of the Maratha Confederacy in the non-Maratha territories.

Power and Legitimacy: A Conceptual Background

The most general use of the word 'power' in English is a synonym for capacity, skill, or talent. This use encompasses the capacity to engage in certain kind of performance or 'skill' in the strict sense, the capacity to produce an effect of some sort on the external world. Therefore, it is an essential aspect of our lives since the beginning of the society, and it was the feature of personal relationships of kinship and their everyday interaction. However, a precise understanding of the power of the Maratha Confederates is vital for understanding the Maratha Confederacy because the common understanding may not be adequate to enable us to recognize the diverse manifestation of the power of the kinship in the Confederacy. The objective is not to understand the concept of power as it is embodied in some critical political theories, as it is often asserted that the concept of power is of central importance to political philosophy. It is particularly an elusive concept because it refers to a complex set of relationship which is manifested at the different levels of social life. In a modern society the "most visible expression of power takes place when an individual, or group or institutions like the state, directly imposes its will on others through the use of penal sanctions, or threat of using sanctions"[21]which was not the case under the Maratha Confederacy because of the non-functioning of the penal sanction system in the Maratha administration of northern India. Therefore, a proper understanding of kinship and power of the Confederates reflect the different modes of the history of the Marathas similar to the opinion of Foucault on power.

[20] Tamara K. Hareven, 'Family Time and History Time', *Daedalus*, Vol. 106, No. 2, Spring 1977, p. 57. Explaining the details of family time, individual time, and historical time.
[21] Sarah Joseph, *Political Theory and Power*, Foundation Book, New Delhi, 2004, p. 1.

Foucault has written extensively about power which may be embodied in social practices, but he defines his work as to 'create a history of the different modes by which, in our culture, human beings are made the subject".[22] Foucault believes that no history could claim the status of science and hence, could not be challenged on the ground that it did not conform to fact. However, genealogy by deconstructing conventional history could make visible the numerous subjected knowledge and local struggle which histories had masked. To the extent that it made such knowledge visible, genealogy could perform an emancipatory role. The genealogical[23] method of Foucault has sometimes been criticized for being more descriptive than critical. Michel Foucault played a significant role in drawing attention to this dimension of power. His central focus is on the forms of power which may be embedded in culture and language, and on the process by which they influence individual and society at the deepest level.

Apart from Foucault, there are different theories of power which show how political stances and theoretical trends have influenced the way in which power has been conceptualizing in recent years. However, for understanding the power of the kinship, the modified version of the definition of Russell as "power is the capacity of some persons to reproduce 'intended and foreseen effects' on others"[24] is one of the proper definitions to explain the power of the Maratha Confederates in the eighteenth century. Steven Lukes emphasizes on multiple dimensions of power, which is necessary for the understanding of the different layers of power of kinship and their politics during the eighteenth century. If we treat the power relation as exclusively

[22] Michel Foucault, *The Foucault Reader*, Paul Rainbow ed., Pantheon, New York, 1984, p. 7.
[23] Michel Clifford, *Political Genealogy After Foucault*, Routledge, New York, 2001. Foucault defines genealogy as "One has to dispense with the constituent subject, to get rid of the subject itself, that is to say, to arrive at an analysis which can account for the constitution of the subject within a historical framework. And that is what I call Genealogy", p. 6.
[24] Laswell and Kaplan also accept the modification of the definition of Russell, see Harold Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan, *Power and Society,* Yale University, New Haven, 1950, pp. 75-76. The intended and foreseen effect is the doctrine of double effect which is often invoked to explain the permissibility of an action that causes a serious harm, such as the death of a human being, as a side effect of promoting some good end. According to the principle of the double effect, sometimes it is permissible to cause a harm as a side effect of bringing about a good result even though it would not be permissible to cause such a harm as a means to bring about the same good end. Also see on http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/double-effect/ and in T. A. Cavanaugh, *Double Effect Reasoning: Doing Good and Avoiding Evil,* Oxford University Press, New York, 2006.

hierarchical and unilateral [25] (within the families of the Confederates or the administrative institution of the Marathas), we overlook an entire class of relations between the persons or groups in which many other sources of power would not come in the picture. In fact, if we explain the power from unilateral basis then many of the other power holders will not get in the picture; a question also emerges as in who rule the rulers?[26] The political situation of the Maratha Confederacy raises the question on the power of the rulers to take a decision at their own discretion.

If we see the power according to Goldhamer and Shils as they pointed out "a person may be said to have power to the extent that he influences the behavior of the other in accordance with his own intention".[27] On this idea, we need to examine the cases in the Maratha Confederacy. Then the question emerges here is that how many power holder were operating in various parts of the Confederacy. Who were the most powerful Confederates viz. the Shindes, Holkars and Gaekwads or the Peshwa or the Chhatrapati? These questions are significant mainly because of the three reasons- first, to understand the turning point of the change of power structure of the Maratha confederacy; second, how the will of kinship of the three families of the Shindes, Holkars and Gaekwads influenced the behaviour of other Marathas and third, to understand the actual cause of the disintegration of the Maratha Confederacy. If we look at the political power of the various families of the Maratha Confederates during the last decade of the eighteenth century, it seems that a number of powerful members of the families of the Peshwa on the one hand and the many powerful members of the families of the Shindes, Holkars and Gaekwads on the other, were operating according to their will in different parts of the Maratha Confederacy.

After finding various power holders within the families of the Confederates, the primary question emerges as what was the basis of legitimate or illegitimate power, how can one define the legitimacy of these Confederates. What makes power legitimate? In common with many sociologists, Gerth and Mills define "authority as *'legitimate Power'* involving the voluntary obedience of the subject based on the

[25]Steven Lukes, *Power: A Radical View*, Palgrave, New York, 2005, he emphasizes on two-dimensional (decision making and non-decision making) and three-dimensional power (decision making, non-decision making, observable and latent conflict, subjective and real interest) and explains the process of conflict of interest and no conflict of interest. pp. 35-40.
[26]Dennis H. Wrong, *Power: its forms, Bases, and Uses*, Basil Blackwell, London, 1988, p. 11.
[27]Herbert Goldhamer and Edward A. Shils, 'Types of Power and Status', *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 45, September 1939, p. 171.

belief that obedience is his duty".[28] Legitimate authority is the power relation in which the power holder possesses an acknowledgment *right to command* and the power subject an acknowledged *obligation to obey.* However, the families of the Shindes, Holkars, and Gaekwads had the right to command their respective regions, and they were bounded by the obligation to obey the order of the Chhatrapati and the Peshwa till the third battle of Panipat. This obligation was not always visible in any of the kin of these Confederates after the third battle of Panipat.

Despite this fact, how the Maratha Confederacy became the longest surviving Confederacy in the world is a matter of debate, but other factors cannot substitute the significance of the obligation to obey in its long-surviving. The idea of Hobbes "a perpetual and restless desire of power after power that *ceaseth* only in death"[29] become true only in the last quarter of the eighteenth century in the history of the Maratha Confederacy, but the expansion of the Maratha territories and supremacy of the Confederacy during the eighteenth century shows that many of the local powers (North Indian powers including the later Mughals) ruled by few Maratha Confederates demonstrates the assumption that either the families of the Maratha Confederates possessed the exceptional strong power drive or that the Maratha authority had been accepted through the obligation of obey.

The exercise of power by one person over others, by one group (or family) over another, is a basic and recurrent feature of all societies. However, how far the exercise of power by families of these Confederates was legitimate, what makes it legitimate and why it matters: all these are inherently challenging and contentious questions which cannot be explained without an understanding of the political culture of the Maratha Confederacy which was suffering from moral disagreement or intense social and political conflicts.[30] An understanding of legitimacy from this perspective helps us to explain why the institution of power differs systematically from one type of society to another and power was exercised more coercively in some context than

[28] Dennis H. Wrong, *Power: its forms, Bases, and Uses*, p. 23.
[29] Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan*, Simon and Schuster, London, 2008, p. 80. John Rawls, *Lectures on the History of Political Philosophy*, Harvard University Press, Harvard, p. 59.
[30] G. S. Sardesai, 'Legitimate Maratha Pride in Past Achievement' in *Main Currents of Maratha History*, Government Press Mumbai, 1933, p. 28. G. S. Sardesai saw the Maratha pride and their legitimacy in defeating the Muslim power in India and highlights the Maratha power as the one who served the sole of India and enthused a new hope "are in my opinion, entitled to a legitimate pride in their past history".

other. Social scientists unlike the moral or political philosophers are concerned with legitimacy in particular historical society rather than universally; with legitimacy in a given social context rather than independent of any particular context. Scholars are well aware that what makes power legitimate in one society may differ from others, and the criteria for legitimacy may be rejected by another. Max Weber defines legitimacy as *believe in legitimacy* on the part of the relevant social agent.[31] Weber also pointed out that "power is legitimate where those involves it in the belief it to be so; legitimacy drive from people's believes in legitimacy."[32] The emergence of princely states of Baroda, Gwalior and Indore under the House of the Shindes, Holkars, and Gaekwads respectively shows that the people of the surrounding regions of these states might have believed in the legitimacy of the families of these Confederates, but it cannot be said for the whole territories which were under the control of these families. Because the power of these Confederates could only be fully legitimate when it fulfilled the justifiability of the rules in accordance with shared believe.

Power is not necessarily legitimate even it is legally valid, and that legality constitutes only one dimension of legitimacy; it is necessary but not a sufficient condition. Normative principle of legitimacy[33] as valid according to rules, the justifiability of the rules in terms of shared beliefs, and expressed consent on the part of those qualified to give it. In the case of kinship of the Maratha Confederates question also arises that justifiable to whom? What could be criteria for justifiability? (for non– justifiable or in the non-Maratha territories) what kind of belief was relevant?

These are the questions which none of the historians ever raises to understand the power and legitimacy of the Maratha Confederates. The Maratha historians are mainly interested in finding out the changing nature of power or shifting of power from the hand of the Chhatrapati to other Karbhari. V. S. Kadam, who traces the shifting of power from the hands of the Chhatrapati to Karbhari (manager), finds out that gradually the central authority lost its power as he pointed out "In the eighteenth century, the power, though theoretically in the hand of the Chhatrapati, came to

[31] David Beetham, *The Legitimation of Power*, Macmillan, London, 1991, p. 6.
[32] Ibid., p. 8.
[33] That any form of power should be acquired and exercised in accordance with the established rules, whether the power is driven from property, position or social function, is the first condition of its legitimacy.

exercise by the Peshwa. After the death of Madhavrao in 1772, the power came in the hand of the manager (karbharis) of the Peshwa and due course a Phadnis become the Peshwa of Peshwa."[34] However, the question of legitimacy and sources of the power of the Confederates still does not occur in the historical discourse of the Maratha Confederacy. How the families of the Shindes, Holkars and Gaekwads become more powerful in terms of military and finance in northern India, must be understood through the changing structure of power relation with the central authority of the Maratha Confederacy.

The idea of power of Robert A. Dahl is most suitable for understanding the power of these Confederates who located the power within the boundaries of living community and argued that "power as the ability to make somebody do something that otherwise he or she would not have done".[35] In fact, the definition of the power of State in the opinion of Weber, power as "monopoly of legitimate (or illegitimate) use of physical force in the enforcement of its order"[36] is right in the context of the power of the families of these Confederates. Here, historians have to be very careful while using the terms legitimate as its characteristics defined above. The most important feature of the study of kinship and power of the Maratha Confederacy on this framework is to understand the nature of the power in accordance with the changing character of the state as shown in the following table.

[34] V. S. Kadam, *Maratha Confederacy*, p.31.

[35] John Searle, *Making the Social World: The Structure of Human Civilization*, Oxford University Press, London, 2010, p. xvii. He pointed out that power does not mean in short, necessarily involve getting people to act against their desire and inclination but rather is the ability to get them do so. It is the exercise of power only when the agents get the subject to do something whether or not the subjects want to do it. But if the subject is doing what he wants to do anyway, then agent is not in such a case exercising power over the subject, even though he could.

[36] Richard Lachmann, *States and Power*, John Welly and Sons, London, 2013, p. 2.

Table-1: Nature of State [37]

		Number of Rulers		
		One	Few	Many
Rule for	Self interest	Tyranny	Oligarchy	Mobocracy (Not possible)
	Common interest	Monarchy	Aristocracy	Democracy (Not possible in the 18th century)

The Maratha Confederacy underwent a significant change after the return of Shahu in 1707. If we understand these change on the above-defined criteria, we need to understand the gradual process of changes mainly under Shahu and after his death with the changing frontier of power center of the Marathas from South to North. The Maratha power after 1708 describes erroneously as the Maratha Empire. As we discussed above, the effort of V. S. Kadam[38] to understand the transformation of the kingdom into Confederacy through the understanding of the changing nature of the Maratha administrative structure in the eighteenth century. However, if we apply the idea of Aristotle on the character of the state, while keeping the nature of kinship relation with the state at centre, then the Maratha state would reflect the presence of *Tyranny* (one-man rule for self-interest), *Oligarchy* (few ruled for self-interest), *Monarchy* (one man ruled for common interest) and the *Aristocracy* (few ruled for common interest) at the same time during the eighteenth century in different parts of the Maratha Confederacy and even within the families of the Shindes, Holkars and Gaekwads during the first decade of the nineteenth century. This multiple characters of the Confederacy make it more complicated to understand the legitimacy of the ruling kinship of the Confederates which would remain an open-ended question for the generations of historians.

[37]Jeffrey A. Winters, *Oligarchy*, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2011, p. 27.
[38] V. S. Kadam, *Maratha Confederacy: A Study in its origin and Development,* 1993.

II

The Families of the Shindes, Holkars and Gaekwads: Eighteenth Century Kinship and Politics

Structural principles that are found in kinship systems are –two persons who are kin related to in one way or the other: either one is descended from the other, or they are both descended from a common ancestor. Marathas' kinship is also based on the descent which followed a simple cognatic principle[39] and cognates are agnates if they are descendants by male links from the same male ancestor. The family histories of the Maratha Confederates are full of conflicts with cognates and agnates as well as the caste conflict of the cognates. This creates the situation to form groups with the help of external power within the family to make claims to be the next successor of the family.

The families of the Shindes, Holkars and Gaekwads had multiple reasons[40] for allying with the internal and external powers which had been a focus in their correspondences. While the formation of groups within the family for personal gain kept on the margin of existing historiography, that needs to understand the causes of the rise and fall of many powerful families who had been serving to the Marathas since the times of Shivaji. Why many of the family members sought to achieve dominance in succession dispute to establish a superior position viz-i-viz to their kinship, the answer cannot be found in a single explanation; we need to understand the origin of the cause of the most of the conflicts within the family. What were the role of multiple wives and the lack of any firm commitment to primogeniture among most of the Maratha families? How could it precipitate a contest among sons, where each allied with the mother male relatives and with the ambitious regional powers? Because of the assorted sexual relationship, some rulers and dynasties repeatedly lacked direct male heirs. In those cases, the struggles were among 'illegitimate' or adopted heirs and cadet branches of the Maratha families as in the case of the Shinde family after the death of Mahadji Shinde 1794, Holkar after death of Male Rao 1767,

[39] O.W. Wolters, *History, Culture, and Religion in Southeast Asian Perspective*, SEAP, London, 1999, p. 235. Mode of descent is calculated from an ancestor or ancestress through any combination of male or female or the system of bilateral kinship link.
[40] Barbara N. Ramusack, *The Indian Princes and Their States*, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2004, p. 49.

and even in the Peshwa family the struggle was between Baji Rao –II and his illegitimate brother after 1795. In a similar situation in the Rajput state, the Shindes, Holkars and Gaekwads found an opportunity to become allies on one side or other in succession disputes.[41] However, the post-decades of Panipat create the similar situation in the families of the Shindes, Holkars and Gaekwads, and the question of a successor was a major issue which provided the same opportunities for different powers to interfere with the Maratha Confederacy directly. The only exceptional case occurred in the Holkar family was when no male member was alive, and women (Ahilya Bai) became the successor in 1767.[42] However, the eighteenth century also reflects the growing consciousness among the women of many families in the Maratha polity and their role would highlight a new dimension in the study of the Maratha diplomacy; for which some examples from the families of the Shindes, Holkars and Gaekwads are taken to show how Ahilya Bai, three wives of Mahadji Shinde and the mother of Anand Rao Gaekwad Gahanabai, and other women as Takhtabi played an essential role in kinship politics particularly during the last decade of the eighteenth century.

The study of kinship shows that the family disputes is not a new phenomenon. It was prevailing since the ancient times, but the conflicts of the Maratha kin deserve a greater space in history. The family dispute after the death of Shivaji in 1680, had been well recorded in history, when one of the factions supported Sambhaji and the other, a much younger son, Rajaram, an eight-year-old, who was promptly opposed by many powerful Maratha families and Sambhaji.[43] What was remarkable during these periods was that many of the new families emerged as powerful in the Maratha administration, and many of the old ones lost their power because of this family fractionalization.

However, under Shahu, the composition of the new elites also contains some of the earlier families but most of the families who served under Shivaji declined after the coming of the Peshwa in power. Three older families remained powerful; one was the

[41] S. C. Mishra, *Sindhia-Holkar Rivalry in Rajasthan,* Sandeep Parkashan, Delhi, 1981, pp. 1-10.
[42] John Malcolm, *A Memoir of Central India and Adjoining Provinces*, Vol. I, Kingbury, London, 1854, pp.144-159; Raghubir Sinh (ed.), *Waqqi-i-Holkar,* J. N. Sarkar (Eng. Trans.), Publication Scheme Jaipur, 1998, pp. 28-29.
[43] Kamal Gokhale, *Chhatrapati Sambhaji*, Poona, 1978, p. 39. It took months for Sambhaji to crush the opposing faction, and it was more than eight months before 1680.

Nimblakar family, whose position of power went back to the century. This family served under Bijapur in the sixteenth century and Shivaji in the seventeenth century; Haibat Rao Nimblakar was still a powerful figure at the court of Shahu. Another family which emerged from the period of Shivaji was the Deshasta Brahmin family of Bhor which took their name from the post of sachiv under Shivaji. The third family who survived in the inner circle of Shahu was the Hingnikar Bhosles. The rest of the elites of Shahu were the leaders of successful, mostly independent bands. The focus would be on these new and independent families who were operating in a different direction in upper India during the reign of the Peshwa.

First, was the Dabhade family, who served under Shivaji had been appointed as the village headmen of the village of Talegao. It was the only Maratha family who first established their power in Gujarat. We find that Khanderao Dabhade was campaigning in Gujarat as early as 1701. He closed the Mughal road from Surat and engaged with the Mughals near Ahmadnagar and was raised to the post of Senapati.[44] At the same time, many other independent families were campaigning in the different parts of Maratha Confederacy, some under the direction of Shahu and other followed Tarabai. Similarly, after the end of the civil war between Tarabai and Shahu, a new group of aristocracy emerged, some of the earlier families replaced from central administration, and new Sardars were appointed by Shahu.

The idea of bringing the different families under the umbrella of the command of Shahu was a long process which had been done mainly through granting the titles and positions to prominent families to convert them into the part of the administration of the Confederacy. The process of legitimizing the different power in the polity of Shahu is integral to understand the kinship relation with the center. The turning of titular legitimacy into real power first through the process of bringing men personally loyal to the inner circle of the administration of Shahu and then rewarding those Sarnjam grants for the maintenance of troops was the core basis of political hierarchy. Nicholas Dirks argued that the royal gift-giving –paradigmatically of honours, titles and tax-free lands known as *inam*- was an essential royal activity whose performance

[44] C. A. Kincaid, *'Bakhar of Dabhades'* in *The Tale of Tulsi Plant and other Studies,* B. D. Taraporavela Sons & Co. Bombay, 1916, pp. 40-45.

constituted Hindu Kingship.[45] Families of the Shindes, Holkars, and Gaekwads were also made a legitimate part of the Maratha Confederacy through grants, but can we say that the alienation of land from the king to military clients was a manifestation of the weakness of the Chhatrapati? If we see it as a strength because the region from Attock to Cuttack (1990 km) could not be controlled without these families, then what would be the limitation of the grants of power that these families could remain less powerful than the central authority of the Maratha Confederacy? Consider, for instance, the admonitions of the early eighteenth century *Anjannapatra* or Royal Edicts,[46] composed for the Maratha King Shambhaji of Kolhapur (1712-1760) by one of his ministers which explain the necessity of the king to rise and maintain a large military, to collect the *Chauth*, clearly pointed out that:

> *"They are not inclined to live on whatever watan they possess or to always act loyally to the king. All the time they want to acquire new possession bit by bit, and to become strong, and after becoming strong, their ambition is to seize forcibly from some, and to create enmities and depredations against others*".[47]

This warning of the Minister in *Ajnapatra* was the most valuable advice which the Chhatrapati or even the Peshwa did not follow. How these circumstances led to the more power in the hands of different families or kinship of the Confederates, due to which the central authority became unable to control the personal motives of the Shindes, Holkars and Gaekwads, is essential to understand the role of the individual families in the Maratha Confederacy.

However, after recognizing the post of the Peshwa hereditary, within a decade, few original families who had served under Shivaji were able to compete with new emerging families in the Maratha Confederacy. There was active warfare against the old sardars who did not submit personal loyalties to Shahu; we might think that old powerful families quietly retired to the land, bided their time, and gave the easy opportunity for the Shindes, Holkars and Gaekwads in northern India but this was not

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[45] Nicoholas Dirks, *The Hollow Crown: Ethnohistory of an Indian Kingdom,* Cambridge University Press, London, 1987, p. 129.
[46] Ramchandrapat Amatiya, 'The Ajnapatra of Royal Edicts Relating to the Principle of Maratha State Policy' (Eng. trans.), S. V. Puntambekar, *Journal of Indian History,* Vol. 8, 1929, pp. 83-105.
[47] Norbert Peabody, *Hindu Kingship and Polity in Precolonial India,* Cambridge University Press, New Delhi, 2006, p. 8.

merely the case. Because the Peshwa purposefully gave free handed rights to the Shindes, and Holkars to gain their territories, for which even they had to kill the other Marathas such as Dhabadhe, and others. The Shindes, Holkars and Gaekwads did not think about the legitimate or illegitimate action even in their own families in order to acquire the power in their own hands. Thus, the question of the legitimacy of the Maratha Confederates is a most controversial issue amongst the native historians of the Marathas because it is not straightforward to define what is legitimate in the non-Maratha territories.

Although the Peshwas are considered as the power center of the Maratha Confederacy, their own family fractionalization was the most significant event in the history of the eighteenth century. The severe situation occurred after the death of Peshwa Madhavrao-I on November 18, 1772.[48] The death of Madhavrao –I signaled the emergence of the forces of the decline and developed the centrifugal tendencies among the Maratha sardars. The varying fortune of the Maratha state, its changed character and outlook and its involvement with the rising British power shaped its vitality and strength for the next thirty years. During the last quarter of the eighteenth century, how this political situation of the Peshwa family gave free scope to the ambitious Maratha sardars the Shindes, Holkars and Gaekwads and their kin to disregard the orders of the Poona government for self-indulgence and satisfy personal vanity? Why was the Peshwa unable to resolve his own family conflict which began in 1772, when Narayan Rao became the Peshwa and murdered after barely nine months of his succession? These questions need further explanation to understand the role of kinship conflict in losing the power of the central authority of the Confederacy.

The next Peshwa Raghunathrao had to take flight from Poona within three months after his succession to the vacant post of the Peshwaship. After that, there was long regency that partially ended only when Bajirao-II suppressed Nana Phadnavis and occupied his ancestral seat that too at the cost of losing the supremacy of the post of the Peshwa in the hands of Daulat Rao and the British mainly due to the increasing power of Yashwant Rao Holkar and the lack of cooperation with the brother of the Peshwa, Amrit Rao. The Peshwa could attain the supremacy in the internal affairs

[48] V.V. Khare (ed.), *Aitihasik Lekh Sangrah*, Vol. IV, 1770-1774, Kolhapur, 1901, p. 1895.

only when the family conflicts would be kept away, which could not happen. Historians[49] consider, that within a decade after the death of Narayanrao the power centre of the Maratha polity shifted from Poona to Northern India. This change was clearly visible after the treaty of Salbai in 1782.[50] However, for understanding the shifting of power centre from south to north we need to dig up new facts from various sources about kinship conflicts within the families of the confederates and its role in the fractionalization of the families of the Peshwa.

Here, one crucial question arises is, if the Confederates of the Marathas in northern India particularly the Shindes, Holkars, and Gaekwads had become stronger than central authority at Poona, then why they did not start any open revolt against the Poona authority or join the Mughals in the eighteenth century. The open rebellion against the Poona authority cannot be seen mainly before the last decade of the eighteenth century. However, they did not neglect any order of the Peshwa till the reign of Madhav Rao-I. In fact, when Mahadji was being appointed as the *Wakil-i-Mutaliq* of the Mughals he did not hesitate to take permission from the Chatrapati. However, Nana Phadnavis blamed Shinde for siding with the Mughals.[51] Despite being a regent of Delhi, Shinde (Mahadji Shinde), was the only Maratha power who played the most significant role in the re-establishment of the Maratha supremacy in the post-Panipat era in northern India. Holkar and Geakwad too had many opportunities to go with the Mughals while later they gained a relation with the British after the eighteenth century. The Peshwa threatened the Dabhare families because of the competitive gains in Gujarat, Dabhade had ample opportunities to be with the Mughals, but Trimbakrao Dabhade died in a battle of Dhabaoi on 1 April 1731 while fighting against Bajirao. Later Shahu defined the boundary of Gujarat and Malwa. Yashwant Rao Dabhade became new Senapati. However, the Dabhade family lost its influences in the Maratha polity.[52] The wife of Khanderao Dabhade, Umabai Dabhade too played a significant role in the Maratha expansion in Gujarat until her death in 1753. The Peshwa went against the decision of the Chhatrapati, to resolve the

[49] Poonam Sagar, *Maratha Policy towards Northern India,* Meenakshi Publication, Meerut, 1993, p. 168.
[50] M. R. Kantak, *First Anglo-Maratha War 1774-1783: A Military Study of Major Battles,* Popular Parkashan, Bombay, 1993, pp. 205-207.
[51] Y. N. Deodhar, *Nana Phadnis and the External Affairs of the Maratha Empire,* Popular Book Depot, Bombay, 1962, p. 128.
[52] M. S. Commissariat, *A History of Gujarat,* Vol. II, Orient Longmans, New Delhi, 1957, p. 439.

right of the Dabhade family in Gujarat and invoked Shinde, Holkar to go against Dabhade. Thus, it is essential to understand the role of the Peshwas in creating the fractionalization among the other Confederates of the Marathas as well as among the family members of the different Confederates. This research mainly examines all these questions only with the case studies of the kinship and families of the three confederates who were the major power holders in Upper India namely the Shindes, Holkars and Gaekwads. It highlights a detailed study of kinship conflict within the families of the Gaekwads in order to understand the role of kin conflict and the British interventions in the Maratha Confederacy in upper India.

Family Background of three Confederates: Shinde, Holkar and Gaekwad

A leader, Damaji Gaekwad was serving under the Senapati, Khanderao Dhabade (Khanderao entered in Gujarat in 1707, serving as Senapati from 1717 and died in 1729), distinguished himself so greatly in ensuring conflicts that he was honored with the title of "Shamsher Bahadur" meaning the "illustrious swordsman" and this name has from the date 1720 been borne by the Gaekwads.[53] Damaji Gaekwad-I died in 1721 and was successes by his nephew, Pillaji Gaekwad, who is regarded as the founder of the present family at Baroda. Pillaji was entrusted by *Senapati* with a collection of tribute in Gujarat a right which has been confirmed to him by King of Satara. Pilaji succeeds by Damaji Gaekwad-II (1732-1768). The death of Damaji Gaekwad-II in 1768 leads to the fractionalization amongst the family member of Gaekwad. Damaji had three lawful wife and male issue by each. His first wife had one son, Govindarao. However, Damaji eldest son Sayajirao, as well as Fatehsing were born of his second wife; and disputes aroused between Govindrao and Sayajirao respecting the successions. The Peshwa at one time took the part of one, and then for the other; large sum were paid by the both parties to the Poona government; but Fatesing who was an able and energetic men, managed the affairs of his brother so well that he finally obtained the sanctioned of the Poona government; and having the advantage of the possession of the Government, he succeeded in maintaining Sayajirao on the throne, while he himself acted as regent for his brother who was of feeble character. Later Fatehsing desires to strengthen his position as well against the Peshwa as against Govindaro and made some overtures to the Bombay government

[53] Arnold Wright (ed.), *Indian States: A Bibliographical, Historical and Administrative Survey*, Asian Educational Services, New Delhi, 2006, p. 9.

(English) with that view in 1772, which were not accepted at that time.[54] V. S. Kadam pointed that the Peshwa played the "policy of divide and rule with Gaekwad"[55] and the Gaekwads were doing the same with the family of the Peshwa.

The similar situation occurred when Govindrao Gaekwad died on 19th September 1800. His successor was Anandrao, whose claim to the title of Senakhaskhel was not disputed by any of his brothers, legitimate or illegitimate. Nevertheless, the opening year of the reign of Anandrao witnesses a fierce faction-fight, not only for the gadi but also for the Ministerial post and the administrative control of the Gaekwad territory.[56]

The causes of friction amongst the family members of the Shindes were very similar to the Gaekwads, but how Shinde became stronger than the Gakewads and Holkars is a debatable issue. What needs to be understood in a more explicit term is the process that how a simple 'Patil' of a village near fifty miles from Satara was established as a powerful family in the Malwa in the eighteenth century. Ranoji Shinde joined the services of the Peshwa during the regime of Balaji Vishwanath. He accompanied Bajirao in the Malwa campaign in 1736. The Peshwa was pleased with the fortitude of Ranoji during his action and instructed to appoint Ranoji as Saranjamdar of the Malwa, and Ramchandrababa as the Diwan. Half of the provinces of the Malwa was ruled by the Marathas when Ranoji died in 1745.[57] The death of Ranoji came with the political crisis within the families as happened after the death of Damaji Gaekwad. Ranoji Shinde had two wives, Nimbabai and Chimabai. Nimbabai had three sons, named Jayajaji, Jytiba and Dattaji. Chimabai had two sons named Tukoji and Mahadji. Chimabai was a Rajput lady, while Ranoji was Maratha. Naturally, the Rajput and Maratha blood raced in the veins of Mahadji. All the five sons of Ranoji were like their industrious father and played a vital role in the Maratha Confederacy. However, in the case of Shinde, out of five sons of Ranoji, only Mahadji survived

[54] J. H. Gense and Banaji (ed.), *The Gaikwads of Baroda: English Documents,* Vol. I, B. D. Taraporevala Sons. Bombay, 1936, p. xii.
[55] V. S. Kadam, *Maratha Confederacy: A Study of Origin and Development,* Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers, New Delhi, 1993, p. 101.
[56] J. H. Gense and Banaji (ed.), *The Gaikwards of Baroda* , Vol. IV Anandrao 1800-1802, p. vi.
[57] M. W. Burway, *Life of Ranoji Rao Sindhia*, Holkar Press, Indore, 1917, p.31. He died at Sujalpur.

even after the third battle of Panipat in 1761.[58] Although it is a long story to know how Mahadji survived in the third battle of Panipat. But most interestingly one should understand the silent contrast of the family of the Shinde on the question of the succession of Mahadji. Because after the death of Jankoji Shinde (15 January 1761) the question of the inheritance of the family remained undecided up to 1762. That time the reign of the administration was in the hands of Raghunathrao. He asked for a fabulous sum as a gift from Mahadji for being recognized as the heir of the Shinde family. Historians like Grant Duff and G. H. Kini state that the orthodox section among the administrators of Pune refused to accept Mahadji as the heir being the child of lady attendants.[59]

Even wife of Jayappa Shinde, Sakhubai had a doubt whether Mahadji was the son of lady attendants or not.[60] Mahadji Shinde could not pay the enormous amount of the gift, and he was also not supporting the dream of the Peshwaship of Raghoba. So, Raghunathrao worked against Madhavrao Peshwa and gave recognition to Kedarji Shinde on November 25th, 1763 as the heirs of the Shinde family. However, Kedarji informed Raghunathrao that Mahadji would be the Sardar of the Peshwa. When Raghoba did not succeed in creating more conflicts among the Shinde family, he made Manaji the Sardar (heir) of the Shinde family on July 10th, 1764. Mahadji very soon impressed Peshwa Madhavrao and was confirmed as heirs of Ranoji on 18th January 1768.[61] While Malhar Rao Holkar, Nana Fadnavis, and others heartily supported this move of the Peshwa, Raghunath Rao was distraught with this decision and started creating troubles in his own family.

The condition of the Holkar family was entirely different from the Shindes, and the Gaekwads. The Holkar dynasty was founded by Malhar Rao Holkar, son of Khandoji who followed pastoral activities while residing in the village of Hol, situated on the banks of river Nera rear Phalthan, in the state of Nimbalkar. His father died in 1696;

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[58] N. G. Rathod, *The Great Maratha Mahadji Scindhia*, Sarup and Sons, New Delhi, 1994, p. 3. Jayappa Sindhe became a victim of treachery practiced by the enemy in the battle of Nagore fought on July 25, 1755 at Tavsar in Rajasthan. Joytiba lost his life in the siege of Kumbheri near Dig. Dataji lost his life in fighting with against Najibkhan on 10 January 1760. Tukoji lost his life in the Battle of Panipat, while Jankoji fell a pray the next day to the cruelty of Najib. (He was alive in the tent of Barkhubdar Khan who wanted to sell him alive.)

[59] Ibid., p. 4.

[60] S. P. D., Vol. 29, No. 53, p. 48, a letter of Sakkubai Sindhia to Raghunathrao, dated 15-03-1764.

[61] S. P. D., Vol. 19, No. 74, p. 81.

then his mother went to reside with her brother in Khandesh. Young Malhar Rao Holkar manifested great skill and bravery, rewarded by the Peshwa with the grant of 12 districts in the Malwa in 1728, and within next three years, this figure was increased in 1731 to 28. Malhar Rao died in April 1766 after actively taken part in more than forty battles.[62] Malhar Rao had only one son, named Khanderao, who had been killed, but Khande Rao left a son named Male Rao, who succeeded the gadi on the death of his grandfather, but he also died after nine months.

Now in this situation, no male member of the Holkar family was alive, so the question of the next successor was the main issue among all the Maratha administrators. Under this circumstances, Gangadhar Jaswant, a Brahmin minister of Malhar Rao strongly recommended that a child should be adopted to succeed Male Rao, a plan which would have secured the continuation of his authority as Minister. Although Ahilya Bai was known as a good administrator and an expert in political diplomacy, yet she was opposed by Raghunath Rao and many other Marathas because of her sex (Female). Raghunath Rao went with 50,000 troops to oppose her when he received a clear reply of war from Ahilyabai. Raghoba too had to accept her decision. Finally, she elected Tukoji as the commander of her army and fulfilled those duties which a female could not perform. However, this divided authority was established in the Holkar state since the days of Tukoji. Various authors remarkably recorded the role of Ahilyabai in social and cultural activities; she died in 1795 at the age of 70 years.[63] Thus, the period of 1767 to 1795 was the most crucial phase of the Maratha diplomacy in northern India, in which she played a significant role in strengthening the Maratha Confederacy.[64] However, it was not only Ahilyabai Holkar but many women such as Umabai Dabhade, a wife of Malhar Rao Holkar, a wife of Ranoji Shinde, the mother of Madhvrao, Anandi Bai, and many others played a significant role in shaping the direction of the Maratha diplomacy in the eighteenth century. Therefore, the role of women in the Maratha polity also evaluates critically to understand the different political as well as social obscurantism from time to time which was faced by the families of the Shindes, Holkars, and Gaekwads.

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[62] Arnold Wright (ed.), *Indian States: A Biographical, Historical and Administrative Survey,* p. 72.
[63] Mukund Wamanrao Burway, *Devi Ahilyabai Holkar,* Holkar Printing Press, Indore, 1922.
[64] John Malcolm, 'Family of Holkar' in *A Memoirs of Central India: Malwa and Adjoining Province,* Vol. I, Leadenhall Street, London, 1824, pp. 164-170.

The period of the seventh decades of the eighteenth century was most remarkable for the entire transformation of the politico-administrative set up of the families of the Shindes, Holkars, and Gaekwads which had changed the direction of the history of the Maratha Confederacy. Within a decade, many of the prominent leaders of these families died; first, Dattaji Shinde in 1760, followed by Malhar Rao Holkar in 1766, Damaji Gaekwad in 1768, then the two Peshwas, Madhav Rao and Narayan Rao in the year of 1772, 1773 respectively. It created the open conflict amongst the these families to become the next successor. In this situation, is it possible to say that this decade was a turning point in the history of the Maratha Confederacy regarding losing the power of central authority of Poona? A similar case also occurred during the last decade of the eighteenth century when many of the prominent leaders such as Mahadji Shinde, Ahilyabai, Madhar Rao Narayan, Nana Pharnavis died. But this time the power of these Confederates was already proved as more potent than the Poona authority, and the Shindes and Holkars appeared as dominating power in Poona. And most of the consequences of the event were happening because of the kinship conflict in all these Confederates and in the Peshwa Household. Since it was also the time when the Shindes and Gaekwads began to invite the English to directly involve in the Maratha diplomacy that ultimately led to the decline of the power of the Peshwa and provided a golden opportunity to the British to expand their power in the Maratha territories. Therefore, it is necessary to understand the role of kinship of the Confederates to understand the process of the decline of the Confederacy. The explanation of the role of kinship conflicts in the decline of the Maratha Confederacy would contrast the prevailing views which says "due to the serious defects of the Maratha Society of the nineteenth century Maratha lost its supremacy".[65] This views neglected the kinship behaviour and their defects on the basis of the continued growing mutual jealousies and conflicts to fulfill the personal motives and selfish aims of the families of the Shindes, Holkars and Gaekwads.

Historiography

A review of the study of kinship demonstrates the sophisticated holistic approaches to socio-economic aspect and ideology of kinship that are not based on the method of historical research. Most of the works on kinship are based on sociological approach

[65] Rajaram Vyankatesh Nadkarni, *The Rise and Fall of Maratha Empire,* Popular Prakashan, Bombay, 1966, p. 322.

rather than historical perspective. However, during the last few decades, western scholars bring many interesting works on Family and Kinship in Europe and USA, which attracted the attention of many historians and anthropologists of the world to understand the history through the politics of kinship and family. Tamara K. Hareven's *Transitions: The Family and the Life Course in Historical Perspective*[66], published in 1978, is the first major work on family history at the individual point of time in a way to understand the history and polity by family transition. The major concern of the book is the synchronization of individual time, family time and historical time. In 2001 Tamara K. Hareven along with Richard Wall, Josef Ehmer and Markus Cerman published *Family History Revisited*[67] which covers a broad range of the issues of kinship and family, highlighting the impact of family history on social history, desire, and experiences of family relation, covering a wider geographical region from Western Europe, North America, and Japan to Southern Europe, China, without touching the Indian family.

David M. Schneider, *A Critique of Kinship*[68] is an important study on the kinship. This book raises questions on the categories of kinship through the study of religion, politics and economy as the product of society. Naomi Tadmor in, *Family and Friends in Eighteenth Century England: Household, Kinship and Patronage* [69] produces a path-breaking and rich analysis of the history of the family and the role of a friend in administration during the eighteenth century in England. David Sneath, *The Headless State: Aristocratic Orders, Kinship Society and Misrepresentation of Nomadic Inner Asia,* [70] declares that the clan and lineages did not exist in the society but were imposed upon them by historians and anthropologists blinded by colonial and evolutionary biases. In his view, such a society was organized around aristocratic elites who dominated ordinary nomads to create "headless state" which served their own class interest. The centre of attention of Sneath is Magnolia.

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[66] Tamara K. Hareven, *Transitions: The Family and the Life Course in Historical Perspective,* Academic Press, New York, 1978.
[67] Tamara K. Hareven, Richard Wall, Josef Ehmer and Markus Cerman (ed.), *Family History Revisited,* Delaware, London, 2001.
[68] David M. Schneider, *A Critique of Kinship*, University of Michigan Press, London, 1984.
[69]Naomi Tadmor, *Family and Friends in Eighteenth Century England: Household, Kinship and Patronage,* Cambridge University Press, New York, 2001.
[70] David Sneath, *The Headless State: Aristocratic Orders, Kinship Society and Misrepresentation of Nomadic Inner Asia*, Columbia University Press, New York, 2007.

Moreover, contemporary to his assertion that anthropologist remains wedded to the genealogical conical clan model. The more common view is that such Inner Asian, Confederation was the product of restructuring enforced by division from the top down rather than the alliance from the bottom up. It has been accepted that the actual kinship relation was evident mostly within smaller units.[71] The headless state devotes itself primarily to demolition, tearing down existing notion of how nomadic pastoral societies were organized and worked. John A. Barnes, *Three Styles in the Study of Kinship*[72] is a detailed analysis of the three approaches to the study of kinship that is considered as central historical importance in cultural anthropology and the development of the study of multiple aspects of kinship. Peter Laslett and Richard Wall's *Household and Family in the Past: Comparative Study in the Size and Structure of the Domestic group over the last three Centuries in England, France, Serbia, Japan and Colonial North America with further material from Western Europe*[73] is the result of a conference held in 1969 by Cambridge Group of History of Population and Social Structure. This book gives a valuable discussion of the methodological and conceptual issues concerned with politico-economic and cultural importance of the families in the past.

Nicholas Dirks's *The Hollow Crown: Ethnohistory of an Indian Kingdom*[74] is the only available book that reveals the vast terrains of scholarship that opens out from the intersection of history, anthropology, and critical theory on the Indian History. It combines the ethnographic fieldwork and archival research in this ethnohistory of 'Pudukkottai' state, in southern Tamil Nadu from its medieval origins to colonial decomposition. His ethnohistory successfully adjudicated two different uses of Aden South Hall's concept of "segmentary State" for pre-colonial India. His material shows that the little kingdom was not only a segmentary state because it was highly decentralized but also because it rested on segmental kin and caste order. However,

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[71] Thomas Barfield, 'Review of the Headless State', *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, vol. 51, No. 4 (October 2009), p. 943.
[72] John A. Barnes, *Three Styles in the Study of Kinship*, University of California, Berkeley, 1971.
[73] Peter Laslett and Richard Wall (ed.), *Household and Family in the Past: Comparative Study in the Size and Structure of the Domestic group over the last three Centuries in England, France, Sarbia, Japan and Colonial North America with further material from Western Europe*, Cambridge University Press, London, 1972.
[74] Nicholas Dirks, *The Hollow Crown: Ethnohistory of an Indian Kingdom*, Cambridge University Press, New York, 1987.

just before Dirks, one attempt had been made by Richard G. Fox to understand the history on the anthropological line in his work *Kin, Clan, Raja and Rule: State Hinterland Relation in Pre-Industrial India*.[75] He did a case study on Uttar Pradesh to understand the model of the development cycle of the Rajput lineage. Each of the cycle is approached by the change of balance in a variable. The main variables are the availability of land, the population, military strength and the power of the state.

Stewart Gordon[76] accomplishes some worthwhile and positive contributions to our understanding of the history of the Marathas and considers the Maratha history as much as military history as it is social history. The British knew that the Maratha history would be military history when they sealed the *Pune Daftar*. Despite this notion amongst the western scholars, the work of Gordon reflects a sense of socio-economic and political understanding of the Maratha history, but he mainly focuses on the families who served under Shivaji and participated in the civil war between Shahu and Tarabai. He did not touch upon a single family who became active and powerful in the eighteenth century.

Raghubir Sinh[77] uses the Marathi, Persian and Rajasthani sources to understand the history of Malwa and constructs the history of the rise of the Shinde and Holkar power as strong institutionalized forces over the anarchical conduction of the Mughal government in the Malwa. Without touching the nature of regional politics and the personal interest of local power, he explains the politics of the later Mughals and the Marathas. The work of Raghubir Sinh seems to be inspired by John Malcolm's *Memoirs of Central India,* which deals with the Malwa and the adjoining regions, and highlights the socio-economic aspects of the region which were under the commands of the Shindes, Holkars and Gaekwads but Malcolm wrote his account on the basis of his investigation of this region as a British administrator.[78] Satish Chandra in his essay, *The Eighteenth century in India: Its Economy and the Role of the Marathas, the*

[75] Richard G. Fox, *Kin, Clan, Raja and Rule: State Hinterland Relation in Pre-Industrial India*, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1971.
[76] Stewart Gordon, *The Marathas 1600-1818, Cambridge University Press,* London, 1993.
[77] Raghubir Sinh, *Malwa in Transition or A Century of Anarchy, 1698-1765*, B. D. Taraporevala, Bombay, 1936.
[78] John Malcolm, *A Memoir of Central India and Adjoining Provinces*, Vol. I, Kingbury, London, 1854, pp. 225-251.

Jats, the Sikhs and the Afghans still remarks, "the internal character of the states of the Sindhia and Holkar needs to be assessed".[79]

V. S. Kadam in *Maratha Confederacy*[80] looks at the origin and development of the Confederacy and explains the transformation of power from the hands of the Chhatrapati to Karbhari, neglecting the power of the Shinde, Holkar and Gaekwad in northern India. However, he explains their financial strength during the eighteenth century. B. R. Andhre[81], N. G. Rathod [82], G. R. Parihar [83], R. K. Saxena[84], Stewart Gordon [85], works mainly focusing on the Maratha campaign and explaining the relation of the Marathas with the Jats, Rajputs, and Bundelas as well as the political motives of the different treaty with the Mughals during the eighteenth century. S. V. Kothekar, *The Gaikwad of Baroda and the East India Company 1770-1820* mainly focuses on the family politics and the British intervention in the Gaekwad territory. Kothekar also highlights the major conflicts among the kin of Gaekwad and the role of the British Resident in the kinship polity, but he explains it to understand the British expansionist policy in Gujarat.

The above literature shows various aspects of the history of family, kinship and power, reflecting the very less study on the eighteenth-century kinship polity. None of the scholars studies the kinship of the Maratha Confederates, which played a significant role in social and political history as well as in the formation of princely states in the 19th century in India. The roles of local elites and the intervention of women in political affairs have been kept on margin in the historiography of the eighteenth century. The present work deals with these issues in five chapters. Each chapter, covers a particular aspects of kinship, power, and legitimacy of the Marathas in northern India during the eighteenth century, that emerges from the analysis of the primary and secondary sources, comprising many documents in Marathi, Hindi,

[79] Satish Chandra, *The Eighteenth Century in India: Its Economy and the Role of Marathas, the Jats, the Sikhs and the Afghans*, K. P. Bagchi & Co., Calcutta, 1991, pp. 28-29.
[80] V. S. Kadam, *Maratha Confederacy*, 1993.
[81] B. R. Andhre, *Bundelkhand Under the Marathas, 1720-1818 A.D: A Study of Maratha Bundelas Relations*, Vishwa Bharti Prakashan, Bundelkhand, 1984.
[82] N. G. Rathod, *The Great Maratha Mahadji Scindia*, Sarup and Son, New Delhi, 1994.
[83] G. R. Parihar, *Marwar and the Marathas: 1724-1843 A.D.*, Hindi Sahitya Mandir, Jodhpur, 1968.
[84] R. K. Saxena, *Maratha Relation with Major states of Rajputana*, 1761-1818A.D, S. Chand, New Delhi, 1973.
[85] Stewart Gordon, *Marathas, Marauders, and State Formation in Eighteenth Century India*, OUP, London, 1994.

Persian, English and other vernacular languages from different archives, which throw light on various dimensions of the eighteenth century Maratha history.

Primary Sources

Most of the primary sources used for the study of the kinship, power, and legitimacy of the Marathas in the upper India are in Marathi, Rajasthani, Hindi, Persian and English correspondences by the Maratha rulers and their administrators, courts of the local rulers' as well as the different authority of the European Company. The regular reports and local affairs of the local powers produce huge sources containing the reports of the Marathas and the Mughals, the reports of the Maratha *Vakils,* the Persian *Akhbarat*, and the correspondences' of the English Residents available in several volumes in different archives of Maharashtra, Rajasthan, and Madhya Pradesh. However, the most important original correspondences of the Maratha history are in Modi script; from these documents some of the *rumal* of Hindustan have been translated and edited in Marathi by Kashinath Narayan Sane, Vasudeo Vaman Khare, Vishwanath Kashinath Rajwade, B. D. Parasnis, G. S. Sardesai and many others, who spend their whole life in arranging different sources of the Maratha history.

John Malcolm's, *Memoirs of Central India,*[86] the first volume contains the chapter on the families of the Shindes and Holkars. Malcolm explains the background of these families since the seventeenth century and gives the account on earlier families of the Malwa. Malcolm arrived in India in 1783 and played a leading role in the British India till 1833. Historians believe that Malcolm truly understood the region, locality and family politics of the Shindes, Holkars and Gaekwads because the "secret of Malcolm success was that he was neither too native nor too European. He understood the native character, and he could sympathise the feeling of the native, but he never fell in the native habit".[87] The depth of the insight of Malcolm into the history of Marathas in the Malwa was unprecedented. The memoirs set out an original and general analysis of the Maratha power in Central India that explains both the process

[86] John Malcolm, *Memoirs of Central India including Malwa and Adjoining Provinces,* Vol. I, Parbury Allen & Co. London, 1832.
[87] John William Kaye, *Life and Correspondence of Sir John Malcolm,* Vol. II, Smith Elder and Co, London, 1910, p. 336.

of expansion and the decline of the Maratha power. By looking at the Malwa, he paid less attention to Poona and the Brahmin courtly intrigues which was done by Grant Duff.[88] Modern historians relied heavily on memoirs as sources of statistical and anecdotal information about territories which were under the control of the Shindes, Holkars and Gaekwads.

G. S. Sardesai, in *Historical Genealogy*, [89] gives the detail genealogies of 370 families of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries who were operating in different parts of the Maratha Confederacy. During his work on Selection from the Peshwa Daftar and Poona Residency Correspondence, he collected a considerable body of information about different families who influenced and shaped the history of India from the seventeenth century onwards. However, some of the genealogical references had been challenged in *V. K. Rajwade Samarg Sahitya*.[90] Robert Lethbridge in *The Golden Book of India: A Genealogical and Biographical Dictionary of the Ruling Princes* [91] listed one hundred ninety-six different titles known to the government of India, complied in the Indian Foreign Office. Much of the information have been derived from the princes whose names are included. Lethbridge also traces the origin of the different administrative titles and compare with the Hindu and Muslim similarities to find out the changes in the titles in the nineteenth century in India. However, this account is not clear on the dynastic titles of the Shindes, Holkars and Gaekwads and their caste issue in the nineteenth century.[92] In many cases, Lethbridge was also not clear on caste titles and administrative titles in Central India. This can be found when we refer to *Further Papers Respecting Gwalior Presented to both House of Parliament*[93] in April 1844. Different meanings of the titles appear in the Gwalior documents.

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[88] Grant Duff, *History of Mahrattas,* 3 Vols, Longman London, 1826.
[89] P. M. Joshi (ed.), *State Board for Historical Record and Ancient monuments No.1: Historical Genealogy*, Government Press, Mumbai, 1957.
[90] M. B. Shaha and A. R. Kulkarni (ed.), *Itihacharya V. K. Rajwade Samarg Sahitya*, Vol. 11, Rajwade Sansodhan, Dhule, 1998, pp. 348-349.
[91] Roper Lethbridge, *The Golden Book of India: A Genealogical and Biographical Dictionary of the Ruling Princes, Chief, Nobles, and other Personages, titled or Decorated of Indian Empire*, Macmillan and Co., New York, 1893.
[92] Ibid., p. xii.
[93] *Further Papers Respecting Gwalior Presented to both Houses of Parliament, by Command of Her Majesty,* April, 1844.

Vishnushastri Chiplunkar (1850-82) reviewing the effort of *Kavyetihas Samgraha,* a periodical devoted to literature and history, divided the Maratha history into three periods which is covered in three volumes. The first period is described as 'Shivaji and His times', the second volume covers the period of 1680 –1748, after the death of Shahu, the range of the Maratha history widens because the Marathas occupied the pockets of territory in different parts of the country. Chiplunkar argued that history does not only mean glorifying Shivaji, or Bajirao or the diplomacy of Nana Phadnavis. It must take into account the judicial and revenue system, art, craft, money, banking, medicine, literature, the forms of popular entertainment such as Tamasha or vocal music. He was the first Maratha scholar, who emphasised on the study of kinship and family and pointed out "history should also deal with social relations between father and son, husband and wife, religious belief and festival, learning dress and diet, and so on". [94] Chiplunkar appeals to collect the historical documents of different families after which Sane, Khare, Rajwade and Parasanis devoted their lives to collecting *bakhar*, copper plate, painting and articles of different families of the Marathas.

K. N. Sane started a periodical called *Kavyetihas Sangraha*[95] in 1878 in cooperation with Chiplunkar and Balaji Janardan Modak, which published more than six thousand pages including the twenty-two *bakhar.* The writing of K. N. Sane is also known as the 'age of bakhar' because about eighteenth bakhars including the *Kaifiyat* were brought to light by him through this periodical. He published bakhar without altering or modifying their texts but only provides relevant details of their location. Later, critical edition of many bakhar[96] published by others, but nevertheless, it is believed that they could be treated as sources of history in a limited way. In this bakhar series, *Holkaranchi Kaifiyat[97],* is a still main source for the Holkar family and their political activities.

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[94] V. K. Chiplunkar (ed.), *Nibandhamala*, Chitrshala Press Pune, 1917, pp. 486-487.
[95] K. N. Sane (ed.), *Kavyetihas Sangrah,* BISM, Pune, 1925.
[96] Krishnaji Vinayak Sohani (ed.), *Peshwanchi Bakhar,* 5th edition, 1878-1925; Krishnaji Shyamrao (ed.), *Bhausabenchi Bakhar,* 5th edition, 1879-1932; Raghunath Yadav (ed.), *Panipatchi bakhar,* 1885; *Senapati Dabhade va Gaikwad Yanchi Hakigat, 1887; Bhausabanchi Kaifiyat,* 1887. *Marathi Samrajyachi Choti Bakhar,*1889. All published first time in *Kavyetihas Sangrah,* BISM, Pune, 1878-1932.
[97] Puroshtam Vishram Mawjee (ed.), *Kaifiyat Yadis, containing Historical Accounts of Certain Families of Renown in the Deccan and S.M country Under the Mohammedan and*

Waqai-Holkar[98], is a full account of the active career of Yashwant Rao Holkar, based on the narration of his contemporary close associate, Bakshi Bhawani Sankar, and the personal knowledge of the author, Mohan Singh. This is more authentic than the Marathi chronicle '*Holkaranchi Kaifiyat'* written in the later year in the 19th century. It gives the details of the happenings from September 1797 to February 1798, as mentioned in *Waqai-Holkar* dually confirmed by the relevant contemporary dispatches' of Joshua Uthoff, then the acting Resident (Feb 1798 to March 1798) at Poona.

Vasudeo Vaman Khare (1858-1924) also joins the editorial section of the history journal *Kavyetihas Sangraha.* Khare and finds a variety of original records at Mirajmala where he worked for seven years from 1893 and published 30,000 letters in his historical journal of *Aitihasik Lekh Sangraha,* in twelve volumes. He clearly laid out the method of his study of a historical document in the first volume of *Aitihasik Lekh Sangraha* published in 1901.[99] It throws light on political activities of Sakharam Bapu, Nana Phadnis, Trimbak Rao Pethe, Mahadji Shinde, Tukoji Rao Holkar, the Bholse, Gaekwad, as well as the enemies of the Maratha State, mainly Haider Ali and the Nizams. However, most of the letters of *Aitihasiik Lekh Sangraha* are primarily the political history of the Marathas, but few of them throw light on the socio-economic condition of the time. It contains the letters related to the *Behadas* (Budget) of Sarnjam, assignment of revenue for military services, *Jabitas* (rule for collecting the revenue), the decision of village Panchayats, markets rates, pensions of soldiers,

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Maratha Governments, Government Printing Press, Bombay, 1908. All Kaifiyat have been divided into five parts: first Marathas Sardar, second Brahmin, third Swami and others, fourth Mohmmadan, and fifth district hereditary officers. However, *Holkaranchi Kaifiyat* was first published in *Kavyetihas Sangrah,* 1886.

[98] Raghubir Sinh (ed.), *Mohan Singh's Waqai-Holkar,* Publication Scheme, Jaipur, 1998. The Original Manuscript of Waqai-Holkar, are extent at Khudabaksh library Patna, Bodleian Library Oxford, Indian Office Library, London, which micro films are available at Sitamau.

[99] V. V. Khare (ed.), *Aitihasik Lekh Sangrahha,* BISM, Pune, 1897 to 1924. Covering historical materials from 1760-1800. He started his Journal in June 1897 with an annual subscription of Rs.3 and fixed the prices for individual numbers at Rs.5 annas. However, the next three years appeared over a period of ten years, from 1901-1911, due to financial problems. His friends T. S. Karkhanis, the proprietor of Maharashtra Natak Mandali suggested that he should write plays for his theatre company, which would help him to cover the expenses to support his families and the cost of the publication of the sources. In all, he wrote six plays namely *Gunotkarsha*(1885), *Tara Mandal* (1914), *Chitra Vanchana*(1917), *Shiva Sambhav* (1919), *and* Ugramangala(1922). His last play, *Deshkantak* was published posthumously in 1930, still popular in Maharashtra. The last three volumes of *Aitihasik Lekh Sangraha,* published between 1926 to 1948 by his son Yashwant Rao who carried on the study of the Maratha history from 1801-1818.

forms of punishment, expenses incurred on pilgrimages to Kashi, etc. It provides the valuable information on the socio-economic condition of the eighteenth century India. In fact, Sane, as has been mention earlier, highlighted the bakhar, but both Khare and Rajwade rejected the bakhar as authentic accounts compared to other sources.

The major contribution of Khare in the history of the Maratha families, particularly for the forty years i.e., 1760 -1800 is the publication of his twelve volumes of his journal. The first volumes are devoted entirely to the period of Madhavrao I, who had to undertake the lost prestige of the Marathas, which had been shattered by their defeat in the third battle of Panipat, 1761. The volume numbers 4 to 9 deal exclusively with the activities of Mahadji Shinde and Nana Phadnavis, the two great pillars of the Maratha state. The major event of the first Anglo-Maratha war and the correspondences of the other events are published in this section. The remaining three (10, 11, 12) volumes narrated the sordid tale of the last phase of the Maratha history from the assumption of the Peshwaship by Bajirao –II (1796) to the death of Nana Phadnavis in 1800.

K. N. Sane, first published *Bhausahebanci Bakhar* in 1879 from three manuscripts and went on to add emendations and variation in the subsequent edition (1886, 1900, 1922). The edited copy of 1959 of S. N. Joshi was translated in English by Ian Raeside[100], and M. S. Kanade recently re-edited other Marathi edition in 1993.[101] It gives the details of the campaign of the third battle of Panipat and the role of the Shindes, Holkars, and other Confederates in northern India. Ian Raeside also translated *Atmacarita of Nana Phadnavis or* the autobiography of Nana Phadnavis. The autobiography of Nana Phadnavis was first translated by John Briggs, who was a Resident at the court of Satara between 1823 to 1826, from a copy which was obtained from the widow of Nana and read in a meeting in Royal Asiatic Society on 19 April 1828. The same translation was later re-published as an appendix to

[100] Ian Raeside, *Maratha Historical papers and Chronicles: The Decade of Panipat, 1751-1761,* Popular Parkashan, Bobay, 1984.
[101] M. S. Kanade (ed.), *Bhausahebanchi Bakhar*, 2nd edition, Sneh Vardhan Publication, Pune, 2004.

Macdonald's *Memoirs of the life of the late Nana Fadnavis* in 1851.[102] It gives a brief account on the conflict of Shinde with Nana.

V. K. Rajwade (1863-1926) was formally registered as a student at the Deccan College Pune in 1884 and received his degree in 1891. During this long gap of seven-years, he was trained in many subjects such as Economy, Science, Philosophy, and Psychology. He made an extensive list of 113 places in India where one could find the Maratha documents. In this list, he also included many places of northern and western India such as Ayodhya, Banaras, Aligarh, Panipat, Bundi, Kota, Bhopal, Gwalior, Dewas, Dhar, Indore, Jaipur, Aurangabad, and many other places. He collected the documents from these sites and started a historical series called *Marathyanchya Itihasachi Sadhane*[103] and published twenty-two volumes in his lifetime between 1891 to 1926, later four more volumes were added in this set between 1941 to 1947 by Rajwade Sansodhak Mandal Dhule. He gives a long introduction in Volumes 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 8, 10, and 11 which did not always deal with the main subject of the volumes he edited, but it explains the various aspects of history.

Volumes 1 of *Marathyancha Itihasachi Sadhne* contains 304 documents related to the different campaigns of the Marathas including the third battle of Panipat in 1761 covering a period from 1751 to 1761 published in 1891. Rajwade wrote a long introduction to this volume which goes up to 127 pages, analyses the content of the documents and criticises Grant Duff.[104] Volume 2 of MIS deals with the chronology of the Peshwa and Fatesing Bhosle of Akkalkot, covering the period from 1714 to 1761. It was published in 1900. Volume 3 of MIS contains 568 documents and covers the period of 1700-1760. This volume is essential for the study of kinship and power because it covers many historical families and an introduction of 97 pages gives an exhaustive account on the internal and external aspects of the Maratha polity, decentralization process of the Marathas and the importance of various types of historical records in the eighteenth century. While volumes 4 critically examines the different bakhar and questions its authenticity and points out few bakhar as authentic sources of information. Volume 6 written in 1905 is significant from the point of view

[102] Ian Raeside, *Maratha Historical papers and Chronicles: The Decade of Panipat, 1751-1761*, pp.103-113.
[103] V. K. Rajwade, *Marathyancha Itihasachi Sadhne,* 22.Vols, Rajwade Sansodak Mandal, Dhule, 1891-1947.
[104] V. K. Rajwade, MIS, Vol. 1, 1898.

of critical understanding of history, covering the period from 1720 to 1761. It also contains an introduction of 98 pages which explains the nature of human history as well as sociology and philosophy of history. Volume 8, covering the extended period of the Maratha history from 1649 to 1817, was published in 1903. It gives the information of different families of the Marathas, the history of Marathi and Modi languages, and the impact of another language on Marathi. However, the introduction of volumes 9, 10, and 11 published between 1906 and 1909 are very brief and mainly highlighted the mistakes of Grant Duff and the ethnographic views of history. He also explained the 'Maharashtra Dharma'[105]and blamed it for not being tolerant.

G. S. Sardesai had emphasized to understand the Hindu, Muslim and British regime to know the role of the Marathas in the eighteenth century. He, therefore, prepares a tentative plan for writing a complete history of India. G. S. Sardesai started working on the Peshwa Daftar which originally constituted about 13000 bundles called *'Rumal'* consisting the record of the Peshwa for eighty-eight years from 1729 to 1817. Subsequently, many other documents were added to this nucleus, and a total number of rumals grew from 13000 to 34972, out of these 27332 were in Marathi, 7482 in English, 29 in Persian and 129 in Gujarati. As most of these records about the land and its ownership, tenure, transfer, revenue, administration, and other allied matters.[106] Sardesai and his team comprising scholars such as K. P. Kulkarni, V. G. Dighe, V. S. Bandre, M. V. Gujar, Y. N. Kelkar and others selected many Marathi documents of modi script from 27332 Marathi rumals, shortlisted them and translated into Devnagri script and published them in forty-five volumes under the title of *Selection From Peshwa Daftar*.[107]

These selections include the private papers of the individual Peshwa, the Maratha campaigns in different parts of India, the Private lives of Shahu and the Peshwa, administration, the Maratha Sardars, and historical families, social life and culture of Maharashtra. These forty-five volumes of the Marathi records running into 7800

[105] A. R. Kulkarni, *Maratha Historiography*, Manohar, New Delhi, 2006, pp. 162-163. He says Maharashtra Dharma =Hinduism + Establishment of Dharma + Protection of Brahman and Cows + Establishment of Swarajya + Unity of the people + leadership. He also pointed out that Hinduism is tolerant (sahishnu) but Maharashtra Dharma is militant (Jayishnu).
[106] G. S. Sardesai, *A Hand Book of Records in Alienation Office Poona*, Government Printing Press, Bombay, 1933, pp. 24-25.
[107] G. S. Sardesai (ed.), *Selection from Peshwa Daftar,* 45.vols, Government Printing Press, Bombay, 1930-1937.

pages included 8650 letters covering the period from 1707 to 1848. Out of these forty-five volumes, Vol.VII, VIII, X, XII, XIII, XIV, XV, XVI, XVIII, XXI, XXIII, XXVII, are the most important ones which give the details of political and administrative activities of the Shindes, Holkars and Gaekwads in the eighteenth century.[108]

After the completion of the Selection from Peshwa Daftar, Sardesai joined the scheme sponsored by Jadunath Sarkar, known as *Poona Residency Correspondence*[109] and edited five volumes out of fourteen volumes were published between 1936 and 1958. The PRC was presented to the non-Marathi speaking readers with full of critical accounts of the Maratha activities in India, particularly such information which are not available in Marathi. However, both Sarkar and Sardesai while working on the Peshwa Daftar realised that the necessary correspondence between Mahadji and Nana Phadnavis particularly after 1776 was missing. It was kept by Nana Phadnavis in his private archive and after his death in 1800 his widow transferred the entire collection to her Resident at Manavali, a village near Wai (Satara). Thus, Menavali Daftar never reached Poona. Some of the letters from this daftar are published in *Itihas Sangrah.*

B. D. Parsani had a secret deal with Shinde of Gwalior regarding the publication of Mahadji Shinde and Nana Phadnavis Correspondences. He had prepared a text of five volumes and those were printed in 1915, but he did not release it because the Gwalior Darbar refused to pay. Then Sarkar requests to Sardesai to reprint and edit the Parsani collection on Mahadji Shinde –Nana letters. Then all the papers including the earlier printed ones were arranged, edited and published in one volume, entitled *Mahadji*

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[108] G. S. Sardesai (ed.), *Selection from Peshwa Daftar,* Vol.VII: *Letter and Dispatches relating to the battle of Panipat*; Vol. VIII: *Early Life of Shahu and Balaji Vishwanath*; Vol. X: *Bajirao and His Family;* Vol.XII: *The Dabhade and the Conquest of Gujarat*; Vol.XIII: *Bajirao entry into Malwa and Bundelkhand*; Vol.XIV: *Maratha Conquest into North 1732-1738*; Vol.XV: *Bajirao Advances upon Delhi 1737-1738*; Vol.XVI: *Shahu and Bajirao Administration*; Vol.XVIII: *Private Life of Shahu and Peshwa;* Vol.XXI: *Bajirao Peshwa and the event in the North 1741-1761*; Vol.XXIII: *Extract from Peshwa Daftar*; Vol.XXVII: *Balaji Bajirao Peshwa and Event in the North(Supplementary) 1742-1761*; Vol.XXIX: *Affairs of Northern India, Peshwa Madhav Rao–I, 1761-1772*; Vol. XXXX: *Miscellaneous Papers of Baji Rao,* Government Press, Bombay, 1930-1935.

[109] J. N. Sarkar (ed.), *English Record of Maratha History, Poona Residency Correspondence,* Vol. I, *Mahadji Sindhia and North India Affairs 1785-1794,* Government Press, Bombay, 1936; G.S. Sardesai (ed.), Vol. II, *Poona Affairs, Malet's Embassy 1786-1797*; Vol. VI, *Poona Affairs, 1787-1801(Palmer's Embassy),*Government Press Bombay, 1939.

Shinde Hayanchi Kagadpatre.[110] This volume contains 608 letters of primary importance for the Maratha history, throws a flood of new light on the family of the Shindes during the last quarter of the eighteenth century. Later in 1934, Satara Itihas Sansodhak Mandal Aitihasik Lekhmal published Parsanis collection, entitled *Shindeshahichhi Rajkarne 1774-1794,* [111] which published the several papers on different historical families; it contains 455 letters.

Sources Relating to the Question of Loyalty of Shinde, Holkar and Gaekwad

There are many reports regarding the general behaviour of Shinde, and Holkar and particularly their role in Panipat. Rajwade opines that since the battle of Kumbheri (1754), Malhar Rao began to hate Shinde and the Peshwa. He also played a dubious role in the treachery against Jayappa Shinde; apart from these, he protected Nazib Khan, Suja-ud-Daulah, and Suraj Mal Jat. But the question of the loyalties of Shinde, and Holkar are still a debatable issue as different sources give diverse perspectives of the facts. *Marathi Riyachi Chhoti Bakhar*[112] says that Holkar left the battlefield and also had friendly relation with Najib Khan. The *Holkaranchi Thaili*[113] and the *bhakar of Panipat*[114], the contemporary documents narrated that Malhar Rao was entrusted by Bhau Saheb to take his family to Poona and report to Nana Sahib and Gopika Bai, his wife. The *Chronicle of the Peshwa*[115] and the *History of Vichukar family*[116] clearly accuse Malhar Rao of the negligence in his duty and his so-called treachery. T. S. Shejwalkar writes, "we have no faith in the widely expressed belief that Malhar Rao had an understanding with Najib who allowed him to escape unharmed". The whole philosophy of Malhar Rao was based not on the honour and prestige but profit and escape. The Marathi adage which says, that 'if the head remains whole, one can have eighty-five turban to wear', seems to have been an old guiding principle of Malhar

[110] G. S. Sardesai (ed.), *Mahadji Sindhe Hyanchi Kagadpatre,* Government Printing Press, Bombay, 1937.
[111] B. D. Diskalkar (ed.), *Sindheshahichi Rajkarne 1774-1794,* Satara Itihas Sansodhak Mandal, Satara, 1934.
[112] R.V. Herwadkar, *A forgotten Literature: Foundations of Marathi Chronicles,* Popular Prakashan, Bombay, 1994, p. 55.
[113] *Holkarachi Thail,* Rajwade, *Marathyancha Itihasachi Sadhnen,* Vol. III, 1901, No. 172.
[114] Raghunath Murlidhar Joshi, *Panipatchi Bakhar,* Marathwara Sahitya Parisad Prakashak, Hydrabad, 1944.
[115] Kashinath Narayan Sane, *Peshwanchi Bakhar,* 5th Edition, Translation Society, Bombay, 1925.
[116] S. R. Vinchookar, *A Brief Story of the Vinchookar Family,* Arya Bhusan Press, Poona, 1909, p. 23.

Rao which he naturally followed at this juncture.[117] The Marathi historians believe that Malhar Rao was neither charged by Bhau with the special defense of Parvati Bai nor did he himself attempt to do anything to escort her out of the field. Only casually and accidentally they met thirty miles to the south of Delhi (Malhar Rao and Nan Purandhre), of which Malhar Rao took full advantage in preparing his apology.[118] However, *Holkarchin Kaifiyat*[119] and *Holkarachi Thaili*[120] both are justifying the diplomacy of Malhar Rao in Panipat and pointed out that he ran away at the previous behest of Bhau to escort Parvatibai, the wife of Bhau.

Sindeshahi Itihasachin Sadhane Part I (1929), Part II (1930), Part III (1937), throw a flood of light on the inner working of the affairs of Shinde, especially valuable aid and the correspondence of the diplomats connected with the Shinde family, justify the role of Malhar Rao in Panipat and also show the good relation between Malhar Rao and Shinde. Ramaji Anant Dabholkar, who was the Diwan of Shinde from 1750 to 1761 and died after Panipat, was the chief director of Shinde affairs; his correspondences also justify the policy of Shinde in Panipat. However, *Selection from the Peshwa Daftar*[121], Vols., II (1930), XXI(1932), XXVII(1933), directly deal with the North Indian activities of the Shindes, Holkars, and Gaekwads for a period of almost two decades previously to the battle of Panipat, which give a different picture of loyalties of these Confederates. Elliot and Dowson, *History of India* (1877), Vol. VIII [122] contains the selected translation of *Tarikh-i-Alamgir Sani*, *Manazil-ul-Futuh,Nigar-nama-i-Hind, Ibratnamah, Tarikh-i-Ibrahim Khan,* and also gives information on the Maratha campaign in the north but this account had a different opinion about Shinde, Holkar, and Gaekwad. *Amirnamah* by Baswan Lal[123] are the most important eyewitness record of the Holkar family. Baswan Lal was encouraged to write this account by Muhammad Wazir Khan, son of Mir Khan who was a soldier of Yashwant Rao. It is one text which says that Yashwant Rao Holkar gave poison to

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[117] T. S. Shejwalkar, *Panipat: 1761,* Deccan Collage Poona, 1946, p.98.
[118] Ibid., p. 99.
[119] *Holkarchin Kaifiyat* in K. N. Sane (ed.), *Kavyetihas Samgrah,* 1886.
[120] *Holkarachi Thaili,* Rajwade, *Marathyancha Itihasachi Sadhnen,* Vol. III, 1901, No. 172.
[121] G. S. Sardesai, *Selection from Peshwa Daftar,* Vols. II, XXI, XXVII, Government Press, Bombay, 1930-1933.
[122] Elliot and Dowson, *History of India by its own Historians,* Vol. VIII, Trubner and Co., London, 1877.
[123] Baswan Lal, *Memoirs of the Pathan Soldiers of fortune the Nawab Ameer –ood-doulah Muhmmud Ameer Khan,* H.T. Prinsep (Trans.), Military Orphans Press, Calcutta, 1832.

his nephew, Khande Rao-II. Baswan Lal also recorded many secret plans of Yashwant Rao regarding the kinship polity.

P. M. Joshi edited *Selection from Peshwa Daftar New Series, Revival of Maratha Power 1761-1772.*[124] It contains many letters divided under different headings and arranged chronologically under each topic, letter nos. from 208 to 227 throw light on Shinde, Holkar and Gaekwad in the Gujarat region. G. H. Khare, *Persian Sources of Indian History*[125], part two of Volume V, contains the newsletters from north India ranging between 1756 and 1765 (10.03.1765). It also contains 20 letters from the pre-Panipat policies of the Marathas and the rest 150 letters give information on the post-Panipat affairs of Shinde, Holkar and Gaekwad. *Ahilya Smarika*[126] is an important Hindi source which throws light on the different aspects of the Holkar family. It gives information about the family relations, rituals, and contains a number of letters of Gotami Bai, Ahilya Bai. It highlights the expansion in marriages, family life, Sati, including the name of all Satis in the Holkar family.

Gulgule Daftar[127] is a copy made in Devanagari script in Hindi, contains 862 letters, the first volumes entitled *Prarmbhik Shinde Sashak,* from 1733 to 1767, and some of the sections of Mandoli Daftar[128], have been translated into Hindi and Marathi containing more than 1000 letters which throw light on the revenue and military aspects of the Shindes, Holkars, and Gaekwads. Apart from these, the types of copies of the Marathi Daftar in twenty-one volumes arranged by Raghubir Sinh throws a flood of light on the family affairs of the Shindes. Volume-I entitled *Ranoji Shinde and his early Descents 1733-1767,* and Volumes 2-6, contain the important correspondences among Holkar, Gaekwad, the Peshwa, Shah Alam-II, and the English which explain the internal and external affairs of Mahadji Shinde, covering the period from 1762 to 1794.[129] *Hingne Daftar*[130], a collection of papers belonging to

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[124] P. M. Joshi (ed.), *Selection from Peshwa Daftar New Series,Revival of Maratha Power 1761-1772,* Government Printing Press Bombay, 1962.
[125] G. H. Khare (ed.), *Persian Sources of Indian History,* BISM, Pune, 1969.
[126] *Ahilya Samrika ,* 10 Vols, Khagshi Trust, Indore, 1974-1976.
[127] *Gulgule Daftar*, Shri Nathnagar Sodh Sansthan, Sitamau.
[128] *Mandoli Daftar,* Shri Nathnagar Sodh Sansthan, Sitamau.
[129] Marathi Daftar, Shri Narthnagar Sodh Sansthan, Sitamau, Vol. I: *Ranoji Sindhe, and Early Descents 1733-1767*; Vol. II *Mahadji Sindhe 1762-1771*; Vol. III *Mahadji Sindhe, 1771-1776*; Vol. IV: *Mahadji Sindhe 1777-1780;* Vol.V: *Mahadji Sindhe 1781-1785;* Vol.VI: *Mahadji Sindhe 1785-1794;* Vol. VII: *Daulat Rao, 1794-1802*; Vol. VIII: *Daulat Rao, 1794-1805.*

Mahadev Bhatt Hingne, the Poona Vakil at Delhi, its first volume covers the period up to 1761 and the second volume from the latter, no. 81 onwards covers the last three decades of the eighteenth century. *Chadrachuda Daftar,*[131] edited by Dataraya Vishnu Apte, published by the Record Department Gwalior, volume 2 deals with the families of the Shindes, Holkars, and Gaekwads and their polity in the north.

The Gaikwad of Baroda: English Documents,[132] published by J. H. Gense and B. R. Banaji in ten volumes contains the details of the Gaekwad family history. The first volume entitled *Pillaji and Damaji Gaikwad 1720-1768,* gives a detailed account of the expansion of the Gaekwad family of Baroda. It also highlights the relation of Damaji with the Peshwa and Raghoba, the reaction of Gaekwad on the English Embassy to Poona, and the internal family rivalry of the Gaekwads after the death of Damaji in 1768. Volume –III, entitled *Fatesingrao, Manaji Rao, Govindrao,* 1776-1800*,* is the most important source to understand the internal family conflicts and the role of the Gaekwads in the Maratha Confederacy. Volume-VIII (1809-1814) contains a section on the 'Gaekwad Family'[133] which gives a detailed account on Malhar Rao Holkar of Kadi, Kanhoji Rao, the Phanse Family- Raoji, Sitaram and Sakharam, and many other ruling and non ruling kin of the Gaekwads, who played an essential role in shaping the future of the Maratha Confederacy in western India.

G. C. Wad, B. D. Parasnis[134] edited, *Selection From Satara Raja and Peshwa Diaries* in 9 Volumes throw light on different aspects of the Maratha history. Volume 5 of this series, entitled *Baji Rao –II,* [135] contains the socio-economic, religious and political correspondences of the Marathas, gives the valuable information of the family of the Dabhares, Gaekwads, Shindes, Holkars, Vinchukars, Patwardhans, and many others. V. V. Thakur[136] edited works entitled *Holkarsachi Itihasachi Sadhne* and parts of it

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[130] G. H. Khare (ed.), *Hingne Daftar,* 2.Vols, BISM, Poona, 1935.
[131] D. V. Apte, (ed.), *Chandrachuda Daftar,* Record Department Gwalior, 1920-1934.
[132] J. H. Jense, and D. R. Banaji (ed.), *The Gaikwads of Baroda English Documents,* Vol. I: *Pillaji and Damaji Gaikwad 1720-1768;* Vol. II: *Fatehsingrao 1771-1776;* Vol. III: *Fatehsingrao ,Manajirao , Govindrao, 1776-1800;* Vol. IV: *Anadrao Gaikwad 1800-1802;* Vol. V: *Anadrao Gaikwad 1802-1803,* B. D. Taraporevala Sons & Co., Bombay, 1930-1936.
[133] J. H. Jense, and D. R. Banaji (ed.), *The Gaikwads of Baroda English Documents,* Vol. VIII: Anandrao Gaekwad 1809-1814, pp. vi-xv.
[134]B. D. Parsani, *Selection from Satara Raja's and Peshwa Diaries*, prepared by G. C. Wad, Government of Bombay, 1907-1911.
[135] B. P. Joshi (ed.), *Selection From Statara Raja and Peshwa Daries, Baji Rao-II,* Vol. V, Poona Deccan Vernacular Translation Society, Government of Bombay, 1908.
[136]B. B. Thakur, *Holkarshahicha Itihassachi Sadhnen*, Holker Press, Indore, 1944.

have been printed as *Shinde sahicha Itihasachi Sadhne* by A. B. Phalke[137] and *Holkarshahichya Itihasachi Sadhne, part-12.* These are valuable sources on the Shindes and Holkars. *Holkarsaheeteel Aitihasik Istriyanchya*[138] contains 205 letters of different ladies of the Shinde and Holkar families including some secret letters of Ahilyabai, and Gotmai Bai. It gives detailed information about the Marathas in northern and central India. Raghubir Sinh's, *Selections from The Peshwa Daftar New Series: Hindi Sources on Maratha Rule and Administration in the North 1726-1784 A .D*[139] is a major source in Hindi that comprises various letters from the different parts of the Maratha Confederacy. It contains 202 Hindi letters, the correspondences amongst the Peshwa, the Maratha Generals and the officers of the different rulers, the officers from the Hindi-speaking region. It throws light on many dark corners of the Maratha-Rajput relation in Hindustan, including the Malwa, Rajasthan, Bundelkhand. It enables us to understand the regional history of the territories of the Shindes, Holkars and Gaekwads.

Among the English sources, *Journal of James Anderson*[140] explains the diplomatic relation between Mahadji Shinde and the British government. The *Ibrat Nama* [141] or "The Book of Warning" by Faquir Khair-ud-Din Illahabadi, who was born in Allahabad in 1751, had written three volumes. These are a report on the diplomatic relation of the Marathas and the English. It is a detailed account of the period from 1771 to 1788 C.E. Moreover; the writer was employed as a confidential agent of James Anderson at the court of Mahadji Shinde. When he found difficulties in balancing his secret affairs between Delhi and the East India Company, he returned to Allahabad in 1785 and died in the year of 1827. The narratives of Anderson and Khairuddin are not similar. Most of the political events of Delhi and its surrounding power centers in upper India have been explained in *Calendar of Persian*

[137] A. B. Phalke, *Sindeshahi Itihasachi Sadhnen*, Holker Press, Gwalior, 1937.
[138] Ananat Narayan Bhagwat (ed.), *Holkarshahichya Itihasachi Sadhne, P.XII: Holkarsaheeteel Aitihasik Istriyanchya,* Itihas Lekhak va Sansodhak Foreign Office Indore, 1925.
[139] Raghubir Sinh (ed.), *Selections from The Peshwa Daftar New Series: Hindi Sources on Maratha Rule and Administration in the North 1726-1784 A .D,* Government Press, Kolhapur, 1976.
[140] P. M. Joshi (ed.), *Maharashtra Archive Bulletin of The Department of Archives*, No. 1, Governement Central Press, Bombay, 1962, pp. 1-63.
[141] Faquir Khair-ud-Din Muhammad Illahabadi, *Ibrat-Nama or "Book of Warning"*, tr. Jadunath Sarkar, published in *Maharashtra Archives Bulletin of The Department of Archives*, No. 2, P. M. Joshi (ed.), Government Press, Bombay, 1966, pp. 1-102.

Correspondence, [142] a set of 11 volumes. These are rich accounts, covering the year from 1759 to 1794, and are a summary of millions of folios of the Company related papers in various languages. *The Persian record of Maratha History*, [143] Vol.I: *Delhi Affairs 1761-1788* and Vol. II, *Sindhia As Regent of Delhi 1787-1791 A.D* are vast accounts written by the officers of the Marathas at the Delhi court and others. These records give information on the great success of the warfare techniques of De Boigne and the political instability of the Delhi court. It is an important source for the study of the Maratha Confederacy in Upper India. Fitzclarence, *Journal of a Route Across India, Through Egypt to England* [144] and James Forbes's *Oriental Memories a narrative of seventeen years Resident in India*, [145] give a detailed account on the Maratha army, Pindari, and their general life, irregularities in the Maratha troops. Forbes accompanied Raghoba on his march through Gujarat as a civil servant attached to the English detachment ordered from Bombay to assist him. His account on military campaigns and general information on culture and society explains the different aspects of the Maratha Confederacy.

Chapterisation

The first chapter, ***Origin, Alliance, and Expansion of Gaekwad, Holkar and Shinde 1700-1760 C. E.,*** deals with the origin and the family background of the Shindes, Holkars, and Gaekwads. The period of 1700- 1760 is one of the most crucial phases for the history of the Maratha Confederacy during which the foundation of the Maratha Confederacy was laid down and expanded up to the highest possible extension from Attock to Cuttack. With the expansion of the vast territorial bases, different groups of aristocrats emerged under the Peshwa administration which gradually led to the transformation of a centralised state into a loose Confederacy

[142] *Calendar of Persian Correspondence*, Vol. 1 to 11 Old publication, Vol. 6 (1781-85), Vol. 7 (1786-1789), Vol.8, (1786-1789), Vol. 9 (1790-91), Vol. 10 (1792-1793), Vol. 11 (1794-95), National Archives of India, New Delhi, 1911 to 1959.

[143] P. M. Joshi (ed.), *Persian Records of Maratha History*, Vol. 1: *Delhi Affairs 1761-1788* and Vol. II; *Sindhia as Regent of Delhi, 1787, 1789-1791*, J .N. Sarkar (trans.), Government of Bombay, 1953, 1954.

[144] Fitzclarence, *Journal of a Route Across India, Through Egypt to England*, John Murray Street, London, 1819; also see, Uma Shanker Pandey, *The European adventurers and Politics in North India in the late 18th and early 19th Centuries,* Unpublished Ph.D. thesis submitted to JNU, 2010.

[145] James Forbes, *Oriental Memoirs,* 2 Vols.,Cochrane and Co. London, 1813.

mainly after the death of Chhatrapati Shahu in 1749. As a result, the families of the Shindes, Holkars, and Gaekwads emerged as a central pillar of the Confederacy in Upper India.

This chapter is divided into two sections. The first section deals with the origin of the families of the Gaekwads, their expansion and domination in Gujarat, their relation with Dabhade and the Peshwa and the power contestation between the Gaekwads and the Peshwas on the issue of the distribution of the territories of Gujarat. The second section focuses on the origin, alliances, and expansion of the Shindes and Holkars and their migration and settlement from the south to the north. It elucidates the dynamics concerning the kinship politics of these families and the question of power, by and large, determined from the Poona authority before the 1760s. The families of these Confederates established themselves in their respective areas when an internal family dispute or kin conflict did not play any significant role in political alliances with the non-Maratha power.

It highlights the important historical events which directly or indirectly provided enough power to these families to frame their own diplomatic policies with the various regional powers. These families were appointed in different parts of northern and western India to consolidate new territories. They were allowed to maintain a certain number of trained forces, but how they became the most potent Confederates in the Maratha politics in terms of economic and military power and how did the Peshwa regulate the power of these Confederates are the major issues of this chapter. It also explains a plethora of questions such as how did the kinship politics determine their diplomatic policies with the Mughals, Rajputs and other ruling elites of upper India; and why none of the families of these Confederates took the side of the Mughals openly, what were the causes of the growing conflicts amongst the families of the Confederates and the reaction of Dabhade on the increasing strength of the Shindes, Holkars, and Gaekwads, how these families established their domination in the new regions such as the Malwa and Rajputana and formed almost an independent relation with the Jats, Sikhs, Rajputs, and with other regional powers in order to become the competitors of each other ? These are the significant issues which have been deeply examined in this chapter and it also shows that the Peshwa could not understand the danger of this independent diplomacy of these Confederates.

Due to the negligence of the Peshwa of the threat of the increasing power of these Confederates, these families became powerful enough to form their own sovereign identity in their respective regions. The process of sovereign identity and state formation are the primary focus of the second chapter, entitled ***Kinship and State Formation in Central and Western India 1761-1780s. C.E.*** This chapter is also divided into two sections: the first focuses on the kinship crisis in the Gaekwad Household after the death of Damaji Gaekwad in 1768 and the struggle for the succession amongst the six sons of Damaji Gaekwad. It highlights how these kin politics created a sovereign structure within the administration of the Confederacy.

The Second section examines the policies of the families of the Shindes and Holkars after the third battle of Panipat and their alliances with the English and other powers. The primary focus of this chapter is to understand the internal family crisis and its impact on the Maratha Confederacy. How these family became stronger than the Poona authority, what was their role in strengthening the Mughal power and what was the central issue of conflict with Poona and the families of the Shindes and Holkar? How Shinde and Holkar played a vital role in the House of the Peshwas?

Raghunath Rao was the first who bore the ignominy of seeking an alliance with the English to get the Peshwaship in utter disregard of the interest of the Maratha Confederacy. However, these Confederates were still loyal towards the Confederacy and it was only after the 1780s, the kin conflict of these families allowed the English to directly intervene in the family politics of these Confederates due to which the attitude of these kin had been changed. The historians understood these changes in the nature of Confederacy as the shifting of power from the hands of the Peshwa to the hands of Karbhari, without identifying a particular Karbhari. So, this chapter highlights the new administrators who gained their power and gradually became more potent than the Poona authority.

The Maratha polity under Mahadji Shinde in north attained the realisation of its ideas, the culmination of its declared objective of reaching the farthest point towards the expansion and consolidation in the north. Emperor Shah Alam was restored to power at his capital of Delhi in 1772 mainly through the effort of Mahadji Shinde. Mahadji Shinde became so much powerful in northern India that he fixed the terms of the

treaty of Salabai in 1782[146] and within ten years of this treaty, he was recognised as a more potent Confederate in India. The chapter also seeks to understand how the other families of the Maratha Confederates had looked at his success and why Nana became more jealous over the success of Shinde in the north which facilitated a substantial amount of factionalism amongst the kinship of these Confederates.

The third Chapter, ***Sovereignty and Kin's Polity: Households and Policies of Gaekwad and Shinde, 1775- 1803 C.E.*** mainly traces the process of the sovereign identity of Gaekwad and Shinde and highlights the role of kin conflicts and family crisis which gradually led to the weakening of the sovereignty of these Confederates during the last decade of the eighteenth century. It shows how the families of these Confederates strengthen themselves in the Malwa and western India due to the northern policies of the Peshwa which suddenly changed their attitude to become more powerful and thus, they tried to overrule the decisions of the Peshwa.

The history of the decades of the 1780s is the most crucial phase of the political domination of the Houses of the Shindes, and Gaekwads which created the situation for the formation of various groups within the families. It deeply examines the formation of the five rival parties viz. Raoji Appaji (Minister of Anandrao), Kanhoji Rao (illegitimate brother of Anadrao), Malhar Rao (Kadi), the Arabs soldiers and the British, and their impact on the polity of the Maratha Confederacy.

Why all the brothers of Fatesing wanted to be the head of the Houses after paying lakhs of rupees to the Peshwa? Why the Peshwa took Nazar for appointing the successor of the Gaekwads, are the major issues of this chapter. It also shows how gradually the Peshwa lost his domination on these Confederates during the last decade of the eighteenth century. The periods of Fatesing, Govindrao and Manaji were deeply disturbed by the Peshwa and the family conflicts which became so extreme that son fought against father, brother against brother, cousin against cousin which helped the British to expand the domination in the Maratha territories.

The important focus of this chapter is on the political crisis of the Maratha Confederacy which emerged during the last two decades of the eighteenth-century particularly after the appointment of Mahadji as *Wakil-i-Mutaliq* and after the death of

[146] V. V. Khare (ed.), *Aitihasik Lekh Sangrah*, Vol. VII, pp. 2636, 3653-3655.

many prominent political leaders of the Confederates including Mahadji Shinde (1794), Ladoji Deshmukh (1794), Ahilya Bai Holkar (1795) and Peshwa Mahdorao Narayan (1796).

In the absence of these influential Confederates and the nonexistence of a direct male heir for appointing the next successor in the House of the Shindes after the death of Mahadji created a difficult situation for the functioning of the Maratha Confederacy. In this phase, how Daulat Rao became the most dominating Confederate after the death of Madhav Rao Narayan in 1795; his political diplomacy to remove Nana from the Peshwa administration and the open violation and abuse of power by Daulat Rao to establish his own domination during the last decade of the eighteenth century are explained to understand the impact of kinship and family conflicts on the power structure of the Maratha Confederacy.

The fourth chapter, entitled ***Conflict of Power: Kin, Clan and Holkar Politics during 1795-1803 C.E.,*** explains the kinship conflicts in the House of the Holkars mainly during the post decade after the death of Ahilyabai Holkar and examines the political challenges which emerged after the death of Tukoji in 1797. The succession dispute amongst the four sons of Tukoji (from the three wives) and the personal policies of the Peshwa for the kin of the Holkars and the important historical event of the House of the Holkars have been explained to understand the rise of Yashwant Rao. It also traces the changes in the attitude and the identity of the Holkars during the last decade of the eighteenth century and also examines the administrative reforms of Yashwant Rao Holkar, through which this Confederates became more potent than the Poona authority.

The strategy of Yashwant Rao, his diplomacy with Shinde and other Confederates, and the dubious role of the Peshwa in resolving the dispute of Shinde-Holkar and the failure of the Poona administration to limit the power of these Confederates are the major focus to understand the various conflicts within the Confederates. How the killing of the brother of Yashwant Rao, Vithoji by the Peshwa led to the situation of a civil war in Poona and the consequences of the military operation of Yashwant Rao in Poona have been explained to show the impact of kinship polity on the Maratha Confederates. It argues that the idea of taking revenge of one of the kin of Holkar ultimately changed the dynamics of the power struggle which was initially amongst

the Shindes, Holkars, and the Peshwa which soon became the British-Maratha trial of strength. The most important change was that most of the treaties which were signed with different Confederates included the issue of kinship politics, which played a significant role in making strategic decisions by the Holkars during this period.

The fifth chapter, ***Transition from Sovereign Confederates to Princely States: the Last Phase of Kin Conflicts in the House of Gaekwad 1800-1818 C.E.*** mainly focuses on the kinship politics and the British domination in the House of the Gaekwads. It traces the various approaches of the British to use the kin of the Gaekwads for the fulfillment of the British motives. This chapter throws light on how the British used kin to weaken the administration of the Gaekwads and it also examines to what extent the kinship polity influenced the administrative policies of the Gaekwads and the British or vice-versa. Why did the British change the military composition of the Gaekwads and how they managed the expenditure of the Baroda House with the help of the kin of the Gaekwads are some of the crucial questions that have been explained in detail. The most critical section of this chapter is the politics of pension and various allowances not only for the ruling kin of the Gaekwads but also for the distant relatives of the kin of the Gaekwads. The study of pensions and allowances of various Confederates are one of the darkest sides of early modern historiography, the question of pensions and allowances for the non-ruling families have been neglected in the Indian historiography. This chapter fulfills this lacuna and highlights the economic and political aspects of pension and the various allowances of the ruling class as well as the non-ruling families of the Gaekwads, through which the British successfully changed the minds of many kin to make them loyal to the English. Finally, it shows how the kin conflict played a vital role in the transition of the Houses of these Confederates into the Princely states.

CHAPTER - 1

Origin, Alliance, and Expansion of Gaekwad, Holkar and Shinde 1700-1760 C. E.

The families of Shinde, Holkar and Gaekwad originated in different parts of South India and gradually migrated and settled in various regions of northern and western India, were the result of a large political transition which transformed the political map of the eighteenth-century. The families of these confederates played a significant role in the expansion and consolidation of the Maratha Confederacy in northern India. This chapter shows the origin of these families and examines different aspects of their alliances, and it argues first, that the kinship politics, the question of power and legitimacy during this period was, by and large, determined by the Poona authority, in which the Peshwa played a significant role. Second, this was the period when the families of these respective confederates established themselves very strappingly in their respective areas, for this was also the period when the internal family dispute did not play any role in forming alliances. However, the personal motives of the Peshwa played a significant part in defining the power of these confederates.

I

Origin of the Gaekwad: Emergence of Baroda as Power Centre

The family name of the Gaekwads was *Matre* which became *mantri*. They belonged to the Maratha clan which was a Kshatriya, or warrior class. The family had long established itself in the village of Bhadre, in Haveli *taluka* of the district of Poona. In the middle of the seventeenth century, lived Nandaji, a relatively prosperous farmer holding the headship of the more than one village. It seems that it was during the period of Nandaji that the family name changed from Matre to Gaekwad.[1] There are many stories regarding how it changed from Matre to Gaekwad. One of the most famous ones is, Nandaji once rescued a cow (*gae*) from a tiger and had it tied up in his own yard behind the locked doors. Another story says that the cow was rescued from a butcher. Neither story appears convincing; it seems to be made up to fit the name of the Gaekwads long after it became famous. But to understand this, it must be

[1] Fatesinghrao P. Gaekwad, *Sayajirao of Baroda: The Prince and the Men*, Popular Parkashan, Bombay, 1989, p. 1.

borne in mind that in those days for any caste in Hinduism to have saved a cow from death was an incredibly meritorious act, and since the rulers were Muslims who customarily ate beef, therefore, to prevent a slaughter was also a recognized way of showing defiance of authority. Historians explain it that Nandaji Matre or Mantri might have been a fierce protectionist that he came to be popularly known as the *gae-kawari.* One who is ready to fight for cow protection. Nandaji possibly used his respective position and influences to forbid cow slaughter in the village of Bhadre, and thus, became *gae-kaiwari.* The label later developed as Gaekwad.[2]

The son of Nandaji Gaekwad, Keroji had four sons, out of which only two sons - Damaji and Jhingoji - played a significant role in the Maratha Confederacy. Damaji was the first in his family who left the life of a peasant and became a soldier. He joined the contingent of Khaderao Dabhade which formed a part of the army of the Maratha king, Rajaram. The historical narrative is silent on anything concerning Damaji for the next twenty years, after which he was raised to the position of the deputy commander of the Maratha army. The Gaekwad had left the village of Dadvi, near Poona many years ago to follow the fortunes of Dabhade. Pillaji was first given some forty or fifty paga horses and was stationed at Navapua where he proceeded to join the senapati at Talegam. Owing to his energy and wisdom, he rose to the command of two or three hundred horses after the successful raids in Surat.[3] He was, however, forced to move out from Navapura, and selected 'a hill in wilderness difficult of access' belonging to the Mewassi Bhils, and there constructed a Songad[4] fort, the cradle of the Gaekwads houses, and for many years (till1766), the capital of their dominion.

When the Gaekwads were busy in establishing their feet in Gujarat, the Indian political scenario was undergoing a kind of revolution where everyone fought for acquiring or for upholding one's own power. In this situation, the Gaekwads went further than they could do in quiet times. However, this situation was challenging for

[2] Ibid., pp. 2-3.
[3] F. A. H. Elliot, *The Rulers of Baroda*, Baroda State Press, Baroda, 1879, p. 19.
[4] An excerpt from the précis of Mr. Willoughby 'The ascent to Songad is 1½ miles and the fort is ¾ miles in circumference. The walls are about 9 feet high and are built of solid masonry. Songad is about 7 miles to the south of Tapti River and more than 40 to the east of Surat. The two forts of Salher and Salkotah, both are built on the same precipitous hill, 14 miles to the south of the British fort of Mules, and are ascended by a path several miles in length.'

the dull and weak men who fell out of the race hopelessly. As a result, Asaf Jah, Alivardi Khan, and Haider Ali laid the foundation of their respective kingdoms. The ablest and most adventurous men among them came rapidly to the front, however, humble their origin was, and in cases, when their sons or relatives equaled them as military leaders, they were able, to establish princely houses such as Pilaji Gaekwad, Malhar Rao Hokar, Ranoji Shinde, and others. Pillaji Gaekwad following the instructions of the senapati turned his attention chiefly to Surat *aththavisi* and strengthened himself by an alliance with an old foe of the Mughals. In 1720 he made an excursion into northern Gujarat and obtained a portion of the *chauth* of that part of the country where he established a *Guastha* or *Haveli* of Ahmadabad. In 1723 he marched to Surat and defeated the newly appointed governor of that place, Moim Khan and after that his levy became more regular than earlier. Entering Gujarat by the Bevapierah Pass, he made his way to Karnali, where he was joined by the Desai or Patil of Padra, Chhani, and Bhayali in the Baroda Pargana, and the first of the three became great use to him by his knowledge of the country south of the Mahi.[5] It was the time when Nizam –ul-Mulk, just before breaking with the Emperor, had arranged affairs in Gujarat and retaining the government of the provinces, left his uncle Ahmad Khan, there as the deputy of his *jagir* which included Dholka, Broach, Jambusar, Makhbulabad, and Bulsar.[6] Pilaji Gaekwad joined Hamid Khan and Bande on Mahi, and three concerned to oppose the Viceroy, who had succeeded in obtaining the assistant of Babi and Abhay Singh of Jodhpur. The result of the first encounter was that the Maratha were defeated in the engagement at Sijotra and Kapadvanj, and

[5] Fatesinghrao P. Gaekwad, *Sayajirao of Baroda: The Prince and the Men*, p. 22. The popular stories, though not accurately, explain how the people of Gujarat sided with the Marathas against the Musalmans. A daughter of Dala Desai of Padra came one day to Baroda to make her purchases in a market. Her beauty was noted by the pimps of Imam Meddi, a Musalman minister. He sent a palanquin to fetch her to the palace, but she succeeded in tricking the servant of the minister and fled to the house of her father. The lady was married to the son of Vagji Patel of Virsad, and the husband and father combined to conspire against the wicked Babi lord. They were later joined by their friends, the influential Sureswar Desai of Baroda. Vagji Patel was, however, a subordinate to Rustam Ali Khan, as was also Daji Patel of Vaso. The daughter of the latter while on the way to the temple of Ambaji, was seized by Sujait Khan and detained in his house for fourteen days, where she was dishonored. In consequence of this insult and outrages, the four Desais or Patels agreed to ruin the Musalman by calling in the Gaekwad, and they managed to meet him secretly by pretending to go on a pilgrimages to Devki Unai ear Bilimora. There they make the plan of invasion. See in Govindbhai H. Desai and A.B. Clarke, *Gazetteer of the Baroda State,* Vol. I, Time Press Bombay, 1923, p. 440.

[6] Govindbhai H. Desai and A.B. Clarke, *Gazetteer of the Baroda State,* Vol. I, Time Press Bombay, 1923, p. 439.

Hasan-ud-din was appointed as the governor of Baroda, Baroch, Jambusahar, and Makhbulabad, displacing the Nizam.[7] The imperial party to regain its influences, appointed Surbuland Khan as Governor of Gujarat and Malwa. Ahmad Khan bestowed on Pilaji Gaekwad the right to collect the chauth of the half of the territory.

Family of Dabhade[8]



[7] Grant Duff, *A History of Mahrattas*, Vol. 1, Low Bookshelers and Publisher, Calcutta, 1913, p. 217, relates that Hamid Khan and his allies gained a victory over the new viceroy Surbuland Khan near Ahmadabad soon after the latter had seized the city.

[8] Pushakar Ramesh Shashtri, *Marathaynchya Amalakhaleel Gujarat*, Uprant Prakashan, Pune, 2014, p. 206.

Governor Surbuland Khan had been appointed as the viceroy to drive out the Marathas, and a sum of one crore of rupees was assigned for the imperial treasury to enable him to equip a powerful army for that purpose. After his arrival, a force of 15000 men was despatched against the Marathas under his eldest son, Khanzad Khan and with him many others sardars were sent. After holding an attack on the Marathas during his advance to Dholka, Khanzad Khan defeated the enemy in a pitched battle at the village of Sojitra in Petlad Pargana in January 1726.[9] The tragic fate now overwhelmed the ancient and prosperous town of Vadnagar, illustrated by contrast what three other cities (Ahmadabad, Virgan, and Cambay) had barely managed to escape at this critical period. The situation led to bring the forces of the Peshwa under Antaji and Bhaskar burst into north Gujarat and in Vadnagar which was famous for wealthy merchants at that time. For saving this town, there was an urgent need for a large force which was not possible, but the inhabitants had an option to save themselves by paying a generous tribute, and they had paid four lakhs of rupees. Sometime later, before they had recovered from this calamity, the Maratha army under Khantaji found its way from Godhra to Idar and thence to Vadnagar. After knowing about this another disaster, people had started to fly away to their ancestral homes or somewhere out of the city. The Marathas had entered in the morning and plundered. They looted almost all the wealth, but even after that they were not satisfied and burnt the city. Many of the inhabitants migrated to Mathura and Banaras while others sought new domicile in the towns and villages of Gujarat. The Author of the *Mirat–i-Ahmadi* wrote the following remarks:-

> "It has been in a common saying among the people of these provinces that the city of Ahmadabad had two golden wings: one was the Vadnagar and the other Umreth. This saying arose from the fact that, in both these town there were many wealthy and prosperous merchant whose wealth was estimated by lakhs but owing to the vicissitudes of fortune, and successive calamity, both these town have fallen low and are reduced to ruin and desolation, so that Ahmadabad is now like a bird bereft of wings and plumage".[10]

[9] M. S. Commissariat, *A History of Gujarat*, Vol. II, pp. 424-25.
[10] Ali Mohmmad Khan, *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, Vol. II, M. F. Lokhandwala *(*Eng. trans.), Oriental Institute Baroda, 1965, pp. 111-112.

Sarbuland Khan remained in Gujarat (1726-30), but he failed to complete his work for which he was sent from Delhi. Though he could have offered further resistance with the army, he had brought from Delhi, but he was somehow indisposed to continue the indefinite struggle and show himself ready to accept the offer made by Khantaji in 1726. By an agreement now made, the *chauth* of all the parganas to the north of Mahi River except capital and *haveli parganas* was granted to Khantaji.

The tragic event associated with Vadnagar shows that another dominant Maratha element now had entered the chaotic field of Gujarat politics. The Peshwa Baji Rao I, a bitter rival of Senapati Dhabade at the court of Shahu was determined to undermine the authority of Trimbakrao by securing for himself lacerating rights over the *Chauth* of Gujarat. In the following year, in 1727, Chimnaji Appa the brother of Peshwa, entered the province with his troops and presented as far as Dholka, within 25 miles of the capital. His representative was sent to negotiate with the viceroy, but no negotiation was concluded. Now the Peshwa was, however, determined to establish his claim in Gujarat, though he must have known that this attempt would be bitterly resented by the Dabhade family and its agents. However, the Peshwa's brother Chimanaji Appa again reached in Gujarat on 1 of January 1730 with a large army. The following extract from the letter of Denial Inne from Cambay to Surat, on 25 March 1730, shows that the methods of extortion adopted by the representative of the Peshwa were on a par with those of Pillaji and Kanthaji, the agent of the senapati.

> "The Gamin under Chimnaji Raja, it is said, before they left petland, got from the town near the two lakhs rupees; whence they moved off Dholka way, which town they attacked, but meeting with some resistance, they have pillaged the greatest part of it; the lost sustain can not be yet to be known, but must be vastly great; multitudes say its crore of rupees, others say half of it. This to be done, and so near the nawab (Sarbuland Khan), makes it plain that he is far from having at heart the good or safety of the Gujarat".[11]

Gujarat had to maintain powerful military forces for which it needed to be financially strong but in the meantime, Delhi was not able to help more to resist the Marathas. The inhabitants and the government authority hoped that Baji Rao with his superior

[11] James H. Gense and Rustomji Banaji (ed.), *The Gaikwards of Baroda: English Documents*, Vol. I, B. D. Taraporevela Sons and Company, Bombay, 1947, p. 10.

authority would be able to check the annual exaction of the agents of Dhabade. So the Viceroy entered into a formal treaty with the Peshwas on 23 March 1730. He agreed to cede to Baji Rao the *Sardeshmukhi* or ten percent of the whole revenue, both from the land and custom except from the port of Surat and district attached to it, together with the *Chauth* from the same sources and five percent of the revenue from the city of Ahmadabad. It was further stipulated that the Peshwa was to maintain 2500 forces to keep in the provinces and no extra demands were made. The treaty may be regarded as the culmination of various negotiations and abortive agreement between the Viceroy and the agent of the Peshwa between 1726 to 1729.[12]

The reputation of Surbuland khan at the court had declined considerably during the tenure of five years when he was away in Gujarat, and the Emperor's hope that he would stem the tide of the invasion of the Marathas had not been realized. There were many complaints against the Viceroy to impose the illegal tax and collect the extra money and other acts of oppression. At the Mughal court it was advised to appoint the Hindu viceroy to solve the Maratha issue easily, therefore, for all these reasons orders were issued to recall Mubariz-ul-Mulk and Maharaja Abhay Singh of Marwar, the eldest son of Ajit Singh was appointed as the Viceroy of Gujarat.[13] Maharaja Abhay Singh left the Delhi court and was granted eighteen lakhs of rupees from the royal treasury as well as 20,000 well-trained troops from Nagor and Marwar. When Surbuland Kand knew about this appointment, he decided to resist him as he was the best for the Viceroy of Gujarat while a minor battle took place and Surbulad Khan was defeated by Abhay Singh and was advised to go to Delhi.[14]

The Maratha menace to the Mughal power in Gujarat was now reaching its climax. But if Khan-i-Duran and other ministers of the Emperor, Muhammad Shah hoped that by sending out great Rajput feudatory rulers as subadars of provinces, they would

[12] The details of this treaty are based on the Marathi record, and Grant Duff Edited, *History of Mahrattas*, vol. I, p. 374. V. G. Dighe (ed.), *Peshwa Bjairao-I and Marathas Expansion*, pp. 32-34.

[13] M. S. Commissariat, *A History of Gujarat*, Vol. II, Longman, London, 1938, p. 430.

[14] After securing the departure of Surbuland Khan from Ahmadabad, Maharaja Abhay Singh still encamped outside the walls of the capital, sent Ratan Singh Bhandari into the city on 17th October 1730. Ten days later on October 28th, the Maharaj himself entered the Bhadra citadel in a great state, accompanied by his brother Vakathsingh, on the day of *Dhanterus*. But the Maharaj himself left Ahmadabad in 1733, and during the four years the government remained in the hands of his deputy Rattan Singh. Ibid., p. 436.

be able to stem the rising tide of the Maratha invasion, they were destined to be disappointed during the three years that he remained in Gujarat. Maharaja Abhay Singh did his best to put an end to the annual predatory incursion of the Maratha leaders in search of tribute, using methods of diplomacy and war but he failed to achieve his goal and satisfy the Emperor. The Maharaja was also baffled by the guerilla tactics as well as the shortage of financial resources to fight with the Marathas. He captured Baroda from the Marathas but he failed to retain it and the town and pargana again passed into the hands of the Marathas. Similar difficulties he had to face when 30,000 forces under the widow of Khanderao, Umabai reached the capital. He had to pay a large subsidy. When the Maharaja realized provinces would be lost, he left Gujarat in 1733 and gave his own share to his deputy Ratan Singh, Bhandari.[15]

The success of the Peshwa in Gujarat was an open challenge to the Gaekwads and Dabhade, because the diplomatic gain of the Peshwa and his brother became a barrier for the expansion of the power of the Gaekwads, and it was intolerable because the prestige and perquisites of the Gaekwad were effected. They insisted that the Peshwa should restrict himself to the Malwa, which had been assigned to him by Raja Shahu as the field of activity and leave Gujarat to them. After the death of Khandeorao in 1729, his son Trimbakrao became the new Senapati on January 8, 1730, and confirmed that there was no hope to get authority in Gujarat because in the Satara court the Peshwa was more powerful. In the end, Trimbak Rao decided to join the Nizam to fight against the common enemy.[16]

Confronted with the threat of a serious military conflict between his dominating minister and his aggrieved Senapati, Raja Shahu endeavoured in vain to effect a peaceful settlement. He sent his personal agents to Dabhade and his mother Umabai to advice them to accept the compromise, and he called upon Baji Rao to concede all the demands of the Senapati. But for opposing the secret alliance between senapati and

[15] Ibid., p. 432.
[16] S. R. Bakshi, *Madhya Pradesh Through The Ages: Studies in Indian History*, Sarup And Sons Delhi, 2008, pp. 356-358. The rivalry between the Peshwa and Senapati Dhabade reached to the extent of a rupture which finally took place at Dhabai, for Dhabade thought Gujarat to be the area of influence. Khandeo Rao Dhabade was succeeded by Trimbakrao on 8 Jan 1730. He followed the same path of anti–Peshwa. M. S. Commissirat, *History of Gujarat*, pp. 436-439.

the Nizam, Baji Rao and his brother took the field in October 1730. According to the *Mirat*, on arrival near Baroda, Baji Rao wrote a letter to Maharaja Abhay Singh who was deputed as the faujdar of Baroch to meet him at Mahi. A meeting took place at Shahi Bhagh between Baji Rao and Abhay Singh when terms of the agreement were settled in February 1731. The following brief reference to them found in a letter from Daniel Innes at Cambay on 7 April 1731:

> "The former (Chimnaji) has agreed with the Maharaja (Abhay Singh) for 13 lakhs of rupees, the quarter part of all Gujarat, six of which the maharaja paid him down, the remainder to be paid on his leaving these parts; but conditionally no other gaining power, beside Chimnaji, shall enter into Gujarat, which Chimnaji promised to hinder, should Khantaji's and Pilaji's forces attempt it".[17]

It was also secured that the Rajput troops would join the forces of Baji Rao in order to ensure Baroda from Pilaji. This plan was made by the combined army. At last, the Peshwa forces encountered the Senapati in the village of Bhilapur (Between Baroda and Dhaboi) and a great fight took place here on 1 April 1731, generally known as the Battle of Dhaboi. Both troops fought bravely, but in the face of a large army of the Peshwa, as the Senapati refused to surrender, Baji Rao troops closed in upon him, he was killed by a bullet shot. After that, his troops broke and fled.[18] Pillaji Gaekwad escaped wounded from the battlefield, and one of his sons was among the slayed. The victory of Peshwa in this civil struggle was complete, and Dhabade who played an important part in the history of the Maratha expansion had completely lost his prestige and influence at the court which they had enjoyed since a long time.[19]

The English factor of that time deeply analysed every aspect of the conflicts between the Peshwa and Dhabade. Deniel Innes at Cambay wrote a letter to Surat. He wrote Chimnaji Appa as the leader of the Peshwa army that there was little doubt that Baji Rao was present in this battle:

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[17] James H. Gense and Rustomji Banaji (ed.), *The Gaikwards of Baroda: English Documents*, Vol. I, p. 10.

[18] It was reported in a letter that the shot that killed Trimbak Rao was fired by his maternal uncle, Bhau Singh Thoke of Abhone who probably had been succeeded by the Peshwa. M. S. Commissariat, *History of Gujarat*, p. 439.

[19] V. S. Kadam, *Maratha Confederacy: A Study in its Origin and Development*, pp. 98-102.

> "Chimnaji Raja (Chimnaji Appa) has lately had a considerable advantage over the joint forces of Pillaji and Kanthaji. The Same day, since came to engagement within 3 or 4 miles from Baroda, when Chimnaji had advantages. Kanthaji fled, Pillaji is wounded and run into Dhaboi fort with 2 or 3000 troops. Trimbakrao a great general, killed, Pillaji son killed, 4 or 5000 men are killed of Kantaji and Pillaji, and Chimnaji said to have lost 1000 men, 17 elephants, it said, Chimnaji has taken 10 Camels of treasure, and four or five thousand horse without their riders, with their tents and baggage."[20]

Another interesting fact was also brought from the same letter which showed the position and condition of the Nizam army.

> "The nephew of Chin Klich Khan [The Nizam] who, it is said commanded 5000 more men belongs to Chin Clich Khan, in the lashkaer of Khantaji and Pillaji, is said likewise to be killed. Udaji Pawar a commander of 15000 horses, taken the prisoner in Chimnaji forces have surrendered Dhaboi fort that Pillaji is in. What makes the action greater is that Chimnaji had but 15000 or 16000 of joint forces of Pillaji or Khantaji are said to have been upwards of 50000."[21]

Shahu Raja was shocked and distressed at the death of his brave commander, while Umabai was heart-broken at the loss of her son and demanded retribution against the Peshwa. A long account is available of the solace of Shahu on the loss of Gaekwad in this conflict.[22]

The result of this battle spread very quickly in the entire *subas*. Abhay Singh understood clearly the situation of Gujarat and power of the Peshwa and wrote a detailed letter to the Emperor and explained every aspect of the future diplomatic

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[20] M. S. Commissariat, *History of Gujarat*, Vol. II, p. 439.
[21] Ibid., p. 440.
[22] Shahu immediately proceeded to Talegao to meet the bereaved mother and brought her to Satara in order to offer her consolidation and comfort her with Baji Rao. He summoned both of them to his presence in the *Durbar;* desired Baji Rao to prostrate himself before Umabai, and gave her a sword and asked her to sever his head if that would placate her. The widow of Khanderao was mollified when the Peshwa humbly begged her pardon and offered her all possible compensation for her loss. The Raja next conferred the office of the Senapati on her younger son Yaswantrao. During the next 20 years, during Damaji Gaikward, after Pillaji was murdered in 1732, served Umabai ably as her lieutenant in Gujarat and though the actual power was in his hands, he remain loyal to her till her death in 1753.

policy. He wrote Trimbak Rao Dhabade and Mominyar Khan, the commander of the Nizam; both had been killed. Udaji Pawar and the son of Pillaji were taken prisoners while Pillaji was retrieved to Dhaboi. In this situation, the Maharaja especially desired the Nawab to issue an order to the Nizam not to help Kanthaji or Pillaji or any confederate leaders. Abhay Singh also wrote to his agent that this time Baji Rao had rendered meritorious services to the Emperor and at last, he requested the Emperor to grant a *mansab* to Balaji.[23] The answer from Delhi to his letter was not in the favour of Abhay Singh. Orders were given to him to punish Baji Rao and to drive him away and give him no help whatsoever. The Nawab was, thus, acting on the advice of the Nizam. It was perhaps due to the inability of Khan Duran to send him the financial help that he so urgently insisted in his letter. He finally added, '*What the Almighty desire will happen, but the Emperor loose the provinces".*[24]

After the death of Trimbakrao Dhabade at the battle of Dhaboli, Baji Rao did not think it wise to allow the bitter memories to sustain and adopted every means of conciliation in his power. He appointed the young Yashwant Rao Dabhade as Senapati to take the place of his father and Pillaji was nominated as his *Mutaliq* and the title of *Sena Khas Khel*[25], (commander of special guard) in addition to that *Samsher Bahadur* which he had inherited from his uncle Damaji I. By his hold in Songadh fort, and his recent acquisition of Baroda and the fort of Dabhoi, he had made himself still more formidable.

On the arrival of Pillaji with a great army of Dakor[26], to collect Chauth, the Viceroy (Maharaja Abhay Singh) sent some Marwadi emissaries ostensibly to carry on negotiation with the Maratha leader for a settlement. They conferred with him for a couple of days and had a frequent interview to disarm suspicion. After some days in one evening after taking leave of Pillaji, one of them returned on the pretext that he had something confidential to communicate to him and effecting to whisper to in the ear of Pilaji, stabbed him to death (March 1732).[27] The assassin was immediately

[23] M. S. Commissariat, *History of Gujarat*, p. 442.
[24] Ibid., p. 443.
[25] 'Sena Khas Khel' came to be henceforth the distinctive title of Gaekwad, and each succeeding head of the House had to purchase investiture under this title from the Poona Darbar before ascending the gadi.
[26] Dakor is the large town in the Thasra taluka of the Kaira District, 9 miles north east of Anand.
[27] *Mirat-i-Ahmadi*, Vol. II, pp. 175-176.

slain by the guard, and the body of their murder leader cremated in the village of Salvi.[28] The murder of Pilaji by the emissaries of Maharaja Abhay Singh took place probably a few days before 23rd March 1732, on which date Maharaja wrote a letter to his own Vakil Bhandari Amarsingh at Delhi court, and stated that "by the grace of the Goddess (Hinglaj) Pilu has been killed" It also says that:-

> *"Pilu (Pillaji) having crossed the Mahi with large contingents, the Subedar has marched from Chandola and encamped at Bareja, at which place Pilaji envoys came to negotiate with him, through whom he commanded the invader to vacate Baroda and Dabhoi which were a Mughal post and to accept the imperial services. Pilaji did not pay the head of these order and declared that Baroda belongs to his chief (Daabhade), and that three Mughal viceroys had come and gone, including Surbuland Khan, who had been obliged to pay chauth. We, therefore, thought that without doing away with him we cannot take Baroda".*[29]

After two hours of the murder of Pillaji, a contingent of two thousand selected cavalries was dispatched. Evidently took advantage of the confusion following upon the foul dead. The brother of Pilaji, along with five or seven people was killed in his camp. Five hundred Marathas fell on the spot and other including a large number of Kolis, booty was taken including 7000 horses.[30] After the death of Pillaji, the Maratha in a great confusion abandoned the town of Baroda and retired to the strong fort of Dhaboi. Maharaja Abhay Singh took full authority, occupied Baroda and placed it in charge of Sher Khan Babi. The son of Pillaji, Damaji-I succeeded the position of his father in Gujarat, and during his remarkable military career of 36 years (1732-1768), he built up an imposing fabric of the rule of the Gaekwad sovereign in the province.[31]

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[28] Salvi is now the headquarters of the *taluka* of the same name in the Baroda District. In the immediate vicinity of the town are large tanks and shady trees and at no great distance is the wild mehwasi areas and jungle bordering on the Mahi river.

[29] M. S. Commissariat, *History of Gujarat*, p. 444.

[30] Pandit Bisheshwar Nath Reu, 'Another letter of Maharaja Abhay Singh about the Murder of Pilaji Gaekwad, I *Proceeding of Indian History Congress*, 6th Session, Jodhpur, 1943, pp. 281-284.

[31] A. R. Kulkarni, *Marathas and Marathas Country: The Marathas*, Books and Books, Bombay, 1996, pp. 139-140; S. D. Kulkarni, *The Struggle For Hindu Supremacy*, Shri Vedavyasa Itihass Sansodhana Mandira (Bhisma), 1992, pp. 209-211; M. S. Commissariat, *History of Gujarat*, pp. 444-445.

Damaji, the eldest son and successor of Pillaji, after burning, the dead body of his father at Salvi, at first went to Singad where Umabai Dabhade supported him, and personally took part in the campaign in attacking of Ahmadabad. While Damaji was driving out Marvadi, his agent Ranoji had to meet Bande in the field at Anand Morgi, and there he defeated severe loss. He then obtained from Momin Khan the Chauth of the revenue north of Mahi, was joined soon after by Damaji and with him entered Viramgam, after expelling the Kasbatis of that town. Meanwhile, Kantaji Kadam Bande, who had thrown himself on the side of the Peshwa in the hope of punishing Damaji, invaded northern Gujarat with Malhar Rao Holkar.

They plundered Vadnagar and Palanpur, without any harm of Gaekwad forces because they fear to meet Partaprao Gaekwad, the brother of Damaji and Daraji Takpir, who were then at the neighbourhood of Dholka, and thereafter assisted Damaji in collecting the tribute of Sorath chief of the Kathiawad and Gohilwad, Pawar too made an attempt to seize something out of the spoil of the Gujarat, but he was defeated.[32]

Abhay Singh resolved promptly to take advantages of the confusion into which the death of Pillaji, as he thought, have thrown the Maratha. His general Dhoklasing marched rapidly to take both the town and fort, which were made over Sher Khan Babi. The Gaekwad lost Baroda and fell back to Dabhoi to the south to maintain position. However, Damaji only waited for the last ritual of his father at Salvi, after this, as above explained, the Gaekwad power again proved its strength in the Gujarat region. Damaji got support from the old ally of Pillaji, the Desai of Padra, stirred up the Bhils and Kolis all over Gujarat so effectively that the Mughals were thrown into confusion, at Songadh the Gaekwad family gathered its forces together; and Umabai, the widows of the last Senapati appealed to all to take revenge from the Mughals. The energetic measure of Damaji soon bore the good fruits. Damajirao raid on Ahmadabad met with some success. His uncle, Maloji or Mahadji, was dispatched from Jambusahar to oppose the Mughal army which he did. In 1734 Damaji recovered Baroda after defeating the governor, Sher Khan Babi.[33] Baroda had ever since remained in the hands of the Gaekwads. The Marathas seized the town of Baroda with

[32] Ibid., p. 28.
[33] *Gazetteer of the Bombay Presidency*, Vol. VI: *Kewa Kantha, Narukot, Cambay and Surat States,* Government Central Press, Bombay, 1890, p. 188.

vigour, so that Mughal garrison, finding no help available, submitted and handed over both the town and the fort.[34] In 1664, Damaji made it its headquarters, and developed as capital for Baroda state; it became the foremost and one of the most progressive cities in the provinces.

Table -1[35]

The Babi Family in Gujarat in the eighteenth century



[34] *Mirat-i-Ahmadi*, pp. 206-207.
[35] M. S. Commissariat, *History of Gujarat*, p. 435.

Damaji then marched from Songadh with a strong army, and made an incursion into the heart of Jodhpur country, after taking many secure places in the east of Gujarat. Abhay Singh then grew so anxious about the safety of his own dominions that he abandoned Gujarat in 1737.[36]

Umabai had recognized Damajirao as her agent in succession to Pilajirao, but she required him in the Deccan, he had been obliged to leave a deputy, Rangoji, to take his place in Gujarat. A quarrel arose between Rangoji and Kantaji Kadam Bande, and the later was defeated at Anand Morgi. Rangoji next obtained from Moim Khan the *chauth* of the revenue north of the Mahi, and entered Viramgam with Damaji who had returned from the Deccan. The brother of Damajirao, Partaprao, and Devaji Takapir, his general gained many advantages and ravaged the whole of northern Gujarat, while Damaji levied contribution in Sorath, Kathiawad, and Gohilwad. During this crisis, not only Bande but Pawar attempted to seize the apparent opportunity of pushing their interest in Gujarat, but Damaji was robust enough to repel them.[37]

The new viceroy Abhay Singh was not able to replace Moim Khan, owing to the continued presence of Marwadi and summoned Rangoji for help and promised him to return grants one-half of Gujarat except Ahmadabad and the port of Cambay, which he had made his own headquarters. Moim Khan, accordingly, undertook the siege of the capital, joined by Damajirao. In return, he did not give half of the revenue of Gujarat but one-half of the city of Ahmadabad and instead of a share in Cambay a share in the whole district of Viramgam. According to the agreement made, several of the gates[38] were handed over to Rangoji, who in the absence of Damajirao at Sorath, commanded the Maratha; and it is needless to add that this divided the authority led to

[36] J. W. Watson, *History of Gujarat,* Cosmo Publication, New Delhi, 1876 reprint 1986, pp. 116-117.
[37] A. B. Clarke, *Gazetteer of the Baroda State,* Vol. I, Time Press, Bombay, 1923, p. 447.
[38] It appears that the terms of the treaty made with Damaji, not only the revenue but also the government of the capital, were to be equally divided between Moim Khan and the Gaekwads. For this purpose, the southern half of the city now passed to Rangoji, along with the control over the six gates viz. the Raykhand and the Khan Jahan on the river, the Jamalpur and the close gate on the south, and the Astodiya and Raipur to the East and Maratha gurad were posted over them. At the same time the *thanadars* of Rangoji took their seats side by side with the Nizam officers in all the wards of the city, and all the chaklas and bazaars eg. the zaveri Bazar, the pan market, ghee-knata, and the vegitable markets to take note that revenue received and to secure one half of the same. See in *Mirat-i-Ahmadi,* II , pp. 290-291.

endless disputes.[39] The power of Damajirao increased very rapidly during these years, both in Gujarat and Kathiawad, as may be conjectured from his capture of Borsad, not far from Ahmadabad and his demonstration against Broach, which was held by an agent for the Nizam, when he probably succeed in obtaining a share in the customs of that city. He was still the agent of Yashwant Rao Dabhade, as he grew up, he proved incompetent for his station and when the lady died in 1747, Damajirao was nominated deputy of the Marathas in Gujarat.[40]

At this stage, Damajirao was in power to limit the design of Peshwa Baji Rao, and when Raghuji was pushing his interest in Gujarat, he was chiefly occupied in watching Songadh and observing the affairs were taking place in the Deccan. However, Damaji at this time paid little attention to Gujarat, but he was looking at the course of the event in the Deccan. He was now a despicable opponent, but the master of large territories, and the real chief of his party, and for Yashwant Rao Dabhade, though nominally he was the Senapati. He had an ally, Raghuji Bhosle, who was then the greatest rival the Peshwa had. When the Peshwa died in 1740, Damaji sided with Raghuji Bhosle in pressing the claim of relative but a competent enemy for the post of the Peshwaship. The next year Raghuji Bhosle and Damaji Gaekwad entered in the Deccan at the same time from the opposite direction, while the Peshwa was in Bengal but his rapid return and detail of Raghuji Bhosle troops quickly put the end of the scheme of these alliances.

The decade of the 1740s was one of the critical phases of the political transition for the Maratha administration which changed the mindset of not only the Peshwa but also the families of these confederates. As a result, Gaekwad who regained his power in Gujarat started forming new alliances to become more superior to the authority of Poona. At this meantime, Rani Sukmabai [41]of the shrinking family who was the bitter enemy of Balaji declared herself in favor of Raja of Kolhapur as successor and requested Damaji to support it. Damaji, therefore, sided with her. In 1750 C.E. when he was summoned to attend at Poona as a representation of the Senapati, he did not come. He could not hinder the formation of the Confederacy which made Balaji as the

[39]A. B Clarke, *Gazetteer of the Baroda State,* Vol. I, Time Press, Bombay, 1923, p. 448.
[40] Ibid., p. 448.
[41] G. S. Sardesai, *New History of Marathas,* Vol. II, pp. 269-270.

head and Poona as the capital of the united Maratha state.[42] In the year of 1751, the Peshwa had demanded from Yashwant Rao Dabhade half of his possessions in Gujarat, which Damaji refused to surrender. The same year later he was called by Tara Bai to rescue the young Raja of Satara from the Peshwa thralldom[43], and Gaekwad considered his action as one of the steps to save the whole Maratha nation from the dominion of the Brahman party. Therefore, he quickly answered the call.

Tara Bai, after summoning Damaji for help to seize the person of her grandson Ramraja, who had been proclaimed as the successor of Shahu, and taking advantage of the absence of the Peshwa at Aurangabad, shut herself in the fort of Satara. Damaji helped her with 15,000 men. On hearing the news, Peshwa Baji Rao, hurried back from Aurangabad. Nana Purandhre had attacked and driven back the Gujarat troops to Jore Khora, when they wanly waited for the Partinidhi promised aid. Damaji at one place called upon to pay up the arrears due from Gujarat by the Senapati, and a portion of his territory and when he urged that he could not do this as he was merely *Mutalik* of Dabadhe, the Peshwa suddenly plundered the camp of Damaji.[44] The Peshwa thereupon sent a secret order to arrest some members of the families of the Gaekwad and the Dabhade, then residing at Talegaon, and imprison them in the fort of Lohgadh. Damaji and his *Karbhari*, Ramchandra Yashwant were imprisoned in Poona, the son of Damajirao, Sayajirao was also sent to Mangalvedha but the younger sons, Govindrao and Fatehsingrao remained safe with Tarabai at Satara.[45]

After arresting Damajirao, the Peshwa made a great effort to wrest Gujarat from the Mughals and the Gaekwad party. The task was given to his brother, Raghunathrao. Jawan Murad Khan took advantages of the occasion to increase his power in Kathiawad. The Peshwa, therefore, determined to come to terms with his formal rival, and Damajirao was anxious to obtain his release at any cost so that he might settle his affairs. During the year of his imprisonment, Gaekwad also paid beside his annual

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[42] A. B Clarke, *Gazetteer of the Baroda State,* Vol. I, Time Press, Bombay, 1923, p. 452.
[43] G. S. Sardesai, *New History of Maratha,* Vol. II, pp. 301-302 , Ramraja was naturally inclined to support the Peshwa as against his grand- mother, but this condition enraged the lady all the more, so that they soon became bitter opponents.
[44] Ibid., p. 33. The unfortunate chief and his Minister, Ramchandra Baswannt, were confined in Poona, his eldest son Sayajji was also sent to Mangalvedha, but Govindrao and Fatehsing the younger member of the family, remained safe with Tara Bai at Satara.
[45] Ibid., p. 453.

tribute of 5¼ lakhs, fine, and tribute which amounted to 10 lakh rupees. Damaji accepted the terms of the Peshwa.[46] These were as followed –

1. 15 lakhs were fixed as the sum due for arrears, and the half of Gujarat and all future conquests, whether in the territory or kind, were to be ceded.
2. He agreed to maintain an army of 10,000 horses in Gujarat, as well as to furnish a contingent of the army of the Peshwa in the Deccan and to contribute towards the support of the Raja.
3. As the *Mutalik* of Dabhade, he consented to pay 5¼ lakhs tribute due on account of Dabhade family beside an annual sum for the backing to the establishment of Senapati's army.

From the money point of view, Gujarat was equally shared between the Gaekwad and the Peshwa. The whole partition was fixed in the following manner.

Table 1 Revenue of Surat Athavisi [47]

(A)	Of the part of Surat *atthavisi:* Hanspot, Ankleshwar, Olpad, Sarbhon, Supa, Parchot, Balsad, Bhutsar, Parnera, Vasda, Buhari, Bardoli, Balvad	
	Customs Value: Svarajya	8,15,500
	Moghlai	88,200
	Total	**9,03,700**
(B)	Between the Rewa and Mahi Kantha, Dabhoi, Dahajbare, Jambusahar, Salvi, Amod, Bahadarpur	7,15,000
(C)	North of the Mahi: half of the Daskroi, Borsad, Dhadhuka, a share in the company customs, Thamna, Mahmudabad, Viragam	8,50,000
	Total	**24,68,700**

Seventeen villages, worth *Svarajya* 77051, Moghlai 3,867(total Rs. 80,918)[48] were not included in the partition. The territories under Amali mahl which had been fully reduced were a new region of conflict amongst the Confederates.

[46] A. B. Clarke, *Gazetteer of the Baroda State*, Vol. I, Time Press, Bombay, 1923, p. 454.
[47] *Aitchison's Treaty,* VI, Appendix-I, 1876.

Territories under the Gaekwad: [49]

1.	Surat aththavisi Rajwara Mahal 28 Jakat	10,18,000
2.	Rewa North and Mahi South Mahal Jakat	9,05,000
3.	Mahi North and Rasti Mahal 5 Jakat and Jortalbi 12 Mahaland 9 Taluka	85,0000
	Total	**27, 73,000**

Thus, the settled and already conquered portions of Gujarat were evenly divided between the Peshwa and the Gaekwad though, later on, the former asserted that this share was not in any way equal to that of the Gaekwad and consequently, insisted on the addition of the certain districts. In addition to half of the share in settled area, the Gaekwad obtained for the maintenance of his family districts worth Rs. 3,00,500 in the Surat *atthavisi*. This was distributed in the following manner:

Table -2[50]

Parganas	Savarajya	Moghlai	Total
Vyara	11,000	----	11,000
Temba	31,000	9,000	40,000
Kadod	29,000	1,000	30,000
Mota	9,000	1,000	10,000
Kasa	3,500	-----	3,500
Raner	10,000	----	10,000
Chikhli	51,500	15,500	67,000
Vanvada	11,000	----	11,000
Dhamed	3,000	----	3,000
Variav	16,500	85,000	25,000
Sinor	85,000	----	85,000
Talikwada	5,000	-----	5,000
Total	2,65,500	35,000	3,00,500

[48] *Swarajya* seems to have been the amount set apart for the Raja of Satara, that being the name given originally to the territories acquired by Shivaji. The word Moghlai means 'belonging to the Mughal' Moghlai was accordingly, that part of the revenue of a village which was share of the Mughal government and which the Maratha did not appropriate. Grants made from this Mughal share of the revenue were also called *Mughlai*. The grantees used to collect it directly from the villages.

[49] पुष्कर रमेश शास्त्री, *मराठ्यांच्या अमलाखालील गुजरात,* अपरांत प्रकाशन, पुणे , २०१४, p. ३१.

[50] A. B Clarke, *Gazetteer of the Baroda State,* Vol. I, Time Press, Bombay, 1923, p. 456.

The important questions which one needs to ask after this partition is – first, was the partition of Gujarat primarily the partition of the power of the Peshwa and the Gaekwad? Second, on what basis was this distribution made? Was it a legitimate way of distributing power amongst the different families of the Confederates? If yes, how many times did the Peshwa follow these rules for determining the power and legitimacy of the Confederates?

This political turbulence amongst the families of different Maratha Confederates took years to settle the internal conflict. Finally, they decided to divide the territorial areas amongst the confederates. Then the dues from Baroch were collected, one-third of the revenue of Surat was extracted from Safdar Khan, who had become the Governor of the city, through the help of the other Maratha and in early 1759 the town was divided among the Peshwa, the Gaekwad and the English. Shankaraji Keshav Phadke, Subhadar of Bassein, who had invaded Surat aththavisi and besieged Parnera, was driven back.



Map 1: Partition of the territories in Gujarat between Peshwa and Gaikward 1752 A.D. From V. S. Kadam, *Maratha Confederacy: A study of its Origin and Development*, Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers, New Delhi, 1993, p. 97.

The Siege of Ahmadabad and Dual Control of the Peshwa and Gaekwad

The powerful Maratha army under the command of Sadashiv Ramchandra was joined by the Martha troops under Damaji and by Jawan Murad Khan, his ally. The great siege of Ahmadabad began in winter season on 7 January 1757 and lasted for nearly fourteen months in February 1758 showed the better phases of the unity and alliances among the Peshwa, the Gaekwad and other Sardars. Moim Khan was not able to understand the Maratha tactics. His army was starved, from the scarcity of the resources. In the beginning of the year 1758, the siege reached the final stage, when the inhabitants of Ahmadabad started believing that the political power of Ahmadabad would be changed soon. An uncommon messenger of peace now appeared on the scene as a person of distinguished Mughal noblemen from Delhi who was a well-known Sufi and was on the way to Mecca. His name was Husain Kulli Khan, who for a long time had held a high position at the court, and who used to be consulted on all state. He was requested to visit Baji Rao at Poona and to establish a friendly relation with the Mughals.[51]

In due course, Shah Nur arrived at Poona, where he was welcomed by the Peshwa, and discussed the terms of compromise for the siege of Ahmadabad. The merchant community and the local inhabitants of Ahmadabad were in suspicion, and many rumors were spread in the market about the terms of the deal of Moim Khan and the Marathas. Before any terms could settle down between Moim Khan and the Marathas, the rumors to the effect of that order had arrived at Ahmadabad and reached at Cambay within a few days.

The *Surat diary* entry on 16 January 1758 refers to a letter from the Cambay agent which says:

> "*We have now current reports here of reconciliation negotiating between the Maratha and Nawab of Gujarat, and these are related to such other circumstances as gives the report a face of credibility. It confidently affirms that there are arrived in the Maratha army several horsemen with Positive order from the Nana (Baji Rao) to*

[51] When he visited Suja-ud-daulah, Viceroy of Oudh, a request was made as he was going to Surat in order to embark for Haj that he might render a service by visiting the court of Balajirao at Poona and arrange to establish friendly relation between them.

head of these forces to compromise their differences with the Nawab, and to grant him to same conditions his father formerly had in possession of that place, that is one-half of the revenue he enjoy, and other to be collected by such person as the Nana shall choose to appoint in his own behalf, so that in we are in daily expectation of seeing an end to these disturbances".[52]

Another entry in Surat Dairy on 28 January records the receipt of the latter as:

"no reconciliation between the contesting parties yet had been effected at Ahmadabad, and this delay is imputed to the peace aid to be lately made between Nana and Salabat Jung, so that it is now reported the Maratha insist on the Nawab relinquishing Gujarat (Ahmadabad). The latter added that Moim Khan, in spite of his difficulties, does not relax in the least from his former demands, we have yet little hopes of seeing a speedy end to these disturbances".[53]

However, the terms finally settled that Moim Khan should receive one lakhs of rupees, after deducting from this amount the sum of thirty thousand which had been offered as a bribe to Jamadar Salim in the early month of siege, and which the latter had handed to his master. Among the other conditions, the Peshwa was to receive as formerly, half the customs duties on the part of Cambay, and Moim Khan was to surrender Gogha and to deliver Shambhuram to the Deccanis. Moim Khan surrendered Ahmadabad to the Marathas, as on 27 February 1758.

The Share of the Peshwa in Ahmadabad and Cambay

In another letter dated 20th March 1758, Robert Lambert conveyed the correct information about the condition upon which Nawab Moim Khan had settled with the Marathas. 'It is now public, says the chief that 'he also had delivered them up all Gogo had granted them a half share in Cambay government.' The English agent explained it as, a half share in the Government was significant as indicating the political grip which in practice the deputies of the Peshwa were able to hold henceforth over the ruler of Cambay. The agent pointed out:-

[52] Gense & Banaji, *The Gaikwad of Baroda*, Vol. I, p. 116.
[53] Ibid., p. 116.

> *"In a few days we expect the Maratha pandit, who is to say here with a power equal, if not superior, to the Nawab's; and as it will be needful for me to make him some present on his arrival, and also to give something to the Nawab on this occasion of his return, I beg your permission to comply with what has been a rule in similar cases".*[54]

On the day Moim Khan left for Cambay after the surrender of the capital (February 27, 1758), Damaji Gaekwad entered the city by the Jamalpur gate. The leading Hindu and Muslim merchants of Ahmadabad waited on Damaji and later on, Sadashiv Ramchandra in their camp. The symbol of the Hindu rule also reappeared. The appearance of the figure of the elephant's God, sacred to Ganesh, on the coins had been prohibited by Moim Khan, was now restored.[55] With the final capture of Ahmadabad in 1758, the sovereign authority over the city passed to the Peshwa, and it was exercised by successive Sursubahs sent by him from Poona. Damaji, however, appeared to have been allowed individual right and privileges. Nevertheless, the question of power of the Peshwa and the Gaekwad in Ahmadabad became one of the most controversial issues which destroyed the Peshwa power in Gujarat.[56]

In 1760 Damaji was also one of the many Maratha chiefs who took part in the third battle of Panipat; one of the few who returned uninjured to his home. Damaji returned to Gujarat as full of vigor as ever, and for several years he was engaged in endless wars, which ended the expulsion of the Babi family.[57] In short, between the years 1763-1766, he dispossessed the children of Kama –ud-din Babi of Patan, Vishalnagar, Vadnnagar, Kherala, Vijapur and all they had.[58] The result of this achievement for the Gaekwad was that now he conquered nine districts which were granted as Saranjam by the Peshwa, and these were- Kheralu, Raozanapur, Bijapur, Dhamni, and Maujpur,

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[54] Ibid., p. 117.

[55] M. S. Commissariat, *History of Gujarat*, p. 542.
[56] Ibid., p. 543.
[57] The Babi family was one of the prominent leading families in the peninsular Gujarat. In the eighteenth century Safdar Khan fought at Ratanpur against Dhanaji Jadhav in 1706 and died in 1726. He had two sons, first Salabat Khan (Faujdar of Virmgam) died in 1730, second Jawan Murad Khan (fauzdar of Petland) died in 1728. Sher Khan Babi was the only son of Salabat Muhmmad Khan. Sher Khan Babi became the first Nawab of Junagadh (entitled Bahadur Khan), 1748-58.
[58] F. A. H. Elliot, *The Rulers of Baroda*, Baroda State Press, 1879, p. 38.

the remaining Pattan, Vadnagar, Vishalnagar, and Sidhpur. In this way were added to the territory of the Gaekwad some of the finest districts he possessed.[59]

In the battle of Godnadi, Damajirao significantly contributed to the victory of Ragunathrao over the Peshwa troops, which was commanded by Gopalrao Patwardhan. Elphinstone pointed out about this alliance that "in the year after the battle of Panipat, Damajirao assisted against his nephew Madhavrao, and through his assistance got the title of *Sena Khas khel* and *Sand* for share in Gujarat".[60] Soon after this, the Peshwa bestowed, on Raghunathrao, Teladi and five other districts, and had granted to the Gaekwad the right of reserving to himself the whole of any future conquest he might make. However, it irritated MadhavRao, asserted that the earlier partition of Gujarat was not fair one, and that the following district should be ceded to the Peshwa.

Table- 3: Revenue from Svarajya and Mughal Territories[61]

Parganas	Svarajya	Moghlai	Total
Teladi	Rs. 66,500	Rs. 6,000	Rs. 72,000
Maroli	40,000	2,500	42,500
Galha	50,,000	9,000	59,000
Bisanpur	12,000	-----	12,000
Moha	36,000	5,000	41,000
Vaghora	25,000	-----	25,000
Total	2,29,500	22,500	2,52,000

However, these regions at this time worth Rs. 2,54,000, after the third great struggle between the Peshwa and the Gaekwad were restored to the latter on the condition of him paying the sum as an additional tribute. [62]

[59] Ibid., p. 39.
[60] A. B. Clarke, *Gazetteer of the Baroda State*, Vol. I, Time Press, Bombay, 1923, p. 463.
[61] Ibid., p. 464.
[62] Ibid., p. 465. It is most probable that in his claim to return the whole of all the future conquests, Damajorao was making a special reference to the Babi *mahal*.If so, a mention should be made of the fact that in 1749 a sanad was granted to Damaji by the Peshwa, bestowing on him as Saranjam the nine districts of Kamal-ud-din Babi, of which a mention has been made in the partition. In later times the Peshwa frequently tried to obtained tribute

In 1768, Raghunath Rao was now at open strife with his nephew Madhavrao Peshwa, who had also taken increasing umbrage at the now open hostility of Damajirao. This year Raghunathrao marched with 15,000 men against the Peshwa, which were commanded by Govindrao, the son of Damaji, encamped at Dhodap, a fort in the Chandore range. He was suddenly surrounded and defeated by the Peshwa; both of them were taken as prisoners. Later Govindrao took way to Poona for a long time. Again, one more term was extracted to the Gaekwad. The six ceded mahals were indeed restored, except some of them were still held back for *darbar kharach* (Office expenditure) and those were Sattargam pargana and the three villages of Dabhoi, Parse and Umran.[63] But instead of 5 ¼ lakhs, he was compelled to pay an annual Rs. 7,79,000 for his rebellion in 1768.

The amount of 41 lakhs was to be paid in installments of 5 ¼ lakhs a year. Damajirao was also to satisfy the claim of Dabhade family and Khanderao Gaekwad, and to keep his agreement concerning the sharing of customs of Surat and Ahmadabad strictly. Finally, it was agreed that the Gaekwad should supply the Peshwa with 3,000 or in times of need, 4,000 horses. In short, the Gaekwad succumbed. The term of this treaty was finally ratified, not by Damajirao himself, but by his son, Fatesing and Govindrao, who as rivals endeavored to outbid each other in their attempts to gain the support of the Poona court.[64] This was the third and last great defeat the Gaekwad suffered at the hands of the Peshwa. But a worse misfortune was now to befall the Gaekwads. Before the agreement had been finally settled Damaji died in consequences, it is said, of an accident which happened in the course of some chemical experiment.[65]

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for this territory from the Gaekwads, or a portion of the district for themselves. But though on the one occasion Gaekwad paid one lakh and another Rs. 21,000 for the Babi mahal, he successfully resisted for all further attempts to this direction.

[63] Ibid., p. 465.
[64] Ibid., p. 466.
[65] Ibid., p. 40. One of the popular and dramatic stories is that Damaji fell a victim to the plots of his enemy. Once, an old man of reverend aspect who promised to show him a way of making gold. He then apparently induced the chief to shut himself up in a room where a charcoal fire was burning, the result being that he was asphyxiated.

II

Origin, Alliances, and Expansion of Shinde and Holkar

The families of Shinde and Holkar were one of the important confederates of the Marathas, who firmly strengthen their power in central and western India in the beginning of the eighteenth-century, later developed as an independent princely state in the early nineteenth century. Kinship of this confederates contributed one of the significant themes in the history of the eighteenth century. This section mainly deals with the origin and alliances of these families and consolidation, and expansion of their power in northern and western India prior to 1760 C.E. The family background and kinship structure of these two confederates were mostly similar but their political motive and diplomatic policies were different, which created more gap in their unity and later, both of them developed as two separate princely states.

Origin of Family of Holkar and Process of Domination in Malwa

The eighteenth century witnessed a change of the first magnitude in the political aspect of India- the transfer of power from the Mughal rulers to the Marathas. The Maratha entered to gain power in the northern provinces of the empire in the first decade of the eighteenth century - a measure adopted in the early stage of struggle as a counterpoise against the Mughal attacks on their bases; the northwards gained in momentum as the century advanced. In this phase of transition, the family of the two leading Confederates, Shinde and Holkar established their strong bases in Malwa. Malhar Rao Holkar [66] who was born in 1693 C.E. in the village named Hol, near Jejuri on the bank of river Nira in the Poona district known to each one in Malwa provinces. His mother was from the family of Bargal, who had settled at Talode in Khandesh district. The original sir name of the Holkar family was *Virkar*, who was Dhangar in the village of Hol- Marum. The Virkar were Maratha Dhangars with some importance in the village of Hol-Murum, as they held the situation of Chowgula under the village Patel.[67] The father of Malhar Rao Holkar died when he was only three years old. Khandoji estate was gradually usurped by the relative, and the mother of Malhar Rao had to face a very hard time to survive, therefore, she decided to go to the

[66] The surname Holkar takes its name from the village *Hol* where his family resided. The original surname of the family of Malhar Rao was *Virkar.*

[67] Chowgula means deputy village officers working under the head Patel. In the Indore state gazetteer, 1794 C. E. is given as the birth year of Malhar Rao Holkar.

place where her brother lived. Her brother, Bhojraj Bargal[68] was living in Talode and she resolved to go there with her child. The family of Bargal also enjoyed some important position in the village, Talode (Khandesh). The young Malhar was asked to look after the horses of the Bargal family and to learn riding and the use of the lance, which was an indispensable weapon in the warfare ~~of~~ in those times. Here, Malhar Rao learned his first lesson in military tactics and the art of work and thus, attracted the attention of his master, Sardar Kadam Bande.

In 1717, Balaji Vishwanath started an important expedition from Satara, also requested by Sayyid brother at the Mughal court. For two years Saiyad Husain Ali struggled hard in the Deccan to put down the Maratha encroachments as best as he could, but suddenly the political situation at the Delhi court changed. The position of his brother, Saiyed Abdulah at Delhi was steadily deteriorating and became so precarious, that it created circumstances to form an alliance with the Marathas. The agent who played a major role in this association also known as Shankaraji Malhar, the author of Shahu Chronicle writes:

> *"When the emperor Farrukshiyar recalled Nizam-ul-mulk and appointed Saiyed Husain Ali to the chief Subaship of the Deccan, later selected for his chief advisor one Shankaraji Malhar, a distinguished and old Maratha diplomat who migrated long ago from his attendance as sachiv upon Rajaram at Jinji and resided at Benares. The emperor learned of this clever and serviceable person, brought him to Delhi under personal persuasion, and sent him to the Deccan with Sayied Husan Ali as his confidential advisor upon matter concerning the Marathas. The emperor made suitable provision for Shankarji Malhar's services as an ambassador".*[69]

Shankaraji arrived at Satara early in 1718. Shahu and his counselors grasped almost like a golden opportunity for establishing direct contact with Delhi and putting an end

[68] The family of Bargal is now extinct. The brother of Gautmabai took service with the Rana of Udaipur and obtained the *jagir* which descended to his son Bhojram and to his grandsons Mugoji and Shaukar Rao. Ultimately the *jagir* was resumed, and after the peace of Mandsaur, the family was stripped of all their possessions. Their members was dying in great poverty in 1821.

[69] G. S. Sardesai, *New History of The Marathas*, V. II, Phoenix, Bombay, 1946, p. 38. This mission was also explained in Mir Gholam Hussein Khan, *The Siyar-ul-Mutakherin*, Vol. I, Haji Mustafa (Eng. Trans.), John Briggs (ed.), Allen &Co., London, 1831.

to the vexatious wars which were sapping their strength and resources practically ever since the release of Shahu. The expedition led to the acquisition of signal concession from the Mughal emperor and the establishment of the Maratha prestige in northern India. This expedition passed through Khandesh on its way to Delhi. Now another Malhar, known as Malhar Rao Holkar, who was young and most energetic, unknown to anyone in the Maratha administration, naturally excited to such an extent as to induce him to ask the permission of his uncle to join it. Bhijraj Bargal willingly accepted the proposal and used his influence with Sarar Phandhre, who accompanied the force under the Peshwa. Malhar Rao allowed joining the expedition as Silledar in the paga of Sirdar Pandhare.[70]

The Peshwa successfully carried out his plan at Delhi. Mahar Rao took leave of the Peshwa and Sirdar Pandhre and returned to the house of his maternal uncle in Talode where the old Bargal welcomed him. The old Bargal after knowing his skill gave his daughter Gautamabai in marriage to Malhar Rao in spite of the unreasonable protest by his wife.[71] Malhar Rao skillfully prevented an unpleasant situation by obtaining the permission of his uncle to go out in search of fresh fields for the maintenance of his troops and the increasing expenses that he had to face. Malhar Rao got a friendly response from Burwani, where the chief found young men to be very useful in warding off the inroad of the Maratha army, which laid siege to Burwani. Malhar Rao repulsed the attack of the Maratha forces. The Peshwa was duly informed by the Commander of the Maratha army that Malhar Rao was the helper of Burwani chief and that was the main difficulty. The Peshwa sent a letter to Malhar Rao to bring about the satisfactory conclusion of operation of Burwani, and then Malhar Rao interceded in affairs and established the Peshwa power at Burwani. The Peshwa was highly pleased with the part played by Malhar Rao in the settlement of Burwani affairs in such a satisfactory manner and resolved to take him into service of the Maratha Raj.[72] Thus, Malhar Rao entered the service of the Peshwa with the consent

[70]Mukund Wamanrao Burway, *Life of Subedar Malhar Rao Holkar,* Holkar State Printing Press, Indore, 1930, p. 6.

[71] The marriage proved a happy one, as the future event would show. Gautmabai was a sagacious councilor and influenced Malhar Rao private dealings in public act. She was a disciple of Shree Brahmendra Swami (1649-1745), the guru of Baji Rao –I, Shahu, Angre and the thousands of the Maratha officers. Verinder Grover (ed.), *The Political Thinkers of Modern India: V. D. Savarkar,* Deep and Deep Publication, New Delhi, 2002, pp. 27-30.

[72] N. N. Nagrale, *Peshwa Maratha Relation and Malhar Rao Holkar,* Publication Scheme, Indore, 1989, p. 9.

of Sardar Raghuji, the elder brother of Kanthaji Kadam Bande. Under Baji Rao, Malhar Rao rose rapidly to greatness. Kantaji Kadam Bande was delighted with the greater prospects that were thus opened up before the young troopers who had to serve him so well; and he permitted him to assume the standard of the Bande Family, a triangular flag with red and white strip was given; these colours are still borne before the gateway of their palace at Indore.

After the death of Balaji Vishwanath on 2 April 1720, Chhatrapati Shahu, however, soon confirmed the Peshwaship on Baji Rao, whose first objective was Malwa, in which Malhar Rao rendered splendid help to his master by accompanying him on every expedition. The primary purpose of Peshwa Baji Rao in his expedition in Malwa was to establish his claim of *chauth* and realize tribute from the principalities of Malwa especially on the western borders of the provinces. The chief officers of Peshwa Baji Rao –I in this expedition were Pillaji Jadhav, Udaji Pawar, and Kanthaji Kadam Bande. The name of Malhar Rao Holkar is not mentioned in this expedition. The reason for the omission of his name was possibly owing to his junior position among the generals. It can be inferred that he was also included in his campaign with his force under Kadam Bande.[73] According to G. S. Sardesai, "in 1723-1724; Malhar Rao Holkar and Udaji Pawar captured Indore and Dhar respectively. Thus it can safely be said that Malhar Rao Holkar was active in Malwa from 1720".[74]

By the end of 1723, Peshwa Baji Rao- I again led a campaign to invade Malwa. This time, Malhar Rao Holkar also joined with the Peshwa. "It's hard to speak of Malhar Rao Holkar without a mention of his master the Peshwa, under whose guidance he served and worked. The career of Holkar and Shinde is quite indissolubly connected with Baji Rao's expeditions and aspirations".[75]

While the Marathas were busy in establishing their power in Malwa, Girdhar Bahadur was appointed as Governor of Malwa for the second time in June 1725. In July 1725, the Maratha chiefs again appeared in Malwa to collect the dues. The Peshwa did not come this time because he was still busy in the affairs of the Deccan. In the absence of

[73] On the basis of the Mandoli Daftar, G. S. Sardesi's records the career of Malhar Rao from the year 1720 regarding the event in the Malwa.
[74] Raghubir Sinh, *Malwa in Transition or A Century of Anarchy*, B. D. Taraporevala Sons &Co., Bombay, 1936.
[75] N. N. Nagrale, *Peshwa Maratha Relations and Malhar Rao Holkar*, Publication Scheme, Jaipur, 1989, p. 15.

the Peshwa in the north, the new emerging sardar Malhar Rao Holkar had earned the reputation of a military general in this expedition and was rewarded for his life services by the Peshwa. In August 1727, he was granted a *saranjam* of 11 districts for the maintenance of his army. Among these districts, six were in Gujarat; four were in Malwa; and one in Khandesh.[76]

In the year 1728, Malhar Rao again brought credit to his name at the battle of Palkhed, which was fought between the Nizam and the Marathas. Baji Rao led an expedition against the Nizam in 1728 in which Holkar played a conspicuous role. Malhar Rao was entrusted with the charge of cutting the communication of the enemy. He discharged his duty in the best possible way and gradually became the master of these tactics of the guerrilla warfare by which later the Nizam was hemmed on all sides by the Maratha forces and all his supplies were cut off, and the Maratha won the battle.[77] The Nizam invited the victorious Peshwa for Jaifat (banquet), the invitation being in the name of the Begum Saheb. The Peshwa accompanied by Malhar Rao Holkar and other Sardars, accepted the hospitality of the Nizam. After this success, Baji Rao conferred a *jagir* of twelve *pargana* on Malhar Rao Holkar for the excellent services in this expedition with an order that Holkar should strengthen his military position and attend to the settlement of affairs in Malwa.

Baji Rao had full confidence in Malhar Rao Holkar when the Peshwa was invited by Begum Saheb of the Nizam, Holkar was one of the two confidential servants who was allowed to attend the Peshwa upto the *Zamat Khna*:

> *"दुसरे दिवशी निजामकडून श्रीमंतास बेगमचे भेटीस येण्याविषयी निमंत्रण आले. तेव्हा बाजीराव साहेब बरोबर निवडक पांच हजार स्वात घेऊन भेटावयास निघाले. त्यावेळी निजाम साहेब औरंगाबादेस होते. शहरपाशी आल्यानंतर पहिल्या वेशिपाशीं श्रीमंतांनी आपल्या*

[76] Ibid., p.15. Bajirao who ever looked upon the officers and soldiers with parental affection, was the foremost to appreciate the sound work and brilliant services rendered by Malhar Rao on whom the heroic Peshwa conformed the sanad for Chauth and Sardeshmukhi.

[77] *Selection from Peshwa Daftar,* Vol. XV, No. 86. In 1728, The Nizam was defeated by Baji Rao at Palkhed. On 6th March 1728, the Nizam signed the treaty of Mungi Shivgao. Nizam – ul-Mulk agreed not to oppose the claims of *Chauth* and Sardeshmukhi of Shahu over the six subas of the Deccan and offer no protection to Sambhaji of Kolhapur; *Life of Shahu Maharaj: the Elder,* pp. 79-80; A. G. Pawar, *Studies in Maratha History*, V. II, Shivaji University, Kolhapur, 1971, pp. 65-66; says that 'Nizam had to recognize Shahu as the sole head of the Maratha as such entitled to the Chauth and Sardeshmukhi'; V. K. Rajwade, *Marathyanchya Itihasachi Sandhen,* Vol. II, pp. 55-56; Setu Madhavrao Pagdi, *Eighteenth Century Deccan,* says that the Nizam decided to not interfere in the Malwa; V. G. Dighe, *Peshwa Baji Rao –I and Maratha Expansion,* p. 20.

बरोबरच्या लोकांपैकी थोडे लोक ठेविले. या प्रमाणे करीत करीत खुद्द निजामाच्या दिवाणखाण्यात फक्त शंभर लोकांनीशी गेले. तेथून पुढे, कसलाही आणीबाणीचा प्रसंग पडला असतं न डगमगणाऱ्या अशा दोन खिजमतगाराच्या वेषाने बरोबर आणलेल्या अत्यंत विश्वासु सरदारांसह, भेट व्हावयाची होती त्या ठिकाणी गेले. तेथे निजामच्या जनानखाना सोप्यास चिकाचे पारडे लावनु आत वसला होता खास बेगामांची बैठक होती, तेथे जाऊन सलाम करून बसले... त्यांच्या बरोबर जे दोघे खिजमतंगार होते त्यापोकीची एक मल्हारराव होळकर है होत"[78]

In fact, the victory at Ajmera[79] brought Holkar in the light. He had created a significant position for himself in the eyes of the Peshwa and his brother, Chimanji Appa. The Peshwa frequently wrote to his brother, Chimnaji to keep Malhar Rao pleased.[80] This was the time when Rao Nandlal Mandoli of Indore was shrewd enough to start negotiation with the Peshwa, Chimnaji Appa and Malhar Rao Holkar to come over and see them and settle the revenue of the territory.[81] In 1731 Baji Rao repeated his orders to Malhar Rao Holkar to look after the province and make a proper arrangement by increasing his army, for the expenses of which Baji Rao conferred a *jagir* of 17 more *pargana* on Holkar. The Peshwa appointed the Vithuji Bulay to look after the affairs of Dhar and Malhar Rao Holkar established the Maratha rule in the sacred city of Ujjain. In the year 1732 Malhar Rao Holkar obtained Indore, and then a small town, by the orders of the Peshwa for his Khasgi, as it was a special *inam* for the services rendered by Holkar.[82] It is also mentioned in the Poona Diary that in the year 1730-31 the Peshwa wrote a letter to Malhar Rao Holkar, committing Malwa to his charge and stated that he must regularly transmit the duties of the *sarkar*. This employment had probably given insolence to Udaji Pawar.[83] The withdrawal of Udaji from Malwa made Malhar Rao Holkar the supreme in the affairs of Malwa.

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[78] Mukund Wamanrao Burway, *Life of Malhar Rao Holkar*, p. 20.

[79] Soon, however, after the battle of Ajmera, the Maratha generals remained busy in collecting money from local principalities.

[80] *Selection from Peshwa Daftar*, Vol. XV, pp. 65-66.

[81] Kota State Archive Samvant 1791 Basta No. 49 Bhandar. It clearly indicates the rapid decline of the Mughal power in the Malwa, firm Maratha hold over the provinces, and Malhar Rao Holkar and Udaji Pawar were the sole leaders of the Maratha campaign in the Malwa.

[82] Mukund Wamanrao Burway, *Life of Malhar Rao Holkar*, p. 22.

[83] C.A. Kincaid, *A History of Maratha People*, Vol. II, Oxford University Press, London, 1922, pp. 251-255. However, Udaji Pawar displeased the Peshwa, when he asked for a share in Saranjam equal to the Peshwa. The Peshswa could not agree to these demands. This led to the decline of Udaji Rao Pawar leadership in the Malwa. The Peshwa now gave the Sarnjami right to his brother Anandrao Pawar in 1732-33.

One of the important opportunities came for Malhar Rao Holkar to become more powerful in the Malwa province, when the Rajput princes, guided by the foresight of Sawai Raja Jai Singh of Jaipur, were ready to help Malhar Rao Holkar against the Mughals. Sawai Raja Jai Singh of Jaipur, who was a friend of Baji Rao and in frequent correspondence with him, visited Ujjain. His visit was an opportunity for the concerted plan of strengthening the Holkar and Shinde power in Malwa and driving away Daya Bahadur, the Mughal governor of Malwa.[84]

Recently one of the important correspondences between Sawai Raja Jai Singh of Jaipur and Malhar Rao Holkar had been brought into light in which Sawai Jai Singh urged Malhar Rao to call Peshwa Baji Rao to the north with the army for the subjugation of Hindustan.[85] Sawai Raja Jai Singh and Nanadlal Mandoli of Indore with the important message from the princes of Rajasthan came to meet Malhar Rao Holkar at Burhanpur.

> *"Nandlal Mandoli gave an important message to Malhar Rao Holkar. There was an exchange of turbans between them which was the Hindu sign of intimate and cordial relation. Holkar told Nandlal that Daya Bahadur would be dealt first and then the wishes of the Rajput princes would be attended to. The main point about finding a fordable passes into Narbada was solved by Mandoli who undertook the task of taking Maratha army safely across the scared Narbada without any difficulties"*[86]

The Maratha and the Mughal army under Daya Bahadur met in a battle at a place named Tirala, midway between Dhar and Amzera; Daya Bahadur was killed and the Mughal army was defeated on 12 October 1731 in the memorable battle of Tirala. Jai Singh congratulated Nand Lal warmly on this outcome, saying, "You have defended our religion in Malwa and crushed the Musalman, establishing the Dharma you have fulfilled my desire".[87] The Peshwa appointed Vithuji Bulay to look after the affairs of

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[84] Ibid., p. 265.
[85] Ibid., p. 266.
[86] N. N. Nagrale, *Peshwa Maratha relation and Malhar Rao Holkar,* p. 19.
[87] William Irvine, *Later Mughals,* Vol.II, M.C. Sarkar & Sons, Calcutta, 1922, p. 248. As Daya Bahadur wrote angrily to Nandlal, "What is your policy? To Save the Marathas, give your brother, sons and Sardar up to the slaughter and put the kingdom in enemy hand? What is that you are doing? Have you lost your senses ? …. Take counsel with your chief and do not give your own country Malwa up to another… but if you invite the enemy and give such

Dhar and Malhar Rao Holkar established the Maratha rule in the sacred city of Ujjain. In the year 1732 Malhar Rao obtained Indore, then a small town by the orders of the Peshwa for his Khasgi.

After the defeat of Muhammad Khan Bangas, the Emperor was ready to offer the Peshwa the *chauth* and *sardeshmukhi* of the subas of Malwa – an assignment of 13 lakhs of rupees of the revenue of the districts; south of Chambal and the authority to levy tribute from the Rajput State. However, after understanding the power of the Holkars and the Shindes, the Peshwa now demanded from the Mughals:

1. The subas of the Malwa inclusive of the tributary state to be granted in *jagir* to the Peshwa.
2. The Rohilla chief of Bhopal and Bhilsa to be ejected from the province and their *jagir* to be made over to the Peshwa
3. The fort of Mandu, Dhar and Risen to be ceded to the Peshwa.
4. The territory up to Chambal to be granted to the Peshwa as jagir
5. An assignment of 50 lakhs of rupees or revenue of Bengal to relieve the the debt of the Peshwa
6. The cesession of the holy places of Allahabad, Banaras, Mathura, and Gaya.[88]

However, these demands were not fulfilled at this moment, but the power of the Maratha Sardars gradually increased in these provinces, which urgent to form right policy to maintain the internal harmony amongst the different confederates. After replacing Udaji Pawar, now Malhar Rao Holkar, became supreme of the Maratha power in Malwa. In October 1730 Holkar was granted a *saranjam* of 30 parganas in Malwa with all rights about the grants. Shinde was also associated with Holkar in the management of the provinces. Ranoji Shinde attained a position in Malwa equal to that of Holkar. In the settlement the division (on 20 December 1731) of the dues was made by Peshwa Baji Rao I.[89]

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advice to Jaisingh, you will gain nothing. Know that in the future these Maratha will not remember this day."

[88] N. N. Nagrale, *Peshwa Maratha Relations and Malhar Rao Holkar,* p. 21.

[89] The other scions of Pawar of Dewas i.e., Tukoji and Jiwaji Pawar were also associated with the affairs of the Malwa and on October 22, 1732 they were granted 7% out of 22.5%, which was reserved for the Peshwa but they were to be paid out of the common purse. Jon Malcolm, *Memoirs of Central India,* Vol. I, p. 104.

Peshwa =8.5%

Holkar =35%

Shinde =35%

Pawar =21.5%

The Supreme control on the affairs in the provinces was vested in control of Holkar and Shinde and on 2 November 1731, the Peshwa handed over the seals of both of them jointly.[90] However, Pawar was not happy with this arrangement.[91]

In order to maintain the unity amongst the different confederates, the Peshwa again divided Malwa in 1734 into five shares i.e (2 Holkar, 2 Shinde, and 1 Pawar), but it did not work for a long time to maintain the unity and control the power of the kinship of these confederates. Meanwhile, a special grants was offered in favor of the family of Holkar by Peshwa Baji Rao -I known as Khasgi an *inam* to Gautmabai, wife of Malhar Rao Holkar. A *sanad* to this effect with the dress of honour was sent. The *talukas* given as Khasgi should continue forever as detailed below:-

Maheswar, Choli, Indore, Harsola, Dapalpur, Mahidpur, Baroli, Jagoti, and Madone, Rs. 263000

Chandwad and Ambad with Mogalai village[92] Rs. 36010

Total Rs. 299010

[90] Raghubir Sinh, *Malwa in Transition*, pp. 324-325.

[91] Share in % was different in this source. The Peshwa fixed the respective share in the following way – 45% Shreemant, 22½ % Sindhe, 22½ % Holkar, and 10% Pawar. The scale of division is given in different manners, S.K. Bhatt (ed.), *The 4th All India Maratha History Seminar 11-13th May 1979*, published from Academy of Indian Numismatics & Sigillography, 1979, p.158, where the share is mentioned as 31% for the Peshwa, 30% for each Sindhe and Holkar and 9% for Pawar. This difference between Holkar Kaifaiyat and Letters, Memoranda etc., on the other hand, is still remarkable. The division of the Malwa caused with heart –burning in the cause of Udaji Pawar, who in the anguish of his heart, uttered the word why should 10% be my share? Am I devoid of velour? The Sagacious Dewan Ramrao Kawathekar, however succeeded in consoling his master Pawar by saying, "श्रीमंत तर मुख्य मालकच आहेत, व शिंदे होळकर यजजवर फौज फाटा फार असून त्याची नेहमी जयत तयारीत असेत, तासांत हि पहिल्याने ज्या वेळी श्रीमानत्याच्यानी तुमची विनवाणी केली, त्यावेळी हे ऐकून त्याच बरोबर सन्मानाणे जर स्वारीस गेला असता तर, इतके हि बोलणे शोभले असते. आताण व्यर्थ कुरकुर केली आसता त्यांचा तुमचा बेबनाव होउन कदाचित पूर्ववत फॅटया मीलन्याचा प्रसंग येईल. तेव्हा सद्यान जे झाले आहे तेंच उत्तम समझून त्याचे बरोबर असत जावे." Pawar was silenced after this argument. *Holkar Kaifiyat*, p. 11.

[92] Mukund Wamanrao Burway, *Life of Subhedar Malhar Rao Holkar*, p. 165.

Thus, came the Khasgi in the existence from the year 1734 and its last nineteenth century. It is a unique institution with liberal latitude for energy, administrative capacity and charitable inclinations of the consorts of the sovereign rulers of Indore.[93] After getting the khasgi land, the power of Malhar Rao Holkar increased, but he still needed to prove his legitimate authority in the newly conquered areas.

This opportunity came in 1735, after an outstanding campaign of Bundelkhand. The newly appointed governor, Muhmad Khan Bangas desired to destroy the Bundelas power in Bundelkhand. Raja Chhatrasal sent a request to Baji Rao to save Bundelkhand. Baji Rao not only saved Bundelas, but also saved his beloved Mastani territories.[94]While returning from Bundelkhand expedition, Baji Rao halted at Jaipur to meet his friend Sawai Jai Singh, who received the Peshwa and Malhar Rao Holkar with magnificent hospitality. The Raja gave 33 lakhs of rupees to the Peshwa with many other gifts. Baji Rao returned to Poona in 1735 along with Malhar Rao Holkar. The Peshwa confirmed the new marks of favour upon Holkar by giving the honour of Jaripataka. Holkar was, at this time, given a karbhari. [95] This prestige of Holkar continued till 1761. After the third battle of Panipat, as his role was doubtful in the battle in the eyes of the Peshwa, he had to leave the legitimate right for a small period and again his name and fame escalated in northern India during the eighteenth century. According to Kafiyat of Holkar, it is said that due to the recommendation of Malhar Rao, Shinde rose to power. However, the study of the family of Shinde in Central India demands a deeper analysis to understand the real cause of its emergence as a significant Confederate.

Origin and Alliances of the Family of the Shinde

About the origin of the Shinde family there are two accounts. One account stated that the family of Shinde was *Sudras* of the tribes of Koombee or cultivator, and the second highlights that Ranoji descended from a younger branch of the Shinden

[93] Ibid., p. 167.
[94]C. K. Srinivasan, *Baji Rao-I: The Great Peshwa,* Asian Publishing House, New Delhi, 1961, pp. 79-80; In 1734 Mastani bore a son to Baji Rao. He was named Samsher Bahadur. In 1736 the Peshwa added a new apartment in Saniwar Palace mainly for the use of Mastani.
[95] Mukund Wamanrao Burway, *Life of Subhedar Malhar Rao Holkar*, p. 32.

families of Kunneir Kheir, a village 15 miles east of Satara.[96] As they lived at Shinde village in Maharashtra, they came to be known as 'Shinde or Shinde'.[97] Ranoji Shinde, the first who became eminent as a soldier, had succeeded to his hereditary office of head men of Kumerkerrah or Karkhed a village in Satara district (26 km from Satara). Ranoji Shinde had been married in the Deccan to women of his own tribe, with whom he had three sons and two sons from another wife. The original name of this family came from Sendrak, from which the name of Shinde/Shinde or Scindia derives. Earlier the member of this family had also worked under the Bahmani Kingdom in the Deccan, as well as held the command under the army of Aurangzeb.[98] This family joins the Peshwa administration, appointed as saranjamdar in Malwa, and later developed as Gwalior princely state.[99]

We have very little information about the early life and career of Ranoji Rao, whose family was reduced to difficult circumstances during the internecine dissensions which raged for a long time between Satara and Kolhapur.[100] It is said that during the rise and continuance of the power of the Bahmani Dynasty, several members of the Shinde family of Kunneir Khed have played a major role in the state affairs. But the subsequent decline of the influences of this family seems to have placed the Shinde of Kunneir Khed in such a position which attracted not much attention of the world at large. Consequently, it has been more or less difficult to enter into details regarding the early history of this famous family. What is known with a vestige of the truth is that the members of this family were, in olden time, very high distinguished Shilledars. It is only the latter career of Ranoji Rao Shinde which Bakhar deals with somewhat scantly yet sufficient to enable the historians to form an approximate estimate of his life and work.

He began service as a Silledar in the Peshwa's bodyguard and died as one of the most powerful sirdar of the Peshwa in Hindustan. There has been lots of discussion as to the way in which Ranoji Rao Shinde rose to such a position of eminence. Several

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[96] James Grant Duff, *A History of The Mahrattas,* Vol. I, R. Cambay &Co., Calcutta, 1912, p. 480.
[97] J.H. Ojha, *Partapgarh Rajya Ka Itihas,* Rajsthani Granthalaya, Jodhpur, Reprint, 2013, p. 221.
[98] http://jaivilasmuseum.org/
[99] Mukund Wamanrao Burway, *Life of Rano Ji Rao Sindhia: The Founder of Gwalior Raj,* Holkar Printing Press, Indore, 1930, p. 2.
[100] Mukund Wamanrao Burway, *Life of Subhedar Malhar Rao Holkar,* p. 2.

causes are given by different authors to explain the rise and predominant influences of Ranoji. It is, therefore, necessary to examine the different narratives to find the real past of his life. Sir John Malcolm points out that Ranoji Shinde served at first as a paga to Balaji Vishwanath and afterwards to his son, Baji Rao I. General Malcolm asserts the fact on the authority of Captain Stewart, who was a British Political agent at the court of Shinde at the time when Malcolm was writing his memoirs. Ranoji Rao deserves, therefore, to be praised all the more for raising himself from such a humble position to the highest pinnacle of glory by dint of his extreme loyalty and devotion to the service of the Peshwa.[101]

H. G. Keen in his valuable work on the rulers of India writes, 'But the father of Ranoji had fallen upon evil days. He had become a Patel, or village manager and his son had been fain to take service as a private trooper in the paga or the bodyguard of the Peshwa Balaji Vishnath. Employed to take care of sleeper during the interview that the latter might have with the Raja, it was Ranoji duty to present them when the Peshwa came out again.'[102]

Several causes have been assigned to explain the very rapid rise of Ranoji Rao Shinde to power. Same says that Ranoji owed his greatness to the influences of Malhar Rao Holkar. This is certainly difficult to understand and seem to have no stamp of truth on its face. Whatever John Malcolm says with regard to the cause of the sudden rise of Ranoji to power may deserve some belief, because the general was closely connected with the Maratha affairs.

It is stated that Baji Rao had many important political questions to discuss with Shahu Chhatrapati with the view of securing his sanction to them and was, consequently, detained in the place until very late at night. Ranoji as the paga of the Peshwa had to wait outside the audience hall with the slippers of his master. Overcome with sleep at that late hour of the night the proverbially faithful Ranoji Rao had fallen asleep fast on the ground with the slippers of the Peshwa held close to his bosom. Coming out of the hall after the discussion of state affairs with the Chhatrapati, Baji Rao saw Ranoji Shinde in the same condition as is described above. The Peshwa rejoiced beyond measure by such a touching sight, and in excess of his joy was heard to exclaim, 'if

[101] Ibid., p. 32.
[102] H. G. Keene, *Rulers of India:Madhav Rao Sindhia: Hindu Reconquest of India,* Oxford at the Claendon, Press, London, 1901, p. 50.

this Ranoji Shinde takes so much care of my slippers, surely much more care he will take my kingdom.' Next day Baji Rao raised Ranojee Rao Shinde to an important office in the Hujuur paga and from that day Shinde rose to greatness by rapid strides.[103]

In the Holkar Kaifiat, the cause of the rise of Ranojee to power is attributed to the intercession of Malhar Rao Holkar. But this story does not appear true and at the same time not corroborated by any weighty authority. Moreover, we never found Ranoji active at any time in a subordinate position under Malhar Rao, and it is frequently mentioned that Ranojee and Malhar Rao held the position of equal importance, independent of each other, under the Peshwa. The time in which Ranoji Shinde lived were happy indeed, in as much as genuine loyalty and faithful service ever met with their due rewards from such a master as Baji Rao who was ever ready to appreciate the unshaken devotion of his servant without any regard to creed, caste or colour. It was during the services and under the patronage of this Peshwa that Ranoji Rao Shinde, Malhar Rao Holkar, the Pawars, and many others rose to greatness and became the founder of the important state in central India.[104]

Ranoji Shinde was an exceedingly devout and faithful Maratha confederate. When Baji Rao came out after his audience with Raja Shahu, it is probable that this faithful Ranoji Rao, even though employed as a bodyguard, might have placed slipper before his master, who had an undoubted ground to be pleased with faithful Ranoji Rao, and advanced Shinde since that day to a higher post with rapidity. Ranoji had three sons viz. Jayappa, Dattaji, and Jyotiba from Minabai who was his lawfully wedded wife. From his informal marriage with Chimnabai, he had two sons, Mahadji and Tukoji. Ranoji Rao looked after the administration of his saranjami Jagheer territory, yielding an income of about sixty lakhs, of which annually he had to send some amount to the Peshwa *darbar* after defraying the expense of civil and military administration. Peshwa Balaji Baji Rao recognized Jayappa alias Jayaji Shinde, the eldest legitimate son of Ranoji Rao Shinde, as successor to the saranjam.[105]

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[103] Mukund Wamanrao Burway, *Life of Subhedar Malhar Rao Holkar,* p. 37.
[104] Colonel G.B. Malleson, *An Historical Sketch of The Native State of India,* Longmans, London, 1875, pp. 138-145.
[105] John Malcolm, *Memoirs of Central India,* Vol. I, pp. 116-117.

It was an important opportunity for Ranoji to strengthen his power more firmly in the Maratha administration when the Peshwa requested him to join Chimnaji Appa against the Portuguese. Ranoji Rao Shinde joined to co-operate with Chimnajee Appa, the younger brother of the Peshwa, in the memorable siege of Bassin (Wusai) in 1739.[106] Shinde had an opportunity to take part in the most vigorous military operation against a European power. Baji Rao had strictly enjoined by Ranoji Shinde and Malhar Rao Holkar, to carry on the war against the Portuguese with vigour and to secure the Konkan district. Ranoji Shinde took Kuttalwadi and Dhanu from the Portuguese in January. Sulgan, Telwa and Tarapur fell into the hands of the Maratha in no distant date.[107]

The long list of services rendered faithfully and zealously by Ranoji Rao Shinde to the Peshwa Baji Rao who was always ready to confer due rewards on his devoted and loyal servants brought forth a noble appreciation and noble recognition at the hands of the gallant Peshwa. The meritorious services of Ranoji Rao and his proverbial devotion to his master had been observed long ago. It was, therefore, fully expected that the Peshwa would confer a *jagir* on Ranoji Shinde. He continued to serve his master as faithfully as he had done before. He served the first three Peshwa and had the good luck to live to old age honored by success and favour by fortune. In the imperial transaction, Ranoji Rao took a considerable part and was at one time a security of the due observance of the treaty between the Peshwa and the Emperor regarding the province between Chambal and Narbada. In 1746, this brave warrior died at Sujalpur.[108] His death deprived Maharashtra at a critical time of an experienced commander, trained under the great Baji Rao and thoroughly acquainted with the military tactics that ensured the success in the field of battle.

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[106] The details of the Maratha operation at Bassein in 1739 is given in 'Life of Chimnaji Appa' by Gopal Govind Khare, who gives a good description of the character of the leader of the operation at Bassein. Chimnaji treated the wife of the Portuguese commander with great respect.

[107] G. S. Sardesai, *New History of The Marathas,* Vol. II, p. 174.

[108] John Malcolm, *A Memoirs of Central India,* Vol. I, p. 117. For detail about the year and date of Ranoji Rao's death, see Rajwade, Vol. IV, and the 'life of Jivaba Dada Bakshi. The Peshwa 'Karkirdee' shows that Ranoji Rao died before the year 1749.

Period of Unity between the families of Shinde–Holkar, 1730-1740 C.E.

Shinde and Holkar both became an important confederates. The decades of the 1730s show that they both were working with unity under the direction of the Peshwa but gradually proved their independent identity due to forming personal alliances with various power in northern and western India. During this period the question of the legitimacy of their action was also, by and large, were decided from Poona which was not the case for these two families after the third battle of Panipat.

In 1736 Baji Rao undertook the famous expedition to Delhi, and Malhar Rao Holkar accompanied the Peshwa together with Ranoji Shinde. The emperor was so misled by the false report of Vazir Sadat Khan that he asked the Peshwa Vakil to leave Delhi court.[109] The Peshwa Vakil arrived at the camp of Malhar Rao and explained the entire story of the affairs of Delhi to Baji Rao. Malhar Rao with Baji Rao made a proper plan to attack Delhi.

From February to June 1736, Baji Rao and the Emperor negotiated through Khan-i-Duran and Jai Singh. The Peshwa had made his demands to the imperial government through his Vakil, Dhondo Mahadeo. Following were his demands: (1) A hereditary state under the crown, (2) Grant of *mansabs* and *jagirs* for himself and his chiefs, (3) Cessation of hostilities against his army,(4) The office of *Sardeshpandeya* of the Deccan, (5) And an indemnity to meet the war expenses. The Emperor received his demands in the court. His first and fifth demands were accepted and he was promised that he would be granted the rest of the demands.[110] Along with it in another *yadi* the Peshwa demanded the *subedari* of Malwa, the control of *jagirs,* excluding the fort in the possessions of the Emperor but including the lands of *jagirdars*, old feudatories, grant of rent-free lands and daily allowances along with thirty lakhs of rupees for expenses. These demands were granted but they agreed to receive the amount of thirteen lakhs in three installments.[111]

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[109] The imperial army commanded by Burhan-ul-mulk defeated Malhar Rao Holkar at Moota Bag, near Agra. The Maratha chiefs with difficulties escaped and join the Peshwa Baji Rao at Gwalior. Mukund Wamanrao Burway, *Life of Subhedar Malhar Rao Holkar,* p. 34.

[110] G. S. Sardesai (ed.), *Selection from Peshwa Dafter*, Vol. XV, p. 92.

[111] Ibid., p. 93. The amount of thirteen lakhs was to be paid in three installments: first, when Pillaji arrived at the court he would get four lakhs and then, five lakhs at the time of the autumn harvest and the rest four lakhs during the spring harvest. The *nazar* of rupees six lakhs which the Peshwa had to pay for the grant of the *Sardeshpandya* right of the Deccan

However, these grants could not satisfy the Marathas. The Peshwa again came up with new demands such as right to collect the tribute of 10,5000 annually from the chiefs and zamindars of the Malwa[112] along with fifteen lakhs of rupees for expenses– five lakhs on his arrival at Malwa, five lakhs on his visit to the Emperor and five lakhs at the end of the year. The Peshwa also demanded the *jagir* of six provinces of the Deccan. The son of the Emperor was to be given the *subadari* of the Deccan; Baji Rao was to get half of the revenue that might be collected for the Emperor through his attempts. The fort of Shivner, the confirmation of the *Sardeshpandyaship* of the Deccan and the village of, *Mokassa,* etc. and the state of Chandarwar (Tanjore) should be given to Shahu.[113] In spite of these demands, the Peshwa continued adding new demands that seemed not possible to achieve without getting complete control over Delhi. Thus, due to the increasing demands, the Mughals decided to reject the wishes of the Marathas. In the end, no claims could be made due to the far-reaching demands of the Peshwa.[114] Later on 29 September 1736, the Maratha received a positive sign of approval of some of the demands.

> "The Emperor Muhammad Shah issued a *farman* to Baji Rao granting him *jagir*, a *mansab* of 7 *hazari*, the *mahals* of his *watan* and right to perquisites. He was also awarded robes of honour and jewelry. Chimnaji was created a five *hazari mansbdar*. Like other imperial vassals, the Peshwa too was invited to the court. It was promised that Baji Rao's demands for 15 lakhs would be met on his going to Delhi."[115]

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was to be paid one fourth in cash and rest in the installments after the establishment of the control in this country.

[112] The chief zamindar of Malwa includes Amjehra, Kota, Datia, Khechi, Seondh, Orcha, Bhadwar, Chanderi, Narwar, Sipri, Rampura, Bundi. See in *Selection from Peshwa Daftar*, Vol. XV, p. 94.

[113] Ibid., p. 95.

[114] Ibid., pp. 96-97. The unacceptable demands were: (1)The suba of the Malwa was to be granted to the Peshwa. (2) Yar Muhmmad and Indrjit Khan were to be expelled from Bhopal. (3) The forts of Mandu, Dhar, and Raisin in the Malwa province were to be given to the Peshwa to keep his family there. (4) The entire land on the north of the Chambal River was to be given to the Peshwa. (5) The Peshwa was to be given twenty lakhs of assignment from the Bengal revenue (6) Prayag, Kashi, Gaya and Mathura were to be granted to the Peshwa as jagirs (7)The office of *sardeshpandya* was to be conformed and some parts of the Deccan, to be given to the Peshwa as *Inam* by *sanad*.

[115] Raghubir Sinh, *Malwas in Transition*, p. 245.

The Peshwa found that many of his terms had been rejected. However, at the same time, he received a secret invitation from Jai Singh. On 12 November 1736, the Peshwa again marched towards northern India because of the misunderstandings between the Emperor and the Peshwa,[116] to carry the war to the gates of Delhi. He crossed the Narmada and reached Depalpur; from here the Maratha forces marched towards Bhopal and besieged the place. Yar Muhammad Khan came out from Islamnagar with his forces to attack them. Yar Muhammad did not get any success, and he had to pay 5 lakhs to the Peshwa on 20 December. Holkar went to Bhopal, the Nizam was coming towards Burhanpur, but he did not get any help from Yar Muhammad. By the end of February, he reached near Bhadwar and defeated him. At last, he agreed to pay the tribute of twenty lakhs and to the Peshwa fifteen lakhs as a personal gift.

At the same time Shinde, Holkar and other powerful sardars marched towards the Doab with ten thousand forces and reached up to the vicinity of Agra. The forces of *Vazir* and *Mir Bakshi* went towards Agra to help Sadat Khan. Jai Singh and Abhai Singh also reached Agra, but after getting confirmed that they all had reached Agra, the Peshwa moved towards Delhi suddenly through the hilly regions of the Jats and Mewatis. The Mughal commanders were ignorant about it. Baji Rao entered the capital on 29 March 1737. The Emperor sent eight thousand troops under Mir Hasan Khan and other commanders against the Marathas. The Mughal forces suffered a heavy loss. Shiv Singh and members of other forces were killed, and many horses were captured. The Peshwa retreated from Delhi on 31 March,[117] because Baji Rao

[116] Poonam Sagar, *Maratah PolicyTowards Northern India*, p. 29.

[117] G. S. Sardesai (ed.), *Selection from Peshwa Daftar*, Vol. XV, No. 47, 17, 37, Vol. XXX, No. 198. Sadat Khan sent a false report about the defeat of the Marathas to the Emperor. The Emperor conformed many honours on him. Baji Rao wanted to show the Emperor that these accounts were false and the Peshwa was still in Hindustan and now very near to the main gate of the Capital. The Peshwa explained his conduct to Chimnaji thus, "I was resolved to let the Emperor know the truth, to prove that I was still in Hindustan and to show him the Maratha at the gate of the capital ....Khan Duran and Bangash reached Agra and met Sadat Khan who had already reached there with his army. My wakil Dhando Pant was with Khan-i-Duran. Sadat Khan sent him a message that Baji Rao's army had been disappeared; that he had fled beyond the Chambal and it was no longer necessary to honour his envoy; he should be dismissed forthwith. Dhando Pat was, therefore, sent away and arrived in my camp. Now changed my plan of sacking the capital. I knew that the Emperor and Khan Furan were inclined to grant my demands, but Mughal faction was opposed to his conciliatory policy. I did not want to drive out friends to an extreme by committing sacrilege on the capital. I therefore sent a letter assuring the Emperor." Cited in Satish Chandra, *Parties, and Politics at Mughal Court*, p. 267.

did not want to destroy Delhi but he wanted the Mughals to accept the policy of granting concessions proposed by Jai Singh and Khan-i-Duran.

The Emperor was very much alarmed by the raid of Baji Rao and wanted some final solution for the Maratha raids. This time he completely lost the hope of any negotiation and peace process. The Emperor had to believe in the idea of his own enemy, the Nizam to contain the Marathas but Sadat Khan proposed that if the *subas* of Gujarat, Malwa, Agra and Ajmer were given to him, he would drive out the Marathas. Since this demand would have created more conflicts among the subedars of these provinces, therefore, the Emperor invited Nizam-ul-Mulk to march against the Marathas. The Nizam arrived at Delhi by the end of June 1737. In August, the Emperor appointed his son as the governor of the Malwa. After the rainy season, the Nizam marched towards the Malwa through Bundelkhand and on his way he was joined by of the Rajas of Datia, Orcha and the son of Jai Singh with his army. He had already sent orders to his younger son Nasir Jang, then his deputy in the Deccan to see that the Peshwa might not leave the Deccan but the attempt to stop the Peshwa in the Deccan failed because the Peshwa informed about the march of the Nizam towards the Malwa. After getting this information, the Peshwa hurried to the provinces with 80,000 equestrians. He reached at Pohanalia on 7 December and next week he was only 40 *kos* far from the rival armies; soon after he was joined by Ranoji Shinde, Holkar and others. [118]

The stage for the final struggle between the Nizam and the Peshwa was fully set on 13 December. He reached at Bhopal after a forced march of 12 *kos*, while the Maratha forces were still 8 to 9 *kos* away. Next day, the Maratha forces led by Ranoji Shinde and Pillaji Jadhav attacked on them while the Peshwa was waiting in the rear for an opportunity to attack on the Nizam. The Nizam was too shrewd to give him such an opportunity. The battle was fought in the evening of 14 December 1737.[119] Within two-three days, the Marathas besieged the Mughal forces and the horses of the army of the Nizam began to starve. The condition of the Nizam and the Rajput armies was very critical. In this situation, the Nizam was waiting to get some help from Delhi and the Deccan but soon after the battle of 14 December, it was reported that no help

[118] G. S. Cheema, *The Forgotten Mughals: A history of Later Emperors of the House of Babur*, Manohar, New Delhi, 2002, p. 172.
[119] Ibid., pp. 173-174.

would come from the capital. Although Baji Rao also wrote for help from Shahu but the condition of the Marathas on the battleground was stronger than the combined forces of the Mughals.[120]

Finally, negotiations started through Ayamal, the Diwan of Jai Singh. On 6 January 1738 at Durai Sarao near Saronj, Nizam-ul-Mulk signed the terms: (1) Baji Rao was to be granted the whole provinces of Malwa. (2) He was to be given complete sovereignty of the territories between the rivers—Narmada and Chambal. He would not cross the Chambal. (3)The Nizam would try to get the approval of the above terms by the *sanad* of the Emperor. (4) The Nizam also agreed to pay Baji Rao fifty lakhs of rupees for his war expenses. If the Emperor would not agree, the Nizam promised to pay it from his own resources.[121] Thus, this treaty fulfilled almost all the demands of the Peshwa as solicited in 1736 except those relating to the Deccan and he was successful in giving an effect to an important phase of his policy.

The convention was signed at Duraha Sarai soon after the Nizam sent Rajas, landholders and other nobles of Malwa to meet the Peshwa. By this convention, the Nizam accepted the Maratha domination in Malwa. The provinces were now practically lost to the empire, and Malwa was painted with a new spirit of the Maratha supremacy. It is not possible to visualize how the situation had shaped after that. Baji Rao might have used Malwa as a base for advancing into the *Doab* or might have maintained peace with the Emperor and concentrated on the realization of his unfulfilled demands regarding the Deccan. However, before deciding any policy for Delhi, the Emperor of Delhi was being threatened by a new and greater danger of the impending invasion of Nadir Shah of Persia.

The gallant Peshwa was enthusiastically assisted by his Sardar and officers, Malhar Rao Holkar and Ranoji Shinde declared their intention to cross the sword against Nadir Shah. Holkar and Shinde army joined the army of the Peshwa before it reached to Malwa. Baji Rao was encamped on the bank of Narbada when the intelligence brought to him that Nadir Shah hastily left Delhi. The letters from the Maratha envoys and diplomats to Baji Rao in connection with Nadir Shah are fascinating:

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[120] Raghubir Sinh, *Malwas in Transition*, pp. 257-259.

[121] G. S. Sardesai (ed.), *Selection from Peshwa Daftar*, XV, No 66. He says that the peace was made on Paus on 7 January. He, however, states this on the basis of bazar gossip and so, it cannot be fully relied upon. William Irvin, *Later Mughals*, Vol. 2, pp. 305-306.

> "Nadir Shah is no God; he cannot destroy the creation; he is bound to come to terms with those who prove strong enough……..all the Hindus Raja and Maharajas, including Sawai Jai Singh, are anxiously waiting for your (Baji Rao) arrival. If but led by you our Maratha, the Hindu can march straight on Delhi, and dethrone the Muslim, and set the Maharana of Udaipur on the imperial throne of Delhi."[122]

When Nadir Shah returned to his country, Baji Rao proposed to all Mughal nobles to join together to face the invader and compose their dispute but could not succeed in his endeavour.[123] After the invasion of Nadir Shah, the positions of the different groups had been changed. Sadat Khan died, Khan-i-Duran was killed, the Nizam entered into an agreement with the Marathas, only Jai Singh was in the court among the nobles, with whom the Marathas could have formed a new policy for northern India. But at the meantime when all the Maratha Sardars were busy in a different campaign, an unexpected and dire calamity was ready to overwhelm. Baji Rao became ill and due to a high fever, he died in his camp on 28 April 1740.[124]

After the death of Baji Rao–I, the newly conquered and seized provinces of Malwa, Gujarat, Bundelkhand, Berar, and other parts of India, became the power center of the families of different confederates. Since the Peshwa could not control the entire new territory, therefore, he had only one alternative to grant them the right of the *chauth* and *Sardeshmukhi* of the different regions to various confederates. In this process Shinde, Holkar, and Gaekwad got the territory in central and western India and very soon became so powerful that even the Peshwa could not drive them out from the territories which they had occupied. The new Peshwa Balaji Baji Rao had to consolidate the conquests and regularize the right which was obtained during the Peshwaship of Baji Rao-I and also to extend the Maratha state either by conquest and annexation. But this new Sardar or families of the various confederates after becoming more powerful were not working in unity and fought against each other for personal gain and prestige. When Ranoji died, it was expected that the rivalry between the families of two confederates Shinde-Holkar would cease. But the seed of

[122] Mukund Wamanrao Burway, *Life of Subhedar Malhar Rao Holkar,* p. 57.
[123] Satish Chandra, *Parties and Politics at the Mughal Court*, p. 237.
[124] G. S. Sardesai, *New History of Maratha,* Vol. II, p. 181. He was taken ill on previous Friday with strong fever. His wife Kasi Bai arrived at his death bed with their little son Janardan. There is no mention of Mastani. Possibly Baji Rao drowned his affliction in excessive drinking.

the trouble had been laid too deep that both the houses, conscious of their acute differences and their mutual suspensions, continued unabated.

Malhar Rao Holkar and Jaipur-Kota Conflict: Beginning of the conflict among the Confederates

The origin of the conflict between Holkar and Shinde can be identified in the decades of 1740s when families of these Confederates began to form alliances with different power in the northern and western provinces. The first incident of conflict occurred when Shinde–Holkar openly interfered in the succession dispute of Jaipur. Sawai Raja Jai Singh while marrying a princes of Udaipur, had agreed that the son born to her would succeed even if he be the younger. But after his death, he was succeeded by Ishwari Singh, his eldest son and not by Madho Singh, the son from the Udaipur princess. Madho Singh and Ishwar Singh both marched against each other, but could not fight for forty days. To save Jaipur from this difficult situation they agreed to the cession of the 1/3 of Jaipur state to Madho Singh and went to Delhi. After returning from Delhi, Ishwar Singh rejected the agreement. In order to strengthen his position against Madho Singh, he sent Rajmal to Poona to seek the help of the Maratha. The Jaipur envoy met Ranoji Shinde, and the Peshwa and offered them one crore of rupees for their military help.[125]

While Jaipur approached Shinde at Poona, the Maharana and Madho Singh approach Malhar Rao Holkar at Kalpi for help against Ishwar Singh. Khuman Singh, the envoy of the Maharana, also offered Malhar Rao Holkar one crore of rupees. At this point, Ramchandra Baba (Shinde Vakil) opposed the policy of Malhar Rao Holkar. Malhar Rao was not satisfied and reported that Ranoji was not supporting the cause of Ishwar Singh because of huge bribe he had taken. As for himself, he was supporting the cause of Madho Singh because he considered his claim to be just and legitimate. The rivalry continued till 1750 which caused great harm to the unity between Shinde and Holkar.

After the death of Ranoji Shinde, Malhar Rao got an opportunity to fulfill his desire of establishing his authority and becoming more powerful in Rajasthan affairs. As

[125] James Tod, *Annals and Antiquities of Rajasthan*, Vol. I, Oxford University Press, London, p. 441.

Malhar Rao considered Jayyapa Shinde junior to him and he did not like to consult him and be bound by his advice. The decisions were not clear when the forces of Shinde and Holkar supported Ishwari Singh and Madho Singh respectively at the battle fought at Rajmahal in 1747. Both the chief had been heavily bribed by the rival parties and fell prey to personal greed. The battle resulted as new challenges for Ishwari Singh and Shinde. Holkar, being jealous of the gain of Shinde in Kota and Bundi, took up the cause of Madho Singh firmly and worked for its success vigorously. Malhar Rao wrote many letters to the Peshwa to justify himself. Lastly, after the failed attempts of bringing peace between Madho Singh and Ishwar Singh, the Peshwa also took the side of Malhar Rao; the Peshwa writes, "if Shinde takes up the cause of Ishwar Singh, this will go against our interest".[126] In November 1749, Jaipur Vakil reported to Ishwar Singh about the decision of Malhar Rao of attacking Jaipur, Ishwar Singh then wanted to offer four to five lakhs to Holkar. But the envoy refused to go to Holkar for the fear of loosing his life at the hands of the Marathas. Ishwar Singh committed suicide.[127] This gave Madho Rao gadi and, Holkar his bribe and the Marathas a firm hold upon Rajasthan. Madho Singh requested Holkar to accept the amount in the form of cash, jewellery, etc. The Holkar replied, "do as you like, I am a solider by birth, today I am ready to take even the sand of Jaipur in place of money if you so desire".[128] The terms of the indemnity had been settled at rupees five crores, out of which Rs. 2,48,10,000 were paid in kind and instead of the balance 2,51,90,105 – the whole district of Rampura together with its eighteenth *haveli* or *tahsil* was mortgaged for thirty-six years, i.e., from 1755 to 1791 C.E.[129]

The conflict which had occurred in Jaipur succession again raised its ugly head during the siege of Kumbheree. There were two reasons for the siege of Kumbheree and the consequent battle between the Marathas and Suraj Mal, the Jat Raja of Bharatpur. The first reason was, Agra and Ajmer had been given to the Marathas by the treaty of

[126] *Aitihasik Patra Vayavhar,* L. No. 76, April 1747.
[127] Ishwar Singh ordered his servant to bring a live cobra and some arsenic on the pretext of preparing a medicine; it was done. At the midnight he swallowed the poison and caused the cobra to bite him. Three of his queens and one favourite concubine took poison along with him and all the five of them died in silence in his chamber. *Bhansh Bhasker,* p. 3618.
[128] Thakur Narendra Singh, *Thirty Decisive battle of Jaipur,* J.E.P. Works, Jaipur, 1939, p. 154.
[129] Ibid., p. 161.

1752, concluded between Imad-ul-Mulk Ghaziuddin and the Marathas.[130] As Suraj Mal also coveted Agra because it lay contiguous to Bharatpur, it became the point of conflict between the two. Secondly, the Emperor and Vazir were also not happy with the Jat Raja due to the support of Safdarjung in the civil war against the Emperor.

Malhar Rao Holkar and Jayappa Shinde accompanied Raghunath Rao in his expedition to Hindustan. The Maratha had a scuffle with the Jats on account of the amount of the tribute. [131] The affairs, at last, culminated in hostilities. The siege of Kumbheree began with enthusiasm, both sides exerting themselves to the outmost. During the operation at Kumbheree, the greatest calamity occurred for Holkar. Khanderao Holkar, the only son of Malhr Rao Holkar, was killed by a cannon ball on 24 March 1754 in the course of an assault against a point in the siege of Kumbbheree. At this time Malhar Rao, in agony, grinding his teeth vowed, "I will chop off the head of Suraj Mal and will throw the earth of Kuumbheree into the Yamuna. Only after this, I will feel my life to be worthwhile. If I fell, I will give up my life".[132] Mukund Burway writes:

> "Words fail to describe the extent and intensity of Malhar Rao Holkar's grief at the untimely demise of his beloved and only son, the pride, and joy of saintly Ahilya Bai and hope and solace of Gautami Bai in her declining age. Malhar Rao's grief was doubled when he found that Ahilya Bai was bent on ascending the funeral pyre of her beloved husband, regardless of the political grandeur".[133]

The whole life of Malhar Rao was affected by this terrible bereavement, which occurred when he was on the border of his old age. Jat relation was terrible and Raja Suraj Mal was totally confused and could see no way to emerge out of this difficulty. At this critical time, the Rani of Suraj Mal and his minister Rupram Chaudhuri suggested a sound plan and a safe way to come out of the danger that awaited the Jat Chief. Rani said, "there is only one way out, no other alternative before us, i.e., Jayaji

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[130] Mir Gholam Hussein Khan, *The Siyar-ul-Mutakherin*, Vol. III, Haji Mustafa (Eng. Trans.), John Briggs (ed.), Allen &Co., London, 1831, p. 326.
[131] The agent of Raja Surajmal, Raupram Chaudhuri offered 40 lakhs, while Raghoba demanded one crore rupees.
[132] M.S. Kande, *Bhau sahebanchi Bakhar*, Snehwardhan Publishing House Pune, 1993, n. 5, p. 4.
[133] Life of Malhar Rao, p. 70.

and yourself are friends and that Jayaji also a man of words, you can now save us only by winning him over to your side. There is nothing else I can think of".[134] She, therefore, proposed that closer relation should be established with Shinde by the exchange of turban (*pagri badal bhaichara*) to secure the sympathy and support of Shinde in the interest of the Jat state. Tejaram, the son of Rupram Chaudhuri, was sent with the Jat turban along with a letter couched in the most courteous and beseeching terms to Jayappa Shinde and the exchange of turban duly took place. This relation was, indeed, an unpleasant affair and is supposed to have sown the seed of disagreement between Shinde and Holkar and led to many disagreeable scenes in the near future.[135]

Malhar Rao Holkar could not break the promise of help which Jayappa had given to Suraj Mal Jat. Malhar Rao went to the tent of Raghoba and pointed out to him the indiscretion of Shinde in exchanging turban with the Jat chief and thus, establishing an intimate relation with the foe. While Raghoba and Sakharam Bapu were describing the merit and demerits of the Jat problems and the views of Holkar about it, Suraj Mal was pressing Shinde to conclude peace. Jayappa Shinde, at last, determined to approach Raghunath Rao and personally explain the whole situation to him, pointing out the benefit of making peace with the Jat.

A dispute had arisen between Ram Singh and Bijay Singh of Marwar. Ram Singh sent an agent to Jayappa Shinde at Kumbheree asking for help. Shinde took full advantage of this situation and immediately prepare for a start for Nagore. When taking leave of Raghunath Rao, Jayappa addressed a few significant sentences to him, and issuing an order to his forces to developing in the direction of Nagore. In this situation, Raghunath Rao requested Holkar to make peace with Jat. Holkar marched towards Mathura, leaving Raghunath Rao and Jayppa Shinde to settle~~s~~ the Jat problems, which

[134] M. S. Kande, *Bhau sahebanchi bakhar*, n. 6, p. 5.

[135] Maharani Hansa the Maharani of Surajamal knew that Jayappa Sindhe was a powerful Maratah Sardra and a friend of the Jat chief. In order to create the division in the camp of the enemy, she therefore, proposed that a closer relation should be established with Sindhe by the exchange of turbans to secure the sympathy of Sindhia and support in the interest of the Jat state. J.N. Sarkar, *History of Jat, pp. 124-125,* Thombare, *Devi Shree Ahilya Bai Holkar*, pp. 28-30.

was settled at last. The Jat chief agreed to pay sixty lakhs through the intercession of Jayappa Shinde. Thus, ended the siege of Kumbheree on 18 May 1754.[136]

Third Conflict: Shinde and Holkar for Bakht Singh and Ram Singh of Marwar 1745-1766

As soon as the size of Kumbheree completed, the internal conflict between Shinde and Holkar become more complicated for the third time in Marwar on the succession issue, resulting in the loss of life of Jayappa Shinde on 25 July 1755.

The Peshwa granted Marwar as *saranjami* right in 1728 to Holkar, and he endeavoured hard to establish his personal influence in the state by maintaining a friendly relation with the Jodhpur house. For this purpose, he visited many times. At Jodhpur, the relationship between Maharaja Abhay Singh and his brother, Bakht Singh was strained. Abhay Singh, in order to elbow out, called Malhar Rao to his aid. Malhar Rao was busy in solving the matter of Madho Singh of Jaipur, therefore, avoided Jodhpur affairs and tried to bring peace between both of the brothers. With the succession of Ram Singh on 13 July 1749, the dispute between Bakht Singh and him started and both the parties wanted to secure help from Powerful Malhar Rao Holkar. Bakht Singh wanted Malhar Rao to either support him (Bakht Singh) or remain neutral. Taking advantage of the neutrality of Malhar, Bakht Singh defeated Ram Singh at Merta, marched towards Jodhpur, occupied it on the throne on 22 June 1751.[137] Ram Singh after this loss, tried to get help from Holkar and he offered them one crore rupees to secure their aid against his rival. Ram Singh sent an envoy to Malhar Rao Holkar to ask for help, but this time Holkar understood the internal conflict and suggested the envoy to meet Shinde. The envoy replied to Malhar Rao Holkar that he did not know him. Then Holkar himself went to the tent of Shinde and introduced the envoy. Shinde assured to help Ram Singh. However, in next year in 1752, Holkar took a bribe from Bakht Singh, and not only ignored the friendly relation between these two families since the time of Abhay Singh but also neglected the interest of Shinde. Nevertheless, the joint venture could not materialize as Bakht Singh died soon after on 22 September 1752 in Sanoli village in the Jaipur territory.

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[136] *Life of Malhar Rao Holkar*, p. 74. While S. C. Mishra, *Sindhe –Holkar Rivalry in Rajasthan,* p. 29 points out that as per the agreement the Marathas had to accept a reduced amount of thirty lakhs and that too in three installments.

[137] G. H. Ojha, *Jodhpur Rajya Ka Itihas*, Part-ii, p. 681.

After his death, Bijay Singh succeeded him and celebrated his coronation ceremony on 31 January 1753.[138]



Map 2: Shinde –Holkar Territories in Rajputana 1795 A.D. From V. S. Kadam, *Maratha Confederacy: A study of its Origin and Development,* Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers, New Delhi, 1993, p. 106.

[138] B. N. Reu, *Marwar Ka Itihas,* Jodhpur, 1940, Part-II, p. 371.

Ram Singh, who was at Mandsore, became uneasy on the accession of Bijay Singh. Since Holkar was on the side of Bijay Singh, Ram Singh decided to get help from Shinde. Shinde after meeting the envoy became so much eager to support Ram Singh that he even threatened to leave Raghunath Rao and Malhar Rao in the lurch of Bharatpur. Jayappa must have been happy because just as Malhar Rao Holkar, after the death of Jai Singh, interfered in the succession dispute of Jaipur, he also got an opportunity to interfere in the affairs of Marwar. Jayappa also must have been happy because he was now able to secure parity with Holkar. It marks the beginning of the rise of Shinde[139] and hence, also the further growth of rivalry between the families of these two confederates. In 1754 he joined the forces of Jayappa Shinde and Ram Singh invaded Marwar to recover the lost throne. A battle was fought on 14 September 1754 in which Bijay Singh was defeated and left for Nagaur.[140] Jankoji, the son of Jayappa, attacked Jodhpur with the forces of fifty thousand. Jayappa Shinde coveted the possession of Marwar for himself and also wanted to wipe off the disgrace of his defeat at the hands of Marwar in 1752. He refused to listen to the advice of the Peshwa for not persisting the wasteful expedition in Marwar, but Jayappa after having occupied Ajmer, and Jalore, felt confident. While the Peshwa also wanted him to desist from any further action and persist in pursuing his plans in Marwar till the complete victory.

Bijay Singh deputed Gosain Bijay Bharti to open peace talks with Shinde. On 24 July Gosain visited the camp of Shinde, but during the discussion, Shinde became angry and started using abusive language for Rathore chief, Bijay Singh and threatened to collect the tribute by the stroke of his shoes. Rathore envoy lost his temper and murdered Shinde instantaneously.[141] After the death of Jayappa, Dataji and Jankoji took up the cause of Ram Singh and conducted the war with full zeal. Raghunath Rao also invaded Marwar. At this time "the party feeling between Shinde and Holkar was so high that there were reports that Jayapp's murder was instigated by the Holkar".[142] Though it is hard to pronounce the Malhar Rao conspiracy in the murder of Jayappa Shinde, but this murder created a breach between the two. The Peshwa understood

[139] S.C.Mishra, *Sindhe –Holkar Rivarly in Rajsthan*, p. 32.
[140] *Marwar Ki Khayat*, Part-II, p. 188.
[141] The other view about his master is that Bijay Singh made a plan to take quick action on his enemy. G. S. Sardesai, *New History of Maratha*, Vol. II, p. 384; G. h. Ojha, *Jodhpur Rajya Ka Itihas*, Part-ii, p. 700.
[142] G. S. Sardesai, *New History of Maratha*, Vol. II, p. 385.

this conflict and called Malhar Rao Holkar in the south and gave the Jodhpur issue to Shinde for the sake of unity and the success of the Maratha effort. Finally, Bijay Singh had to submit mercy to Dataji and consequently, an agreement was concluded between Bijay Singh and him, on 2 February 1756 by which the former had to accept the imposed terms in which Jodhpur, Nagore, and Merta, were given to Bijay Singh and the remaining half of Jalore, Maroth, and Sojat to Ram Singh and the Marathas received an amount of fifty lakhs and Ajmer.[143]

Alliances with the Mughals at Delhi: Shinde –Holkar loyalties for Maratha Confederacy

The political alliances of the Shinde and Holkar with the Mughal power at Delhi could not create any kind of rivalry. The decades of the 1750s also show the period of unity and becoming a powerful diplomat in terms of relation with Delhi and Poona. The conflict and disagreement between the two families of Shinde-Holkar continued on the issue of alliances with the Rajputs, but the diplomatic action of these confederates shows the greater commitment to the expansion of the Maratha confederacy in northern India. Peshwa Nana Saheb was highly pleased with the service of Malhar Rao Holkar. In 1750 Holkar and Shinde both were invited by Vazir Safdar Jung to help him against the Pathans of Farukkabad who was aided by the Rohillas. Malhar Rao Holkar and Jaya Ji Appa were encamped at Agra; Vazir Safdar Junj came there to meet them and welcomed their help. Gangadhar Yashwant and Sabaji Shinde were sent with 25,000 horses to attack the Pathans. After several skirmishes had taken place, the Maratha commander was able to defeat the Pathan forces and killed their commander, Bahadur Khan Rohilla. At last, the Pathans and Rohillas sued for peace, which was concluded favourably to the causes espoused by Shinde and Holkar. After bringing this important affair to a satisfactory result, Malhar Rao Holkar and Jayapaa Ji Shinde marched to Delhi. The Emperor asked Malhar Rao Holkar to accept some territorial grants. After that the brave and loyal Maratha Sardar replied, "I am the Peshwa's servant, without his consent I cannot accept any rewards. Yet if it please his Majesty, the Sardeshmukhi of Chandwad Mahal may be granted to me".[144] The Emperor was delighted to confer the *sanad* of the *sardeshmukhi* of

[143] G. H. Ojha, *Jodhpur Rajya Ka Itihas*, Part-ii, p. 705, says that Ajmer was given to Sindhe in 1756 as 'Moond Kati' price of murder.
[144] *Life of Malhar Rao Holkar*, p. 67.

Chandwad Mahal on Malhar Rao Holkar. This incident shows his commitment and honesty for the Maratha Confederacy, due to which he received a very high position and respect in the eyes of the Peshwa. Shinde at this stage was also working very sincerely for the Maratha Confederacy, but the Jat issues created a big conflict between Shinde and Holkar, although the mediation of Malhar Rao resolved it but this incident created the situation for Shinde to think more independently than Holkar.

Malhar Rao did not forget the part played by the Emperor in sending succor to the Jat Chief. He was brooding over these affairs in his camp at Mathura when intelligence was brought to him that the imperial army was about eighty miles from his camp and he considered it as a good opportunity to surprise the forces of the Emperor. Holkar started from his camp by forced marched and arrived in the vicinity of the Mughal forces and attacked the camp of the Mughal. The Emperor escaped from the camp in Nalki. The loot was general, and the Pindaris who accompanied the army of Holkar plundered the camp. Empress Malkazamini was also deprived of all her precious ornaments and clothes and surrounded by the Pindaris. When Malhar Rao heard about the plight of the Empress, he went himself and protected her from the Pindaris. Malhar Rao then proceeded to Delhi where the Emperor received him with great respect. The Emperor paid eighty lakhs to Malhar Rao Holkar in cash and kind. It is evident from what has been recorded that Malhar Rao Holkar had been successfully establishing his prestige and name in Hindustan and making the Maratha power a living force and reality throughout the imperial districts. [145]

On 2 June Imad-ul-Mulk with Gangadhar Tatya and others went in the palace. Ahmad Shah confirmed on him the *Khillat* of *Vazirship*.[146] The Emperor and his mother were imprisoned and kept in custody. A prince named Aziz-ud-din, the son of Muiz-ud-din Jahandar Shah, was declared the new Emperor with the title of Alamgir II.[147] Immediately after this Raghunath Rao, Malhar Rao Holkar and other Sardars roamed around five months in the vicinity of Delhi seeking to realize the promised sum (82 lakhs) from the Vazir.[148] It was decided that the Vazir will pay forty lakhs of rupees immediately and the remaining forty lakhs later on. Attempts were made to collect

[145] Ibid., p. 75.
[146] *Selection from Peshwa Daftar*, Vol. XXVII, No. 79, *Siyar-ul-Mutakharein*, Vol. III, p. 339.
[147] Mir Gholam Hussein Khan, *The Siyar-ul-Mutakherin*, Vol.III, p. 339.
[148] *Selection from Peshwa Daftar*, Vol. XXI, No. 60, Vol. XXVII, No. 90.

these forty lakhs. A Maratha agent who was at Delhi wrote a letter to his master informing:

> "There is no money in the Emperor house, there is not a single piece of with Vazir, their solider are dying of starvation, and dagger and knife are being piled every day. In such a state of thing, we are pressing for money. No cash, no jewelry are available. In the last resort, the Vazir is asking us to take the assignment for thirteen and a half lakhs on the revenue of the land around Delhi".[149]

The vazir gave the Marathas twenty villages in Shaharanpur and some land from Khalsa land in the Doab territory, and most of the Maratha army left Delhi on February 1755. The management of these places was entrusted to Damaodar Mahadev. In the year 1754-1755, a *sanad* for the sacred places of Gaya and Kurukshetra was granted to the Maratha government. Shinde and Holkar, both agreed not to levy any tax on these holy places, so Raghunath Rao wrote to Damodar Mahadev that no tax should be levied on both the places.[150]

In the year 1756, the Nizam had offered Malhar Rao Holkar the temptation of an imperial *jagir* at Malwa, but the faithful Malhar Rao Holkar and Shinde ever remained staunched in their devotion to Peshwa Balaji Baji Rao in spite of the despicable endeavours and offers of the Diwan of the Nizam and other Sardar in the Nizam services.[151] The year of 1757 can be considered as the most important phase in the career of Malhar Rao Holkar when under the command of Raghunath Rao, Malhar Rao Holkar had the glorious opportunity of seeing the Deccan horse quenching its

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[149] *Hingne Daftar*, Vol.I, No. 94, dated 13 July 1754 letter to bapuji and Dmodar Mahadev, "we are in delhi from one and half month but nothing have been collected".

[150] *Selection from Satarta Rajas and the Peshwa's Diaries, Balaji Baji Rao Peshwa,* Vol. I, No. 79.

[151] The Nizam was also soliciting the help from the Peshwa help to get rid of M.Busy. It is also known from the letter dated 18th May 1756 that Balaji Baji Rao intended to keep M. Busy in his service, as the artillery had attracted special attention of the Peshwa at Savnoor. फिरंगी यास आज्ञा दिली की, आपले फुलचारीस जाणे. त्यांस अति निकट करून काढले. फिरंगी कूच करून मल्हार राव होळकरपाशी उतरले. होळकर लागरासाठी पंत प्रधानपासून रजा घेऊन चालले. मुसा बुसी याचा बनाव न वने यास्तव सालावात जंजानी निरोप दिला. त्याच मच्छली बंदरी पाठविले. तेथून जैवाचे भय यास्तव पेशवा करून त्यास पांचशे राऊत पाहूनचावयास दिले. पुढे त्यांनी सरकारात चाकरीस यावे असे केली. फिरंगी मर्द, सरंजाम चांगला, याज करीता चाकर ठेवले, *Life of Malhar Rao Holkar*, p. 77.

thirst in the water of the Attock. After this memorable Maratha expedition, the influence of Holkar gradually began to decline for a reason which will be mentioned in the next chapter.

Meanwhile, a new challenge occurred in the politics of northern India which changed the mindset of the Maratha Confederates for defending the region from the fourth invasion of Ahmad Shah Abdali. The fourth invasion of Abdali took place in November 1756. Again, this time Punjab politics and life of the people was full of fear owing to the danger of the Afghan invasions. The Sikh had risen everywhere. The Marathas were interfering in the politics of Delhi and harassing the governor. They were only interested in the government for acquiring money and the Mughal sources. At this time Ahmad Shah was invited to invade Hindustan by Mughlani-Begum, the widow of a late *subedar*, Muin-ul-Mulk, Najib-ud-Daulah and Emperor Alamgir II; all of whom promised to support him fully.[152] On this occasion, there was no opposition to him till he reached Delhi. Delhi was looted and ravaged systematically. Cholera and epidemic in his army, however, made him return on 2 April 1757. Before leaving for his country, Abdali had already installed Alamgir II as the Emperor. He gave the office of the *Vazir* to Imad-ul-Mulk and that of *Mir Bakshi* to Najib-ud-daulah, making the latter his own plenipotentiary and the real master of the Mughal government.[153]

The Peshwa had to take a strong action to solve this critical political situation. The Peshwa entrusted Raghunath Rao with certain important tasks such as to establish a firm hold on different areas, to set up efficient administrative arrangements in the imperial territories of Delhi, to make arrangements with Abdali and the Rohillas in Rohelkhand. He was asked to launch an expedition in the eastern provinces of Kashi, Prayag, and Bengal and to collect tributes from there as well as to look after the Maratha interests in the regions including those of the Malmlatdar in the Maratha territory. He was also to issue an order for the suspension of the Damodar Madhav, Bapuji Madhav, Lakshman Sankar, Govind Pant Bundelas, Naro Sankar and others who were not sending money regularly and appropriately. Raghunath Rao firmly

[152] R. C. Majumdar, *The Maratha Supremacy*, p. 187.
[153] Jadunath Sarkar, Ahmad Shah Abdali in Delhi in 1757: the most detailed and authentic sources are Delhi Chronicle, an anonymous Persian MS. Described by Jadunath Sarkar in *Tarikh-i Alamgir Sani* in Elliot and Dowson (ed.), *History of India*, Vol. VIII. G. S. Sardesai, (ed.), *Selection from Peshwa Daftar*, Vol. XXI, pp. 95-111.

ordered to destroy Najib Khan and to collect money from the conquered territories and to march on further expansion.[154]

Najib Khan captured all the crown lands. The Emperor did not feel his condition improved under Najib Khan vis-a-vis that of Imad-ul-mulk and the Emperor joined the Marathas to oppose Najib Khan. Raghunath Rao engaged himself in the affairs of Delhi. Raghunath Rao had sent a force under Sakaram Bapu from Jaipur to re-establish the Maratha post in the Doab and to expel Najib Khan out of Delhi after bringing the territory under his control.[155] By the end of July Raghunathrao and Malhar Rao Holkar marched towards Delhi from the Rajputana. On 27 July, Shankar Bahadur reached at Rewari with a Maratha force, captured it, and made it a *khalisa* land. But they found *khalisa* lands were under the control of the Jats. The Marathas then went to Sonipat and Panipat *parganas* to make arrangements with Najib Khan. On 11 August, Raghunath Rao reached Khirzirabad and the same day he started an attack on Delhi. Now there were only a few supporters of Najib Khan in Delhi.[156]

The Peshwa sent this order to control effectively the forces which were working at Delhi under the guidance of Najeeb Khan Rohilla and Shuja-ud-daulah backed by Empress Malka Jamani. Malhar Rao Holkar was the right hand of Raghoba in this campaign, who sufficiently met any emergency. Raghoba and Holkar proceeded on their mission and reached Agra where the fugitive Vazir Gazi Uddin met them and explained the whole situation. Gaziuddin joined with the Marathas and marched towards Delhi. For about two weeks the defiance of the fort was carried by Nazib Khan, who ultimately began to despair of holding out any longer against the Maratha assault. Najeeb Khan, therefore, opened negotiation with Malhar Rao Holkar. Holkar was prevailed upon by the entreaties of Najib Khan and he promised to save him at all cost.

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[154] G. S. Sardesai (ed.), *Selection from Peshwa Dafter*, Vol. XXI, No. 171.

[155] V. K. Rajwade (ed.), *Maharathyancha Itihas Sadhnen*, Vol. 2, No. 79. In this letter Antaji wrote to the Peshwa, "I will march towards Garhmukteshwar and Najib has captured the Imperial territory, I will change it into Khalsa, and drived Najib khan out of Delhi. Najib Khan and Abdali are not two person. Najib Khan was in Delhi from Abdali's side. The vazir and the Emperor near us". A. B. Phalke (ed.), *Sindeshahi Itihasi Sadhnen*, Vol. III, No. 366.

[156] J. N. Sarkar, *Fall of Mughal Empire*, Vol. II, p. 108. Vithal Shahdeo made Najib Khan captive with all his supporters. The Emperor gave him a *khilat* with the title of Imad-ul-mulk; a *jagir* near Nasik was also given to him. V. K. Rajwade (ed.), *Marathchya itihaschya sadhnen*, Vol. I, No. 100, dated 1 October 1757, "the news from north that Gazi-ud-din Khan vazir made friendship with Raghunathrao and defeated Najib Khan Rohilla".

On 1 and 2 September, Malhar Rao Holkar made an effort to make peace between the Marathas and Najib. On 3 September Najib Khan sent a letter with Abdul Ahmad Khan to Malhar Rao Holkar with the following messages –

1. "I am your adopted son and I shall act, as you bid me, you have done me many favours, and it is not proper that you should (now) bare your sword against me. If you say so, I shall go away across the Jamuna, and you can entrust Delhi and the empire to the control of whomsoever you pleases.
2. Bid me and I shall go to Abdali Shah and arrange peace between you and him by delimiting your respective boundaries, which would be respected in future by both parties so that there might not be war again.
3. I shall deputy my son Zabita Khan to serve you with a contingent of five or seven thousand men as a proof of my fidelity.
4. If you do not agree to these terms but are bent on fighting against me, I shall write the Rohilla and others and give you a good battle. He will rule the whole realm that God gives Victory".[157]

Finally, the Marathas settled peace through the mediation of Malhar Rao Holkar. Najib-ud-daulah went back to Saharanpur district. At the same time, Najib ordered his tax collector in the Doab to escape from there. Thus, the Marathas recovered their post in the Doab.

The vacant place of Najib was occupied by Ghazi-ud-din who took control of all affairs of the administration of the country. Malhar Holkar was sent robes of honour by the Emperor to appoint new officers according to his own will. As Delhi was captured, an agreement was made. Five thousand Maratha forces remained in Delhi for the maintenance of these troops, fifteen lakhs of rupees was fixed as a tribute to be paid. But in June 1757, the Marathas made a new agreement with Imad-ul-Mulk.

[157] G. S. Sardesai (ed.), *Selection from Peshwa Daftar*, Vol. 2, No. 77. Gholam Husain Khan, *Siyar-ul-Mutakharin*, John Briggs (Eng. trans.), Vol. III, p. 364. The author of this book says, "both the Emperor Alamgir and Najib, his minister going to fall in his hands, when the letter sent, might bribe to Malhar, who from that moment assume the character of a mediator, and proposed an accommodation. Meanwhile, having brought Najib from the citadel, with both his family furniture, and effect he load him close to his own quarter"; G. S. Sardesai, *New History of Maratha*, Vol. II, p. 396; J. J. Sarkar, *Fall of Mughal Empire*, Vol. II, p. 108.

Instead of one-fourth, they were promised the half share of all the revenues that they could collect from the Mughal Empire.[158]

Raghunath Rao received an order from the Peshwa in October 1757 to finish the enemy in Kashi as soon as possible. On 22 October, the Maratha entered in the Doab under the command of Raghunath Rao. Then he went to Garhmukteshwar, levying tribute and plundering the villages on the way, to have a bath in the sacred river, Ganga. And the forces went to capture the Doab. They collected the tribute of twenty thousands of rupees at Baghpat and seventeen thousands of rupees as ransom from Baraut.[159] Some Maratha sardars entered in Saharanpur where Qutub Shah (Deputy of Najib) was driven out, and the Maratha forces captured the whole city. Najib and his family crossed the Ganga and went to the other bank. In January 1758, the Maratha forces reached Kunjpura and demanded five lakhs from the commander of Najabat Khan, who agreed to pay three lakhs and two lakhs, remaining through the *diwan* of *vazir*. Malhar Rao crossed the Yamuna and reached at Sharanpur by the end of January.

The Maratha forces reached Sarhind in March 1758 and besieged it. They fought a battle with Abdul Samad Khan, the *faujdar* of Sarhind, appointed by Abdali. The city was plundered. From Sarhind the Marathas marched towards the Satluj in the Doab. The *Vazir* came to Lahore. The Maratha army marched from the Doab towards Lahore. It was Adina Beg who had requested Raghunathrao when at Delhi, to extend the Maratha domains as far as the Indus. There was a force of twenty thousand under Jahan Khan, the general and Taimur Shah, the son of Abdali and the governor of Lahore.[160] After finding themselves unable to fight with the Maratha troops, Jahan Khan and Taimur Khan decided to take to flight. The troops under Nanaji Paigude, Gangadhar Baji Rao and Goplarao Ganesh were sent abroad from the bank of the

[158] Poonam Sagar, *Maratha Policy Towards Northern India*, p. 73.
[159] J. N. Sarkar, *Fall of Mughal Empire*, Vol. II, pp. 111-112; G. S. Sardesai, *New History of Maratha*, Vol. II, p. 397.
[160] G. S. Sardesai, *Selection from Peshwa Daftar*, Vol. XXVII, No. 218, 220; A. B. Phalke, *Sindhyachi Itihasachi sadhnene*, Vol. III, No. 94. The writer says, "Lahore was captured, it was empty upto Attock. After establishing a few posts and making the arrangement of *vazir* and the Emperor, the country of one and half lakh people would be evacuated".

river Bias. The Maratha soldiers followed Taimur Shah up to the river Attock and then returned to Lahore and captured it.[161]

From this longest campaign, Raghunath Rao and Malhar Rao Holkar returned by the end of May 1758 at the call of the Peshwa. The whole administration of the Punjab was left in the hands of Adina Beg who promised to pay 75 lakhs a year to the Marathas. The danger of the Maratha power laid in not staying in Punjab in sufficient strength and consolidating their conquests. That was the weakness of the whole of the northern policy of the Peshwa. A small force could not meet all eventualities. However, on their return, Raghunath Rao sent Vithal Sahdeo, and Malhar Rao sent Tukoji Holkar to Punjab. Raghunath in his letter to the Peshwa from Lahore on 4 May 1758 described the Maratha achievement in the Punjab in the following words:-

> "We have already brought Lahore, Multan, Kashmir and other subas on this side of the Attock under our rule for the most part...Ahmad Khan Abdali's son, Taimur Sultan, and Jahan Khan have been pursued by our troops, and their forces completely routed. Both of them have reached Peshawar with few broken troops... we have decided to establish our rule up to Kandhar."[162]

Some Marathi letter says that Raghunath Rao was requested from different quarters not to move towards the Deccan immediately but to stay near Delhi and to make his arrangement stable or to stay up to the arrival of Dattaji and Jankoji in the North. Raghunath Rao was also told that Najib Khan was trying to call Abdali to India for the protection of the Muslim interest from the Marathas, but Raghunath Rao did not care for it and returned to the Deccan.[163]

In January 1758 Jankoji Shinde and in May Dattaji advanced towards the north from Poona. In July 1758 Jankoji had a meeting with Raghunath Rao who was returning to the Deccan from the North. Raghunath Rao described the situation of Delhi and Punjab and asked him to go to Delhi immediately for the defense of the capital and the Doab territory. But in Punjab, the political situation became unstable after the death of Adina Beg in October 1758. After his death, a great scramble for power

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[161] Ibid., No-218.
[162] R. C. Majumdar, *The Maratha Supremacy*, p. 189.
[163] Poonam Sagar, *Maratha policy towards Northern India*, p. 76.

began in Punjab. Antaji also wrote to the Peshwa to inform Tukoji not to move towards Marwar but to marched towards Delhi to settle the matter of the Rohillas and do work for Punjab.[164] Dattaji and Jankoji Shinde marched towards Delhi. The Peshwa had entrusted them the work of tackling with the problems of the Rohillas with the help of the *Vazir* and to organize the defense of Punjab and collect tribute from there. After settling Lahore, the Peshwa ordered to proceed to Bengal with a large force together with Shuja-ud-daulah and to raise a significant amount of tribute by force if needed and to evacuate the territory in Patna and Bengal. They were also ordered to take *nazar* from Kashi and Prayag and collect tribute.[165]

The arrival of large forces of Shinde had completely changed the Maratha policy in the North. The soft-spoken Malhar Rao Holkar was replaced by Dattaji Shinde who was just the opposite of him in nature and dealings. Malhar Rao had accepted Najib as his adopted son while Dataji was ordered to suppress Najib Khan as he was the only remaining obstruction in the establishment of the Maratha supremacy in the North. After that, the Marathas could easily send their forces in the Punjab and Bihar and collect an enormous amount of tribute from this place to lessen the debt of the Peshwa.[166] After appointing Dattaji as the *subedar* of Agra, the Peshwa wrote a letter to both, Jankoji and Dattaji in which he explained that –

> "the Vazir Imad-ul- Mulk's heart is not sincere. Mansur Ali khan's son will pay 50 lakhs if he is given the post of Vazir. If I order you to make this change, effect it on your return from Lahore. Formerly when Dada was near Delhi, Mansur Ali Khan's son voluntarily offers to cede Banaras to us. If we now make him Vazir, he must cede both Banaras and Allahabad and pay 50 lakhs. If he refused to make the above traditional surrenders and ask for two or three years for payment. Don't give him the post of Vazirship. But give it if he pays 50 lakhs and at least Allahabad".[167]

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[164] G. S. Sardesai (ed.), *Selection from Peshwa Daftar*, Vol. XXVII, No. 230. In this letter Antaji asked the Peshwa to order Jankoji to perform the work either in the east or at Lahore. Antaji was ready to do different works with the Emperor and the *Vazir*, No. 231, 236.
[165] R. C. Majumdar, *The Maratha Supremacy*, pp. 188-190; G. S. Sardesai, *New History of Maratha*, Vol. II, pp. 390-397.
[166] J. N. Sarkar, *Fall of Mughal Empire*, Vol. II, p. 139.
[167] Poonam Sagar, *Maratha Policy towards Northern India*, p. 117.

The Peshwa also wrote, "Dattaji Shinde had three important works of Lahore, Bengal, and Patna. Lead an expedition into Bengal and Bihar; realize vast sum of money there for paying my debt. Bengal is a province capable of yielding a core and half. Dattaji himself and Jankoji with strong forces should go there, capture Patna and remain encamped there".[168]

Dattaji was negotiating with Najib Khan for the Bengal campaign. It was proposed that if Najib joined the Marathas in this expedition, his territories would be spared. But the wily Pathan was not taken in by the smooth promise of the Marathas. Clashes had already taken place, and some villages held by the Rohillas were plundered. Eventually, the negotiation was broken off, and Najib retired into the prepared position at Sukartal. The attack failed. Shuja-ud-Daulah sent troops to assist the Pathans. The intervention of Shuja forced Dattaji to come to terms. At the same time the matter in the Panjab had taken a complete summersault. After the repulse of Jahan Khan, Abdali himself had marched towards India, and his formidable army swept everything that lay in its path.

Dattaji frantically tried to collect all his allies, and fast order was dispatched to Rajasthan to summon Malhar Rao Holkar. On 16 November Imad took leave of the Emperor to join the Marathas before Sukartal. Till the time entire Punjab had been lost, Imad understood the gravity of the situation and hurried back to Delhi. Imad murdered the Emperor on 29 November 1759. All the other members of the retinue, which included one of his sons, were also detained outside of old Kotla of Firoz Shah.[169] Later, about midnight the corpse of Alamgir was buried in the Humayun's tomb.[170]

Dattaji marched westwards and crossed the Yamuna at Ramra Ghat near Panipat. Here he learned that Ahmad Shah had passed Sirhind. Within a few days, the news was spread that Ahmad Shah and the main army had crossed the Yamuna at Burari ford. Dattaji rushed back to Delhi. The strength of the invader was increasing day by day with more and more Indian adhesions. Dattaji arranged for the dispatched officers

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[168] *Sinndeshahi Itihasachi Sadhnen,* Vol.III, No. 97-101, Letter no .99 the Peshwa ordered Dattajito "after making arrangement in Delhi, you finish the work in Kashi and Patna and Ayodhya with the help of Shuja –ud-daulah and go to Bengal".
[169] G. S. Cheema, *Forgotten Mughals*, p. 297.
[170] J. N. Sarkar, *Fall of Mughal Empire,* Vol. II, p. 214.

to the relative safety of Rewari and took position near the Barai Ghat. Sabaji Shinde was stationed at the crossing for its protection. However, on 9 of January 1760, Najib Khan, who has succeeded in crossing the river fell on Sabaji Shinde, taking him by surprise. In a confused battle, Dattaji was struck by a musket ball and killed. Although Sabaji was escaped, almost his entire contingent was destroyed. The Marathas abandoned his chief body and Qutb Shah cut off his head and took it as a trophy to show it to Abdali. The surviving remnants of the Maratha army led by Jankoji Shinde, retreated to Rajasthan and camped near Kotputli to regroup.[171] It happened mainly due to the failure of the diplomatic relation of these confederates in Upper India.

The main drawback of the diplomatic policies and alliances of the families of Shinde, Holkar, and Gaekwad was the continuous change in policy and allies. The people of Upper India became suspicious and lost their confidence in having any kind of long terms alliances with any of these confederates, and the changing behavior of Shinde and Holkar became the cause of loss of the sympathy of the Rajputs, the Jats, the Nawab of Awadh, and the Rohillas. The result was that there were no real and constant allies in the North to further their aims.[172]

The history of the decades of the 1750s is full of pride of the Maratha expansion up to the Attock, in which the role of Raghunath Rao and Holkar, had been explained as a miracle for the power of the Marathas. However, in reality, after the Attock campaign, it was the family of Shinde, particularly Dattaji and Jankoji Shinde who took the challenge to maintain the administration of Delhi to the Punjab in which Dattaji lost his life. Although, the Shinde had followed the direction of the Peshwa to maintain the political alliances with northern power, but he also formed his own alliances with the Jat and the Rohilla Sardars which was not on the line of diplomatic policies of the Holkar and the Peshwa, which added more fuel in the internal disputes amongst the families of the Shinde and Holkar even decades before the third battle of Panipat.

[171] Ibid., p. 299.
[172] V. K. Rajwade (ed.), *Marathyancha Itihasachi Sadhnen*, Vol. I, p. 59.

Appendix

Distribution of Territories between the Peshwa and Gaekwad

Table

1. In the Surat *atthavisi* districts and dues worth Rs. 7,62,500.

Parganas	Svarajya	Moghlai	Total
Vasrai	64,000	----	64,000
Mandvi	30,500	----	30,500
Tadkeshwar	6,500	----	6,500
Kamrej	30,000	14,000	44,000
Chorasi	1,05,000	32,500	1,37,500
Balesar	60,000	25,000	85,000
Kadod	500	-----	500
Temba	-----	500	500
Teladi	66,500	6000	72,500
Maroli	40,000	25,00	42,500
Galha	50,000	9,000	59,000
Navrsari	15,000	2,000	17,000
Gandevi	46,500	18,500	65,000
Bisanpur	12,000	----	12,000
Mahuva	36,000	5000	41,000
Anaval	3,000	----	3,000
Khadke	3,000	-----	3,000
Patmahali	6,000	----	6,000
Mahasret	3,000	----	3,000
Rajpipla (comprising 5 districts)	70,000	------	70,000
Total	6,47,5000	1,15,000	7,62,500

2.	In custom from five districts (Panch Mahal)	33,000
	In Custom from Vyara	12,000
	Total	45,000

3.	In the districts to the north of the Reva and South of the Mahi, including customs	
	Baroda	5,00,000
	Baroach	2,25,000
	Koral Bandar	40,000
	Vighodia	25,000
	Sankheda	25,000
	Total	8,15,000

4.	In the loyal districts, *Rasti*, *mahals*, north of the Mahi	
	The Daskori *pargana* and *haveli* of Ahmadabad exclusive of half of the city	1,00,000
	Half Petland, including the Thana	3,00,000
	Dholka	2,50,000
	Mata	50,000
	Nadiad	75,000
	Mahudha, including Umrath	75,000
	Total	8,50,000
	Grand Total	24,72,500

CHAPTER-2

Kinship and State Formation in Central and Western India 1761-1780s C.E.

I

Kinship and Polity of the Gaekwads: Family dispute in Post-Panipat Decades

The post-Panipat history of the Maratha Confederacy in Upper India, is the history of the state formation by the Shinde, Holkars, and Gaekwads in central and western India, through multiple alliances with regional powers who have isolated themselves from native powers and the later Mughals.

The role of the Gaekwads in the politics of the confederate had undergone a fundamental change. Hitherto they were an invader, or as they looked upon themselves - as liberators. The period of 1755 to 1761 was spent in resettling the land, in weeding out the pockets of resistance to the change of rulership and, at the time, dealing with family disputes. Ahmadabad was lost and retaken and some of the tribal areas were pacified. The amity with the Peshwa had continued and indeed imposed its own obligations. Thus, in 1761, in answer to the call of the Peshwa, Damaji took his contingent to augment the Maratha armies in their ambitious northward march and was swept into the holocaust of Panipat.

> "Gaekwads were lucky to escape with his life (Damaji), but almost immediately upon his return, sprang back into full vigour resumed his work exactly where he had left off. He took in quick succession in the fort of Kaira which was one of the last Pockets of Mughal resistance and made the Raja of Idar and Rajpipla his tributaries and after that had resumed his regular *mulukgiri* or tribute collecting expedition deep into neighboring state of kaithiawad. He conquered the entire stretch of Kathiwad from Palanpur in the north to Dwarka in the west and brought the whole Gujarat under Maratha control".[1]

Balaji Baji Rao with whom Damaji had made a pact to share the territory of Gujarat, had died in 1761, and his son Madhavrao succeed him, much to the distress of his uncle Raghoba, an ambitious and self–centered man who had, nevertheless, proved

[1] Fatesinghrao P. Gaekwad, *Sayajirao of Baroda: The Prince and the Man*, p. 14.

himself to be a bold commander. It will be recalled that Raghoba had joined forces with Damaji in their assault against Ahmadabad. Damaji Gaekwad and Raghoba both had shared the privations and dangers to the battlefield and shared the triumphs too.

The mounting rivalry between the Peshwa and his uncle came to a head in 1768, when Raghoba decided to settle the issue by war. He marched against the Peshwa; at this time both sides called upon the Gaekwads to come to their aid. Damaji ignored the Peshwa, but sent a column under his son, Govindrao, to join the army of Raghoba. The battle took place near a place called Dhodap, on 10 June. The Peshwa won convincingly and took both Raghoba and Govindaro Gaekwad prisoners. Two months later, while the Peshwa had still not made up his mind about the amount of penalty to be extracted from the Gaekwads for the release of Govindaro, the news was received that Damaji Gaekwad had died.

This sad day in the history of the Gaekwads was rendered infinitely more lamentable by the succession dispute that it generated among the sons of Damaji. Out of the six sons of Damaji, initially, only two laid claims to the succession. Sayaji Rao, even though feeble-minded, made his claim because he was the eldest, and Govindarao, the next senior, on the ground that Sayaji Rao was unfit to rule. Later another son Fatesing, more resourceful and energetic than the others, too, was to make his own bid for succession. Because of this unfortunate dispute, what should have come to one of the brothers as a matter of right, now took on the aspect of a gift to be bestowed to the Peshwa to the highest bidder. And the Peshwa, for his part, was absolutely ruthless in the manner in which he pressed home his advantage.[2]

[2] Ibid., p. 15. Damaji had three lawful wives and male issue by each. His first wife had one son, Govindrao. But Sayajirao, the eldest son of Damaji, as well as Fatesing, were born of his second wife; and a dispute arose between Govindrao and Sayaji Rao. The Peshwa at one time took the side of one, and then of the other; a large sum was paid by both the parties to the Poona Government, and having the advantage of the possession of the government; he succeeded in maintaining Sayaji Rao on the throne, while he himself acted as a regent for his brother who was of feeble character. Fatesingh, however, desired to strengthen his position as well against the Peshwa, Govindrao, and made some over turn to the Bombay government with that view in 1772, which were, however, not at that time accepted, J. H. Gense and R. Banajji (ed.) *The Gaikwad of Baroda*, Vol. I, p. xii.

One of the two claimants of the *gadi* was Sayajirao. He was himself untrained in administrative affairs, but he was supported by Fatesing[3], a shrewd, active and intriguing person who took his side by the hope that he might himself obtain the administration of the state. The other claimant was Govindarao, a man of weak and vacillating character, who took wrong advice from his counselor, and the unfortunate creature destined to be abandoned by every person with whom he successively sided, Raghunath Rao, the English, the Poona court, Shinde and his cousin of Kadi.[4]

The kinship of the Gaekwads was under the direct influences of the Poona authority and to gain the power against other kin, they were under the necessity of abiding by the arbitration of the Peshwa, who did not lose the opportunity of weakening by dividing the family interest of his enemy. Fatesing who was in Gujarat at the time of the death of his father, promptly secured Baroda, and Govindaro was still in the prison at large in Poona, and by dealing with the *Darbar* succeeded in persuading the Peshwa to recognize his title after agreeing to pay –

> "50½ lakhs, that is 25¼ lakhs for rising in 1768, 5½ lakhs as last year tribute, 1 lakhs for the new conquests from the Babi, and in addition to these sums, 20 laks and 1 rupees for *Nazar* for the confirmation of the title *Sena Khas Khel* with 50 thousand rupees for Darbar expenses, beside other items".[5]

For four months, he bargained the terms with Govindarao, trying to wear down his resistance, and in the end, convinced him to agree to the above conditions. With that, the Peshwa announced his long-awaited verdict: Sayaji Rao was to be bypassed and Govindarao was recognized as the successor of Damaji.

While in Poona the Peshwa was slowly playing a game of securing power, with the kin of the Gaekwads. The things were moving at a much faster pace. Fatesing Gaekwad had set himself up as the champion of Sayajirao and had gone to enlist local support for him and also taken over several important military posts and the town of Baroda under his control. He made it difficult for Govindrao to exercise authority as

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[3] The sixth son, Fatesing, who was to play the most important part in history, was born to Damaji by (less probably by) his third wife.

[4] *Gazetteer of the Bombay Presidency: Baroda*, Vol. VII, Government Central Press, Bombay, 1833, p. 188.

[5] *Aitchsion's Treaties, (1876),* IV, Appendix. V.

the ruler and what was even more important in the context of the strategy of Fatesing Rao, virtually impossible for him to pay the installments of the agreed fine to the Peshwa.

Having thus prepared the ground in Gujarat itself, Fatehsing Rao, presented himself at the court of the Peshwa in Poona and directed his remarkable talents and energy to get the Peshwa to reopen the question of the succession of Dmajirao all over again. The confusion prevailing in the capital must have significantly assisted his maneuvers. The Peshwa was a dying man and took but little interest in the affairs that what had now come to be recognized as the 'Great Maratha Confederacy.' His younger brother, Narayan Rao, then merely a boy of seventeen, advised by a panel of time-serving courtiers, looked after day to day business of the Confederacy. The courtiers were no doubt won over by Fatehsing Rao with a judicious bribe and tempting promises, and between them, they impressed upon the Peshwa the necessity of taking another look at the credential of Sayajirao. Ultimately late in 1771, a revised decision was announced- "the recognition given to Govindrao was annually, and Sayajirao declared to be the successor of his father. But since Sayajirao was believed to be feeble-minded, Fatesing Rao was appointed to act as his *Mutalik (agent)* and empowered to carry out his duty and responsibilities".[6]

> "Fatehsing's promises rivaled his brother's: the fine was estimated at 21 lakhs, the *nazar* at 20½ lakhs, and darbar expanses ½ lakh. As the Peshwa had promised before to support Govindaro against his brother Sayajirao, so in the present treaty a stipulation was made that 'Fatehsing was to be supported if Govindrao attempted to disturb the state, though he was to get 2 lakhs a year. Certain guaranteed bankers' debt has to be paid and, and Dhabade family has to be satisfied".[7]

In both, the above-mentioned treaties, the ultimate yearly tribute was fixed at Rs. 7,79,000 and the service of the horse at 3000 or in time of need at 4,000. It was not even though Fatesing Rao had agreed to give the Peshwa much more than Govindrao had. Indeed if anything, he had managed to bring off a much less onerous treaty: in

[6] Fatesinghrao P. Gaekwad, *Sayajirao of Baroda: The Prince and the Man,* p. 16.
[7] *Gazetteer of the Bombay Presidency: Baroda*, Vol. VII, Government Central Press, Bombay, 1833, p. 189.

return for the Gaekwads paying him an extra seven lakhs a year. The only thing that can account for quite barefaced reversal of the earlier verdict is the fact that the payment undertaken by Govindrao had fallen in arrears, and Fatehsingrao must have able to convince whoever was really in power, or at least in position to make decision on behalf of the Peshwa, that he would be able to pay all the agreed dues promptly. The hard fact of the matter was that the terms imposed on the Gaekwads were so harsh as to be virtually imposed to implement, that with the best will in the world, neither brother could have found the money to make right these payments without running himself. The fault in the last analysis, lay squarely with the Peshwa for asking too much, not with Govindaro giving too little; and in the event, it was the Peshwa or rather, the Maratha Confederacy which had to pay dearly for this severity, for it ultimately drove the Gaekwads to seek an alliance with the British East India Company as a means of breaking the stronghold of the Poona court.

In this manner, the family was divided against itself, and to add to its misfortunes, one of its members now began to play on a larger scale part he had long contemplated. Pilaji Gaekwad had two sons, of whom the younger named Khanderao. To him, his father had bestowed the government of Kadi with the approval of Senapati, who had also bestowed upon him the title of *Himmat Bahadur.* Khanderao on many occasions attempted to advance himself by an intrigue with the Muslaman. He now sided with one or other of his nephews, but in the main with Fatesing. He, thus, helped to rend the country by a selfish policy which his son afterward carried out with still greater pertinacity.[8]

In 1772, Fatesing returned from Poona to Gujarat, but before doing so, he made an agreement with the Peshwa which absolved him from the necessity of sending contingents every year to Poona. Whenever his troops were not called out for services, he agreed to pay the Peshwa rupees six-lakhs and three quarters, and after the time it became the customs of the Gaekwads not to furnish the Peshwa with any troops but pay him around 14,54,000 rupees for tribute and remission of service.[9] Though Fatesing to all appearance gratified with the treatment he had received at Poona obtained leave to withdraw his contingent of horses from that place to Baroda,

[8] *Gazetteer of the Bombay Presidency: Baroda, Vol. VII*, Government Central Press, Bombay, 1833, p. 189.
[9] F. A. H. Elliot, *The Rulers of Baroda,* Baroda State Press, 1879, p. 43.

alleging that he wished to be in a position to control his brother. But his real policy was disrupting the Poona court, and on his return, he made a proposal to Mr. Price, Chief of Surat, for an offensive and defensive alliance with the British.

A Gaekwad agent named, Bapuji, stating that his master when at Poona met with such treatment which obliged him to leave it suddenly 'much increases threat to having had two pistols fired at him'. He said Fatehsing intended to withhold his tribute; and if the English aided him 1000 sepoys, 300 Europeans, and 20 guns, Fatehsing would grant the honorable company 'the share the Brahman received on account of the Surat pragana, and would at later time surrender to them his share of the chauth at Surat'.[10] These terms eight years later formed the basis of the treaty of Baroda, but as yet the Bombay government had the wisdom to refuse the bait which was to draw them into a war with which they had no concern. Though unsuccessful in this matter, we find that soon, after, he made a treaty, notable at first the Gaekwads joined hands with the British. On 18th November 1772, the British assaulted the fort of Baroach and disposed of the Nawab of the city. Now Fatesing was very anxious to get Broach that he might use it as his headquarters in his contest with his brothers, and its capture had long been the ambition of the Gaekwads.[11] Having, thus, placated the Gaekwads, the British proceeded to wait for the main chance; the quarrel that was brewing between their friends and ally Raghunath Rao and the Poona court.

The Peshwa Madhavrao died in November and he was succeeded by his younger brother Narayan Rao, with none other than Raghoba appointed as his guide and mentor. Within eight months, an agent of Raghoba murdered Narayanrao, and thus, removed what he believed was the last obstacle for Raghoba in realising his ambition of making himself the Peshwa. On 6 September, the tenth day of the demise of Narayan Rao, Sakharam Bapu, Nana Haripant, the Patwardhans, Raste, and others

[10] *Gazetteer of the Bombay Presidency: Baroda*, Vol. VII, Government Central Press, Bombay, 1833, p. 190.

[11] Pilaji had resigned from the districts he had conquered to get two-fifths of the Broach customs. Damaji had made a bold attempt to take it from the Nizam, but have been prevented from doing so by the resolute defence of Nek Alam Khan. He would have renewed the attempt, if he had not been brought off by the grants of three-fifth of the custom and revenue of Broach. And finally in the partition of Gujarat, Broach and Koral had fallen to the share of the Gaekwads. For these reasons, Fatesing offered the British rupees 60,000 lakhs per annum out of his share in Surat, but the British refused this term and the treaty above referred to (12 January 1773), according to which the Gaekwads retained his three-fifths share, which was estimated between rupees six lakhs by Elphinstone.

who had assembled at the cremation ground resolved not to recognize Raghoba and not to support him if the inquiry, which Ram Shastri was then conducting, proved his part in the murder. Raghoba hand was proved. By January 26, 1774, Sakharam Bapu, Haripant Phadke, Nana Phadnis, Morabba, Haripant Phadke, all had assembled at Poona and were ready to take open action against Raghoba.[12] But it turned out that the wife of Narayan Rao was pregnant, and in April 1773 a posthumous son was born. By this time Raghoba had himself thoroughly disliked by most of the influential members of the Poona court. They proclaimed the newborn son of Narayanrao as the Peshwa and his name was declared against Raghoba. On February 17, 1774, a proclamation was issued from Purandhar in the name of the Chhatrapati to the effect that Raghunath Rao, having committed the gross sin of bringing about the ruin of Peshwa Narayan Rao and of forcibly exacting robes of that office from the Chhatrapati, had now been deprived of that position and a force had been dispatched against him under Tribmak Rao Pethe.[13] Raghoba fled to Gujarat closely persuaded by the army of the Peshwa. In Gujarat, Raghoba joined the force of his old ally Govindrao Gaekwad in his dispute against Fatesing Rao, and at the same time appealed to the British for help in his war against the Peshwa. When the rupture came between Raghunath Rao and the coalition of the regent Gangabai, Sakharam Bapu and Nana, it was at first rumored that the Gaekwad brothers would combine to support Raghunath Rao. But there was no truth in the report for, when this prince, deserted by Shinde, Holkar and pursued by the ministerial army, reached Baroda on 3rd January 1775 with a small army, he found Govindrao and his uncle Jagirar besieging Fatesing at Baroda.[14]

The British governor of Bombay must have been waiting for just such a chance as this to prove that he too could match the spectacular military achievement of his countrymen in the province of Madras and Bengal. Govindrao had already entered into communication with the British with a view to gain their support in the coming war. The anxiety of Raghunath Rao to gain the assistance of the company's arm was

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[12] Shanti Parsad Verma, *A Study in Maratha Diplomacy: Anglo-Maratha Relation 1772-1783 A.D.,* Shiva Lal Agrwal, Agra, 1954, p. 60. Gangabai was to be proclaimed as the Peshwa, Sakharam Bapu as *Mukhiya-Mantri,* Nana Phadnis as *Duiyan Karbhari* and the command of the armed forces was to be placed in the hands of Trimbak Rao Mama.

[13] *Patre, Yadi Wagere,* p. 230.

[14] *Gazetteer of the Bombay Presidency: Baroda,* Vol. VII, Government Central Press, Bombay, 1833, p. 191.

quite as great but it was not till the 6th of March 1775, that the Bombay Government, dazzled with the hope of acquiring Bassein, Salsette, and another district round of Surat, concluded through Mr. Robert Gambier the Surat treaty. The negotiation had been started between Raghoba and English during the last stage of flight. Narrottam Das, a man in Mostyn's confidence, who had tried to bring Raghoba round to an understanding with the English immediately- after his usurpation of power at Poona, wrote around April 1774, asking the English to aid him with sufficient force to carry him to Poona and establishing him as a government there. In return for this aid, Raghoba was prepared to defray all charges for the expedition and make very considerable grants to the company and entered into any terms of friendship and alliances of the chief of Surat might choose. Gambier had replied that he could think of getting the English assistance only if he came nearer to their frontier and they were in a position to join his forces.[15]

Though the Bombay government did not sign the treaty until March, Col. Keating had been sent with a small force to Surat in February. On 17th of that month Hripant Phadke, joined by a body of troops of the Shinde and Holkar, forced Raghunath Rao and Govindrao to raise the siege of Baroda. He and Fatesing then followed their retreating, next day suddenly attacked Raghunatha Rao forces. The fear fell in Raghunath Rao army as it never recovered from during the remainder of the campaign. He himself fled to Surat. From this place and they were quite able to beat off attack of their pursuers.

Colonel Keating joined the fugitive army of Raghunath Rao near Cambay on 7th April 1775, and Govindarao also attended him with 800 foot and a few horses. But Khanderao Gaekwad and Jagirdar now went over to Fatesing, whose force united to that of the Ministerial army under Haripant Phadke amounted to about 25,000 men, of whom 5,000 were infantry.[16] The Ministerial army moved with great rapidity, attacked and retreated when they pleased, and harassed them with charges of cavalry but could not make a permanent impression, as the service of the British army kept them off. The British infantry and guns always succeeded in beating off the enemy

[15]*Bombay proceedings,* 6 September 1774, Gambier letter from Surat. "It is in your power to resist Raghoba. The preset junction appears to me a very favourable one for procuring the Hon'ble Company every great and lasting advantage and such as will make their principal settlements on this coast profitable instead of losing one of them".
[16]Keating's Letter, 19 April 1775 (Bombay Record).

and sometime in throwing them into confusion, but this advantage could not be followed up as their alliances never acquired sufficient boldness to act on the offensive with their cavalry. Besides not only that the British had no horse of their own, but at the stage of their history they had not learned to dispute the enemy and to make those apparently rash attack which was subsequently always successful. Very soon Raghunath Rao forces threatened to mutiny as they could get no pay; Govindarao army refused to march on Poona till he had been placed in Baroda, many of the Arabs and Shinde were deserted, till at last Raghunath Rao determine to remain in Gujarat during the rain. In this situation, an attempt was made here to launch a surprise attack on the camp of Haripant. This was the last act of this campaign. But because of heavy rain at the end of June, the half-drowned British troops sought shelter behind the venerable wall of Dabhoi while the Marathas camped at Bhilapur somewhat near Baroda.[17]

Fatesing was now left alone in Baroda, and Govindrao pressed Colonel Keating to begin the siege of the place, but he was not for his brother in diplomacy any more than he had been in the field. In July, Col. Keating and Raghunath Rao threw over their ally to treat with the possessor of the capital and on 8th of that month Col Keating met Fatesing, when it was agreed that– he on behalf of his brother Sayaji Rao should pay Raghunath Rao 8 lakhs a year, furnish him with 3000 horses, and cede to the British government the revenue of the pargana of Broach agreeably to the agreement made between them and the Peshwa. Govindrao was to have no claim on his brother, but Raghunath Rao promised him a *jagir* 10 lakhs in the Deccan, and Khanderao was to retain his formal possessions.[18]

Besides, Fatesing had to pay Raghunath Rao 26 lakhs in sixty days, though it was very much possible he had not such a sum in his possession. But Col. Keating wanted a significant portion of this money which was dues on Raghunath Rao to pay off the

[17] Haripant now drew up his troops and brought this canon to the shore but just as he began to engage. The army of Raghunath Rao with the remainder of the English forces arrived and fell upon his rear. This maneuver totally disconcerted him. He fled with 25,000 horses to a distance of forty miles, carried about half of his canon and left others to the enemy. The loss of the Marathas was more in material than in men. All his generals as well as chosen men were safe with Haripat. Col. Keating now retired to Dhaboi, 19 miles south–east of Baroda, while the troops of Raghoba troops encamped at Bhilpur, a village on the Dhader river between Dabhoi and Baroda.

[18] *Aitchison Treaty*,1874, Vol. IV, No. LXXVI.

arrears of his troops. From the British camp in the Mastu Bagh came the daily threat of bombardment, under the pressure of which Fatesing by 8th August paid 10 lakhs. By this date Col. Keating received advice that the Supreme Government, disapproved of war as unpolitic, dangerous, and unauthorized and unjust. Raghunath Rao case was to be abandoned, but Col. Keating contrived to keep the news secret till Fatesing had paid up all that he had engaged to give.[19]

It is possible that Fatesing Rao agreed to the terms of Keating in his desperation to isolate his adversary Govindrao from his powerful supporters. This arrangement resulted in a treaty signed on 8th July 1775 which made allies of Fatesing and the British, and sure enough, after Keating and Raghoba withdrew, Fatesing was quickly able to assert his superiority over Govindrao. As proof of this, he was accorded recognition by the Poona court as titular as well as the executive head of the possessions of the Gaekwads. The withdrawal of the army of Hripant Phadke from Gujarat, mainly because he had not been sufficiently supported by Mahadji Shinde and Tukoji Holkar, paved the way to the success of the English in their efforts to win over Fatesing. Certain crude attempts had been made by Col. Keating earlier.[20]

In 1776 we heard a truce for two months and then of the endeavours of Govindrao to injure his brother by the machination of Ahmadabad. But what followed is uncertain, till in February 1778 Fatesing obtained from the Peshwa, who was much in need of his support, the great remission of tribute and service payment with other most advantageous terms. He paid up 10½ lakhs for arrear and bribed the Minister with a present of one lakh~~s~~, and obtained the title of *Sena Khas Khell*, while Govindrao was promised a *jagir* of 2 lakhs only from the Peshwa, and Khanderao was to retain the position he had formerly held.[21] In fact, every inducement was now held out to the

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[19] *Warren Hastings as Governor General In Council, to Government of Bombay,* Letter on 1st May 1775.

[20] The story of the ill-fated attempts of Keating to detach Fatesing from the Ministerial party is an interesting interlude, full of sordid humour. Every step in his negotiation with Fatesing was known to Haripant Phadke. On 22nd April a treaty was actually signed with Fatesing by which he ceded to the company the *Pargana* depending upon the Nawabship of Broach and the custom of the town and authorized their agents to take immediate possession of that and receive all and every part of its rent, revenue etc. from that very day, see in *Keating's letter,* 28th April, 1775.

[21] From the extremely easy terms on which Fatesing was recognized by the Peshwa we may gather how greatly his alliances were sought by the latter. Only 5 lakhs were to be paid as *Nazar* for the title of *Sena Khs Khel*, the smallest sum the Gaekwads ever paid. On the other hand, Fatehsing in vain asked for Dabhade state, and for an indemnity of five lakhs of the

latter to side with the Peshwa, or more accurately Nana Phadnavis, against the Bombay government, and he willingly accepted the favorable terms offered to him.

On 30th March 1779, after the war had broken out again between the Peshwa and the Company, and the Bombay government had suffered both defeat and disgrace, Governor Hornby proposed to make use of Gujarat in the campaign. Unlike the other Maratha chief, the Gaekwad would be a safe ally, because he was cut off from the rest, and if the Peshwa was beaten, there might be a partition of the territory, the Peshwa district north of the Mahi river going to Gaekwad, those south of the Tapti river goes to the English. Warren Hasting approved the plan, and in the middle of December Colonel Goddard, a very different person from Keating crossed the Tapti and took Dabhoi from the Peshwa in 1780.[22]

On 26th January, Goddard met Fateh Singh near the village Khandala in the district of Dabhoi, where a treaty of alliances between him and the company was signed, sealed and mutually interchanged. The Peshwa too was sending Fatesing frantic appeal to stand firm by his obligations. Fatesing wavered. The British column was menacingly close; the Peshwa whom he had never liked anyway, was in far away in Poona. He accepted the following British offers in January 1780[23], and thus, became the first major Maratha ruler to break away from the Confederacy. According to this treaty [24]–

I. The English and Fatesing agreed to constitute a league of defensive alliance and to protect each other;
II. The contracting party mutually agreed to enter immediately into an offensive league, excluding government of Poona from all shares of the country in the provinces of Gujarat;
III. A new settlement of Gujarat was to take place;

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territory (Broach) ceded by the Peshwa to the British. Khanderao was to serve with 300 horses for his *jagir* of 3 lakhs, but a constant source of dispute was the amount he should pay for the land entrusted to him in Kamavis and for his levies in Idar. *Aitchison Treaty –V, No.* VI.

[22] *Gazetteer of the Bombay Presidency: Baroda*, Vol. VII, Government Central Press, Bombay, 1833, p. 196.

[23] On 26 January treaties were exchanged and mutually interchanged. But no final exchange of this treaty was made between the Supreme Government and Fatesing, it was cancelled by the treaty of Salabai. F. A. H. Elliot, *The Rulers of Baroda*, Baroda State Press, 1879, p. 56.

[24] Shanti Parsad Verma, *A Study in Maratha Diplomacy: Anglo-Maratha Relation 1772-1783 A.D.,* Shiva Lal Agrawal, Agra, 1954, p. 220.

IV. Ahmadabad and its dependencies – the country to the north of river Mahi then possessed by the Poona government – was to be allotted to Fatesing, in lieu of which the English would take control of the Gaekwad division of the country south of Tapti. Four more articles were mentioned in this deal.

Goddard thought that by this treaty the company dominions in Gujarat were fixed upon the most firm and unshaken basis, as the only power. Besides, the English who could have legal or just claim to the possession of the country was now equally interested in them in excluding the Poona Government from all shares or participation in it. The treaty with Fatesing was expected to be not only a tremendous diplomatic victory but also a prelude to large-scale military conquests. This step of the Gaekwad had been taken with the purpose to form a separate territorial zone where the power of the Peshwas could be minimized and the Gaekwad achieved success in it.

The treaty of 1780 was entirely proved failure for the Gaekwads, when in the settlement of 1782 signed with the Peshwa and the English, the Company agreed to give back to the Peshwa all the territories it had conquered in Gujarat, including Ahmadabad, and to abandon both their allies, Raghunath Rao and Fatesing. This alliance with the British had brought Fatesing little more than the greatly intensified enmity of the Peshwa, or, more particularly of Nana Fadnis, the one man who now dominated the affairs of the Poona court. Nana wanted to impose a new obligation on the Gaekwads: that he would serve the Peshwa with troops whenever called upon to do so.[25]

For the next few years, Fatesing was left in the undisturbed enjoyment of his territories, and during this interval, he established the body of foreign mercenaries, Arabs, and others. In the main, he was one of the rulers to whom the Gaekwad House owed its continued life and prosperity. Fatesing was able to live a remaining year of his life in relative peace. But of course there was no sign of resolving the financial obligations that the Gaekwads had undertaken, and the insatiable demands of the Poona court continued unabated, imposing a crippling drain on the Gaekwads revenues. Fatesing died in 1789[26], and since he had no son, the successor had to be found from among his brothers. The Poona court bypassed the claim of Govindrao

[25] Fatesingrao P. Gaekwad, *Sayajirao of Baroda: The Prince and the Man,* p. 22.
[26] Fatesing died on 21st December 1789, in consequence of a fall from an upper story of his palace.

who was, in fact, older than Fatesing, and gave their decision in favour of a younger brother, Manajirao, but only after obtaining his consent to paying them a sum of six million rupees.

II

Kin and Conflicts in the Households of Holkar and Shinde: 1761-1780s

The history of the Maratha Confederacy during the post-Panipat decades represents the various transitions in the process of the Maratha supremacy in Hindustan, as well as in the mutual interest of the families of Shinde–Holkar. The direct action of Madhavrao could bring the Maratha supremacy up to the south of Satluj, but he could not resolve the gap which was emerging amongst the kin of the Confederates for the power struggle in northern India. After the third battle of Panipat, the Martha dominion in Hindustan particularly in Delhi, Agra, Doab, Bundelkhand, and Malwa became aflame with revolts of petty rulers, rising of local militants and disturbances of hill tribes, and the next few years witnessed the shrinking of the Maratha frontiers and withdrawing of their rule to the south of Chambal. This section would highlight the cause of the conflict amongst the families of the Confederates of Shinde-Holkar and their internal and external relations with other regional powers, to form the individual power in central and western India during the eighteenth century. It would also highlight: how the close relatives of these families had created the more gaps in the unity of Shinde-Holkar, as well as it also examines the nature of power and question of the supremacy of the kinship of these Confederates.

Kinship and Politics of Holkar in Post-Panipat era

Many historians have heavily criticized the role of Shinde-Holkar in the third battle of Panipat.[27] There are many hearsay reports regarding the behavior of Malhar Rao Holkar and notably his departure from Panipat. Rajwade opines that since the battle of Kumbheri (1754), Malhar Rao began to hate Shinde and the Peshwa. He also played a dubious role in the treachery against Jayappa Shinde. Apart from this, he protected Najib Khan in view of the growing strength of the Peshwa. He purposely delayed in helping Dataji, which led to the death of the latter. He was afraid of the increasing

[27] S. C. Mishra, *Shinde -Holkar Rivalry in Rajasthan,* Sandeep Parkashan, Delhi, 1981, pp. 2-13.

power of the Peshwa which made him weak and he suspected that Shinde was responsible for it. That is why he was against the Peshwa and Shinde. He also pointed out that Malhar Rao had a special affinity for Najib Khan, Shuja-ud-daulah, and Suraj Mal Jat. Bhau Saheb wrote to Shuja, "threaten Abdali with great strength. Do not doubt Malhar Rao in this matter. He is also in this mission".[28] It can easily be suggested from the earlier behaviour of Malhar Rao, and the suspicion of Shuja referred to in the above-mentioned sentences that this man might not have been sincere in the Panipat campaign.[29]

The other version of the story of Malhar Rao is that he was insulted by Bhau Sahib, Malhar Rao was rather displeased, and therefore, he left the battlefield as recorded in the *Marathi Riyachii Choti Bakhar.* The *Holkaranchi Thali* and the *Bakhar of Panipat* (Raghunath Yadav), the contemporary documents, narrate that Malhar Rao was entrusted by Bhau Sahib to take his family to Poona and report Nana Sahib and Gopika Bai, his wife. The *Chronicle of the Peshwa* and the *History of Vinchukar family* clearly absolve Malhar Rao from the charge of negligence in his duties and his so-called treachery.[30]

The view of Sardesai is that in spite of the differences of the opinion between Malhar Rao and Bhau Saheb, it is rather hard to believe that Malhar Rao played a treacherous role in the execution of his duty as a loyal servant. That he was too old and had lost all the enthusiasm of the time of Baji Rao must also be taken in judging his action. It is self-evident that he did not intentionally commit any breach of trust.[31]

Shejwalkar writes:

> "We have no faith in the widely expressed belief that Malhar Rao Holkar had an understanding with Najib who allowed him to escape unscathed. Malhar Rao's whole philosophy was based not on honor and prestige but profit and escape. The Marathi adage which says that 'if the head remains whole, one can have eighty-five turban to wear' seems to have been an old Malhar Rao's guideline principal which he

[28] R.V. Herwadkar, *A Forgotten Literature: Foundation of Marathi chronicles,* Popular Parkashan, Bombay, 1994, p. 54.
[29] V. K. Rajwade, *Aitihasik Prastavana,* Poona, 1928, p. 52.
[30] R.V. Herwadkar, *A Forgotten Literature: Foundation of Marathi chronicles,* Popular Parkashan, Bombay, 1994, p. 55.
[31] G. S. Sardesai, *Peshwa Balaji Rao,* Government Press, Bombay, 1953, p. 373.

> naturally followed at this juncture. Bhau neither charged Malhar Rao Holkar with the special defense of Parvati Bai nor did he himself of his own accord do anything to escort her out of the field. Only causally and accidentally they met thirty miles to the south of Delhi, circumstances which Malhar Rao took full advantage in preparing his apology."[32]

Jadunath Sarkar says:

> "the weight of evidence is irresistible that Malhar thought only of saving himself, Sand by secret collusion with Najib, that neither party would molest the other, he reminds inert during the critical stage of the battle…. But as soon as Bhau defeat appeared certain, though still an hour before the end of the struggle, Malhar fled away westward, thus utterly unconcerned Jankoji's right flank". [33]

The natural results of the post-Panipat decade were the death of Baji Rao, the various challenges of Madhavrao, the Shinde -Holkar controversies, and the desire of Raghunathrao to become the Peshwa, as well as the rise of the English as a more powerful enemy and the revolts of various Sardars and local rulers in every corner of the Maratha territories. Simultaneously, the power center of the Mughal Empire was suffering from various problems, and it was incapable to command the Mughal territory. It provided a golden opportunity to the British to establish their hold in Bihar and Bengal where the three legitimate owners: the Mughal Emperor, the *wazir* of Oudh and the Nawab of Bengal quickly defeated during the three years following Panipat. Neither the Bhosles of Nagpur nor the Peshwa offered any resistance to the British aggression. For Madhavrao the aggression of Haider Ali became the most pressing problem, and he was compelled to leave the northern affairs to the Shinde and Hoklars.[34] Shinde, however, was for some years unable to take any bold action

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[32] T. S. Shejwalkar, *Panipat: 1761,* Poona, 1946, p. 98.
[33] Jadunath Sarkar, *Fall of Mughal Empire,* Vol. II, p. 264.
[34] Jaswant Lal Mehta, *Advanced Study in the History of Modern India, 1707-1813*, Sterling Publication, New Delhi, 2005, pp. 456-460. After the disaster of Panipat, Haider Ali felt encouraged like the Nizam of Hyderabad to lay his hands on the adjoining Maratha territories. Madhavrao and his uncle Raghunathrao undertook the first expedition to the Karnatak in January 1762, after their victory over the Nizam of Hyderabad at Uruli to save their possessions from the growing encroachment of Haider Ali; Raghunathrao fell out with the young Peshwa and left his camp soon thereafter. However, Madhavrao took over the Maratha troops under his direct command and continued his marched. He realised tribute from Kitture

against Raghunathrao, interfering in the succession dispute of the Shinde fief and declaring Mahadji a rebel. Thus, Mahadji could do little in the politics of the north till 1768 when his *Saranjami* rights were restored, which was taken away after 1761.[35]

The Holkar status was persistently eroded at the Poona court, although the rising power of the Rajputs was controlled only by the Holkars.[36] The most powerful Rajput, Madho Singh of Jaipur and his confederates sustained a severe defeat by the hands of the Holkars at Mangrol near Kota on 29th November 1761.[37] It was on the field of Rakshas Bhuwan that Peshwa Madhav Rao had the occasion to know Malhar Rao Holkar and his prowess and service to the state generally. It was on this battlefield that Peshwa Madhavrao gave ~~a~~ vivid proof of his undaunted bravery and undoubted capability to bear the burden of this exalted office with conspicuous honour and success.[38] Peshwa Madhav Rao greatly favoured the cause of Malhar Rao Holkar as expressed in the following words:

> "मल्हारजी बिन खंडोजी होळकर यांनी हुजूर येऊन वीनती केली कि, आपण राज्यातील एकनिष्ठ सेवक स्वामी सेवा एक निष्ठेने केली; त्यास कृपाळू होऊन परगणे आंबर, सरकार जालना व मोजे कोरेगाव, तर्क पाबळ, प्रांत जुन्नर नूतन इनाम करून देउन चालविले पाहीजे हणोन; त्यावरुन मानस आणून, त्याजवर कृपाळू होऊन सदरहू प्रमाणे इनाम नूतन पुत्रपौत्रादी वंश परंपरेनं करार करून देऊन भोगवटीस".[39]

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and Bendur, and also challenged Haider Ali. The battle with Hiader continued until the final treaty was signed in May 1767.

[35] N. G. Rathod, *The Great Maratha: Mahadji Scindia*, p. 4. Raghunathrao immediately issued the order to arrest Mahadji. But Mahadji dodged the pursuers and arrived in Malwa safely. Also see G. S. Sardesai, *New History of Maratha*, Vol. II, p. 517.

[36] S. R. Bakshi and S. K. Sharma, *Maratha Diplomacy and Foreign Policy*, Deep and Deep Publication, New Delhi, 2000, pp. 72-95.

[37] G. S. Sardesai, *New History of Maratha*, Vol. II, Phoenix Publication, Bombay, 1958, pp. 517-518.

[38] The Pargana of Khargaone was offered as military Saranjam on Malharao Holkar, 1762-1763, including the Pargana Baver in prant Malwa, Pargana Sagnamer, Sirkar, Bijgad, Pargana Vijapure, Pargana Galna in prant Khandesh and the village of Pande in Dindori and Korogaum in Taraf Pabel. K. N. Sane edit., *Selection from Satara Raja and Peshwa Diaries: Peshwa Madhavrao –I*, Vol. IX, Government Printing Press, Bombay, 1922, pp. 142-143.

[39] Mukund Wamanrao Burway, *Life of Subedar Malhar Rao Holkar: Founder of Indore State*, p. 145.

Maharashtra witnessed on this battlefield the beginning of his victorious career, which during the coming decades made the Maratha power stronger and more formidable than it was in 1761, the year of the battle of Panipat. On 25th of September, 1763, a treaty was concluded in Paithan, the Nizam agreed to cede the territory yielding eight-two lakhs per annum, together with the fort of Naldurg. After this victory, the position and status of the Holkar family was re-gained again as it was earlier before the third battle of Panipat.

In 1764, Peshwa Madhavrao started from Poona on an expedition against Haider Ali of Mysore. Malhar Rao received orders from the Peshwa to join with 15,000 strong forces. The Peshwa along with Holkar, Patwardhan, Vinchukar sardars proceeded to Mysore. Haider Ali was compelled to sue for peace, and he accepted the terms. After this, Holkar arrived in Malwa and continued to take part in the affairs of Hindustan. The increasing power of Shinde and Holkar in Malwa, created a serious threat for other confederates. After 1764 both these families set diplomatic policies in accordance with the situation of the changing environment of the post-Panipat decade. After Panipat, the Marathas and Afghans retired from the Indian contest, and now there was a kind of vacuum in the Mughal Centre. New forces rushed in to seize the central authority vacated by the powerful antagonist. Najib Khan Rohillas assumed supreme power in Delhi, which was challenged by the Jats of Bharatpur, who had now gained strength. Both the chiefs solicited the Maratha help, and Malharao Holkar was asked to handle the situation. The Maratha chief looked upon Najib Khan as his adopted son and had no mind to support the Jats. Malhar Rao understood the situation and patched up a treaty of peace between Najib Khan and the Jat ruler, Jawahar Singh and became free to understand and handle a more strengthened plan in Hindustan and was ready to take up the British challenges.[40] In this situation, the Maratha chief was requested by Suja-ud-Daulah, Najib Khan, and Banga Chief to assist them to hold command over the Doab and other areas of Northern India.[41]

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[40] Ibid., pp. 519-520.

[41] G. S. Sardesai (ed.), *Selection from Peshwa Daftar,* Vol. XXVII, No-13, 22, 23, 24, 27, 32, 34, 35, 37. The period of 1761 to 1763, Shinde and Holkar were busy in re-establishing the supremacy of the Maratha power in Hindustan, without any help and direct support from the Poona court. At first in June 1761, Malharao Hokar sent Gangadhar Thakur to Surajmal Jat to effect an agreement about the mahal in the Doab and establish *Amal* in the territories across the Jamuna as before, while Suja-ud-Daulah, Najib Khan and Banga Chief sent the request to the Marathas and were ready to return their possessions in the Doab on the condition that; if

At that time the English having captured Allahabad, began a march upon Lucknow, the capital of Shuja. The English came to know that the two dominant Marathas, Malharrao Holkar, and Mahadji Shinde were near Agra, negotiating peace between Najib and the Jats.[42] The English had to change their plan of expansion. Holkar wrote on 30 March 1765, "I have arrived at Anupshar where Shuja-ud-daulah came and met me. I am agreeing to lend him my arm aid and with this purpose am now proceeding towards the Ganges".[43] Thus Shuja and Malhar Rao Holkar joined their forces. The English (Major Fletcher), keenly watching the movement, marched upon them from Allahabad.

The two opposing armies came face to face on the plain of Kora. Malhar Rao Holkar with his guerrilla tactics at first severely harassed Fletcher but the latter brought his excellent artillery rapidly into action on 3rd May and compelled Holkar to retrieve to Kalpi for safety.[44]At this moment of Holkar's reverse, Mahadji Shinde was near Kota in Rajputana and run immediately to that veteran support. Mahadji wrote to the Peshwa on 10th August: "Holkar is at Datia, where I am going to meet him, and with his cooperation, I am anxious to understand some grand project".[45] Although, Mahadji moved from the Rajputana to meet Malhar Rao Holkar, insulted by many supporters of Raghunath Rao, it proved as an essential step towards the unity of Shinde -Holkar in Hindustan.

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the Marathas sent their *Sardars* to capture these places. By the end of 1762, Suja captured many areas of the Doab.

[42] K. P. Kulkarni, G. S. Sardesai and Y. M. Kale (ed.), *Aitihasik Patren Yadi Wagere*, No. 223. On 25th December 1763, Surajmal was killed in a battle against Najib. Then Jawahar Singh succeeded his father in 1764 with the foremost objective to kill the killer of his father. Malhar Rao Holkar accepted Najib as his adopted son. However, at this moment he wanted to acquire more sums, therefore, he promised to help Jawahar Singh but in reality, he was not interested to harm Najib. So Jawahar Singh took the Sikhs in his service and they continued to fight till January 1765. Neither of the two emerged victorious. Then Jawahar Singh wanted to offer peace. On 9th February 1765, Najib Khan visited Malhararo Hokhar and Jawahar Singh to show the customary courtesies and peace was made.

[43] V. V. Khare (ed.), *Aitihasik Lekh Sangrah,* Vol. III, Nos. 545, 573, No. 575 written on 30th March 1765 says, "I have arrived at Anupshar where Suja-ud-Daulah came and met me. I have agreed to help him and with this purpose I am now proceeding towards Ganges".

[44] In 1765, Suja-ud-Daulah asked for help from Malhar Rao Holkar. Malharrao Holkar met Suja-ud-Daulah at Anupshar and agreed to help him. Gaziuddin also joined his forces and the battle was fought on 23rd May 1765 near Kora. Malhararo Holkar was defeated by Fletcher and was compelled to seek refuge at Kalpi.

[45] G. S. Sardesai, *New History of Maratha,* p. 521.

The English wanted to make alliances with Suja-ud-Daulah, the Rohilla Chief and the Jats against the Marathas, which would have been created more difficulties for re-gaining policies of the Marathas. Therefore, as soon as Madhavrao came to know about the progress of this incidence in the North, he sent Raghunathrao to the North in February 1766 to recover the lost prestige of the Marathas.[46] Raghunathrao marched towards the Malwa and on the way, Shinde and Holkar joined him in April 1766 at Bhander. However, the main problem with Raghunathrao was to understand the proper political situation of the North, and Raghoba also had no desire to see Mahadji as part of this campaign. Indirectly he also tried to remove Mahadji from his position. When Malhar Rao sent his report to Poona about the safety of Shinde, Peshwa Madhavrao was exceedingly rejoiced to hear of this happy news. The siege of Gohad ended in the submission of the Jat chief, peace was concluded and the Jat was compelled to pay three lakhs. The great credit was due to Malhar Rao Holkar for the rescue of Mahadji Shinde, as well as the end proposal of the Gohad siege. While this satisfactory issue of the Jat problems was in progress, the health of Malhar Rao Holkar was not well due to both physical and mental worry. Raghoba, Mahadji Shinde, Malerao Holkar, and Tukoji Holkar were called to have the last sight of the great hero, whose last words were important to know the future successor of this family- Malhar Rao placed the hand of his grandson Malerao, in those of Raghoba, and begged that the young man might be supported and enabled to serve the Shreemant. Thereafter, he placed the hand of his grandson in those of Mahadji Shinde and Tukoji Holkar, and Malhar Rao said- "माइया मांगे माझे नाव राखून श्रीमंताची चाकरी तूच करशील"[47] (You are quite fit to maintain my reputation after my death and to serve the Shreemant Peshwa). The gallant Malhar Rao then died on 20th May 1766 at Alampur, where a cenotaph was built in his honour. Malhar Rao was seventy-six year old when he died; he had more than forty years of his life been a commander of repute and during the later part of this period, he was certainly one of the most distinguished in the Maratha Confederacy.

Malhar Rao Holkar had only one son, Khade Rao Holkar who, was also killed at the siege of Kumbhere, near Dig. The Prince had married Ahilya Bai, by whom he had

[46] G. S. Sardesai (ed.), *Selection from Peshwa Daftar*, Vol. XXIV, No. 97; A. B. Phalke (ed.), *Sindeshachi Itihasachi Sadhnen*, Vol. III, Gwalior, 1937, No. 439.
[47] Mukund Wamanrao Burway, *Life of Subedar Malhar Rao Holkar: Founder of Indore State*, p. 162.

one son and daughter. The only son of Ahilya Bai, named Malerao, whose hand kept in the hand of Raghoba by Malhar Rao as the next successor, immediately received the *khilat*, or honorary dress, recognizing him by the act as a successor to the power and possession of the grandfather.

This youth, however, did not long enjoy the dignity; and his death which occurred in nine months, after his elevation, was very melancholic. He had always been considered of the weak and unsettled intellect, but no symptom of positive insanity had appeared before he came to the head of the government. The life of his mother (Ahilya Bai) was devoted to the act of charity and benevolence. It is said that Malerao was affected by some *jin* or demon. Ahilya Bai satisfied this fact and used to sit day and night by the bed of her afflicted son. In the hope of soothing the demon, she offered to build a temple to the deceased and to settle an estate upon his family, if he would only leave her son. But all was in vain- Malerao died. This incident compelled Ahilya Bai to come forward to save the interests of the family she represented, and to exhibit in the person of female, the combined talent, virtue and energy which made her life, proved as a blessing to the territories. She had associated with her memory with every plan of improvement and just government in the province of Malwa.[48]

The daughter of Ahilya Bai had been married into another family, and could, therefore, according to the Hindu tradition, had no claim to participate in the administration of the Holkar sovereignty. Under these circumstances, Gangadhar Yashwant[49], the Brahmin minister of Malhar Rao, strongly recommended that some child should be adopted to succeed Malerao, a plan which would have secured the continuance of his own authority as a minister. This proposition was combined with the office of a large separate provision for Ahilya Bai, whose abilities were admitted, but her sex objected to as a disqualification for the conducting of public affairs. Gangadhar at the same time proposed to give a considerable amount to Raghunath Rao in the event of his agreeing to the arrangement.

Raghunathrao in the way of returning from the North came to know about the death of the son of Ahilya Bai, Malerao on 27th March 1767. He decided to improve his own selfish advantage by seizing the wealth of the lady on the pretext that the Holkar state

[48] John Malcolm, *A Memoir of Central India including Malwa and adjoining Provinces,* Vol. I, Landelhall Street, London, 1832, p. 160.
[49] Gangadhar Yaswant was appointed as Minister of the Holkar family by Peshwa Baji Rao-I.

was now heirless and deserved to be confiscated. The spirited daughter-in-law of Malhar Rao Holkar who had given her very best to the Peshwa house could not suppress so easily. When Raghunath Rao on the evil advice of Gangadhar and Chinto Vithal ordered an attack upon Indore, none of his followers obeyed him. The question of choosing the heir for the state of Indore was referred by Ahilya Bai to the Peshwa at Poona in which Raghunathrao could not override it. Ahilya Bai became very angry when she came to know the malevolent of Raghunathrao and Chandrachud and replied to Raghunathrao:

> "यह वैभव मेरे पुरखो ने हसी – मसखरी में या नाच गाकर प्राप्त नहीं किया है I उन्होंने आपना खून पसीना एक कर व् तलवार के जोर पर यह राज्य स्थापित किया है I में एक अबला हु, असहाय औरत हु ऐंसा कोई नहीं समघे! हाथ में भला लेकर सामने अर जाउंगी तो सारी योजना धरी रह जाऐगी – मै पेशवा के अधीन रहने को सादा तैयार हूँ पर किसी ने मेरे राज्य की और आंख उठाई तो वह कंही सफल नहीं होगा" I [50]

She was busy in strengthening her military power, and many other sardars were ready to help Ahilya Bai against Raghunathrao. Raghunathrao imagined it to be easier to capture the Holkar state, but in reality, he was shocked when he received a diplomatic letter of Ahilya Bai in which she stated:

> "आप सेना लेकर मेरे राज्य छीनने आये है, पर आपकी यह इचछा कभी पूरी नहीं होगी ! आपने मुघे अबला समझा है, पर मै कैसी अबला हूँ इसका पता आपको रणक्षेत्र में चलेगा. आपसे शीघ्र ही रण क्षेत्र में भेट होगी. मेरे अधीन महिलाओं का सेना आपकी सामना करगी. मै हार गयी तो कोई भी मुझपर हसी नहीं उरायेगा. और आप हार गए तो कभी भी मुह दीखाने लायक नहीं रहेंगे. फिर एक अबला पर आक्रमण करने से आपके नाम पर जो कलंक लगेगे, वह कभी मीट नहीं सकेगा. इन सारी बातो पर विचार कर लीजीए तो ही आपका अच्छा है. इशी में आपका हित है". [51]

Raghunathrao understood the situation and replied to her that he came for the condolence of his son. Ahilya Bai answered: "if you came for congeniality, then why

[50] Heeralal Sharma, *Ahilyabai*, National Book Trust, New Delhi, 2012, pp. 25-26.
[51] Ibid., p. 26.

you came with a large army, you are my guest. Come in Palki. This is your home". Finally, Raghunathrao went to meet her and Ahilya Bai became the successor of the Holkar state.[52]

Ahilya Bai was elected for the commander of her army and fulfilled those duties which as a female she could not perform, Tukoji Holkar was chief of the same tribes, but no way related[53] to Malhar Rao. Tukoji was highly esteemed as a soldier, commanded the Paga and Household troops; and before he had reached on a higher position in the administration, he had established a character, which he spent through a lifetime. Raghoba after this arrangement proceeded to Poona.[54]

Ahilya Bai had appointed Tukoji as commander of the armies of the state, as well as the titled head of sovereignty. A partiality of her own choice made her very indulgent; and Tukoji seemed never to have forgotten for a moment his original sense of obligation to his benefactress, beside which the respect that her virtue and liberal piety had established over all India. Malcolm writes:

> "He was more than obedient: he was delightful, and all his actions were directed to please and consolidate the princess, to whom he was solely indebted for his high station. He constantly called her his mother; but as she was much younger than him, this relation was not engraved upon his seal. On that, he was styled, by her command 'Tukoji, the son of Malhar Rao Holkar".[55]

When Tukoji was in the Deccan (remained there for 12 years), all the territories of the family of the south of Satpura range were managed by him, and the territories north of

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[52] Pushpa Paal, *Ahilyabai Holkar*, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India, 1992. On the issue of legitimate successor, Ahilya said "जिस वंस के लोगो ने इस राज्य पर सासन किया है, उनमे से एक ही मै पुत्रवधू हूँ, दुसरे की पत्नी हूँ और तीसरे की माता. इस नाते मेरा यह अधिकार ही नहीं बल्कि कर्तव भी है की साशन वाव्स्था को आपने हाथ में ले लू जिससे परजा जन को कोई कष्ट ना हो, प. ९.

[53] The relation of Tukoji Holkar with Malhar Rao Holkar is a debatable issue among the historians- He was the grandfather of Holkar's Khande. Tukoji used to tell other officers that he was a close relative of Malhar Rao. However, in the old genealogy of the Holkar family, the name of male members were-Mahadji, Hingoji,Sadhaji,Khandoji,Vreeraji, Malhar Rao, Janoji, Khanderao, Tukoji. See in Govindram Keshwa Ram Joshi, *Ahilybai*, pp. 74-76.

[54] John Malcolm, *A Memoir of Central India including Malwa and adjoining Provinces*, Vol. I, Landelhall Street, London, 1832, p. 164.

[55] Ibid., p. 165.

it were managed by Ahilya Bai, to whom the different tributaries also made their annual payment. While he was in Hindustan, he collected the revenue of the countries that had been acquired there, and in Bundelkhand and also the tributaries of the Rajputana. The district in the Malwa and Nemur continued, as usual under the direction of Ahilya Bai, and her authority was on such occasion extended over the possession in the Deccan. The treasure of the family which was considerable (said to have two millions), remained with Ahilya Bai; and she had beside personal estates yielding annually four lakhs of rupees, entirely expended at her discretion.[56] The account of the receipts and disbursement were kept with scrupulous exactness; and Ahilya Bai after paying the civil and military charges, sent the balance that remained in the public treasury, to supply the exigencies of the army employed. Tukoji was no doubt from the extant was placed, and the sense he was engaged, often obliged to act for himself; but he is stated to have referred, on every occasion in which the general interest of the government was implicated. Ahilya Bai was dealing with the matter related to peace, war, or the foreign relations of the state, her supremacy was proclaimed by her envoys of all the principal as well as petty rulers of India at her court. Ministers, deputed directly by her, resided at Poona, Hyderabad, Seringapattnam, Nagpoor, Lucknow, and Calcutta. While inferior agents remained in the court of the petty rajas, particularly those from whom tribute was collected. It is very clear that Ahilya Bai was the actual head of the government; and Tukoji, gratified with his high station and her complete confidence, continued during her life, to exercise no duty beyond those of commander-in-chief of the army, and the collection of the revenues that this vicinity enabled him to realize with more convenience than any other agent of her administration. The servants of the Holkar government, who filled offices at the period, all speak the same language; and with every disposition to praise Tukoji.[57]

[56] Ibid., p. 166.
[57] Ibid., p. 167.

Kinship and Power of the Family of Shinde

It is said that the third battle of Panipat which was fought on 14th January 1761, killed the whole generation of the Maratha warrior. It was also a dark day for the kin of Shinde who were fighting, and were alive after the battle, but the next day they were killed by the forces of Abdali. Tukoji Shinde lost his life in the battle of Panipat, while Jankoji fell prey the next day to the cruelty of Najib Khan.[58]

Out of five sons of Ranoji Shinde (Nimabai's-Jayaji, Jyotiba, Dattaji, and Chimnabai's-Tukoji and Mahadji) only Mahadji survived. From the battlefield which proved fatal to the Marathas only Nana Fadnavis, Parvati Bai, Malhar Rao Holkar, Vitthall Sahdev were among the few who managed to come back alive. Mahadji Shinde was one of them. In the fierce battle of Panipat Mahadji Shinde was badly injured in the leg. He was found lying in an unconsciousness state by Rane Khan, the water carrier, who recognized Mahadji among the dead bodies on the ground of Panipat. Rane Khan brought Mahadji in a safe place in the Jat territory, where he stayed some time with the Maratha troops; it took more than six months to heal his leg injuries, and then came to the Malwa. Mahadji Shinde was for long crippled by not being at once recognized as the heir of ancestral estates before 1768.[59] Although they both got their right on ancestral territories from Madhavrao court but their internal rivalries could not end which was the central weakness of the Maratha power in upper India. In spite of all these difficulties, the continuous efforts of Mahadji had brought the Maratha power in a more superior phase and within a decade it regained its pre-Panipat position in the North.

Although it is a long story to know how Mahdji survived in the third battle of Panipat. But most interestingly one should understand the silent contrast of the family of the Shinde on the question of the succession of Mahadji. Because after the death of Jankoji Shinde (15 January 1761) the question of the inheritance of the family remained undecided up to 1762. That time the reign of the administration was in the

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[58] *Shindesachi Itihasachi Sadhnen,* Vol. I, No. 222, p. 191.

[59] N. G. Rathod, *The Great Maratha: Mahadji Scindia,* Sarup and Sons, New Delhi, 1994, pp. 4-6. After the death of Jankoji Shinde the question of inheritance of the Shinde family remained undecided up to 1762 C.E. That time the reins of the administration of the Peshwaship were in the hands of Raghunathrao and he wanted a fabulous sum as gift to recognize Mahadji as the heir of the Shinde family. Finally, after a long struggle, Madhavrao Peshwa was convinced of the ability of Mahadji, and the title of the Sardar & Jahagir of the family was conferred ceremoniously on 18th January 1768.

hand of Raghunathrao. He asked for a fabulous sum as a gift from Mahadji for being recognized as the heir of the Shinde family. Historians like Grant Duff and G. H. Kini state that the orthodox section among the administrators of the Pune refused to accept Mahadji as the heir, being the child of a lady attendant.[60]

The latter wife of Jayappa Shinde, Sakhubai had one doubt whether Mahadji was the son of a lady attendant or not.[61] Mahadji Shinde could not pay the huge amount of the gift, and he was also not supporting the dream of acquiring the Peshwaship of Raghuba. So Raghunathrao worked against Madhavrao Peshwa and gave recognition to Kedarji Shinde on November 25th, 1763 as the heir of the Shinde family. However, Kedraji informed Raghunathrao that Mahadji would be the Sardar of the Peshwa. When Raghoba did not succeed in creating more conflicts among the Shinde family, he made Manaji the Sardar (heir) of the Shinde family on July 10th, 1764. Mahadji very soon impressed Peshwa Madhavrao and confirmed as heirs of Ranoji on 18th January 1768.[62] Malhar Rao Holkar, Nana Fadnavis and others heartily supported this move of the Peshwa. Raghunarh Rao was totally upset with this decision and started creating trouble in his own family.

Mahadji Shinde and North Indian Affairs, 1768- 1780s

Mahadji experienced a period of uncertainty between 1761-1768, but his dedication towards the Maratha Confederacy, helped him to win the trust of the Peshwa and other Maratha officers, and he became the successor of the Shinde family. From 1769 C.E. luck smiled in favour of Mahadji; he was able to remove all internal conflicts of his family, and change the feeling that the Marathas had become weak. The sole objective of Madhavrao, during this year was to strengthen the Maratha power in all directions, south as well as in the North.[63] For this purpose, he dispatched an army to the north under the command of Ramchandra Ganesh Khande, and Visaji Krishan Biniwale in April 1769.[64]

[60] Ibid., p. 4.
[61] S. P. D. Vol. 29, No. 53, p. 48 a letter of Sakkubai Shinde to Raghunathrao dada dated 15-03-1764.
[62] S. P. D. Vol. 19, No. 74, p. 81.
[63] S. P. D. Vol. 29, Nos. 220, 232, 222, 234.
[64] S. P. D. Vol. 29, No. 239.

Emperor Shah Alam was at Allahabad under the British control and was helpless. Madhavrao had given a clear instruction to Visaji Krishan that the Marathas were to make a headlong dash to Delhi, and take possession of the capital. But on two sides of Delhi, the Marathas had two enemies, the Jats, and Rohillas, but they were held in check by the Marathas, and that cleared the path of the Marathas to gain control of Delhi. Mahadji forcing the Badshah to come back to Delhi.[65] The British were afraid that the rulers of the north might rise against the British under the Marathas. So, the English made constant effort to see, after the battle of Plassey, that the northern rulers do not join hands with the Marathas, and the English also kept a firm grip on Badshah Shah Alam at Allahabad.

The Badshah had realized that it was no use to depend upon the English to help him to go back to Delhi to establish his position. Zeenat Mahal, the mother of Badshah, also advised him to seek the help of the Marathas. This was the biggest opportunity to emerge as powerful Confederates for Mahadji Shinde, because Vazir Sirjudaullah met Ramchandra Ganesh Khande on behalf of Badshah, Mirza Najaf Khan also met with the Marathas (were stationed at the Doab), but Shah Alam hesitated to believe on any Maratha except Mahadji, therefore he started to bargain with Mahadji, and the Badshah clearly told, 'Maratha choice may fall on someone else they may install someone else upon Delhi throne, Gazziuddin may be made vazir'. Therefore, Shah Alam sent his envoy, Saifuddin Mohmmad Khan on 27th December 1770 to the Maratha camp; an agreement was concluded on January 1771. After getting this positive response early in 1771, Mahadji Shinde directed his attention to the capture of Delhi, which was then held by Zabita Khan. Shinde advanced with his forces and captured it on 10th February. He placed Jawan Bhakt (the son of Shah Alam) on the throne and offered him *nazar*. On 12 February, Shah Alam ratified a formal agreement with the Maratha agent and left Allahabad on his journey for Delhi. He reached Farukhabad on 26th July and halted here for some time and arranged his future affairs with local rulers. On the 16th of November, he reached Anupshahr, where Mahadji Shinde came and made his obeisance. Then they travelled into Delhi

[65] C. P. C, Vol. 3, Nos. 527. 505, 517. The battle between the Jats and Marathas on April 6, 1770, the Jats were decisively beaten by the Marathas. As a result Nawal singh Jat started a peace talk with Mahadji, and as per the treaty Jat paid 65 lakhs to the Marathas. See J.N. Sarkar, *Fall of Mughal Empire,* Vol. III, p. 9.

and made a formal entry into the capital on 6th January 1772.[66] Visaji Krishna was appointed as the collector of areas around Delhi, which were earlier in the possession of Najib Khan for a long time.[67]

After knowing this success, the Peshwa gave an instruction to the Northern Sardar:

> "I quite appreciate the value of performance which the English desisted from undertaking. I should however like to know what amount of money and territory the Emperor has given you. You have now been out for three seasons. The Emperor has attained the cherished object, but I did not see what you have gained. Our men has shed their blood, in return you must have acquired money and territory proportionate to the sacrifice. Have you at least freed the holy places of Kashi and Paryag from the Muslim control? Had the English so minded, they would have certainly placed the Emperor on his ancestral throne. However, as their power is mainly based on sea, they declined to go a long way inland without a corresponding advantage. Now you must remember, never allow the English to make a lodgment at Delhi. Once they obtain a foothold, they can never be dislodged. Of all the European nations, the English is certainly the strongest. They have seized strategic points and have formed a ring around the Indian continent, from Calcutta to south".[68]

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[66] G. S. Cheema, *The Forgotten Mughals: A History of the later Emperor of the house of Babar*, Manohar, New Delhi, 2002, pp. 350-352. At Gharoli, 4.5 miles south east of Sahadra, Shah Alam was received by the queen mother, his heir apparent and other members of the family. On 6 of January which also happened to be the feast of *id-ul-Fitur*, he rode into the capital and entered the *Quila-i-Mualla*. The celebration of this historical movement was well recorded by the eyewitnesses; people jostled and climbed on to rooftop and filed the balcony to catch the glimpses of the Lord.

[67] *Calendar of Persian Correspondences*, Vol. III, No. 663. The Maratha captured the fort and the city of Delhi and the mother of the Emperor, children and members of the royal house of Taimur. They demanded an amount of some lakhs by way of ransom from the mother of the Emperor. They appointed their own officers. A letter dated on 20th February 1771, was received to the following effect, "The Marathas are appointing the *amals* in districts round the capital which belong to Nawab Zabita Khan. They also intend to fight the Nawab. The Maratha had formed these resolutions. First, if Shah Alam pays the sum agreeable to his engagements, they would then appoint his son as his successor. Secondly they wrote to Gaziuddin Khan that if he pays Nazar, they would appoint him as Vazir and placed another king whom he may choose on the throne. Thirdly, if Zabita Khan pays *Nazaranah*, they would restore to him the district around the capital which was formerly in his possession and the fort shall also remain in his hand."

[68] G. S. Sardesai, *New History of Maratha*, p. 531.

Apart from this instruction and all information about the Maratha activities in the north, the Peshwa was very much appreciated at the Poona court. But as in his letter, the Peshwa wanted to know how much money and land had been acquired by this victory, as the Marathas always preferred the money matter first. But the financial status of Shah Alam was not in a condition to fulfill their desire.

Zabita Khan was only a notable person from whom some money could be extracted to pay the Maratha dues. But aware of the strength of the Rohilla state, the Emperor gave Zabita another chance to mend his ways. The Rohillas were once again invited to come and make the ritual *tasleemats* like a royal *amir* at the next general *Darbar* for celebrating the return of the Emperor to Delhi. The rest of the nobles came or sent their *Vakil*, and paid their respects, but Zabita stayed away.[69] Now the Emperor did not have any option except for the military operation. The imperial forces under Najaf Khan and the Maratha forces under Visaji, Tukoji, and Mahadji Shinde marched into the Doab. The imperial and Maratha forces attacked on the troops of Zabita Khan at Chandighat, which was 12 *kos* distance from Sukartal. On 23rd February 1772, they got the victory. The Marathas besieged Partapgadh and after the siege of fourteen days, they captured the fort on 16th March 1772.[70] The Maratha Sardar captured all the artilleries and treasures of Zabita Khan including his houses and found ten lakhs of rupees. Finally, on the 11th of May an agreement was concluded at Farrukhabad. The Maratha started negotiations due to division among the Maratha chiefs.[71] Since on the matter of Zabita Khan Shinde-Holkar had always conflicts because of the personal relationship of Najib khan with Holkar, therefore, at this time after the death of Najib Khan, Visaji Krishna and Mahadji Shinde demanded a sum of twenty-five lakhs of

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[69] G. S. Cheema, *The Forgotten Mughals*, p. 355.

[70] Fakir Khahir-ud-din Muhmmad IIIahabadi, *Ibrat–Nama*, Jadunath Sarkar (Eng. trans.), Maharashtra Archives Bulletin of the Department of Archives, No. 2, P. M. Joshi (ed.), Bombay, 1966, pp. 1-2. Many noble Afghan families after escaping from the Marathas with a thousand hardships and disgrace and unable to walk or arrange any means of transport, went in to the direction of the camp of the Emperor as refugees. However, the plunders of the imperial army and Turani Mughals robbed them off the clothings of the person, which the Marathas had saved dragged women by their hands towards their tents; Mirza Najaf Khan sent his army to save them. See letter no. 209.

[71] A. B. Phalke (ed.), *Shindeshahi Itihasachi Sadhnen*, Vol. III, Gwalior, 1934, No. 464 says that "Now the three forces are marching to Farrukhabad. The three Sardars are not one minded. The two Sardars are united while Ramchandra Ganesh is not on good terms with the other two". *Calendar of Persian Correspondence*, No. 517 says that "It is hoped that the Marathas will soon enter into an agreement with the Rohillas and march toward the country of Shuja–ud-daulah."

rupees to be the successor of his father's post—*Mir Bakshi*. But Tukoji Holkar was in favour of Zabita Khan and Mahadji ordered him to expel Zabita from the camp. Another twist to the conflict was the desire of Ahmad Khan Bangas to get the same imperial post as wanted by Zabita Khan. Therefore, Mahadji Shinde advised the Emperor to move towards Delhi. The Emperor reached Delhi by long marches on 9th July 1772. By this time, Mirza Nazaf Khan had gained the favour of the Emperor and became the envy of other nobles.[72]

When the Emperor Shah Alam reached Delhi, the Marathas demanded the payment of money, which they were promised to be given on getting the throne back. The Marathas knew the financial situation of Shah Alam, that he would not give any payment. Therefore, Tukoji Holkar and Visaji Krishna advised the Emperor to give the office of *Mir Bakshi* to Zabita Khan since Zabita Khan was ready to pay ten lakhs to the Marathas so as to secure the post of his father. However, the Emperor refused to do so. Now the Marathas attacked Delhi on 17th December 1772 and compelled the Emperor to surrender. Finally, the Emperor pardoned Zabita Khan and appointed him as *Mir Bakshi* and the Marathas received an imperial *sanad* for Kora and Jahanabad.[73] Although the Peshwa was to be reported about all these developments, but before it could be done, the Peshwa Madhavrao died at Poona on 18th November 1772.[74]

The untimely death of Madhavrao on 18th November 1772, was another calamity, since he was successful at home and outside, and could also pacify his self–seeking uncle, Raghunathrao. He could utilize the services of all the powerful Sardars for boosting the Maratha prestige and impress upon the various powers-groups and states in Hindustan. But the death of Peshwa Madhavrao signaled the emergence of the forces of decline and the centrifugal tendencies among the Maratha Sardars. The fortunes of the Maratha state changed the character and outlook. This gave free scope to the ambitious Maratha Sardars: the Shindes, Holkars, Bhosles, Gaikwards and others who were busy to establish their own supremacy and had disregarded the writ

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[72] Fakir Khahir-ud-din Muhmmad IIIahabadi, *Ibrat–Nama*, Eng. tr., Jadunath Sarkar, No.2, (ed.) P. M. Joshi, Bombay, 1966, Letter No. 212.

[73] Munna Lai, *Tarikh-i-Shah Alam*, (Eng. trans.), Oriental Public Library, Patna, pp. 9-10; *Persian Record of Maratha History*, Vol. I, pp. 63-64. The Marathas have to receive eight lakhs from Zabita Khan and they had to give him all the territories except a few Parganas, which they kept in their hands.

[74] G. S. Sardesai (ed.), *Selection from Peshwa Daftar*, Vol. XXIX, Nos. 219, 280; *Calendar of Persian Correspondences*, Vol. III, No. 544.

of the Poona government and sought self-indulgence and satisfied personal vanity. All these ultimately resulted into the loss of the Maratha supremacy because of irreparable damages to their national pride, self-complacency, undaunted advance and self-growth. In 1772 when Narayanrao became the Peshwa,[75] he was only seventeen years old and he died after barely nine months of his accession. The next Peshwa, Raghunathrao had to take to flight from Poona within three months after his succession to the vacant post of the Peshwaship.

In spite of these internal and external difficulties the Marathas succeeded in re-occupying the Malwa, Bundelkhand and extracting tribute from the leading Rajput princes, almost curbing the Jats, Rohillas, and finally in occupying Delhi, and establishing the fugitive Mughal Emperor on his ancestor throne, in which Mahadji played an important role, which proved his strength in northern India. Mahadji became one of the most powerful Confederates in northern India, within a decade after 1772; he also started to neglect the decision of Poona, to strengthen his own diplomatic alliances with other power. The question is, if this was the case that Shinde was getting more power, then why other Confederates such as the Holkars and Gaekwads did not try to limit his power? The primary reason was that even other Confederates did not realize the growing strength of the Shinde, the time when the kin of the Holkars and Gaekwads came to know, Mahadji became too strong to take the open challenge with any power in the eighteenth century. The second reason was that the Peshwa was not present on the actual ground of military activities in Hindustan to reinstall the unity among the Shinde-Holkar and other Sardars because the main power centre of the Marathas was itself divided. The domestic trouble and the murder of Narayanrao compelled the concentration of the Marathas from the North to the South.[76] In fact, Mahadji was also busy in the southern campaign for more than a decade, but once he became free from this campaign, he was totally dedicated to turn his attention towards Hindustan again, having full zeal and commitment towards the expansion of the boundary of the Confederacy. Thus, he had successfully re-

[75] G. S. Sardesai, *New History of Maratha*, Vol. III, pp. 10-19.
[76] Anil Chandra Banerjee, *Peshwa Madhvrao –I*, Mukherjee & Co. Pvt., Calcutta, 1968, pp. 140-144.

established the Maratha supremacy over Hindustan with the help of a trained army under the guidance and discipline of a French commander, De-Boigne.[77]

The emergence of Shinde as most powerful confederates also can be seen as the shifting of power centre from Poona to northern India, that too within decades after the murder of Narayanrao. This change was clearly visible after the treaty of Salabai in 1782 and the death of Haider Ali. As far as the political condition of that period is concerned, it was a period of comparative calmness all over India. Immediately after the accession of Narayanrao, the Poona court reported the following opinion, "The Shrimant is yet a child and does not follow the guidance of Sakharam Badu. The Tiger is gone, now the jackals alone remained behind. God save the state".[78]

The future of the Maratha Confederacy was clearly visible to everyone. The sequence of negative forces continued, providing an opportunity to the English to expand their territory beyond the Maratha frontiers, which posed the biggest challenge for the Marathas. Now the only option to save the Maratha dignity was to give a lesson to the English for which the Marathas needed to invest their entire forces to fight against the English and Raghunathrao. At this stage, the most powerful sardars of the Peshwa were the Shinde-Holkar, who succeeded in re-establishing the Maratha domination in Hindustan, which was lost after the third Battle of Panipat.

The decades after the murder of Narayanrao on 30th August 1773, until the treaty of Salbai 1782, was the period of crisis of Northern policies for the Peshwa. This period witnessed the number of challenging events which had changed the mentality and the decision-making body of the Peshwa power in the north and as well as the south. Mahadji Shinde and other Maratha sardars were engaged in looking after the imperial matters of Delhi and collecting revenue from the different districts of north India. The British aggressive expansion policy after the death of Narayanrao created a dangerous situation for the Maratha power at Poona. This brought the attention of Mahadji towards the Southern Confederacy of the Marathas, which was needed to be saved from the aggressive action of the Bombay government who were receiving the order to attract the neighboring island of Bombay from the Court of Directors since the days of Madhavrao. Mostyn was sent to Poona, who reached on October 13, 1772 which

[77] J. N. Sarkar, *Mahadji and north India Affairs,* Vol. I, pp. V-XII

[78] Poonam Sagar, *The Maratha Policy Towards Northern India,* Meenakshi Parkashan, Allahabad, 1993, p. 169.

was the last month of Madhavrao I. Mostyn silently observed the course of events at Poona with the aims of wrecking the Maratha power and was sending dispatches of the day-to-day developments to the Bombay Council. He also suggested the British authorities to take advantages of the difficulties of the Maratha government.[79]

After knowing the proper situation of Poona, the British formed an idea to capture important places of Bombay such as Salsette, Bassein, Elephanta, Karanja and other islands. Immediately after the death of Madhavrao–I, the British Navy started aggressive attacks on the west coast but their efforts were foiled by the stiff opposition by naval officers. Nobody had the idea that the presence of Mostyn in Poona could create any harm. On August 30, 1773, Peshwa Narayanrao was murdered by the Gardis after a secret direction of Raghunathrao, and within two months Raghunathrao immediately secured the robes of the Peshwaship from the Chatrapati on October 10, and accepted them on 31st of October.[80] He prepared his own seal from which he removed the name of Chhatrapati Ram Raja considering it as inauspicious. Immediately on the murder of Narayan Rao, Mostyn called on Raghunathrao very frequently and offered the British help in case of need. At the same time, Chief Justice Ram Shastri had started the inquiry and found him guilty. After this event, Poona people did not want to see him as the Peshwa. Very soon, the council of *Barabhai* (twelve commanders) was formed to rule the country and it expelled Raghunathrao from his position, which brought a war with the English known as the first Maratha war, lasting for eight years - from 1774 to 1782.[81] The hope of Raghunathrao to remain the legitimate Peshwa was soon shattered, when on

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[79] *Calendar of Persian Correspondence,* Vol. IV, Nos. 552, 553, 581, 584, 972, 1018; *Proceeding of Secrete Committee,* from 15th February to 4th October 1773, pp. 75, 78.

[80] G. S. Sardesai, *New History of Maratha,* Vol. III, pp. 25-30. On 30th August 1773, the Gardis entered into the house of the Peshwa; the posting of clerks were cut down. Places resounded with the cries of horror but none could oppose the unruly attack. Naraynrao run to the room of Raghunathrao, begging to be saved and imploring him to become the Peshwa if his life was saved. The Gardis pulled him away from his uncle and cut him into pieces. Thus, within a short space of time about an hour eleven person were murdered: seven Brahmans, two Maratha servants, two maids and one cow. Forbes corroborated these details, saying, "The accounts of this catastrophe are variously related. The Peshwa family and a large part of Nation accused Raghoba for the murder." Then they plundered the wealth of the Peshwa. It was only after the mid night the Gardis allowed the dead bodies to be removed for performing funeral rites. Then Raghunathrao was proclaimed as the head of the state and the Gardis joined him.

[81] M. R. Kantak, *The First Anglo-Maratha War 1774-1783: A Military Study of Major Battles,* Popular Prakshan, Bombay, 1993. This war ended with the final treaty of Salbai, 32 Kms far from Gwalior on 17th May 1782.

April 18, 1774, the wife of the murdered Peshwa gave birth to a son. With this event, the position of the Raghunathrao to continue in office vanished. He became a wanderer for all his life. The rule of *Barabhai* formerly established in the Maratha state.[82] The Chhatrapati gave the robes of the Peshwaship to the child and they were invested on him on the 40th day of his life on May 28, 1774, at a special *darbar* at Purandar.[83]

Mahadji Shinde and Tukoji Holkar both just returned from their assignment in the territories in Delhi. They had their own problems. Their troops were clamouring for pay. Mahadji Shinde generally supported Nana Phadnis and Tukoji Holkar to the opponents. Raghunathrao sent his agent from Indore to Calcutta and Surat and asked the British help to recover his loss position; he also wanted to get support from north India. Shinde and Holkar tried their best to persuade Raghunathrao from adopting the rebellious path which he was following. They told him,

> "You must give up your claims to the Peshwaship; recognize the newly born child as the Master and manage the state in his name till he comes of age. If you wish to make war, you have enough filed outside; if you accept our advices, we shall guarantee that Bapu and Nana would support and obey you".[84]

However, Raghunath Rao only wanted to rule as the Peshwa and he sent another request to Suja-ud-Daulah and Warren Hastings asking for armed help from them. Shinde–Holkar requested him to come for an agreement. The process of negotiation went on from June till December, but in December Rahunathrao got suspicious that he would be caught by the Maratha sardar through this negotiation and therefore, he flew away and signed a treaty with the English on 6th March 1775 known as the treaty of Surat.[85] According to this agreement, a British force marched from Surat to Cambay

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[82] G. S. Sardesai, *New History of Maratha,* Vol. III, pp. 40-45. The birth of a son to Gangabai at Purandhar on 18th April 1774 became the happiest moment. The event turned the political situation of the Maratha state. Barabhai came in confidence to destroy the strength and plan of Raghunathrao.

[83] Ibid., p. 46.

[84] Ibid., p. 47.

[85] Sailendra Nath Sen, *Anglo-Maratha Relation,* Popular Parkashan, Bombay, 1961, pp. 38-39; *Calander of Persian correspondence,* Vol. IV, No. 1848, p. 173. The main terms of the treaty were as followed: 1. A military contingent of 2500 men should be placed at the disposal of Raghunathrao, of which at least 700 hundred were to be Europeans with sufficient

with Raghunathrao to defeat the Maratha army encamping in Gujarat and then marched to Poona. But Hastings asked the Bombay authorities to stop the war. This letter reached on 21st May when both the armies were busy in a deadly fight in north Gujarat.

Warren Hastings wrote to Poona on 10th July that he was sending his own agent to Poona to stop the war and to start friendly negotiations with the Marathas. Upton reached at Poona on 30th December 1776 to negotiate the terms of peace and encamped at Purandar. After a long discussion in March, a treaty of Purandar was signed and peace between the English and the Marathas should be fully established after being rectified by the Calcutta Council on 1st April 1776[86] after this treaty, the hostilities end for all practical purposes. Everybody left Raghunathrao alone. The Peshwa had now become two years old and was acknowledged as the master of the Maratha Confederacy.

The English were always active in searching for the possibilities to control the Maratha territories. After this treaty, they tried to subdue the Marathas. When Ram Raja was dying, Warren Hastings made an effort to give the post of the Chhatrapati to Madhoji Bhosle of Nagpur and thus, established a direct control at the centre of the Maratha power. Vithoji Bhosle, the son of Trimbak Ji of the *wavi* branch, was adopted by Ram Raja on 15th September 1777 with the help of a minister and he was also given the name of Shahu. On 9th December Ramraja died. Warren Hastings continued in his efforts to pursue Madhoji to go to Satara under the British protection and claim the throne but his plan was rejected by Madhoji.[87] The English intervention in the politics of the succession of Chhatrapati was an excellent opportunity but even if they could appoint Madhoji, their desire for expansion could not fulfill easily as

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artillery. 2. For expenses of this body, a sum of rupees one and a half lakh was to be paid every month in advances.

3. Rupees six lakhs or an equivalent in jewellery should be deposited in the British hand. In addition, Raghunatharao was to cede to the English in all the Bombay islands including Thana, Bassein, and Salsette and the Talukas of Jamusar and Olpad near Surat.

[86] S. N. Sen, *Anglo-Maratha Relations*, Firma K. L. Mukhopadhyay, Calcutta, 1961, pp. 65-68. The draft of the treaty was drawn four or five times, and at last on the 1st March 1776, a treaty was signed by Upton on the behalf of the Company, and Sakharam Bapu and Nana Fadnis on the behalf of the Peshwa. By the term of the treaty, it was declared that the peace between the English and Marathas was fully established. This treaty had fifteen terms and conditions which were rectified by the Calcutta Council on 1st April 1776.

[87] G. S. Sardesai, *New History of Martha*, Vol. III, pp. 63-64.

they thought. Very soon, international politics was altered; now the British had to expand their territory anyhow in India.

International factors played an important role behind the quick action of the English on the Maratha territories. This year American colonies of England declared the war of independence; France also joined hands with America. Consequently, towards the end of 1777 England sustained a severe defeat.[88] This disastrous news reached in India in the early 1778. Now the main task of Hastings was to retrieve the lost fortune of England by creating a new empire in India. Poona Council realised the trend of these events and prepared to meet the changed situation. Now Warren Hastings set aside the treaty of Purandar and authorized the Bombay Council on 23 March 1778 to fulfill the desire of Raghunathrao. Against the advice of the councilors, Francois and Wheeler, Hastings ordered Bombay to renew the war. For the purpose, a strong and well-equipped army was dispatched by the overland route from Allahabad through Bundelkhand.

In 1778 when Godard moved across central India, he had reported to Warren Hastings that unless the Maratha power in the Malwa was totally paralysed, the war in western India could not be ended. Mahadji was the main power of the Peshwa government and enjoyed full power until he died in 1794. Mahadji Shinde shifted his activities in the Malwa and concentrated his attention on the affairs of the northern India and Nana Phadnis took care of the affairs of the south. At this time the news of an unexpected fight of Raghunathrao came. In this situation, Nana was concentrating on the movement of Raghunathrao and Mahadji was busy in finding a new strategy of winning the war. Nana Phadnis formed a grand quadruple alliance against the British forces. The four members were the Peshwa~~'s~~ government, the Nizam of Hyderabad, Haider Ali of Mysore and Bhosle of Nagpur in an anti-British alliance.[89]

The well-equipped British forces marched through the Malwa and Bundelkhand under the command of Captain Popham and later on, under Colonel Camac and Muir. Nana was well informed about the direction of the British army. He ordered Mahadji to

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[88] Joachim Merlant, *Soldiers and Sailors of France in the American war of Independence,* Kessinger Publication, New York, 2010. On 4th July 1776, Americans declared their independence after almost 200 years of the British rule.

[89] *Calendar of Persian Correspondence,* Vol. V, No. 1997; M. R. Kantak, *The First Anglo-Maratha War 1774-1783,* pp. 210-212.

encamp in Khandesh between Burhanpur and Kondani, but Mahadji encamped in the Malwa. Nana became angry but Mahadji explained his logic and told him; Poona could be safeguarded only from the Malwa by checking fresh British forces passing through the Malwa into the Deccan. He urged that if the Malwa was lost, the Maratha state would not endure.[90]

Since the British also understood the danger and power of Mahadji in the Malwa, he made his strategy first to settle the Malwa power. Therefore, Hastings sent a force under Popham. Very quickly two important forts of Gwalior and Gohad were captured which were possessed by the Rana and were the basis of the power of Mahadji in the Malwa and Bundelkhand. This success of the British attracted many Maratha sardars towards them. Mahadji requested Ahilya Bai to send reinforcement from Indore. Forces also reached from Poona under Balwantrao Dhondev. Now the position of Mahdji improved and he wrote to Nana not to approach Godad to conclude peace terms. On July, Mahadji encamped near Jhansi. Colonel Muir also established his camp at Sipri. There was a distance of about forty miles between the two camps.[91] During the summer of 1781, Hastings came to know about the defeat of Goddard in the campaign of Konkan, and the failure of Mahadji in concluding peace with Poona. He became extremely disappointed because of the paucity of funds. He marched to Banaras to extract some money from Chet Singh and to open negotiations with Mahadhji. At this time, Chet Singh also rebelled but during August, Muir came to know through his mediators about the readiness of Mahadhji to finalise the treaty if Salsette, Bassein, and other places near Bombay were returned to the Poona government and the Rana of Gohad was kept under his control. This matter was referred to the Governor–General at Banaras. After knowing this positive sign, how anxious Hastings was to conclude the peace may be gauged from his letter,

> "My primary, and I may add, my sole motive, since every other operated only as a subservient to it, in making this distant excursion, was peace. A separate peace concluded with Mahadji Shinde will be the great leading steps to it, and his assistance heartily given will complete it –will in effect command it. And I will venture to promise

[90] G. S. Sardesai (ed.), *Historical Papers relating to Mahadji Sindia*, Gwalior, 1934, Nos. 103-109, 134-136, 152.
[91] Poonam Sagar, *Maratha Policy towards Northern India*, Meenakshi Prakashan, Meerut, pp. 175-177.

> that if this end can be accomplished early, it will as surely draw after it in the peace in Carnatic: I do not mean a peace with Haider, but his retreat from Carnatic, or his destruction if he says".[92]

Warren Hastings wished to meet Mahadji Shinde. He deputed and sent his personal agent, David Anderson with full power to settle the terms[93] based on the agreement already arrived with Muir. Anderson had problems with the Raja of Banaras, and he requested Mahadji to dismiss Chet Singh, but Mahadji refused, and Anderson did not have an option. He visited Mahadji on 23 December 1781. The terms proposed by Warren Hastings for affecting a treaty through Anderson are as follows:

Mahadji should bring about an offensive and defensive alliance between the English and Marathas on one hand and Haider Ali on other.

1. That the English should retain their conquests in Bombay and Gujarat.
2. Raghunathrao should be given adequate provision.
3. This treaty should not affect the engagement which the English had made with Nagpur, Baroda, and Hyderabad, that Mahadji was free to deal with the Rana of Gohad as he liked.
4. The Marathas should entertain no other European nationals in their services.[94]

Apart from these terms, they already demanded that the country of the King (Shah Alam) taken by the English would be restored and in future would excite no animosity between His Majesty and Najaf Khan. Kashi and Prayag would be sold to him as they were holy place. The *Chauth* of Bengal would be given to him as before and the English would not disturb Cuttack.

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[92] Dodwell, H, *Warren Hastings' Letter to Sir John Macpherson*, Faber and Gwyer, London, 1927, p. 87; *Foreign Department Record, Secret Consultation,* 1781, National Archives of India.

[93] Shanti Prasad Verma, *A study in Maratha Diplomacy*, Shiva Lal Agarwal Publication, Bombay, 1956, p. 327. The terms of the agreement were: 1. Mahadji and Mir should stop fighting. 2. In a week's time of both the parties should returned to their headquarter, Mir beyond the Jamuna and Mahadji to Ujjain. 3. Mahadji Shinde should arrange peace between the English and Haider Ali through his mediation. 4. The territory captured by the English in Bundelkhand should be given back to the Marathas with the princes who had gone to the English.

[94] G. S. Sardesai, *New History of Marathas*, Vol. III, p. 117.

On 14th February 1782, Mahadji Shinde wrote a letter to Nana, intimating him about the visit of Anderson with certain terms for Hastings. He asked Nana whether he should be sent to Poona or it would be possible to make a treaty without any references to Haider. Mahadji also explained if the Marathas would not come in the treaty. They had to come in another war, for which Mahadji had a paucity of resources and wealth. He also requested Nana if Poona provided the resources, he would march towards Bengal and give challenges for weakening the central point of the English power. If it were not possible then he would request Nana to finalise the treaty with best possible terms. After prolonged discussions and correspondences, a treaty was finalized and signed by Mahadji Shinde and Anderson at Salbai, twenty miles south from Gwalior, on May 17, 1782. This treaty contained seventeen terms which was signed by the Governor General, Warren Hastings at Fort William on 6th June but Nana Phadnis signed it much later on 24th February 1783.[95] Although the treaty of Salbai is still a debatable issue among the historians, some see it as a great failure and others see it as a great positive historical turning point in the Maratha Confederacy in the eighteenth century.

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[95] W. W. Hunter, *The Indian Empire: Its People, History and Product,* Routledge, New Delhi, 2013, pp. 392-393. Jaswant Lal Mehta, *Advance Study in History of Modern India,* Sterling Publication, New Delhi, 2005, pp. 539-540. Radhey Shyam Chaurasia, *History of Modern India, 1707-2000 A.D,* Atlantic Publication, New Delhi, 2002, pp. 59-60. N. G. Rathod, *The Great Maratha: Mahadaji Scindia,* Sarup and Sons, New Delhi, 1994, pp. 20-27. Terms of the treaty of Salbai: 1. All the land forts and territories taken by the English should be returned within two months. 2. Sasti and three neighbouring islands will be retained by the English. 3. Territories given by Fateh Singh Gaikward should be returned. 4. Raghunathrao should fix his residence; Poona will be given to him for 25000 P/m and the Peshwa will not do any harm to him 5.There was a treaty between Haider Ali and the Peshwa in 1780. Beside all these, it was agreed that whatever lands they had taken from the English and Mohammad Ali, should be return to them. The English were unwilling to have any confrontation with Haider Ali. 6. The Peshwa should not harm the allies of the English and the English should not harass the allies of the Peshwa. 7. The Peshwa and the English, within their own territories were allowed full mobility, from port to port or land to land, and they should not obstruct their maritime trade. 8. The Peshwa should not give shelter to any other foreigners. 9. Mahadji Shinde should act as a personal guarantee for the perpetual and invariable adherence by both parties to the condition of this treaty. However, Nana had problems on the issue of Mahadji as the guarantor and Haider Ali's relation. Nana consistently insisted on two points, the first was to get all the conquests made by the English during the last seven years particularly, Sashti, Vasai, and the ports of Gujarat, Baroch and Ahmadabad, the other was the inclusion of Haider Ali. This treaty is still a most debatable issue among the historians. Some see it as a great success while others consider it as a failure depending upon the interest of the parties. M. R. Kantak, *The First Anglo-Maratha War 1774-1783*, pp. 210-215 and Sailendra Nath Sen, *Anglo- Maratha Relations: During the Administration of Warren Hastings, 1772-1785,* pp. 195-223.

Thus, the period of the first Anglo-Maratha war which covered almost nine years from the murder of Narayanrao to the treaty of Salbai is the most vibrant diplomatic and political phase in the history of the Marathas in which the treaty of Salbai is an important landmark in the political history of India. This phase also represented the rise of Mahadji Shinde as an important source of power not only for the Maratha state but also for the sustenance of the Mughal Badshah. After the treaty of Salbai, the importance of Mahdji increased because he was accepted as a mutual guarantor for securing faithful and strict observances in the terms of the treaty. After getting honour by Shah Alam, now it was an opportunity for Warren Hastings to offer the hand of friendship with Mahadji and gave him a free hand in the management of the imperial affairs that offered Mahadji many scopes and opportunities to make subsequent advances into the North.

From 1775-1782, the Marathas were fully engrossed in the war of succession at Poona and so when there was a war with the English, they could not send any expedition under any *Sardar* to Hindustan. Even after 1782 when the Peshwa government settled peace with the English, no large-scale expedition could be sent to the North which could match that of Raghunathrao and Sadashivrao Bhau or even match the attempts of Ram Chandra Ganesh and Visaji Krishna in the North. After 1782, the Maratha supremacy in the north was not the handiwork of the Poona government but it was the result of actions of some ambitious and powerful Sardars, particularly Mahadji Shinde who at this stage became one of the most successful diplomats and administrators of central India. Mahadji efforts to hold ~~a~~ complete command over Delhi was opposed by different forces and nobles at Delhi government till 1788. But after the modernisation of the forces of Shinde by De Boigne, Mahadji Shinde could organise a massive discipline and invincible forces to become the master of Delhi.[96]

It was because of the military might of Mahadji that Emperor Shah Alam had come to Delhi in 1772. Nana knew this. Since then the prime aim of Mahadji was to hold control over Delhi politics but the unfavourable series of circumstances began from the death of the two Peshwas: Madhavrao in 1772, and the murder of Narayanrao in 1773, the escape of Raghunathrao from the English camp and the First Anglo-

[96] V. V. Khare (ed.), *Aitihasik Lekh Sanghrah,* Vol. VII, p. 3655; J. N. Sarkar, *Fall of Mughal Empire*, Vol. III, 1771-1788, Orient Longman, New Delhi, Reprint 1975, p. 101; Poonam Sagar, *Maratha Policy Towards Northern India,* Meenakshi Prakashan, Meerut, 1993, p. 187.

Maratha war and its result. Mahadji was detained in the South and Central India. But the year of 1782 was an important phase for Poona and Delhi politics because on one hand after the treaty of Salbai in 1782, the Marathas gained confidence and the death of Najaf Khan created a vacuum at Delhi which provided a golden opportunity for Mahadji Shinde to hold control over Delhi politics.[97] The problem with Mahadji Shinde in undertaking any quick action was his financial difficulties. After the First Anglo-Maratha war, his financial condition became very deplorable. For that, Mahadji asked the court of Poona for a loan of twenty-five lakhs and military help but Nana replied him to submit the account of all the previous wars, and only after then Mahadji could get a loan from Poona.[98]

It was Mahadji who understood the whole dynamics of the political situation of the Malwa and central India after the event of Panipat and now it was the time to regain the Maratha power in this entire region of upper India. Mahadji was conscious of the fact that it was very necessary for the Marathas to implant their feet in the Malwa and Bundelkhand areas if the Marathas wished to control Delhi.[99] Since it was not an easy task without full cooperation with the Poona court and the unity of Shinde and Holkar, therefore, Mahadji wanted to get full support of Nana and Holkar, but he could not get as much he wanted. In spite of all these difficulties, the trained armies of Mahadji under the command of De-Boigne[100] fulfilled the desire of Mahadji Shinde and within a decade (1782-1792) the Maratha supremacy extended upto the South of Sutlaj.

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[97] G. S. Cheema, *The Forgotten Mughals: 1707-1857*, pp. 392-404. The death of Mirza Najaf Khan left a vacuum in the *Qilla-i-Mualla*; there was no obivious candidate for his post; N. G. Rathod, *The Great Maratha: Mahadji Scindia,* p. 29.

[98] Y. N. Deodhar, *Nana Phadnis and External Affairs of Maratha State,* Popular Prakashan, Bombay, 1962, pp. 117-121. With the ratification of the treaty of Salbai, Nana and Shinde succeed in relating to background, they have some minor differences on the issue of relation with the Europeans. Shinde was struggling to re-establish the Maratha supremacy at Delhi. The prolong and mortal illness of Mirza Nazaf followed by the confusion and unseemly scramble for his post had paralysed the government of Shah Alam. In his letter to Nana, Hingne, observed, "the English have sent their Vakil from Calcutta, the present situation in Delhi is most delicate and deserve your constant attention". After knowing this he also advised Shinde to rush to Delhi and win over the Emperor. However, he was not interested to give any financial help to further military expansion. Warren Hastings wanted a friendly relationship with the Shinde. Hingne reported all the internal activities of Delhi and Calcutta with Shinde and sent it to Poona.

[99] M. G. Rathod, *The Great Maratha: Mahadaji Scindia,* p. 29.

[100] Jean-Marie Lafont and Rehana Lafont, *French and Delhi,* Indian Research Press, New Delhi, 2010, pp. 80-85.

At first after the treaty of Salbai, Mahadji decided to teach a lesson to the new rising local power in the Malwa and Bundelkhand, particularly the various landlords of Bhopal, Datai, Chanderi, Narwar, Salbai, and an urgent action was needed to be taken against Chatrajit, the Rana of Gohad, and Rajdhar, the king of Chanderi. For this prime objective during the month of April 1782, Mahadji was busy in attacking Chanderi. The king of Chanderi was defeated and a rich tribute was collected from him. Ramchandradhar was appointed in his place.[101] After that Mahadji Shinde turned all his attention to the Rana of Gohad who captured the fort of Gwalior in February, 1783. The siege continued for five months. Mahadji entrusted the administration of the fort of Gwalior to Khandeorao Hari Bhalerao.[102] These continuous successes of Mahadji made him a superior figure in the eyes of Shah Alam. At the time when the political situation at Delhi was not well organised due to the internal fights among various nobles and on the other hand, the English did not want to miss any opportunity to interfere in the Delhi administration so as to take full advantage of this political vacuum in the area.

Warren Hastings knew that the rule over the country could be wielded easily if they could control Shah Alam, the Emperor of Delhi. While the Peshwa at Poona had repeatedly informed Mahadji and Emperor Shah Alam that no state in India could be safe once the English fixed their feet firmly at the Delhi court. Even Nana Fadnis advised Shah Alam through his envoy that they should sever all political relations with the English. But there were two kinds of belief at the Delhi court: one had a soft corner for the Marathas and the other had for the English. Now the task of Mahadji Shinde was to manage the internal political affairs of Delhi according to the emerging diplomatic situation of the Indian State. In the meantime, Shah Alam ordered Afrsayab Khan to collect tribute from the provinces of Agra. The Badshah needed urgent financial sources because the treasure was empty and Afrsiyab Khan was afraid that the English would evade Delhi with the help of Abdul Ahad. Because of this decision Jawan Bhakt became angry with Afrasiyab Khan. Warren Hastings took full advantage of it and established a secret relation with the prince and called him to Lucknow. On May 6, 1784, Sahzada Jawan Bhakt[103] was welcomed by the *Vazir* and

[101] M. G. Rathod, *The Great Maratha: Mahadaji Scindia,* p .30.
[102] Ibid., p. 31.
[103] Lester Hutchinson, *European Freebooters in Mughal India,* Asia Publishing House, New Delhi, 1964, pp. 66-67.

Warren Hastings. Shah Alam and Afrasiyab Khan knew fully well the future implication of all these political developments and sent a letter to Warren Hastings to send the prince back to Delhi soon.[104]

Mahadji was shocked that Warren Hastings played such tricks in the Delhi politics. Mahadji imagined the political situation of Delhi and the English intervention and realised that finally, they had to settle against the English on the battlefield. The military of Mahadji was being modernised under De-Boigne, the French military officer who gave a new zeal into the army of Shinde. Shri Govindrao Hingne informed Nana Fadnis that the English were trying to have a hold over Delhi.[105] Mahadji sent Sadashiv Malhar Baxi to Lucknow to know exactly why Warren Hastings interfered in the affairs of Emperor Shah Alam and why Prince Jawan Bhakt was called to Lucknow without informing Mahadji. The English were not supported by the British Council and Warren Hastings was in financial difficulties and Hastings was also afraid that Mahadhji would attack Calcutta. That is why he decided to have a friendly relation with Mahadji and sent Jawan Bhakt to meet Mahadji. This time there was no other person except Mahadji who could give protection to the Emperor. Therefore, Emperor Shah Alam himself reached Agra and wished to see him immediately.

At Agra, Shah Alam came to know that Muhammad Beg Humdani had rebelled and so many problems had cropped up in the collection of revenue in the provinces of Agra. Humdani refused to meet Shah Alam and he started committing all sorts of atrocities on the people of the province of Agra. In this situation, the main task of Afrassiyab Khan was to check Humadani but he was unable to do so by himself. He suggested to get help from Mahadji Shinde and sent a request to Mahadji for a meeting with Shah Alam at Agra, but because of heavy rain, he could not meet the Emperor at this point. Finally, Mahadji sent his Sardar, Ambuji Ingle, to meet the Emperor. After Dashara, Mahadji left Gwalior for Agra. In this way, he won Dholpur that belonged to Humadani. On October 26th, 1784 Afrasiyab Khan met Mahadji and told him about the condition of the imperial power of Delhi which was on the verge of

[104] M. G. Rathod, *The Great Maratha: Mahadaji Scindia,* p. 40.
[105] Y. N. Deodhar, *Nana Phadnis and External Affairs of Maratha State,* p. 119.

collapse, and that it should be saved at all cost.[106] Afrsayib Khan wanted to get help from Mahadji to settle Humadani. On the other hand, Humadani wanted to kill Afrsaiyab Khan. Mahadji was not well aware of the danger of this conflict as it happened on November 2, 1784. Hamadani sent Zain-ul-Abdin with one bodyguard to meet Afrasiyab Khan and after the talk, the bodyguard attacked Afrasiyab Khan and he died in the afternoon. Finding an opportunity, Zain-ul-Abadin went to the camp of Mahadji Shinde and told him about the event. Mahadji did not believe and kept him imprisoned. Mahadji was suspected as being responsible for the murder of Afrsaiyab Khan.[107] While in reality Mahadji was not evolved in his murder but historians still have debates over the issue of the role of Mahadji in the murder.

The situation at the camp of Afrasiyab Khan was not in favour of Mahadji when he went to bring the dead body. The armies were demanding his payment. Finally, Mahadji promised that he would pay his salary and bring the body for the burial. Mahadji was afraid that all Muslims would go against him, therefore, he made a quick arrangement in his camp and went to bring Humadani on 7th November. After three days of fighting, Humadani surrendered himself to Ambuji Ingle on 10 November 1784. Mahadji imprisoned Humadani and all his officers. Later Muhammad Humadani Beg was released on the following conditions[108]:

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[106] H. S. Bhatia, *Marathas, Sikhs and Southern Sultan of India: Their Fight against Foreign Power,* Deep and Deep, New Delhi, 2001, pp. 147-150. In the Mughal court, various groups were fighting each other after the death of Najaf Khan. Afrasiyab Khan had been doing best to serve Humadani Beg, who was keen to succeed Najaf Khan. They both fought each other and both sent a request to Mahadji for help. Mahadji had received the invitation from Afrasiyab Khan; he moved towards Agra and met the Emperor on 22nd November, 1784 A.D. After the arrival of Mahadji in the court, the brother of the late Mirza Safi Khan, Zain-ul-abdin murdered Afrasiyab Khan on 2nd November and fled to the camp of Mahadji to take shelter. Some person doubt Mahadji for this murder.

[107] Historians like Franklin, Grant Duff and Kini have concluded that Mahadji Shinde was behind the murder of Afrasiyab Khan. Nana Fadnis wrote to Sadashiv Dinkar to gather all the details of his murder and informed it to Poona. He reported, "*आमदनी जैनुल अब्बदीन्खान व् भोगले, सर्वाचा मंसबा थर्लाजे अफशारिफखान दक्षिणनायाशी घरात घालतो तो याश जैनुल आबदीनखान मारवा, म्हणजे पतित्बबा सहजच राहिले. बादशाही बंदोबस्त करण्याचा विचार, आमीरुलउमराई, जैनुलाबदिन्खानासधावि ज्ञानया चेवुलल्ेट आहे*" All this proved that the inferences of the history was totally wrong. N. G. Rathod, *The Great Maratha: Mahadji Shinde,* p. 43.

[108] G. S. Cheema, *The Forgotten Mughals: 1707-1857,* pp. 394-395. Hamadani also tried to exploit the situation. His agent tried to seduce the imperialist soldiers. Shinde demanded to surrender, but he did not want. After the three days of the war, Hamadani surrendered to Shinde. Of the four successors of the heritage of Mirza Najaf, Afrasiyan Khan and Mirza Safi Khan were dead, while the power of Hamadani had been destroyed. Najaf Kuli alone survived, but he was dissipating himself in drink and debauchery. Moreover, like others he

1. Humdani should surrender all weapons and war materials.
2. Humadani should keep all the relations at Ujjain, the capital of Mahadji.
3. Humadani should serve Mahadji hereafter.

The role of Mahadji in punishing Humadani pleased Badshah Shah Alam. Mahadji sent a request to meet Shah Alam. They met at Fatehpur–Sikri on 14 November 1784. Mahadji touched the feet of the Emperor and presented him 101 gold coins. The Emperor urged that Mahadji should take the responsibility of making arrangements about the state. He decided to give Mahadji responsibility for two posts: *Vakil-e-Mutalik* and *Mir bakshi*. In fact, Mahadji said that he would ask the Peshwa at Poona before taking such a big responsibility. But Shah Alam had ~~a~~ full faith in Mahadji and Mahdaji did not have much time to have proper conversations with Poona. On 30th November the Emperor reached near Pingore which is near Sayadpura. Here he held a big *Darbar* on December 1, 1784 and appointed Srimant Peshwa on the post of *"Nayab-e-Munaib"* and *"Baxi-Ul-Maulik."* As per the written condition, it was decided that Mahadji should manage the daily administration and so, he was offered *"Nayabgiri"* by the Badshah.[109] With the achievement of such a great success, the desire of the Marathas to control Delhi was fulfilled, and Mahadji became the supreme power of the Imperial administration.

The beginning of the year 1785 was infused with various internal and external challenges with regard to the administration for Mahadji Shinde. On one hand, many of the Sardars rebelled against the post of Mahadji and on the other hand, the title of such a big post in the Mughal administration had no financial resources. The first task of Mahadji was to have proper control over the rebels and to look for various financial sources for expanding the administration. By the end of the year 1784, the expenditure of Mahadji Shinde exceeded eight million rupees and his running cost was ruinously high. His own army cost was 70,0000 rupees per month and the cost of the maintenance of the Emperor and the camp was another 130,000 rupees per

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had never been in the race to become the keeper of the Emperor. The road was at last wide open for Mahadji Shinde.

[109] Faquir Khair-ud-Din Muhammad, *Ibrat-Nama,* Vol. II, Jadunath Sarkar (Eng. trans.), P.M.Joshi (ed.), *Maharashtra Archive Bulletin Of the Department of Archive,* No. 2, Government Press Bombay, 1966, pp. 70-74. When the Emperor heard of the murder of Afrasiyab Khan, his courtiers urged him to personally take charge of the administration and not to call anyone else. But his personal friend advised the Emperor to make Shinde the regent on the condition of a fixed subsistence.

month.[110] In addition, there was no financial source to fulfill the demand. The only way to collect the money was to attack the rebellious Sardars and search their treasury in various forts of Hindustan. Keeping this prime purpose in his mind, Mahadji launched a campaign in the first week of January to capture the fort of Dig which was under the command of Malik Muhmmad. Mahadji won the fort on 16 January 1785.[111] After winning this fort Mahadji marched towards the fort of Agra which was under the control of Shujauddin Khan. For commanding over this fort, Mahadji had to stay two months in Dig. Finally, on 27th March 1785, Shujauddin Khan surrendered the fort.[112] Now Mahadji turned his attention towards the fort of Aligarh, which was the key station of the Rohillas and under the control of the younger brother of Afrsaiyab Khan. Mahadji wanted to appoint the son of Afrsaiyab Khan in this fort. However, Jahangir Khan wanted to have a war with Mahadji Shinde and sent a request for military help to Nawab of Ayodhya in the following words,

> "If men from south win over this fort, which is on the borders of Ayodhya, it would mean a chronic headache for your region. From there they can easily destroy Ajodhya. Help me to retain this fort and the land held by me. If you do so, I will part with half of the wealth which Najaf, Safi, Afrasiyab and others have stored in this fort, and give it to you".[113]

In this letter, he also promised to give all the expenses for military help and if the English wanted to hold command over this fort, they could. He expressed to live as simple landlords of these provinces and pay regular tribute. Sir John Cummings himself took a decision and stationed at Atroli. Mahadji filed a complaint through James Anderson and the Governor General gave an order to back out with forces. The

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[110] Michel Edward, *The King of the World: The Life and Times of Shah Alam Emperor of Hindustan*, Secker and Warburg, London, 1970, p. 172.

[111] दिग्येच्या किल्ल्या तहसम होते त्याची तलब पंधरा हज़ार रूपये चढले होते. ते त्यास देऊन किल्ला खाली करूँ देवजी पाटिल नामें किल्लेदार करूँ एक पलटन किल्ल्यात व् शहरात आपला अमल केला. N. G. Rathod, *The Great Maratha: Mahadji Shinde*, p. 49.

[112] *Foreign and Secret Department Dairy*, No. 32, letter No. 27, p. 177, the fort of Agra was surrendered to Shinde this afternoon.

[113] N. G. Rathod, *The Great Maratha: Mahadaji Scindia*, p. 50.

siege continued until the 20th November 1785, when Raiji Patil got success in conquering the fort of Aligarh.[114]

The monthly expenses of Mahadji for military and cannons equipment were seven lakh rupees. The forces of the Badshah were added too for further expansion. To tide over these difficulties, he started a mint at Mathura, and brought out rupees with the stamp of Nana Fadnis. Mahadji wrote many letters to Poona regarding the financial difficulties faced by him in maintaining the Maratha affairs in the north. Even after a number of requests, Nana Fadnis did not give any financial help. In addition, the most important task for Mahadji Shinde was to have permanent control over Delhi, Agra, and Aligarh which were the centres of the imperial power and from there they could check on the Sikhs in the North, the Pathans in the Doab and the Rajput Kings in the South West.

Thus, it is clear that all these confederates the Shinde, Holkars and Gaekwads had created their own respective territorial zones after the third battle of Panipat. The Peshwa was not able to maintain all the administrative affairs. The kin of these families became an important shareholder in their particular zone of territories, and to gain personal power, gradually they all stated to form personnel alliances with the English and others. Till the decades of the 1780s all these confederates had their own diplomatic partnerships and military organization which were not under the complete control of the Poona authority.

[114] In the fort Mahadji got 65 canons, one very big gun for cannon charge, 100 mounds of cannon powder, 1000 mounds of lead, bags of grains and forty thousand rupees in cash. This was equally distributed between Mahadji and the Emperor. *Secrete and Political Department Dairies*, No. 33, Letter No. 4.

CHAPTER - 3

Sovereignty and Kin's Polity: Households and Policies of Gaekwad and Shinde, 1775- 1803 C.E.

The last quarter of the eighteenth century can be seen first, as the formation of a sovereign base for the families of the Shindes, Holkars, and Gaekwads, and second, as the phase of equality in terms of the power of the Peshwa, Shindes, Holkars, and Gaekwads. During this process, the role of the kin of these Confederates played critical conscientiousness in the transition from sovereign states to princely states under the British dominance. The history of the decade of the 1780s is the most crucial phase of the development for both the ruling elite and the sovereign territorial politics for the house of the Gaekwads and other Confederates. This chapter throws light on the question of sovereignty and power of the Gaekwads, and Shindes from the decades of 1775 – 1803 C.E. when most of the Confederates of the Maratha Confederacy lost their supremacy.

Gaekwad and his Politics of Sovereignty

The question of sovereignty can be understood through the power structure of the Central authority of the Confederacy or Poona and the House of Baroda. In order to understand the power and kinship polity, the most important questions that we need to examine is, whether the Gaekwad princes were on an equal footing with the Peshwas, or they were the subordinates and servants of the Peshwas, the *jagirdars* and the vassals of the Poona *Darbar*. The status of Raghoba, Fatesing and the Bombay Government are very important to understand the power and sovereignty of the Gaekwads. The political status of Raghoba was not in a situation to control the power of the confederates. Fatesing was not likely serious to imperil the Peshwa authority. The state which the Gaekwads called as their own was claimed by the Peshwa as their state, entrusted to the Gaekwads for the purpose of internal administration and revenue collection but in reality, it was the property of the Poona *Darbar*. They claimed as suzerain rights and considered the Gaekwads as their vassals. In the articles IV and V of the treaty of Purandhar, signed on 1st March 1776 by them, the Poona government agreed to give the English forever all rights and the title to the entire revenue share of the city and *pargana* of Baroch and territory of three lakhs of

rupees near or adjoining Broach as full and complete right to collect the revenue.[1] Article 7 of this treaty says:

> "The English do agree that every part of Gujarat country ceded to the Company by Raghunathrao or taken possession of by them, shall be forthwith restored with all the forts and towns, thereunto belonging, except what is settle by this treaty. The Country ceded to the English by Seajee or Futty Singh (Fatesing) Guicowar, shall also will be restored….that they do not possess power or authority to make such session."[2]

These articles show that the sovereign right of the Gaekwads was under the complete threat of the Peshwa and the British. However, in the coming decade, the Gaekwads took many decisions without consulting the central authority at Poona, but the Poona authority mainly decided to appoint the next successor of the House of the Gaekwads till 1800. After the death of Fatesing on 21st December 1789, it might be supposed that his brother Govindrao would certainly succeed him. But, in spite of the loud remonstrance of this luckless and rather foolish person, and of the support he sometimes received from Shinde, the Poona *Darbar* favoured the claim of Manaji Gaekwad, who had accordingly installed a regent for Sayaji. He did not get a post without making specific promises– the payment of a *Nazar* of 33,13,000 rupees and Fatesing's arrears, amounting to thirty-six lakhs, or according to some Maratha manuscript the sum of sixty lakhs in four years, in installments of fifteen lakhs.[3] Though this article it is also clear that the territories of the Gaekwads (Broach) had been surrendered to the English without its consent. However, the VIIth articles, at the same time, all the former treaties were annulled. This VIIth article was clearly framed by the Poona *Darbar* to catch Fatesing in trap "if he produced sanad showing that the Gaekwad had not the power to make cessions without the leave of the Peshwa, the

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[1] C. U. Aitchison, *A Collection of Treaties, Engagements, and Sanads* Vol. VI, p. 29. Article -4 "The Maratha do agree to give to the English Company for ever all right and title to their entire share of the city of Pargana of Broach, as full and complete as ever they collect from the Mogul or otherwise without retaining claim of chouth,, or any other demands whatever, so that the English Company possess it without participation or claim of any kind. The Pargana of Chikli and Karol with the town of Varial, three villages of the Pargana of Choraasi and the Village of Bhatgam were to continue with the Possession of the Honorable Company as pledges till the Sanad for country of 3 lakhs made over".

[2] Ibid., p. 30.

[3] F. A. H. Elliot, *The Rulers of Baroda,* first published in 1879, p. 55.

precedent would be a dangerous one in after times, if he did not produce the sanad he would lose his ceded district".[4] He evaded the difficulties with his usual tactics and stated that he had given up his districts "conditionally that Raghunath Rao should get all his thana properly settled, which was not done". It was not until June 1778 that the Peshwa government confessed that the proof mentioned in the treaty of Purandhar was not forthcoming. Since the war was already started between the Peshwa and the Company, the British Governor advocated an alliance to capture the territories of the Gaekwads, which was accessible to the British troops from the sea.

On 29th February 1780, Shinde, Holkar, and the Peshwa allies crossed the Narbada and encamped near Dhaboi on 7th March but the town was bravely held by Mr. Forbes, the author of *Oriental Memories*. He reached Baroda on 8th March; Shinde tried to bring unity among the Gaekwads, but failed. On 17th May 1782, however, a fresh treaty was concluded at Salbai between an envoy of the Governor General one side and Mahadji Shinde as plenipotentiary for the Peshwa and the minister of Poona on another side. It replaced the Maratha territory in Gujarat exactly where it was on the outbreak of the hostilities against Raghoba in 1775. By the Vth article, the country mentioned in the Purandhar treaty was to be restored by the British either to Gaekwad or the Peshwa and by VIIIth "whatever territory Fatesing Gaekwad possessed at the commencement of the war was forever to remain on the usual footing in his possession." [5] Therefore, the result of two wars between the Peshwa and the British in the Maratha Confederacy, Gaekwad was left in his old position; but he was greatly improvised, and had lost forever his share of Broach, which was now made over to Shinde or slightly to his agent, Bhaskararo.

Fatesing died on 21st December 1789, in consequence of fall from the upper story of his place. Great parsimony marked his later administration. The death of Fatesing left Sayajirao without a guardian; but as Sayajirao died in 1792 that his younger brother Manajirao practically succeeded shifty and prudent prince in spite of the bold

[4] Ibid., p.52.

[5] G. O. B, Vol. III, letter from William Honby to the Peshwa, p. 141. The treaty was finally ratified at Gwalior on 20th December 1782, and a portion of it affecting the Gaekwad was communicated to Fatehsing to give up Ahmadabad. The great difficulty experienced in making this treaty was to forcing Fatehsing to give up Ahmadabad. By 17th July 1783, such a Gaekwad territory remained in the hands of the English. 31st October 1783, Fatehsing was officially informed that, in the opinion of Governor General, Ahmadabad should be given up.

resistance of Govindrao made from his obscure retreat in the village of Daur near Poona. He could bring forward no argument as good as Manajirao, who promised a *nazar* of Rs. 33,13,000 and promised the Poona government to pay Fatesing's arrears which amounted to 36 lakhs.[6] But Mahadji Shinde to whom Govindrao had offered his son AnAnandrao as a husband for his daughter, and a grant of three lakhs of rupees, espoused the claim of Govindrao much to the disgust of the Poona *Darbar*. The rivalry between the brothers kept alive until the death of Manaji on 1st August 1793.[7] The Bombay government at this time refused to interfere or even to mediate between the two brothers, holding that by the treaty of Salbai an attempt to dismember the state would alone justify their interposition; In fact, this was the main policy of Lord Cornwallis on the 15th of July 1793. However, the personal correspondence of Gaekwad with the English shows that Gaekwad was openly requesting enemies to interfere in the state, as it can be seen in the correspondence of 1793.[8]

Govindrao Gaekwad became the next successor of Manaji. All parties expected that Govindrao would not face any rival from other family members of the Gaekwads, but the rapacious Poona court headed by Nana Fadnavis refused to allow the unfortunate man to leave until he had signed an agreement[9] to pay 20 lakhs dues of Manajirao, Rs.

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[6] According to the Peshwa record, Manaji promised to pay 60 lakhs in four years in the installment of 15 lakhs. See *Gazetteer of Baroda,* Vol. I, 1923, p. 481.

[7] *Gazetteer of Baroda*, Vol. I, 1923, pp. 480-482.

[8] See the translation of Persian writing presented by Gulabrao, the Vakil of Manajirao Gaekwad, on 25th January 1793, for the consideration of the Government of Bombay. "It being requisite that Honourable Governor and Council of Bombay should be acquainted with all circumstances that regard the interest of the Gaekwad Sarkar, Gulabrao vakil dispatched to Bombay on part of Manajirao, having eight important requests in a letter such as- 1. Treaty of friendship and alliances; 2. Information about the officers of Manaji who dispatched to Poona to settle the dispute of succession; 3. After the Manaji became successor, Nana Fadnavis and Haripant Phadke, by oath not to interfere in the Gaekwad government. 4 Mahadji and Govindaro agreement at Poona 5. Sir Charles W Malet, the representative of Company at Poona, being well acquainted with all circumstances of the treaty settled between Genral Godar and Fatehsing. 6. Manaji assured that through the mediation of government of Bombay all disputes between the two brothers will be adjusted, but Minister of Peshwa and Mahadji Shinde is not listening to their advice. 7. Manajirao desiorious to communicate the many matter to Government of Bombay. 8. Manaji depends entirely on the friendship of Government of Bombay." See in G. H. Gense and D. R. Banaji (ed.), *The Gaekwad of Baroda: English Documents,* Vol. III, Letter dated on 25th January 1793, pp. 177-178.

[9] The agreement of 1793 superseded by one made in 1794.

56,38,0001 as *nazar* for his title, and Rs. 43,62,000 as arrears of tribute for the years from 1791 to 1793, calculated at the usual rate of Rs. 14,54,000 a year, that is a tribute of Rs. 7,79,000 and in lieu of military services, Rs. 6,75,000. Beside this, he was directed to give up at once, in part the payment of his dues, all jewels, monies, and clothes, to be found in the Baroda palaces to make the Peshwa the present of three elephants, five horses and jewels worth one lakh, in order to restore Salvi which had been given to Fatesing.[10] Along with it, a request was also made for the ceding of all the territories belonging to the Gaekwads south of the Tapti River including a share of revenue of Surat.[11] With all these agreements, Govindaro was allowed to receive the title of *Sena Khas Khel* on 19th December 1793, but he did not enter his capital without one more struggle. Kanhoji Rao, his illegitimate son by Gujarabai, a Rajput princess of Dharampur, obtained some assistance from his mother and from the agent of Shinde at Baroda and entered into Baroda with 2000 Arabs and 600 Pathans to oppose the position of Govindrao. [12]

The strong and successful reigns of Fatesing and his predecessor saved the Gaekwad territory from the external and internal threats and gave a new identity to the Baroda state. However, his successors, Govindrao, and Anandrao seemed to be weak rulers, in whose time all the real power passed into the hands of ministers. So, it was not only the Chhatrapati and the Peshwa who were losing their power, V. S. Kadam says, "power shifted from the hand of the Chhatrapati to the hands of Karbhari" but the similar case was there in the House of the Gaekwads. The rivalry and ambitions of the kin of the Gaekwads were far more injurious to the state than even the obstinate conduct of the rulers like Sayajirao (1768-1778). Damaji (died in 1768) and his brothers injured each other. The reign of Fatesing, Govindrao and Manaji by their internecine strife played into the hand of their enemy the Peshwa; but the evil was intensified after their times – son strove against father, brother against brother, cousin against cousin, while wives and mothers pushed the interest of their husbands and sons with the entire disregard of justice or common good of the family.

Before discussing some of the chief incidents of the reign of Govindrao, it must be understood that his succession brought a kind of revolution for the Gaekwad family.

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[10] *Gazetteer of Baroda,* Vol. I, 1923, p. 482.
[11] F. A. H. Elliot, *The Rulers of Baroda* , p. 56.
[12] *Gazetteer of Baroda,* Vol. I, p. 482.

Govindrao and his brother had been fighting each other for many years, and when the death of Fatesing and Manaji destroyed the hope of their party, the late could expect no mercy at the hands of the new rulers. Govindrao accordingly not only turned out the old ministers, but as he was at first the humble servant of Poona, he brought his new servants from the Deccan, the ancestors of the several present Sardars, and amongst other the Majumdars and the Phanavis. He also opened the way for the greatness of the Prabhu family, of which the first and most conspicuous members were Ravji Appaji, the Dewan and his brother Babaji, who in time became the commander of the state army.[13]

The Baroda state also became more amenable to the dictates of the Peshwa than it had ever been. This tendency towards the passive obedience probably would have become still more marked, if, the struggle between the British and the Peshwa, the Gaekwads had not been forced by circumstances to side with the former, to his lasting gains. The Poona authority was constantly increasing the pecuniary embarrassment to Baroda house during the reign of Govindrao.[14] At this stage, his illegitimate son Kanhoji also played a negative role in the Gaekwad family. Although Kanhoji surrendered to his father, who placed him in confinement, very soon he managed to escape disguised in female attire. When he fled into hills, he found that the Bhils ready to aid him in the ravaging Sankheda and Bahdurpur. After that, he joined the rebellion by Malhararo (from Kadi), the son of the late Khande Rao Gaekwad, who died in 1785, but his family worked for many years for vexation of the family of the Gaekwads.[15]

In the meantime, Nana Phadnavis was also arrested in the camp of Shinde. His partisan Aba Shelukar, who was then working under Chimnaji Pant (Appa Saheb), the nominee of Bajirao, as Suba of the possession of the Peshwa in Ahmadabad, also got a notice from Govindrao to accept his order. Govindrao was directed to farm the

[13] G. H. Gense and D. R. Banaji (ed.), *The Gaikwads of Baroda: English Document,* Vol. IV, pp. ix-x.
[14] F. A. H. Elliot, *The Rulers of Baroda* , p.58.
[15] G. H. Gense and D. R. Banaji (ed.), *The Gaikwads of Baroda: English Document,* Vol. VIII, p. vii.

district, and peatland was actually occupied. But he and his servants Raovji Appaji and Babaji were fairly well disposed towards Abba Shelukar.[16]

Ahmadabad district was nominally farmed by a favourite but illegitimate son of the Maharaja, named Bhagwat Rao for a term of five years at rupees five lakhs a year, and it unfortunately so happened that the proceed of the first two years- that is 10 lakhs –were pledged, by the order of the Peshwa to Shinde. The farm[17] had hitherto fetched not more than three and a half lakhs, but even if five lakhs was worth taking up, for at one blow all those evils were removed which arose from there being two governments whose boundaries were not accurately fixed, but at many points interlaced. Govindrao was busy in collecting the money to be paid for the Ahmadabad farm- had, in fact, with the difficulties scraped together the full sum of rupees five lakhs- and in order to counterbalance the great power of Ravji Appaji, was negotiating for service of a brother to Yadavrao Bhaskar, then a favourite minister of Shinde.[18]

Once again the state, impoverished by the payment to the Peshwa two years before this was sixty lakhs of rupees, was plunged into what may almost be termed as a civil war. Which lead to the miserable condition of the state. The treasury was empty; virtually all the districts were mortgaged to creditors, the tributes were to pay only when compelled by military forces, withheld their tribute with impunity. The Gaekwads were split into friction; A foreigner whose chief anxiety was to enrich his family was nominally at the head of the affairs. The maintenance of the army alone exceeded the receipt of the state; No attention was given to the administration of justice, the protection of the public, and such matters. There was, properly speaking, no government, for all real power lay in the hands of the rapacious and overbearing Arab soldiery. In society and private matters, there was terrific disbelief in both the ruling elite and the people of Baroda.

Meanwhile, Shinde, Holkar, and the Peshwa too were watching the dissolution with interested views, and the only way out of the dangers which encircled the state was a

[16] G. H. Gense and D. R. Banaji (ed.), *The Gaikwads of Baroda: English Document*, Vol. IV, p. x .

[17] This farm included share in the Kaithiawad and Sorath tribute, the revenue of Petland, Napad, Ranpur, Dhandhuka, and Ghogho, together with right to certain customs dues in Cambay and a share in the revenues of the city of Ahmadabad. At the same time Shinde was granted the proceeds of the farms for the first two years of its lease.

[18] F.A.H., p. 62.

desperate one and appeal to the British arbitration. Mercenary troops had been introduced into the state by Fatesing, but with a sparing hand; before the death of Govindrao their number was doubled; and Ravji Appaji, in trouble now to come, augmented their numbers and increased their power and privileges. Of these mercenaries 13,126 were foot, and 3,731 were cavalry, and they cost the state monthly Rs. 2,99,642. The most esteemed were the Arab adventurers or those who came from a distant part of Asia. It was not Baroda alone that the services of these foreigners were sought, for at this time almost every native state in India entertained mercenary troops. But in the case of Baroda, most of the important places and forts were under the command of the Arabs, including the fort of Baroda, Borsad, Sankheda, and other crucial locations. Gradually, they became more selfish and independent and were interested only in getting a salary. Mangal Parekh and Samal Bechar, each of whom headed by a party, were willing to support the administration of any rulers.[19]

Govindrao had intended to send his Deputy to Ahmadabad a brother of a minister of Shinde, Yadavrao Bhaskar, thinking that by doing so he would be able to counterbalance the excessive power which Raoji Appaji had acquired in the state; but he was not sufficiently strong to assert himself against his masterful Diwan, who secured the appointment of his cousin, Raghunathrao, alias Kakaji. The first payment of five lakhs had been made over to Bankar Hari Bhakti for Shinde when Govindrao died, on 19th September 1800.[20]

Again history repeated itself, as had happened when Damajirao died, so now the heir was all but they were fighting with each other. The kinship of the Gaekwads was involved in forming a group and was quite incapable of managing the state affairs in turbulent times. Once again disputes emerged amongst all the kin of the Gaekwads, over the issue of who would act as a regent and guardian. Again, there were all the distractions of the civil war; and all these troubles beset the state at the time when its finances were seriously impaired by the payment to the Peshwa in 1798, nearly 79 lakhs of rupees.[21] After the death of Govindrao on 19th September 1800, his successor was Anandrao Gaekwad, whose claim to the title of *Senakhaskhel* was not only

[19] F. A. H. Elliot, *The Rulers of Baroda*, p. 64.
[20] *Gazetteer of Baroda*, Vol. I, 1923, p. 485.
[21] Ibid., p. 486.

disputed by his legitimate and illegitimate brothers but also by the group of *jagirdars* and ministers. However, the opening year of the reign of Anandrao witnessed a fierce faction fight, not for the *gadi*, but for the Ministerial power and administrative control in the Gaekwad domains under the nominal rule of the then reigning sovereign; for until circumstances made Anandrao a mere figurehead, out of whose feebleness ambitious politicians tried to make Baroda in order to further the cause of their own personal greatness. Self-interest was the primary motive that swayed the rival parties, inspired their ambitious design, and animated their warlike activities in their struggle for success.

Kin and Rival Parties

Many rival parties emerged within the family of the Gaekwads. There were groups according to the clashing interest that divided them; and at the same time such information about their character, as it had been possible to cull from the documents, is appended to the name of the principal actors. There were five parties[22] involved in the struggle for the supremacy in the Gaekwad territories, in which the primary group emerged due to the maladministration of the Gaekawads during the last decade of the eighteenth century.

1. Raoji Appaji, Minister of Anandrao
2. Kanhojirao, illegitimate brother of Anandrao
3. Malharrao, the *jagirdar* of Kadi
4. The Arab soldiers at Baroda
5. The Bombay government

First, Raoji Appaji party- Anandrao Gaekwad, *Sena Khas Khel Samser Bahadur*. In this contest, he was little more than a figurehead. He appeared about 40 years of age, a robust person, who had no visible signs of feebleness. The understanding of Raja is not naturally defective but impaired by excessive smoking. Gahenabai- the mother of Anandrao. She played an essential part in the accession of Anandrao to the *gadi*, for she threatened to become Sati if Anandrao were to be set aside.

[22] J. H. Gense and D. R. Banaji (ed.), *The Gaikwads of Baroda: English Documents*, Vol. IV, 1800-1802, B. D. Taraporevala, Bombay, 1938, p. viii.

Raoji Appaji- Minister of Govindrao. He is about 60 years old and a respectable person. He had talent and experience of administrative affairs. Raoji was taking help from the Company for himself and his descendant to get the post of the *diwanship* under the Gaekwads as hereditary. He was ambitious and subservient and impatient of delay, but when neglected by the Bombay government, he was profuse to protestation. Muncherji Desai- A wealthy Parsi zamindar. He was spoken as one of the revenue officers of the state of Baroda and a farmer of Navasarai. He depended entirely on the Company for the ultimate protection of his own authority. His great anxiety was to put his lads under the protection of the Company over the Baroda state. This for him, financially speaking, a matter of life and death. These principal personages had some servants of Raoji Appaji.

Table-1: **Name of the Agent and Leaders of the Gaekwad family** [23]

Name of the agent	Name of the leader
Kamal-ud-din Khan Hakim Muhammad Ajmal Khan Bury Khan	Agents of Raoji Appaji
Mir Muhammad Husain Khan	Brother of Kamal-ud-din.
Bapu Khote Shiak Gulab Gopalrao : Agent of Raoji	Working under the service of Kamal-ud-Din.
Sakharam Chimnaji	The *sarsubas* of Gaekwad
Jayram Kashi	Gaekwad Chauthia
Dularam	The *karkun* of Chauthiya
Hafizji Moti Ram Sarabji Parsi	Son of Chobar in Surat In the service of Muncherji

Second, Kanhoji and his group: Kanhoji Rao –an illegitimate brother of Anandrao. He was politically intrigued, imprisoned and banished by Govindrao. He is said to be addicted to the pernicious use of drugs, and under its influence, he was liable to be

[23] J.H. Gense and D.R. Banaji (ed.), *The Gaikwads of Baroda: English Documents,* Vol. IV, 1800-1802, B. D. Taraporevala, Bombay, 1938, pp. viii-ix.

violent. He had not played a leading part in the faction–fight because he was a prisoner. Gajrabai- mother of Kanhoji. She was one of the most ardent supporters of the claims of her son and one of the most determined enemies of Raoji Appaji. Ganeshpant: A minister of Kanhoji. He was in the opinion of the Judge and magistrate of Surat, a spirited fellow with a good deal of candor for the Marathas.

Table –2: **Leaders and supporters**[24]

Ganesh Vinayak	A minster of Kanhoji
Govindrao	Kanhoji Diwan
Murrarao	brother of Anandrao
Mukundrao	brother of Anandrao
Said Edroors	The religious Musalman head of the Arabs. He looked upon by the party of Kanhoji's party as one of the heirs; in reality, he was in the other camp.

Third, Malhar Rao was not the one from the family of Holkar but he was Gaekwad's *jagirdar* of Kadi: Malhar Rao, the ruler of Kadi. He was not popular at Baroda. The general voice was against him, from Raja Anandrao to the lowest civil servant. According to the English record, "the expostulation of his punishment was the chief means of reconciling so many jarring parties to request our aid. He seems to be easily influenced by others and unable to come to the final decision. It must, however, be noticed that unselfish decision does not inspire him".[25] His activity was against Raoji Appaji. John Charles Parker: an English man in the service of Malhrar Rao played an important role in diplomatic alliances amongst the kin of the Gaekwads and the British.

Fourth, the *Arabs Soldiers and Kin Politics:* The Arab soldiers were most potent at Baroda. It is said that a single Arab traveler, travelled like a prince in Baroda. An armed Arab aristocracy was in possession of the Government but had again sold and relinquished its influences to two shroffs of its inability to manage it. They were the

[24] J. H. Gense and D. R. Banaji (ed.), *The Gaikwads of Baroda: English Documents,* Vol. IV, 1800-1802, B. D. Taraporevala, Bombay, 1938, p. ix .
[25] Ibid., p. x.

only obstacle to the complete establishment of the authority of the Company, but they were not really formidable. They were ferocious and, not capable of subordination. They were attached to their individual chiefs, but unconnected by any common system of the union. The Arab *jamadars* were also part of the group in this kin conflict. Smal Parekh and Mangal Parekh–He was the Vakil agent and Shroff of the other half of the Arab soldiers.

Fifth, and the most important was the Bombay Government-One of the most important person was Jonathan Duncan, the energetic Governor of Bombay. He was bent on securing the *pargana* of Chorasi, and the *chauth* of Surat which Govindrao had promised to confer on the English. Daniel Seton- The Lieutenant Governor of Surat. He publically supported Raoji Appaji and his party. Nathan Crow, the Judge and Magistrate of Surat. He was openly in favour of the followers of Kanhoji Rao, Gajrabai and Ganesh Pant. Robert Halford: Resident at Cambay. He was in terms of friendship with Malhar Rao of Kadi.[26]

Now let us look at some of the significant phases of the transition in kin politics, and the process of the transition of power from the hands of the Gaekwad family to the hands of Minister and the British officers. When Govindrao died Minister happened to be away, but Babaji, Mir-Kamal-ud-din, and the two paymasters, backed by the Arabs and *jamadars*, dissuaded Rani Gahenabai from becoming *Sati,* by the assurance that their support would be given to her. This lady during the time of her late husband had been very powerful, as she did not intend to relinquish her influences, nor was there much fear of this happening if Anandrao, the legitimate and eldest son of Govindrao, were placed on the *gadi*. Anandrao was accordingly placed on the *gadi* and Raoji returning to Baroda carried on for him the administration of the state. But Kanhoji who was still in confinement now saw a chance of gaining power. He entered Baroda disguised, gained admittance to the presence of his feeble but really good nurtured elder brother, and by degree so won upon by him that he was able to make a show of being *mutalik,* and indeed to deprive Raoji of all authority. Kanhoji was unable to bend the mercenary troops to his will, and after spending the money,

[26] *Proceeding of Indian Historical Record Commission*, Vol. 18, 1942, p. 322.

Govindrao, had collected, he was no better able to conciliate them than Raoji had been.[27]

It was possible that the Gaekwad family hated the foreigner Minister, but the conduct of Kanhoji towards the several of their members soon became unbearable, for to satisfy the Arabs, he had to squeeze money out of his relations by the violent method. He confined the Raja itself, and the relatives, and servants of his ladies with harshness and ill-treated the widow and daughter of Fatesing and widows of Manaji. The Arabs became tired of him; at last, Raoji promised them to short out this problem. So one night they all come to an understanding and quietly surrounded the house of Kanhoji, and after arresting him sent him to AnAnandrao. Anandrao confined him (Kanhoji) in the fort of Ranpur.

Once again Raoji was in power, but the Arabs had become more challenging to manage than ever, and on one occasion when the Minister was entering Baroda after a visit to Cambay, where he was negotiating with the Bombay government for armed assistance, they fired on his Palki. But besides the Arabs, Raoji had on his hand all the members of the Gaekwad family, each of whom were expecting something from him for which he had nothing to give.

Jagirdar of Kadi, Malhar Rao Gaekwad**,** loudly demanded the entire remission of his *peshkash* and who, when his request was refused, found that Kanhoji, of whose arrest was first approved, was being ill-treated by a foreigner. Gujarabai, the daughter of Fatesing urged him and he was soon joined by Mukundrao, the younger and illegitimate brother of Raja, who quit Baroda with his all movable property under the pretence of going on a pilgrimage to Dakor. Malhar Rao took the field, ostensibly, with the purpose of fighting Kanhoji and freeing Anandrao whose order he carried out. Raoji arrested with equal vehemence that all he did was by the command of his sovereign, and both he and Malhar Rao applied to the Bombay government to arbitrate on their claim, both offering to surrender the *chaurasi*, the Surat *chauth*. Gujarabai, in addition to these cessions, offered Chikhli. Mr. Duncan, Governor of Bombay, was in no hurry to interfere, though he viewed the condition of Baroda with anxiety as a possible war with Shinde. The English finally decided to send Major

[27] *Selection from the Historical Records of the Hereditary Ministers of Baroda,* Collected by Rai Bahadur, University of Calcutta, 1922, Document No. 1, p. 2.

Alexender Walker, to Baroda to arbitrate between Raoji and Malhara Rao according to the apparent jurist of their views and the wishes of Anandarao.[28]

Govindrao left 11 sons, of whom 7 were illegitimate,[29] added more oil in fire at the house of the Gaekwads which resulted in the formation of the above group and all these parties approached the Bombay Government, and offered for its support with the offer of Chaurasi and the Surat *chauth*, the surrender of which had once before been tendered by Govindrao at the commencement of his campaign with Abba Shelukar.[30] Gujrabai, in addition, proffered Chikhil. On the one hand, the *jagirdar* asserted that his reasonable wish was to free the Gaekwad family from the tyranny of a foreigner, and that the Maharaja privately contended to do so because Governor Duncan, was hesitating to intervene in the Gaekwad family. After a long delay, however, he decided to send Major A. Walkar to Baroda to mediate between the kin of the two parties and to ascertain the wishes of the reigning princes, and at the same time, there was sent to Cambay an adequate force of 2000 men to support his decision if it was resisted.[31] This was the time when Shinde also decided to directly interfere in the House of the Gaekwads, Yadav Bhaskar and his brother, who used to be *diwan* under the Gaekwads, played an important role to bring the attention of Shinde towards the Gaekwad kin polity.[32]

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[28] F. A. H. Elliot, *The Rulers of Baroda* , p. 67.

[29] *Gazetteer of Baroda,* Vol. I, 1923, p. 486.

[30] This succession was in direct contravention of the treaty of Salbai, and therefore, was condemned as impolitic by the court of Directors in their dispatch, dated 28th August 1804, but was subsequently recognised by the XIVth article of the treaty of Bassein. As to the previous tender of the treaty it is stated that Governor Duncan was instructed by the Governor General in March 1800 to affect an exchange of territory. Govindrao actually ceded the chauth of Surat and Chaurasi pargana, but owing to delay in obtaining sanction from the Poona Ministry the negotiation hung fire and Govindra died.

[31] *Gazetteer of Baroda,* Vol. I, 1923, p. 488.

[32] At the same time Shinde threatened to interfere in the politics of the kin of the Gaekwads, in which Yadav Bhaskar played an important role. Yadav Bhaskar used to be a clerk under the revenue officers of Baroda known as Khandopant Nana and he subsequently rose to Diwan under Fatehsing. After the reign of Fatehsing he was arrested along with his brother Lakshman (Ramchandra and Lakshman) but with the consent of the Poona court with the order of Manaji, Yadav Bhaskar and his brother were released by Govindrao with the influences of Raoji Appaji. And at this time the brothers were influential Diwan in the court of Shinde. Now Shinde had a direct claim on the Baroda state for 10 lakhs for the Ahmadabad farm. Ibid., p. 489.

On 29th January 1802, Major Walkar reached Baroda and met Anandrao. He believed him to be a feeble intellect, afraid of Arabs, unfriendly to Jagirdar Malhar Rao, but in deep dejection on account of the imprisonment of his brother. Acquitting Dewan Raoji of all offences, Major Walkar blamed Malharrao for his selfish change of policy in supporting Kanhoji. The *jagirdar* had not only refused to listen to all officers of arbitration, but had persisted in rising tribute within the Baroda state and retaining Visanagar which he had taken by force.[33]

Jagirdar Malhar Rao became more powerful than any other officers with a short span of time and by 1802 he organized his own military around 12000-15000, which was the composition of the Sindhis, Pathan, Kolis, and Kulanas. So, the challenge before the British and Anaadrao was to defeat the power of Holkar without destroying the social bases of these communities. Major Walkar attacked Kadi on 17th March and on 3rd May 1802, Malhar Rao surrendered before the British. The *jagirdar* was permitted to live at Nadiad where districts were allotted to him worth 1¼ lakhs and the possession of both branches of the family were now for the first time brought under one rule to the great gain of Surat.[34]

From July to August 1802, the Gaekwad relative was facing more serious threat from the English. Ganpatrao Gaekwad, a descendant of Pillajirao and *jagirdar* of Sankheda and Bahadurpur who joined hands with Malharrao and Murra Rao Gaekwad and formed a plan to raise a strong rebellion against the British intervention in the house of the Gaekwads. But on 7th July, these groups were also defeated and Murra Rao fled to Anandrao Pawar of Dhar, which became the centre of the opposition party of the Baroda and English authority. Therefore, the British intervention ultimately destroyed the opposition of Anandrao Gaekwad, but Gaekwad lost his sovereignty due to the helping hand of the British.

So, this was the result of the British help to Anandrao and his group, now the British did not delay to claim his reward. Gaekwad had before the commencement of the campaign, ceded the Chorasi pargana and the portion of the *chauth* of Surat as a gift to the British. According to the agreement made between Mr. Duncan and Raoji at Cambay, he consented to pay the expenses of the campaign with interest in the

[33] Ibid., p. 489.
[34] The British flag was hoisted at Velachha, the principle station at Chaurssi on 7th July 1802.

installment, which fall on 1st October 1801 and 5th January 1802.[35] Gaekwad share of Surat attavisi was being held as security. Finally, the state secretly subsidised a force of 2000 sepoys and a company of the European artillery at the cost of 65,000 per month to be paid by landed Jagir. This arrangement was not to be carried out till the end of the Kadi war. The revenue of Kaithwad and Kadi were pledged. After the same time, a bond was given for the expenses of the army incurred during the first year which amounted Rs. 7.8 lakhs at 9% interest.[36]

Finally, on 29th July 1802 – the Maharaja approved the treaty made by Raoji Appji and other officers and wrote that:

> "In consequences of there being many ill-disposed persons among the Arabs, who have plotted against my liberty and even my life, I desire that my subject will pay no attention to my order in this situation but hear what Major Walker has to say" [37]

He further says,

> "If any evil-disposed person attempts anything unfair or unreasonable against my person, my Diwan Raoji Appaji, his son, his brother, his nephew or his relations, and Madhavrao Tatya Majumdar, I even should I myself or my successor commit anything improper or unjust, the English Government should interfere".[38]

Through this treaty Gaekwad virtually surrendered his sovereignty and power before the English, and within a decade the state of Baroda became a full-fledged princely state under the British government. So, finally what we see that it was the internal kin conflict of the Gaekwads, due to which Baroda which was the part of the Maratha Confederacy changed its character without the consent of the Poona government and became the part of the British dominant territory. How does the kin conflict played a significant role in making it the British territory during 1800-1818, is explained in the next chapter. However, the most interesting fact that we come to know during this

[35] Ibid., p. 491.
[36] Ibid., p. 492. On January 1803 the following districts were fairly ceded – Dhokla (4.5 lakhs), Nadiad (1 ¾ lakhs) Vijapur 1.30 lakhs , Tappa and Kadi (25000) making a total of 7.8 lakhs.
[37] Ibid., p. 492.
[38] Ibid., p. 492.

transition is that the English officers were divided too into groups. One group was willing to support the Gaekwad sovereignty without harming their power while the other group of the British officers, following the direction of the Governor General, purposefully intervened in the conflict of the group of the kin of the Gaekwads during the end of the eighteenth century.

This declaration coupled with the treaty of alliances threw a strangling net over the Gaekwad rulers. It not only established political and military control of the British at Baroda but also gave them a basis to interfere in the Baroda affairs. An irreparable dent in the edifice of the Maratha Confederacy, which the former Bombay President had strived for, was at last made by Duncan. As Duncan himself observed, Walker's transition at Bombay "powerfully established, on the foremost foundation, the predominance of the company's influences in Gujarat and facilitated our directing all the material operation of its future administration as far as our national prosperity or commercial advantages render our interpretation advisable".[39]

How the family of Raoji acquired more power through private negotiation with the British is also more critical to understand the shifting of power in the Gaekwad territory. The agreement forced on the Gaekwad rulers was followed by a secret engagement made on 8th June by the British with Raoji. It was approved that the *Diwanship* of the Baroda state would always remain in the family of Raoji Appaji from generation to generation and his sons, nephew, relatives, and friends were to be protected by the British. These secret agreements were the evil fruits of the treacherously selfish role of Raoji in the whole transaction with the English which caused the doom of the Gaekwad independence.

The reaction of the Peshwa to the treaty between the Gaekwad and the British was naturally strongly adverse. As early as November 1801, he had expressed his strong disapproval of the proposed Gaekwad cession to the British.[40] Later on, he had warned the Poona resident that such alienation of territory by the Gaekwad rulers would mean a violation of the treaty of Salbai and infringe upon the right of the Poona sarkar.[41] He has also emphatically asserted that no Maratha chief had the right to enter

[39] S. V. Kothekar, *The Gaikwads of Baroda and The East India Company 1707-1820,* Nagpur Vidhyapeeth Mudrnalaya, Nagpur, 1977, p. 86.
[40] Gazetteer of Bombay , Vol. IV, November 1801, p. 43.
[41] P. R. C, Vol. VII, 9th January 1802, p. 13.

into a treaty with any foreign power independently of the Peshwa.[42] However, this was not a new rule of the Maratha Confederacy, then the question which remains unsolved by the historians is,- was it the beginning of the sovereign rule of the Gaekwads at least from the day of the violation of the Peshwa regulation? If yes, as it is clear from the above example, that the Gaekwad territory was a sovereign territory, having a particular set of power structure, which demised due to the internal kin politics of the Gaekwads particularly during the last decades of the eighteenth century.

[42] P. R. C., Vol. VI, 20th November 1801, p. 672.



[43] Prayagji Anant Phanse, was the subedar of the forts of Satara and Parli in the reign of Shivaji. Mahipat Rao Kakaji was general of Baroda Army during the reign of Anandrao. Rao Ji Appaji was Diwan under Govindrao and Anadrao. Babaji Appaji was Genral of Baroda Army in the reign of Govindrao and Anandrao. Sitaram Raoji, the son of Chimnaji and the adopted son of Raoji Appaji, was Diwan in the reign of Anandrao and Fatehsingrao-II. Vithal Rao Babaji, the son of Babaji, was Diwan of Sayajirao-II. J. H. Gense and Banaji (ed.), *The Gaikwad of Baroda*, Vol. VI, pp. vii-viii.

Family of Shinde and Politics of Power

The post-Panipat history of the Maratha Confederacy in northern India is, by and large, dominant by the role of Mahadji Shinde, and the formation of the sovereign identity of Shinde state during the second half of the eighteenth century. However, the kinship and politics in Shinde family was not that much critical as in the case of the Gaekwads, but still it cannot be neglected that the role of the widow of Mahadji and Daulat Rao was not less than any other factor to create the different group of the kin of the Shinde, who played the vital role in demolishing power of the Shinde state during the end of the eighteenth century. This section highlights the process of Mahadji supremacy in central India and how kinship politics directly affected the power structure of the Maratha Confederacy and its overall impact on the political scenario of the eighteenth century.

The treaty of Salbai left Mahadji virtually in an independent position with optional obedience to the dictates of the Poona *Durbar* and the history of the decade proceeding to his death in 1794 is by and large the story Sindhe effort to re-establish the Maratha supremacy over northern India. The Mughal affairs continued to be hopelessly confused in the eighteenth century due to the feeble and degraded character of the later Mughal Emperors.[44] The death of Mirza Najaf Khan on 6th April 1782 increased the confusion in the Delhi affairs. The history of the next two years was the history of dissolving and newly forming combination of the four generals of Najaf Khan, who were under the service of Mahadji along with his 2500 men.[45] Mahadji took full responsibility of the northern enterprise in his hand and ignored the direction of the Poona authority in order to strengthen his own power in northern affairs.

The Maratha envoy at Delhi informed the Poona court, "The Mughal soldiers get no money for buying food. Even Najaf Khan personal guard fasting. Everyone wishes to make himself dominant, and great disturbance prevails".[46] The worsening condition compelled the Emperor to come to an agreement with Mahadji. The meeting of Mahadji with Mir Bakshi Mirza Safi on 27th June 1783, and a second meeting with

[44] K. K. Dutta, *Shah Alam-II and English East India Company*, p. 74.
[45] R. G. Pandey, *Mahadji Shinde and the Poona Darbar,* Oriental Publisher and Distributors, New Delhi, 1980, p. 92.
[46] B. D. Parasnis (ed.), *Delhi Yethil Marathayanchi Rajkarne,* Vol. I, p. 84.

Afrasiyab Khan on 23rd October 1784, forced Mahadji to conquer the imperial territory and to undertake the protection of the Emperor.[47]

Power of Confederates and Kin of Shinde: Mahadji as Mutaliq

Mahadji came to the audience of the Emperor on 14th of November 1784 at Khanuna near Fatehpur Sikri. On the 1st of December, the Emperor at the public *durbar* appointed the Peshwa as his deputy (*Naib-i-Munaib*) as well as Commander-in-Chief (*Bakshi-ul-Mamalik*). Mahadji Shinde and none else should be a permanent agent of the Peshwa in discharging the actual functions of these exalted offices. [48] Complimentary robes for the agent of the Peshwa, Nana Phadnis were made over to Mahadji for the dispatch to Poona. On the 4th of this month, Shah Alam conferred on Mahdaji the highest possible post in the imperial government namely that of 'Regent Plenipotentiary' (*wakil-i-mutaliq*) directly on him without any reference to the Peshwa.[49]

This achievement of Mahadji created insecurity in the Poona court, and led to a debate between Mahadji and the Poona *durbar* and introduced a significant cleavage in the relation of Mahadji with the Poona authority. In view of rank and dignity, *Wakil–i-Mutaliq* was the highest post followed by *Naib–i-Mumalik.* Nana was very objective in observing the protocol of forms and ceremonies. When Mahadji got the post of a more senior rank, Nana refused to accept the insignia of the positions of the *Naib-i-Manaibi* and the *Mir Bakshi* for the Peshwa. Mahadji conscious of the mistake urged in his first letter to the Peshwa that expediency of the situation forced him to accept the post of the regent.[50]

The Peshwa wrote to Mahadji, "You will function as *mutaliq* from the Poona government. You will carry out the instruction of the government. Nothing will be done without the approval of the Government"[51] and order also given to his agent Hingne "that no honour or title will be confirmed on the sardar of the Poona

[47] The agent of Nana informed about the proposal of the Emperor for the regency of the Empire and the acceptance of Mahadji, J. N. Sarkar (ed.), *Persian Records of Maratha History*, Vol . I, No-B-11, p. 150.
[48] G. S. Sardesai (ed.), *Historical Papers relating to Mahadji Shinde*, No. 342.
[49] J. N. Sarkar, *Fall of Mughal Empire*, Vol. III, p. 200.
[50] G. S. Sardesai (ed.), *Historical Papers relating to Mahadji Shinde*, No. 342.
[51] *Historical Papers of the Shinde of Gwalior*, Satara Historical Research Society, Vol. I, No. 91.

government from the Emperor without the approval of the Peshwa".[52] Hence, the acceptance of the high post of the regent of the Emperor by Mahadji and the circulation of his new seal bringing the title "Wakil-Mutalaq Fidwi Shah Alam Badshah- Maharaj Dhiraj Umarao Alija Bahadur Madho Rao Shindhe"[53] offended the Poona *Darbar* and incensed Nana Phadnis. It was ample proof of the perfidious attitude of Mahadji. Mahadji lame excuses of the mistake of the Persian writer and Shah Alam attitude towards the Marathas did not convince the Poona *Darbar*. Finally, Mahadji cancelled his seal and issued a new one mentioning the name of the Peshwa as Wakil –i-Mutaliq.[54] Again, Mahadji ceremoniously received the new farman for the post of *Wakil-i-Mutalaq* from the Peshwa on 21st July 1790.[55]

A letter is very important to understand the power of the Confederates. Balaji Janaradan in one of his letters which was written on 4th August 1770 says "The rank of Partinidhi is higher than the Peshwai. It is actual power that counts not the post".[56] British agent Palmer correctly pointed out that "the title conforms upon the Peshwa can only be deemed extorted and upon the widest ground of right could only be possession which only the king held at the time of the grant".[57] The three important decisions by Mahadji Shinde in the decade of 1780s can be highlighted to understand the power of Shinde, in terms of his diplomatic alliances with other authority. The significant point that one needs to look at is that Mahadji was not interested in taking permission from the Poona court in these matters.

First, new terms with the Sikhs and Rajputs. After the death of Afrsayab Khan, the surrounding regions of Delhi were disturbed by the loot and plunder by the Gurjar community. Mahadji sent Ambuji Ingle in January 1785 to control Delhi and the neighbouring surrounding areas from the loot of the Gujjars and other communities. People of the neighbouring Delhi were very much dissatisfied. Ambuji Ingle gave some relief to the people in those areas by checking the activities of the Gurjars. The action of Ambuji Ingle helped the people to live in peace and prosperity after a long

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[52] Ibid., No. 93.
[53] G. S. Sardesai (ed.), *Historical Papers relating to Mahadji Shinde*, No. 429.
[54] Ibid., No. 411.
[55] Ibid., No. 571.
[56] Ibid., No.577. श्रीमंताचे पेशवाई पेक्षा प्रतिनिधी श्रेष्ठ पद आहे. परंतु परतापुढे पदे काय करतात. आमी पेहू तेव्हा जाबसाल होईल. चिंता नाही.
[57] Ibid., Nos. 343, 346, 355, 361, 418.

time. Now the rural population and commercial communication were in a better position. After this success, the Marathas concentrated their attention towards the Sikhs and Ambuji Ingle consulted many Sikh chiefs and understood their mentality. Then he came to meet Mahadji Shinde at Mathura. On 10 May 1785, the Sikh leader Mohan Singh, Dulja Singh, and Mahadji Shinde signed a treaty of friendship at Mathura with the following terms:[58]

1. The Sikhs should not plunder people in the areas under the Badshah.
2. They should not collect revenues from any areas.
3. They should have *jagirs* only at the allotted places near Jaipur, and they should serve Mahadji with the army of five thousand.
4. They should not do any rebellious activities in the areas under Mahadji, the English, and the areas around Delhi.

While he was, having a friendly agreement with the Sikhs, Mahadji also kept in mind the relation with the English and the present diplomatic situation. Therefore, he wrote to the Sikhs, stating: "I am in friendship with the Chief of the English company and Nawab Vazir, let there never do any injury offered to their country. In this agreement God is between us, so no deviation shall happen".[59]

Second, demands from the English as one-fourth areas of Bengal. As we discussed above the main problem of Mahadji Shinde after receiving the robe as *Vakil-i-Mutalik* which was the paucity of funds, with the hope to collect it from the English. In February, Mahadji demanded from the English a quarter part of Bengal, Surat and other parts. The question was not whether it was reasonable or not. The issues which one needs to explain are: how and in what manner Mahadji came out with this demand and how they both had maintained a diplomatic relationship when Shah Alam too had signed on a demand letter, acknowledging one-fourth part of the English in Bengal. It was his own decision to pose such demands before the English, in which neither the Poona authority nor Nana was informed. The opposition of the English to

[58] S. R. Bakshi, *Maratha Diplomacy and Foreign Policy*, Deep and Deep Publication, New Delhi, 2000, pp. 221-224; H. S. Bhatia, *Mahrattas, Sikhs and Southern Sultans of India*, pp. 147-149. Subduing the Gujars, Ambuji moved towards Panipat so that he could teach a lesson to the Sikhs as they had been revolting against the imperial authority. He halted at Bakhatwarpur; here nine Sikh Sardars of Panipat region came and visited him on 27th March 1785 C.E.

[59] Ibid., p. 222.

the demand for a quarter of Bengal made by Mahadji was published in a newspaper in Calcutta. As a result, false news was spread in Poona that Mahadji Shinde had started a war with the English. While there was no thought of war in the mind of Mahadji. Mahadji also wanted to know the reaction of Poona on this demand. James Anderson gives us a detailed account on the misunderstanding between Shah Alam, Shinde and the English Governor General. His mind was open to understand the entire situation and he wrote, "As I have since understood, was the identical one which Shinde supported the King's demand of the tribute, and I was fortunate in having thus avoided being an ignorant instrument of conduct so unworthy of any British subject".[60] As soon as the English understood that it was the demand of the King, they started their own approach to get rid of this demand. However, the steps taken by James Anderson washed away the plan of Mahadji.[61]

Third, after this demand, the English had lost all their faith on Mahadji and they thought Mahadji might let the English down in future. So, the English thought that if they had a Consul at the Poona *Darbar*, they could know exactly what was happening in the courts of Mahadji and Poona. Therefore, after the treaty of Salabai David Anderson was appointed at the court of Mahadji and he reported to Macpherson, the Governor General, that Mahadji might pose a great danger to the English if he was not restrained in time.[62] Finally, Malet was appointed at the Poona court with a special instruction to obtain the consent of Mahadji. Mahadji believed that there was no need for an English Consul as he himself was the true representative of the Marathas. This increased the conflict between Nana and Mahadji, while Malet met Mahadji before coming to Poona. As the diplomatic dimension had been changed and very soon Mahadji realised that the English Consul would be appointed at the Poona court because of the dominance of the French at the Poona court.[63]

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[60] P. M. Joshi, (ed.), *Journal of James Anderson,* in Maharashtra Archives Bulletin of the Department of Archives, Government Press, Bombay, 1962, p. 56.

[61] Ibid., pp. 58-59. Anderson discussed the detailed issues of the conflict and consulted various English authorities at Calcutta and Delhi. Finally, the conflict was resolved by his personal interference in a diplomatic manner. He wrote, "These considerations determined me to accept of Shinde's proffered satisfaction; and accordingly when he came to me the next day and delivered to me letters from his Majesty and himself disavowing their knowledge of the demand of tribute I agreed to remain. Both letters were indeed highly satisfactory".

[62] N. G. Rathod, *The Great Maratha: Mahadji Scindhia*, p. 57.

[63] Umesh Ashokrao Kadam, *History of the Marathas: French–Maratha Relations, 1668-1818 A.D.*, Sandeep Prakashan, New Delhi, 2008, pp. 139-218.

The appointment of Sir Charles Malet at the court of Poona is evidence of the growing estrangement of Mahadji with Poona. The treaty of Salbai had raised the prestige of Mahadji and made him the spokesman of the Maratha state and the British affairs. Nana Phadnis proposed the British to have a separate Resident posted at Poona for direct dealing without Shinde's medium. The British government accepted the proposal. However, during this time Mahadji constantly delayed and many times ignored the work assigned by the Poona *durbar*. He even flatly denied of having any personal connection with the British government, and wrote to Nana, "No I do not have any correspondence with the English".[64]

Nana did not want to lose any opportunity to use the English for personal benefits. In a meeting on 19 May, 1786 Malet was requested by Nana for military help against Tipu, which was secretly communicated between the two. Mahadji was totally unaware of this. The Governor-General sent a letter to Poona that contained instruction for not giving any military help, which was to be handed to the Peshwa by Malet. But he was in a state of confusion whether he should give this letter immediately or not. In September Lord Cornwallis became the Governor General and adopted a policy of neutrality in matters relating to quarrels among the Indian states. But Malet played the role of an English diplomatic politician who did not lose any opportunity to create conflicts among the Maratha Sardars and created chinks in the unity of the Maratha leaders for the benefit of the English. This time Malet ordered by the Governor General to understand the mentality of different zamindars and cordially tried to engage with them which he did totally only in favour of the English. Even the British diplomat did not like the ascendancy of Mahadji in the imperial affairs. Mahadji did not like the posting of two British residents for one unitary Maratha state. But on the assurance of the British and the personal explanation of Malet[65] Mahadji supported the appointment of Malet. James Anderson wrote, "Mahadji had expressed himself extremely well pleased with Malet's appointment. The advantages Mahadji enjoyed from the friendship of the English and expect to drive from the continuance

[64] G. S. Sardesai (ed.), *Historical Papers relating to Mahadji Shinde*, No. 335.
[65] Ibid., No. 408, Mahadji had a long meeting with Malet and it was not the cold affairs as mentioned by G. S. Sardesai.

of it are not limited to the foreign pursuits but extends to the support of his power in his own state".[66]

Through this tactic, Mahadji continued to use his connection with the English to gain his own power against the opposition from the Poona ministry. Thus, what we see that even in the appointment of the British regent at the Poona court was directly or indirectly the matter of power and prestige for Mahadji. However, the British Government used the opportunity in keeping Nana estranged from Mahadji and even assuring him of the British help and protection if Shinde proved too strong.[67] Mahadji became more powerful than any other Maratha Confederates but in the year 1787 he did a small mistake which demolished his strength for the next two years. Mahadji engaged the Rajput forces of Jaipur and Jodhpur on the field of Tunga miscalled that Lalsot and suffered a devastating rout. Hingne wrote to Nana, "the overbearing attitude of Shinde assume such a proportion that it caused general discontent against the Deccanis and his majesty blamed Shinde for having brought his ruin upon himself".[68]

The eclipse of Mahadji began on 1st August 1787 when he retreated from Lalsot. The tide turned decisively in his favour after 17th July 1788, when under the wall of Agra he destroyed the army of Ismail Beg as a fighting force. In 1785 the main problem of Mahadji was the reduction of Jaipur. By the end of 1785, Mahadji started for Jaipur on 3rd January 1786 along with the Emperor to press the Raja for a huge tribute and arrived near Lalsot.[69] The Jaipur ruler sent his envoy to him to settle the amount of tribute. They proposed ten lakhs in all while Mahadji demanded three cores and forty lakhs. However, the amount was settled at 63 lakhs of rupees: 60 lakhs as *peshkash* and three lakhs as *darbar* charge. Out of it, 11 lakhs were to be paid immediately, 10 lakhs within six months, 20 lakhs by the cession of land and the remaining to be realised from the assignments on the revenue of fiefs of the feudal lords.[70] After receiving the first installment, Mahadji left Jaipur under Rayaji Patil and went to

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[66] Choksey, R.D., *A History of British Diplomacy at the Court of Peshwa*, p. 35.
[67] *Poona Residency Correspondence*, Vol. II, p. 24.
[68] B. D. Parsanis (ed.), *Delhi Yethil Marathayanchi Rajkarne*, Vol, I, p. 227. J. N. Sarkar (ed.), *Persian Record of Maratha History*, Vol. I, pp. 168-170.
[69] R. K. Gupta and S. R. Bakshi, *Studies in Indian History: Rajasthan Through The Ages The Heritage of Rajputs*, Sarup and Sons, New Delhi, 2008, p. 304.
[70] S. C. Mishra, *Shinde-Holkar Rivalry in Rajasthan*, p. 89.

Mathura. Here he spent five months in controlling the affairs of Mathura and Vrindavan. In January 1787, he removed his pro-Maratha prime minister.

Khushali Ram Bohara had appointed Haldia, an anti-Maratha politician, as the prime minister.[71] The Jaipur ruler started anti-Maratha policy once more, formed a close defensive alliance with the ruler of Jodhpur, and asked his *jagirdars* to resist the Marathas. By the middle of February 1787 the situation of Shinde men, become really bad. This time the object of Mahadji was not only to exact tribute but to take the entire possession of Jaipur.[72]

Finally, a battle was fought between the Marathas and Rajputs on 28th July on the plain of Tunga, about forty miles north-west of Lalsot. In this battle, Humadani was killed by a cannonball. Although Rajputs thought that, they won this battle but in reality, they could not capture a single gun and troops of the forces of Mahadji.[73] However, the battle of Lalsot became an important theme of the study of different aspects of warfare tactics of Mahadji. It attracted the attention of various colonial and modern historians, who suggest many causes of the defeat; the financial difficulty was one of the important ones for the defeat of the army of Mahadji in the Battle of Lalsot. The important aspect of this battle, which needs to be highlighted here is, how it had affected the dignity and superiority of Mahdaji Shinde in Delhi as well as in Poona.

The development that took place after the battle made the position of the Marathas critical. Many of the troops of Mahadji rebelled for salary. Mahadji finally left from there in August and marched towards Dig and from where he went to Mechri territories and stayed there till November 1787. During this period Ismail Beg, a nephew of Humadani, seized Agra city from the Marathas on 16th September but Lakba Dada boldly resisted the attempt of Ismail Beg to capture the Agra fort. After

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[71] Ibid., p. 90.

[72] Jadunth Sarkar, *A History of Jaipur 1503-1938*, Oriental Blackswan, New Delhi, 1994, pp. 622-270.

[73] Hans Hagerdal, *Responding to the West: Essays on Colonial Dominion and Asian Agency*, Amsterdam University Press, London, 2009, pp. 41-42. The battle of Lalsot between the Rajputs and the Mughal imperial army under the command of Mahadji and trained by De-Boigne proved that well trained and disciplined infantry battalions could even face cavalry charges. N. G. Rathod, *The Great Martha: Mahadji Shinde*, p. 182. Mahadji had to withdraw from the battle of Lalsot in 1787. The retreat of Mahadji at Lalsot was not on an account of his want of courage. The defeat was due to the shortage of equipments, changing of sides by some soldiers and the treachery of the Mughal soldiers. Poonam Sagar, *Maratha Policy Towards Northern India*, pp. 201-203.

knowing this anti-Maratha movement in Agra, the Rajputs also started attempting to overthrow the Maratha authority. Ajmer was captured by the Raja of Jodhpur from the agent of Mahadji on 27th August.[74] Thus, the defeat of the Marathas in the Battle of Lalsot brought a setback in the rising career of Mahadji.[75] The power and prestige enjoyed by Mahadji was lost for the time being. Hingne, the agent of the Peshwa at Delhi, sent a detailed report to Poona about the defeat of Mahadji Shinde. Thus, the enemy of Mahadji got an opportunity to create problems everywhere.[76]

Gulam Qadir, the eldest son of Zabita Khan, had overrun the whole territory of the Doab, which was in the possession of the Marathas and captured the whole property that was recently seized from him. Gulam Qadir reached Delhi to oppose the rule of Mahadji there. Ladoji Deshmukh and Shah Nizam left their posts and on the night of 24th August, 1787 they retreated from Delhi but on the way, they were plundered by the robbers. The helpless Emperor fearing the attack of Gulam Qadir invested the latter with the offices and power of *Amir-ul-Umra* and *Mir Bakhshi* hitherto held by Mahadji Shinde in the beginning of September.[77] With the withdrawal of Mahadji Shinde from Lalsot Sawai Partap Singh of Jaipur gathered new zest. The joy was expressed through a cannon fire. Daultram Haldia advised Sawai Partap Singh to give up the thought of driving away Mahadji from the northern India. Ranaji Patil ran away from Bharatpur and Lakhabadada took shelter in the fort of Agra–Dholpur. This continuous insult of the ability of Mahadji helped in gaining the confidence against Mahadji to drive away from the north. Not only the king of Jaipur but also many of the Rajput kings became united to drive away Mahadji Shinde. As a result, Pratap Singh of Bharatpur started a campaign against Mahadji. This time the king of Jodhpur was not only busy in uniting all Rajput kings against Mahadji but also he sent a

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[74] *Calendar of Persian Correspondence*, Vol. VII, Nos. 1660-1661, 1925-1926, p. 167; P. M. Joshi (ed.), *Persian record of Maratha History*, Vol. I, J. N. Sarkar (Eng. trans.), p. 159.

[75] J. N. Sarkar, *Fall of Mughal Empire*, Vol. III, 1771-1788, Orient Longman, New Delhi, Reprint 1975, p. 270. The eclipse of Mhadhji Shinde began at the end of May 1787 when he hurried back from the Jaipur kingdom towards his base at Dig.

[76] P. M. Joshi (ed.), *Persian record of Maratha History*, Vol. I, J. N. Sarkar (Eng. trans.), Government of Bombay, 1953, pp. 159-160; *Calendar of Persian correspondences*, Vol. VII, Nos. 1560, 1563, 1564, 1568.

[77] *Foreign Department Secrete Consultations*, 3rd October 1787, No. 14; *Poona Residency Correspondences*, Vol. I, No.149, 179; *Calendar of Persian Correspondences*, Vol. VII, Nos. 1785, 1933, 1649, 1648. P. M. Joshi (ed.), *Persian record of Maratha History*, Vol. I, J. N. Sarkar (Eng. trans.), p. 170.

special request to Taimur Shah, the administrator of Afghanistan, to come against the Maratha rule.

As the officers of the Peshwa did not hesitate to insult Mahadji in his correspondence to Poona, they openly criticised his policy in Northern India after the Battle of Lalsot. Vijay Singh of Jodhpur sent a letter to the Peshwa at Poona, writing:

> "पाटिल बवानिं दक्षिणच्या सर्दार्ची वाट सोडून बहुताची खुंखराबी करूँ शेवटी जैनागरा वर चालून गेले आपले काम आले होते ख़राब केले! हल्ली इंग्रजांशी संधान करूँ कुम्केश आणावे या इराधात आहेत, त्यादु स्थानातील सरदारा सहवागोष्ठी पसंत नासु नातमामउमदेसरदार एक दिल्लोविरुध घाले आहेत. हे आपणांसही जार पडेल, सबब आपण पात्लाश चार गोष्ठी लिहावयात ही आगल भार्काली टर तिच्या धीन्या दक्षिणपावेतो जातील अखेरीस त्या विक्षविने आपणांसही कठ्नीपडले![78]

In these words, Vijay Singh complained to the Peshwa against Mahadji. In the meantime, a conflict arose between Mahadji and Ali Bahadur. Nana had ordered Ali Bahadur to go to Bundelkhand after finishing the work of Mahadji and to recapture the Maratha post which had been seized by rebels. Tukoji and Ali Bhadur were instructed to consider themselves as an independent authority and not as a subordinate of Mahadji which created friction. Therefore, Mahadhji was not happy with Tukoji Holkar and Ali Bhadur.[79] Tukoji demanded a share in the newly conquered territories of Mahadji Shinde.[80] These problems led to heated discussions between the two parties for a very long time.

In spite of various negative forces against Mahadji in the atmosphere of Hindustan, the year of 1788 was known as the phase of successful diplomacy of Mahadji in which he re-established the Maratha supremacy over Agra, Vrindavan and settled Gulam Qadir and came with an apparent condition for Tukoji Holkar. In the first three months of the year of 1788, Mahadji was on the side of river Chambal, meaning out of Northern India. In April he sent a large force towards the camp of Ismail Beg. They

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[78] N. G. Rathod, *The Great Martha: Mahadji Shinde*, p. 100.

[79] P. M. Joshi (ed.), *Persian record of Maratha History*, Vol. II, J. N. Sarkar (Eng. trans.), Director of Archive Bombay, 1954, pp. 21-23; G. S. Sardesai (ed.), *Historical Papers Related to Mahadji Shinde,* Gwalior, 1934, Nos. 535-536, 539-540, 570-571, 620, D. B. Disakalkar, *Historical papers related to Shinde of Gwalior*, Vol. I, Satara Historical Society, Satara, 1934, No. 159. Nana Fadnis sent Ali Bahadur to assist Mahadji on 8. 9. 1787; on 20th April 1788, Ali Bhadur met Ahilyabai Holkar.

[80] G. S. Sardesai (ed.), *Poona Affairs, (Malet's Embassy)*, Government Press, Bombay, 1936, No. 140.

captured and controlled Mathura and Vrindavan and on October 2, 1788, they captured Delhi from Gulam Qadir. On December 31, 1788, Gulam Qadir was brought in the camp of Mahadji by Ali Bahadur, and killed on 4th March 1789 after getting the permission of the Badshah. The Badshah thanked Mahadji for giving a proper punishment to Ghulam Qadir because Qadir had made Badshah Shah Alam undergo a lot of sufferings. As a reward, the Badshah gave Mahadji all powers of the administration of some Hindu holy places like Mathura and Vrindavan and the Badshah abolished cow slaughtering by issuing a royal decree.[81]

Northern Confederacy and Supremacy of Mahadji's Kin

When Mahadji destroyed Ismail Beg's army on 17th June 1788 under the wall of Agra and captured Gulam Qadir at the end of 1788, people naturally thought that Mahadji would once again become the supreme controller of Delhi Empire as he had before the usurpation of the Rohillas. In the meanwhile, Mahadji won over and kept him harmlessly employed in wresting from Najab Quli Khan the *jagirs* of Rewari and Narunal. Mahadji remained at Mathura from July 1788 to December 1790. During the period the captain of Mahadji was variously occupied in different localities in settling the country and putting down the prevailing disturbances. With the two decisive victories of Patan and Medta, the captains of Mahadji, with the aid of the disciplined brigade of De-Boigne, vanquished the army of Jaipur and Jodhpur and re-occupied Ajmer in the year 1790. Thus, Mahadji succeeded in restoring full Maratha power in the north up to the Sutlej by the end of the year 1790.[82] After strengthening the Maratha power in the disturbed regions of the northern and western areas, he decided to move towards the Deccan to meet the Peshwa at Poona. He reached Ujjain en route to Poona on 21st January 1792.

The political situations and major power disputes which were emerging at this time were the main causes of the march of Mahadji Poona, the main reasons to visit Poona were:

1. First, his severe illness and conquest animosity with Himmat Bahadur Gosavi and Ali Bahadur threatened a civil war between the two Maratha chiefs;

[81] G. S. Cheema, *Forgotten Mughals*, p. 419.
[82] R. G. Pandey, *Mahadji Shinde and the Poona Darbar*, Oriental Publisher & Distributor, New Delhi, 1980, p. 103.

2. Second, a tripartite treaty of involving the Nizam,; the Peshwa and Cornwallis caused apprehension as it strengthened the enemies of Mahadji at Poona.
3. A half and half division of all conquests' spoils brought about a temporary reconciliation between Mahadji and Tukoji Holkar. But Mahadji did not abandon his exclusive hold both on the treaties and their administration. This renewed the friction.
4. The Poona *darbar* all along supported the cause of the unity of the Maratha chief in the north. But the arbitrary rule and calculated diplomatic moves of the shrewd Mahadji caused the irreconcilable rift in the Maratha command. The dispassionate study of the contemporary papers reveals these facts.

Thus, the year of 1790 can be seen in the light of the success of Mahadji in establishing complete Maratha supremacy in the North up to the Sutlej River. Due to the achievement and vast trained military resources of Mahadji, Taimur Shah Durrani, the ruler of Afghanistan, set a proposal of peace to Mahadji. An agreement was made on the problems of Punjab among the Marathas, Sikhs, and Afghans. The Sikhs[83] were permitted to control between Lahore and Sutlej and the Marathas to the south of that river. With this treaty, the main historical problems between the Marathas and Afghans had been solved, and Mahadji achieved the glory of being a successful diplomat and ruler up to Sutlej. The continued success of Mahadji and his significant achievements in Hindustan created fear among many of the Marathas in the Deccan and personally Nana Fadnis was more jealous of his success. His jealousness reflected in public when Mahadji decided to visit the Peshwa at Poona. When Mahadji wished to go to Poona, he also wanted to hand over the politics of Delhi to Ali Bahadur because the Badshah of Delhi was a Muslim and he was also a Muslim. Therefore, if Ali Bahadur had been appointed permanently at Delhi on behalf of the Peshwa, Muslims would not have resented the domination of the Peshwa at Delhi. That was what Mahadji wished for.[84] Mahadji assured Ali Bahadur of all his help, but he was directed by Nana not to take the responsibilities and to come back to Poona. Ali Bahadur and Nana both wanted to evolve in the Bundelkhand politics that was against the opinion of Mahadji. The chief reason was that Bundelkhand was the private territory of the Peshwa, and no share of it was to be given to Shinde and Holkar. Nana

[83] Poonam Sagar, *Maratha Policy Towards Northern India*, p. 214.
[84] B. R. Andhare, *Bundelkhand Under The Marathas 1720-1818*, p. 95.

urged that Ali Bahadur who belonged to the Peshwa to manage the affairs of Bundelkhand[85] and set new terms of tribute as Mahadji was collecting about 54% from some of the territories of Bundelkhand, which Nana wanted to change according to his direction. Finally, during the absence of Mahadji, Ambuji performed his duties in Northern India.[86]

After this settlement, Mahadji decided to go to Poona to resolve different issues which were pending since a long time due to the interference of Nana in northern policies. But as per the tradition, any confederates meeting with the Peshwa at Poona was permitted or called by the Peshwa. But this time Mahadji did not wait for any of invitation. This attitude of Mahadji, created fear in the Poona court as they already knew that Shinde was more potent than the Peshwa at this stage.

Now Mahadji Shinde decided to go to Poona.[87] On the way to Poona, Mahadji helped Zalim Singh of Kota to capture Chittor, which was captured by Bhim Singh Salumbar. On 17th November Bhim Singh surrendered the fort and promised to pay an indemnity of twelve lakhs.[88] Shinde now left his northern domain and marched for Poona on 6th January 1792. He reached Ujjain on 21st January en route to Poona[89] and entered Poona on 11 June 1792. At this time the allies' war with Tipu Sultan also came to an end. The direct result of this war was the emergence of the British as a more powerful entity in Indian politics, and the Maratha prestige was lowered to some extent. However, Shinde proved himself as the most powerful entity in India. He was one of those chiefs of the house of the Peshwa who had developed the Maratha power, which fulfilled the dream of Shivaji and Bajirao-I and gave the new identity of Hindu in upper India. In spite of all these significant achievements, the march of Mahadji towards the Deccan had created fear among many elites and non-elites of various courts of the Deccan who considered the move of Mahadji towards the Deccan as a threat for a southern state. While common views over the Shinde march towards the

[85] N. G. Rathod, *The Great Martha: Mahadji Shinde*, p. 118. Earlier Samsher Bahadur, the father of Ali Bahadur had already gone to manage the affairs of Bundelkhand.
[86] Poonam Sagar, *Maratha Policy Towards Northern India*, p. 217.
[87] G. S. Sardesai (ed.), *Historical Papers Related to Mahadji Shinde*, Gwalior, 1937, No-596; P. M. Joshi (ed.), *Persian Record of Maratha History*, Vol. II, J. N. Sarkar (Eng. trans.), p. 52. Mahadji said, "My going to the Peshwa is supreme over all other matters. Unless I go there, most of our affairs cannot be righted".
[88] Beni Gupta, *Maratha Penetration into Rajasthan: Through the Mukandra Pass,* Research, 1779, pp. 53-54.
[89] N. G. Rathod, *The Great Martha: Mahadji Shinde*, pp. 153-154.

South was that it was after an order of the Emperor, given to check further encroachment of the British that Shinde moved towards the south. Shinde wanted to tell the *jagirdars* of the Deccan about the modernization of military power and to unite against the British to save the Indian state. Shinde declared the following as his primary objective to visit Poona:

1. Shinde wanted to settle his claim of several crores against the Poona government for the expenses incurred during his expeditions in north India since 1777 under the orders of the Peshwa.
2. He was ready to prove that he had not collected vast treasures by his capture of Delhi and spent them instead of making payment of his master.
3. He also wanted his disputes with Ali Bahadur and Tukoji Holkar to be finally decided.

However, the real object of Shinde was to revive and re-strengthen the Maratha government to face the threatening danger that surrounded it. But the Poona environment was very different and immersed in the confusion, owing to the threat of the march of Mahadji. When he was campaigning in northern India, he was blamed to carve out an independent state, and when he reached Poona, it was said that he was trying to capture the Maratha Government. The reaction of Nana to the march of Mahadji towards Poona was unbelievable. He was so much afraid of his visit to Poona that he requested Cornwallis to get the help of the Bombay regiments which were coming back from Mysore as if he wanted to begin a civil war in Poona to defeat the only man, Mahadji who could have protected the state from the most challenging situation.[90]

Since Mahadji was well aware of the future planning of the British, no one politicians at Poona could understand the situation appropriately. Mahadji wanted the Peshwa to independently take charge of the Maratha government and frame up a strong central authority so that he could command obedience from one and all. Shinde in his formal visit to the Peshwa on 13th and 14th June discussed various issues related to diplomatic and political affairs of the Marathas in Hindustan and requested him to accept the title

[90] G. S. Sardesai, *New History of Maratha*, Vol. III, pp. 231-232.

and dresses which he had brought for him from the Emperor which were accepted in the *Darbar* of 22nd June 1792.[91]

Mahadji desired a few things, and for that, he started to visit the Poona *Darbar* more frequently. The first purpose was to make the Peshwa free from the rigid discipline of Nana. Secondly, Mahadji wished to make the Peshwa aware of his rights and responsibilities, and thirdly, Mahadji wanted to win the mind and heart of the Peshwa in his favour[92] which was entirely against Nana. Naturally, Nana felt so jealous of Mahadji that to avoid an open conflict in future, he planned to retire from public life and to go to Banaras to pass his days there in worship and prayer. The discussion, which had taken place, showed vast differences of views and policies between the two. When this conflict reached a breaking point, Hari Pant Phadke and the Peshwa interfered and brought a friendly understanding between them.[93] Hari Pant personally met Mahadji many times and tried to solve the differences. Then Nana and Hari Pant met Mahadji and tried to defuse the tense situation.

Mahadji violent interference in the Poona administration was aimed at weakening the hold of Nana Phadnis and his master. Mahadji admirably succeeded in his plan. Though Nana and Shinde were ambitious by nature, both of them were inherently patriotic, and they did not allow the enemies of the Maratha to take advantage of their difference. Mahadji did not want to dissolve the Maratha Confederacy by inviting the actual interference of the Nizam or British. The final reconciliation proved to be a source of grave concern for their enemies who were eagerly anticipating the disruption of the Maratha Confederacy. However, he did not attempt to re-organization of the Maratha administration or combination of the native state against the British owing to his quest for personal power. A letter published in *Historical*

[91] V. V. Khare (ed.), *Aitihasik Lekh Sangrah*, Vol. IX, Mitaj, 1916, pp. 4583-4586, No-3482. Mahadji arrived at the Sangam of Poona on 12 June. On 13 June Srimant Sawai Madhavrao Peshwa, Nana, Haripant Phadke, and their retinue went to Ganeshkhind to welcome Mahadji. It was a great meeting and a grand faction. A permission was sought from the Chhtrapati Maharaja of Satara and 22nd June was decided for the day of the function. Accordingly, the function for the *Vakil-e-Mutalik* was celebrated on 22 June 1792.

[92] N. G. Rathod, *The Great Martha: Mahadji Scindhia,* p. 161.

[93] V. V. Khare, *Aitihasik Lekh Sangrah*, Vol. IX, p. 4583. After the arrival of Mahadji at Poona, there were many meetings and feasts between Mahadji and the Peshwa during the month of July and August. On 13 March, Mahadji celebrated Rangpanchmi with gaiety in the presence of the Peshwa.

Papers of the Shindes of Gwalior[94] gives a long list of the following demands of Mahadji.

1. Settlement of the affairs of Sawant
2. Settlement of the affairs of Ghorpade
3. Settlement of the affairs of Rajasbai Nimblankar
4. Grant of the good resident to Mahadji in lieu of his original resident
5. Reinstatement of the family place, garden, and Faltan town of Mahadji
6. Reimbursement of the expenses incurred by him in settling the imperial affairs
7. Settlement of Gosavi and Holkar affairs
8. Investiture of Sardesai to Govindrao Gaekwad
9. Settlement of the affairs of Rang Rao Trimbak
10. Settlement of the affairs of Raghunath Rao Balwant and Malhar Rao Pawar
11. Disposal of other petty affairs.

Finally, Shinde settled all the business at Poona to his satisfaction, as an above-mentioned point. Through this action, it is abundantly clear that Shindhe came to Poona with a very limited aim of ensuring the recognition of his life and power, and his activities at Poona were aimed at getting his demands accepted by the Peshwa.[95]

Mahadji did not live long to implement the agreement and formulate the new relationship with the Poona *darbar*. The first notion of his illness is contained in a newsletter from Poona dated 5th June 1793 as "Mahadji has been getting the fever for the last eight days".[96] Mahadji personal clerk Jagnath Vishwnath sent a full account to his officers in the north, reporting that "Mahadji was attacked by a cold and a fever. It was not considered serious for some time and physician-administered their usual remedies. Next evening, Wednesday 12 February Nana was called, but no conversation took place".[97] Mahadji died in his camp at Wanwadi on 12th February 1794, at the age of 67.[98] Thus, passed away the last great Maratha chieftain, a man of great political sagacity, of deep artifice, of restless ambition and endowed with

[94] *Historical Papers of the Shindes of Gwalior,* Vol. I, No. 404.
[95] J. N. Sarkar, *Fall of Mughal Empire,* Vol. IV, p. 129.
[96] V. V. Khare, *Aitihasik Lekh Sangrah,* Vol. IX, pp. 3513, 3626.
[97] G. S. Sardesai, *Marathi Riyasat: Uttar Vibhag,* Vol. II, p. 407.
[98] G. S. Sardesai (ed.), *Selection from Peshwa Daftar,* Vol. 40, No. 276 and *Secret and Political Department Dairy,* No. 47, letter No. 16.

qualities of valiant fighter and an astute diplomat. The death of Mahadji Shinde was a significant blow to the power of the Marathas. The final reconciliation and the unity of the Maratha chief was a source of grave concern to their enemies, who were eagerly anticipating the disruption of the Maratha Empire.

The nine years that lay between the death of Mahadji Shinde and the signing of the treaty of Bassein (1794-1802) were the most momentous in the history of the Maratha state and moved inexorably on to bring about a complete revolution in the destiny of that race. This was also the period of the transition of power from the hand of Shinde to hand of the different minister and other intermediary power. During the interval, the centre of gravity of the Maratha Empire again shifted in Poona. The first half of this period gave the Marathas absolute freedom from any foreign threat was also because of the non-intervention policy of Sir John Shore, the Governor General from October 1793 to March 1798.[99] This was also the time when Nana became the most powerful and prosperous person.

But the cruel irony of the fate was the victory at Kharda proved to be the beginning of the end of the Peshwa rule. Seven months after the supreme triumphs of the Maratha arms and diplomacy, Madhavrao Narayan committed suicide (27th October 1795). Baji Rao Raghunath, the most despicable character in the Maratha history, gained the throne of the Peshwa. The death of Madhavrao Narayan was followed by an extended period of the most puzzling and disgraceful intrigue, diplomatic treachery which fasted into murder, pillage, civil war and devastation in the domain of the Peshwa and even the city of Poona itself.

The dilapidation of the character of the leader (particularly kinship relation in the absence of direct male member) is the most painful sequence of a historical event in which Nana also played a dubious role. Fate seems to have taken a malicious delight in removing all the great men and women of later Maratha history during these few years. As Mahadji died on 12th February and Ladoji Deshmukh on 15th April 1794, next year in 1795, Ahilya Bai Holkar on 13th August, Mahdo Narayan Peshwa 27th October and in 1796 Jiva Dada Bakshi died on 6th January, De-Boigne retired from India in February; in 1797 Appa Khande Rao closed his long active life (25th June)

[99] J. N. Sarkar (ed.), *Poona Residency Correspondence,* Vol. 8: *Daulat Rao Sindhia and North India Affairs,* Government Printing Press, Mumbai, 1943, p. 1.

and so did Tukoj Holkar on 15th August. The result was that when Wellesley arrived in India in mid-1798, fully prepared and determined to enforce the policy of the British supremacy, he was faced by leaderless states and sprite people in Hindustan.[100]

The most important factor which marked these years off from the decade before was the fact that not a single powerful kin of Shinde was present in Hindustan in person from the day in February 1792 when Mahadji left Ujjain for Poona to 19th October 1801 when Daulat Rao crossed the Narmada again to return to his capital. Mahadji did not live to revisit his conquest in the north, and his successor, Daulat Rao a dull-brained, ignorant, pleasure-seeking youth, pursued the vain dream of controlling the government of the Peshwa.

Mahadji Shinde had no son; his brother Tukoji had three named Kebanjee, Joteeba, and Anandrao, of whom the eldest died without issue, the second had two, the youngest Anandrao, became the favourite of uncle, who in consequence of his affection to him, adopted his son, Daulat Rao Shinde as his heirs. This prince was only thirteen years old when Mahadji died, and left him not only the vast possession but an army which rendered him the arbiter of the Maratha Empire.[101]

The succession of Daulat Rao Shinde disputed by the widows of Mahadji, who proclaimed another panic, and having assembled an army, did not give up the contest till they had been defeated in several actions. The youth of Daulat Rao Shinde had been stated as an excuse of his early abuse of power but his unfortunate marriage with the daughter of Sirjee Rao Ghatikia, by placing the wicked men at the head of the council, was perhaps the chief cause of shameless and bold rapacity which marked the commencement of his reign. The seizure of Nana in violation of the most scared pledged, the murder of several Bramins, the plunder of inhabitants of Poona were the severe crime by him.[102]

Mahadji maintained the harmony and balance in his ministry by assigning civil administration to the Deshastha Brahmans and control of Army to senvi Brahmans. However, Daulat Rao did not keep that harmony which gave rise to caste rivalry and proved disastrous to the Marathas. The men of Deshtatha groups as Aba Chitnis,

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[100] J. N. Sarkar (ed.), *Poona Residency Correspondence,* Vol. 8: *Daulat Rao Sindhia and North India Affairs,* p. ii.
[101] John Malcolm, *Memoirs of Central India,* Vol. I, 1824, p. 131.
[102] Ibid., p. 135.

Krishnoba Chitnis, and Gopal Bhau, had better administrative capability and political understanding than Senvi. Mahadji also left behind him three widows Lakhsmibai, Yamunabai, and Bhagirathibai who in themselves were in power, being supported by the old and experience followers of Mahadji.[103]

Thus, the Shinde house was divided into two groups, one Daulat Rao and second widows of Mahadji. The situation seemed that the "Maratha state had developed a loose Confederacy of the powerful chief and had all long been administered by individuals without any settled constitution to which the various elements could remain bound".[104] This can be clearly seen if we look at the motive behind the use of the Deshastha group and Senvi group of Brahmans against Daulat Rao by Bhagirathi Bai, Yamuna Bai and Lakshmi Bai (widows of Mahadji). What were her purposes to creating more conflict within the clan of Shinde and how the politics of the widows added in declining the power of the Shinde, are the most crucial issues that demanded the detailed explanation of the politics of the kin that was making the loose Confederates? This kind of conflicting situation was not only dominating in the house of the Confederates but also became the prominent feature of the house of the Peshwa at Poona.

The death of Madavrao-II immediately destroyed all peace and unity amongst the Confederates and the ruling elites of Poona, hastening the final ruins of the state in less than a quarter of the century. It gave a more significant opportunity to Nana to become the most powerful person at Poona. Bajirao-II and Chimanji Appa, sons of Raghunath Rao, with Amritrao, his adopted son, were the only surviving direct family members of the Peshwa. Chimanji was then only 11 years old, Bajirao-II observing the situation to securing the Peshwaship, Nana had promised to make a final settlement for them after the conclusion of the war against the Nizam. Internally Nana had desired to keep Bajirao and his brothers out of any share in the Peshwa government.

Nana and Daulat Rao: Contestation for Power

The ill feeling between Nana and Shinde, which had been manifested even during the lifetime of Mahadji, now started taking a concrete shape. In between, the idea of

[103] G. S. Sardesai, *New History of Marathas,* Vol. III, p. 313.
[104] Ibid., p. 313.

adopting a child for the Peshwaship became a new threat for Bajirao-II. Therefore, he agreed with Shinde. The agreement being finalized between Bajirao-II and Shinde to the effect that "Shinde should raise Bajirao to the Masnad, and on accession Bajirao should pay Shinde 1 Crore and 25 Lakhs and grant him a Jagir of 25 lakhs".[105] On the conclusion of this pact, Shinde ordered his troops which were in the way to the north near Burhanpur and recalled Jiwa Dada Bakshi from Poona to Jamgoan. Accordingly, Shinde minster left Poona without seeking the permission of Nana.

The refusal of Bajirao to go to Shaniwarwara without first consulting Shinde, made Nana extremely uneasy because of his fear of Shinde. Tormented by suspicion, Nana forced to Bajirao-II, to ensure his dominant position in administration and also promised him safety against Shinde. Bajirao on his part promised that he would never, by word or deed, harm Nana or his adherents and would not allow the others to do so. This agreement was signed on 11th March 1796. [106]

While the event was, thus, shaping themselves at Khadki, Baloba Tatya Pagnis who looked forward to the governing of the Maratha state through Shinde had assumed the charge of Shinde administration after the death of Jiwabadada. He put the Shinde affairs in order, apprehended the assassins employed against Daulat Rao, and kept the heavy equipment of the army at Jamgao. Baloba was exceedingly enraged at being outwitted by the master stroke of Nana in bringing Bajirao-II to Poona. He visualized the probability of the promised 1.25 crore slipping away from his hand. Furious with Nana, Baloba openly demanding that Nana should retire from the administration; the ill feeling multiplied between Nana and Shinde.

The situation grew to worsen at this juncture because of the plan of Nana to create treachery in the Shinde camp through Abba Chitnis, who was caught red-handed, and there was also a plan to assassinate Baloba.[107] This activity infuriated Baloba beyond his control and he decided to remove Nana from the Poona administration. The news of the march of Daulat Rao Shinde towards Poona increased the panic of Nana. Nana himself had written to Shinde to stop his journey towards Poona, and also requested

[105] Khare, Vol. IX, p. 4776. Duff states that Bajirao was to grant 4 lakhs worth territory and expenses incurred for troops.
[106] S. G. Vaidhya, *Peshwa Bajirao-II and the Downfall of the Maratha Power,* Pargati Parkashan, Nagpur, p. 27.
[107] G. S Sardesai, *Marathi Riyasat: Uttar Vibghag,* Vol. III, p. 15.

not to come with more than 5000 troops, but Shinde came with the whole of his forces. Finally, Bajirao-II allowed Nana to retire from Poona, promising to bring reconciliation between them on the arrival of Shinde. Nana fled from Poona in the direction of Satara on 21st March 1796. He had already sent his family to the hill fort of Konkan, applying for the British protection, but the last action he took in Poona took away all the treasures of the state.[108]

Shinde arrived on Khadki; a meeting took place between Bajirao-II and Daulatrao on 24th March and on the same day Bajirao-II made entry into the Saniwarwada in Poona. During the discussion Shinde pressed for two demands: first, an amount of minimum 25 lakhs must be paid immediately, and Nana should be entirely removed from the Poona administration.[109] Bajirao-II made his entry into Poona on 24th March, and two days later, he started in the direction of Satara to receive the robes of the Peshwaship from the Chhatrapati. Shinde and Parshurambhau accompanied him. On 2nd April 1796, he was encamped at Theur. After this stoppages, his onwards march was checked by Shinde and Bhau. Shinde now began to press Bajirao-II, not only for the immediate payment but also for the surrender of Nana to him. Bajirao was not in a position to pay any amount, while it was impossible that any arrangement for the payment could be made without Nana. Bajirao himself was young, inexperienced, and entirely without the support of any powerful, experienced administrator. It was naturally that the solution to the deadlock could be evolved only through the reconciliation with Nana. But the intransigence of Shinde blocked all the path of settlement.

Very soon Shinde decided to overthrow Bajirao-II. Baloba at the beginning of the April 1796 negotiated with Parshuram Bhau and an agreement was finalized between them–

> "Shinde should arrest Bajirao and rise Chimnaji to the Masnad after giving him an adoption to Yashodabai; that the administration should be interested in Bahu, and the arrested Bajirao should be handed over to him by Shinde on getting 25 lakhs from him; that both jointly should lead an expedition against Nizam for enforcing the terms of

[108] S .G. Vaidhya, *Peshwa Bajirao-II and the Downfall of the Maratha Power,* Pargati Parkashan, Nagpur, p. 29.
[109] Ibid., p. 30.

> Kharda, and on receiving 75 lakhs from the indemnity from the Nizam, Shinde should proceed to North after having crushed all the opposition and established Bhau securely in the administration"[110]

On 17th April, when Bajirao-II was celebrating the birthday of Chimnaji, Shinde surrounded the camp and arrogantly pressed for the payment of 1 crore 25 lakhs. He again demanded that Nana should be removed from the administrative post. During this critical hour when the life of Bajirao was itself in danger, he displayed commendable courage, excellent self-respect, and strength of character, he expressed the view that Shinde should in no way harass the life and honour of Nana, that the latter should be allowed to stay in hometown Menavali. However, he agreed to pay 50 lakhs within a week and Parshurambhau and brother –in the law of Bajirao, Pandurangrao Baramatikar stood securely for the same. When Bajirao could not raise the fund of 50 lakhs within the period given by Shinde, the Diwan of Shinde, Baloba Tatrya, accompanied by 8000 forces, surrounded the camp of Bajirao with the specific aim of arresting Bajirao, but he changed his plan that day.[111]

In the same evening, Baji Rao requested to visit the camp of Shinde. Before he could leave to meet, a messenger rushed in shouting the news that Parshurambahu had fled from the camp carrying Chimnaji with him. Baji Rao was stunned by this news because he was relying on loyalty. Being entirely in the dark about the plan of Bhau and Baloba to kidnapping Chimnaji, Baji Rao again requested Shinde to pursue and stop Bhau. Shinde not only denied his order but replied to him that even he would not be allowed to leave the camp, and this was the moment when Baji Rao realized that he was made a prisoner.[112]

Chimnaji refused to take the post of the Peshwa, but Bhau forced him in the palanquin and rushed him in the direction of Poona. They reached there by midnight and kept in the house of Raste. Chimnaji even threatened to destroy himself by suicide, but carried against his will to Saniwarwada, on 12th May 1796. But the next problem was to arrange for the adoption ceremony of Chimnaji and to place him on the *masnad* after bringing the robe of the Peshwaship from Satara.[113] The accession of Chimnaji

[110] Ibid., p. 31.
[111] G. S. Sardesai, *Marathi Riyasat; Uttar Vibhag,* Vol. III, p. 27.
[112] Ibid., p. 34.
[113] Ibid., p. 35.

through the initiative of Bhau and Baloba gave a shattering blow to the aspirations of Nana. His original plan of the adoption of some distant relative of the Peshwa family had failed to materialize. Then his design of giving Chimnaji for adoption was also foiled by Shinde. Therefore, his next move was to make Bajirao as the Peshwa and to secure his power, was even now destroyed. Nana, thus, appeared wholly outwitted by his rival.

This situation forced Nana to leave Satara and he arrived at Menavli in the middle of May 1796, soon after the procuring the robe of the Peshwaship for Chimnaji from the Satara Raja Chhatrapati. However, the adoption of Chimnaji by Yashodabai was opposed by some prominent Pandits of Poona such as Blakirshan Shastri Chhatre. Other Brahmans supported this move on 25th May, Chimnaji Ragunath was made Chimnaji Madhorao;, the final ceremony took place on 2nd June 1796. [114]

Nana was busy in finding a proper solution to regain his own power, and cooperation of Shinde for the Maratha administration. Meanwhile, Nana could weave his network of intrigue only round the critical point of the candidature of Bajirao-II. Bhau and Baloba, on the other hand, decided to remove Bajirao from the scene of active conspiracy, so as to defeat the machination of Nana. Under the escort of Sarjirao Ghatge, who had initially entered the service of Shinde as a spy of Nana, they forced Bajirao to march towards Ashirgadh. But by the time Bajirao came to Jalgao understanding between Nana and Shinde had been affected. It was at this time that Shinde, through Sarjerao Ghatge, enticed Bajirao into an agreement that the daughter of Sarje Ghatge should be given to Shinde and in return, the Diwanship of Shinde should be given to Sarjerao; and that Bajirao should pay Shinde Rs. 2 crores for rising him to the Peshwaship, and protecting him from Nana.[115] Through this contract Shinde were getting double benefit, on one hand he had made an agreement with Nana, whereby he was supposed to get 1 crore and a *jagir* for supporting Nana to rise Bajirao, on the other side for the same purpose he planned to extract Rs. 2 crores from Bajirao, for saving him from Nana.[116]

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[114] Ibid., p. 36.
[115] V. V. Khare, *Aitihasik Lekh Sangrah,*Vol. IX, p. 4920.
[116] S. G. Viadya, *Peshwa Bajirao-II and Downfall of the Maratha Power,* p. 42.

Another revolution in the Poona government soon followed, overthrowing Chimnaji and bringing Bajirao to the Peshwaship. The primary aim of Nana was to bring Bajirao to the Peshwaship. Nana feared that Shinde soon would rise to power when he saw Bajirao encamped at Kharadi, being guided by the soldiers of Shinde. He refused to visit Bajirao at the camp unless Shinde guards were removed. Nana demanded that both Shinde and Nizam Ali should guarantee that on the accession of Bajirao, the administration would rest in the hand of Nana and that no harm would ever be done to his life and honour. It was only after such securing Nana assumed the charge of administration on 25th November 1796, and visited Shinde and Holkar in the next week. Bajirao ultimately was raised to the *masnad* of the Peshwaship on 5th December 1796.

In this whole process, the move of Shinde was chiefly directed by the thirst for money and power. For a long year, because of the failure of the Peshwa, the bureaucracy in the Maratha state had been habituated to exercise unrestrained power in the Poona government. Mahadji deeply resented the autocratic authority wielded by Nana. Though Mahadji died in 1794 but his successor Daulat Rao Shinde was not less, who nurtured the grievance against Nana and cherished the dream of the ascendency of Shinde in the Poona government. When they saw that in deciding the issue of the succession Nana was aiming merely at perpetuating his power, they also decided to jump into the arena of power politics. Parshurambhau too was interested only in power politics. The rivalry and enmity that inevitably flared up among these contestants in the race for power soon filled the Maratha scene with chaos, bloodshed, and anarchy, which has always proved as clear head of decay and degeneration of states; this happened to Maratha Confederacy too.

The relationship between Shinde and Nana steadily deteriorated after the assumption of Bajirao-II of the Peshwaship. Shinde, contrary to his agreement with Nana, began pressing him for the payment at Poona only, on the plea that his soldiers refused to march to the north unless their arrears were paid, while Nana refused to pay until Shinde departed to the north.[117] The tension increased with bitterness to such an extent that Nana called the Arab guards against the surprise attack by Shinde. This

[117] V.V Khare, *Aitihasik Lekh Sangrah*, Vol. X, p. 5048.

issue was finally resolved by the mediation of the Peshwa, resulting in Nana the payment of 20 lakhs to Shinde in December 1796.[118]

When Nana and Shinde were talking in lakhs and crores for such a small dealing for power, the Peshwa had nothing in except his name and post. "Bajirao was penniless and possessed not even the means of buying his daily food. He sent his brother Amritrao to Nana to adjust matter asking him to be after to all the brothers. Amritrao could affect nothing".[119] Bajirao in the need of money imposed several taxes upon the people, such as *'Santoshpatti'* meaning a gift from the people joy at the accession of Bajirao-II.[120] At this stage, Daulatrao thought that he had established his influences over Poona politics and his power was well secure in the Deccan. But the political situation in the north was worst not only because of the external threat to the northern power but also because of the war started by the widows of Mahadji Shinde against his own family successor and adopted son, Daulat Rao. As a result, all this enjoyment of pleasure and power was suddenly marred by the outburst of a war started by the ladies of Shinde. Mahadji Shinde left behind three wives: Lakhmibai, Yamuna Bai, and Bhagirathibai, who demanded sufficient independent provision to be ensured for their maintenance. Daulat Rao before his adoption gave them a solemn promised but failed to carry out on account of his financial strain, which went on increasing on account of his prolonged stay in the Deccan. Out of three ladies all having experiences in military and administrative matters, Bhagirathibai was reported to be attached to the interest of Daulatrao, while the other two who lived at Ujjain were compelled by their distress to take up arms, and were supported by a strong Sarswat faction in the service of Daulatrao. A regular war conducted for four years by the spirit of Lakshmibai and Yamunabai, over an extensive field from south to north, from Poona and Kolhapur to Ujjain and another northern plain.[121]

With massive followers, these ladies marched towards Poona, determined to get readdress of their grievances at the hand of Daulatrao. In the last week of March 1798, Narayanrao Bakshi, Rayaji Ramaji Patil, and many other supporters were at the suggestion of Sharzarao. As the ladies advanced upon Poona, Sharzarao Ghatge

[118] Ibid., p. 5076.
[119] G. S. Sardesai, *New History of Marathas,* Vol.III, p. 327.
[120] J. L. Mehta, *Advance Study in the History of Modern India,* p. 606.
[121] G. S. Sardesai, *New History of Marathas,* Vol. III, p. 337.

offered to meet him and conveyed them to Jambgao. But they refused even to see his face; they looked upon him as a most sinful and wicked person alive, unworthy of their sight. Then Daulatrao himself saw them and composed their ruffled spirits by arranging for their residence at Burhanpur. But they refused to move unless all their ornaments and property which had been seized, were restored to the possession.[122]

Muzaffar Khan, another military chief joined the ladies party and civil war on a vast scale brought out in the Poona vicinity; now jointly demanding for the surrender of Sharzarao as the cause of the whole trouble. On 8th June, the ladies party under the direction of Lakshmibai attacked the camp of Shinde at midnight and created havoc with their artillery fire. Daulatrao was so scared that he sent Rayaji and Ramaji Patil as mediators to explain that he was ready to accept all the demands. After a few days, all guards of ladies were removed. While Daulatrao came to know they were without any guard, suddenly attacked them with their full force. Bajirao then arranged a meeting with the ladies, but they would not budge in their demands for the surrender of Sharzarao and his five advisors. It was well known that the leading cause of the ladies trouble was Ghatge, and Daulatrao too realized this fully. The ladies had strong sympathy in north India, where Lakhba Lal espoused their cause and commenced a general rebellion against Daulatrao mismanagement. Lakhba sent monetary help to the ladies and was reported to coming to the south to lead an army. So, the situation at the end of the eighteenth century was quite clear that Shinde state was headless, where the widows of Mahadji and his officers were fighting against his own successor.

Even after two years had been passed since the accession of Bajirao and there was no prospect of the administration running correctly and smoothly, on the contrary, it was destroyed in every direction. People felt disgusted with constant insecurity and harassment at the hand of two chiefs and with wars and unrest desolating the land. On 14th November 1798, Bajirao-II with only one servant appeared suddenly before Nana and requested him as "I am innocent and helpless. You are in the position to father to me. Protect me and save this Brahman Raj".[123] The first thing Nana now insisted upon was to compel Shinde to depart in North. Bajirao-II gave him formal leave on 17th June 1799. But before Shinde left Poona, Bajirao-II again requested to him for wait

[122] Ibid., p. 338.
[123] Ibid., p. 341.

few days more in Poona to control the behavour of ministers like Baloba and Parshuram Bhau. So, Shinde once again cancelled his plan to move to the north.

After this decision, the ladies of Shinde obtained nothing for their maintenance and would not trust any oral or written pledge given by Daulatrao, unless they had a direct guarantee from the old servants of Shinde like Baloba Tatya and Abaji Raghunath. When the negotiation failed, the two ladies joined by Narayan Rao Bakshi and Deoji Guali, moved southward at the beginning of 1799. The ladies plundered Sangola, Kasegoan, and another place in the southern route and extracted whatever they could from innocent people. They sent their agent to Kolhapur and arranged for their visit to the Chhatrapati. For two months they were making a plan to remove the Peshwa and Shinde from their power. On this occasion, one of the illegitimate sons of the Maharaj was married on 14th May to a daughter of Mahadji Shinde near Kolhapur. Their friendship, thus, cemented and ladies now offered such a threat to Shinde. Baloba and Abba Chitnis sent from Poona to settle an agreement, and at the end of August 1799, the war of Daulatrao with the ladies was temporarily closed. But on 14th January 1800, one of the Shinden ladies, Yamunabai was suddenly stabbed in the bed by assassins, employed by Sharzarao. Thus, the ladies then moved to the north and ended hostility in the south.[124]

Shinde left for the north at the end of 1800 for the protection of his country. By the time he arrived at Burhanpur, in February 1801, a significant part of his territory in the north had suffered devastation at the hand of Jaswantrao Holkar. The ladies also contributed to the complete desolation of the Shinde territory. Shinde, however, hoped that with Khanderao in his custody and Kashirao Holkar marching with him to Hindustan, some compromise might be forged with Jaswantrao.

It is clear that during the last decade of the eighteenth-century Shinde and Gaekwad both decided their terms according to the demands of kinship politics within the household and formed separate alliances with the English and other powers without taking any permission from the Peshwa and other authorities at Poona. Thus, it was clear that kin conflict within the families of these Confederates gave enough space to the Peshwa and Nana to use the family conflict to fulfill the personal agenda in the name of the power of the Maratha Confederacy. However, very soon kin of these

[124] Ibid., p. 342.

Confederates understood the benefit of the sovereign identity of their respective areas and planned their policies to become more potent than the Poona authorities, which they became till the last decade of the eighteenth century.

CHAPTER-4

Conflict of Power: Kin, Clan and Holkar Politics during 1795-1803 C.E.

The political dynamics during the post decade of the death of Ahilyabai can be understood with the study of the internal and external conflicts of kin of the Confederates and its impact on the politics of the households of the Peshwa and Shinde. This chapter highlights the significance of power conflict among the different Houses of the Confederates and also through the light on the situation of the political vacuum particularly in the absence of a direct male member in the families of the Shindes and Holkars, which created the circumstances of political tragedy during the last decade of the eighteenth century.

Holkar and Kin: Political crisis at the House of Holkar

Tukoji Holkar passed away in his camp on August 15, 1797[1]. After his death, it was seen that his long career was only a disguised approach to feudal chaos. In fact, during his lifetime the question of succession had been engaging the attention of his own and other kin. He was despaired of future as his sons broke into violent quarrels among themselves, and sometimes he used to say, "if in my lifetime your brotherly love has turned into hatred and hostility, God knows who it will end after my death."[2]

The story of the power struggle in the family of Tukoji was very different than the other Holkar clan. Tukoji had four sons by three different wives. The eldest Kashi Rao Holkar was a weak-minded cripple, quite unfit for the active duties.[3] Malhar Rao-II, was the second son with undaunted courage, but had taken to a life of lawlessness. Inordinately proud, he developed positive contempt for Parasardhar Dada and other advocates of peace in the camp of Holkar.[4]

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[1] P. N. Shrivastav, *Madhya Pradesh District Gazetteers: Indore,* District Gazetteer Department Bhopal, 1971, p. 64.
[2] Raghubir Sinh (ed.), *Mohan Singh's Waqai-I-Holkar,* Publication Scheme, Jaipur, 1998, f. 24b, p. 28.
[3] V. V. Khare, *Aitihasik Lekh Sangraha,* Vol. X, p. 4079; G .S. Sardesai and J. N. Sarkar (ed.) , *Poona Residency Correspondence,* Vol. IX, p. 40. Tukoji Holkar died leaving four sons, viz. Kashi Rao and Malhar Rao by a women of the same caste and Yashwant Rao and Vithoji Rao commonly called Etaji by a Khwas or slave girl.
[4] G. S. Sardesai, *New History of the Marathas,* Vol. III, p. 330.



[5] P. M. Joshi (ed.), *Historical Publication Series, No. 1: Historical Genealogies*, Government Printing Press, Bombay, 1957, p. 163.

Tukoji failed to reform him, and even Ahalya Bai could not muster enough courage to restrain his unmitigated ruffian. In her eagerness to uphold the prestige of the House of the Holkars, Ahilyabai had sometimes supported him. The mother of Malhar Rao, Rukma Bai warned Ahilya Bai- "You are keeping Malhar with yourself, but you do not know his character."[6] When information about this kind of thought reached to Malhar-II, he refused to see the face of the mother anymore. On the advice of Prasar Dada Malhar was imprisoned for his rebellious activities in the fort of Khusalgardh, but was released after short detention as Tukoji threatened to commit suicide.[7]

The third son name was Yashwant Rao who born in 1776. He was full of adventure, courage, and resourcefulness. He was passionately attached with Malhar Rao-II.[8] Vithoji, the youngest son of Tukoji, had no experience for any respectable kind of work, naturally took the predatory way of life. Hingane, who discussed the ways of the sons of Tukoji, suggested the confiscation of the entire state on the score of maladministration.[9]

Kashirao was legal heir but was unfit to manage the affairs. However, the Peshwa had made his choice during the lifetime of Tukoji. Tukoji Holkar who had fallen ill, summoned Kashi Rao Holkar from Maheshwar, and by the advice of his officers, appointed him as a regent for managing his affairs. Malhar Rao –II, who was very curious to know about all the activities of the Holkar family, asked Tukoji,

> "My brother has been elevated to such a dignity. What provisions do you intend to make for me? Tukoji told him to conduct affairs as his elder brother's deputy. Malhar Rao replied if a chance –heaven avert it-our health break down, it would cause innumerable mischief. So it would be better Kashi Rao is seated on the Gadi of Ahilya Bai, and I made your deputy" [10]

But Kashi Rao also pointed out:

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[6] Sudhindra Nath Qanungo, *Jaswant Rao Holkar: The Golden Rogue,* Abhinav Bharat Printers, Lucknow, 1965, p. 14.
[7] G. S. Sardesai, *New History of the Marathas,* Vol. III, pp. 330-331.
[8] Raghubir Sinh (ed.), *Mohan Singh's Waqai-i-Holkar*, fl. no. 25b., p. 28.
[9] Ganesh Hari Khare (ed.), *Hingane Daftar,* Vol. II, BISM, Pune, 1947, p. 73.
[10] Raghubir Sinh (ed.), *Mohan Singh's Waqai-i-Holkar*, f. 24a, p. 28.

> "Two swords cannot be placed in one sheath, and two kinds of weight, cannot be correct in one pair of scale"[11]

As all the officers agreed to transfer the headship of the state to Kashi Rao, and Tukoji Holkar wished at heart that things should be so managed that a war might not break out between the two brothers. On 29th January 1797, Tukoji received the robe from the Peshwa making Kashi Rao Holkar as the head of the Holkar state. The proposal of Malhar Rao-II was that Kashi Rao should live at Maheshwar as the nominal head of the state, while he himself would actually manage the administration and military affairs of the state as the regent of his brother.[12] Malhar Rao-II was enjoying the support of Nana Fadnavis secretly, but failed to gain on his side Bapu Holkar, Praji Pant Bakshi, and Khandoji Pant. Sorely disappointed Malhar Rao–II, with his 600 paga marched away from Maheshwar. His fatuous conduct in the Lakheri campaign was the same and sorrow of his father ministers.

Yashwant Rao Holkar was also not in complete favour of Kashi Rao. Once he sat on *Dharna* to make the payment of 80 *Bargis* under him, Kashi Rao ordered him to put in prison, but he was soon released. Nagoji after speaking to Tukoji Rao, came to Kashi Rao and gave him this message of his father-

> "I am still alive, and yet in my presence, such quarrels are raging; we can know from this that what shape this quarrel will take after my death. Kashi Rao replied- "From outward appearances, we have learned that Yashwant Rao will join Malhar –II. If you stand security for him, I shall release him".[13]

After this incident, Yashwant Rao joined hand with Malhar Rao-II with all his property. Jija Bai, the wife of Malhar Rao-II, also took interest and met Tukoji Holkar on this issue. Kashi Rao's side was not doing well in state affairs. Soon after this event, Kashi Rao committed a great mistake, he requested for help from Daulat Rao Shinde after paying him 14 lakhs of rupees against his brother Malhar Rao-II. Daulat Rao immediately agreed because he knew Malhar Rao-II would be a problem for

[11] Ibid., p. 28.
[12] Ibid. , fl.no. 24b., p. 28.
[13] Ibid., p. 30.

Shinde.[14] This can also be seen as a golden opportunity for Shinde to create more conflicts among the kin of the House of the Holkars.[15]

Daulat Rao planned a night attack on the camp of Malhar–II at Bhambudra and detached Muzaffar Khan with 500 horses and two battalions. The news of the probable attack by Shinde had already reached Malhar Rao–II. Yashwant Rao requested his brother "it is not advisable for you to stay in this district. Your first duty is to gather troops, raise the banner of your predominance, and conquer territories. Then expulsion of Kashi Rao would be an easy task".[16] But Malhar Rao, intoxicated with the pride of courage, did not listen to his excellent advice. He even sent Hari Holkar[17] and Harnath Singh Chella away towards Khandesh, and himself remained in the camp at Bhambhudra with few forces. This situation of Malhar Rao was known to his enemy who did not miss such an advantage to give a surprise attack. Muzaffar Khan made a surprise attack on 14th September 1797. Malhar Rao fought with desperate courage, overthrew many soldiers, received fourteen wounds and then was killed by the trust of a spear.[18] Fifteen of the followers of Malhar Rao were killed, and twenty were severely wounded. Jija Bai and Anni Bai, the wives of Malhar Rao, and the daughter of Yashwant Rao were taken into captivity. Daulat Rao Shinde rewarded the messenger carrying the 'glad tiding,' and started believing that the end of the Holkar House is near, allowed his golden moment to slip in a false dream. If he would have realized that this incident of kin conflict and killing of Malhar Rao-II would open new challenges for the Shinde politics, he could have made a new alliance with the kin of the Holkars. But in the middle of this threatening chaos, his bold challenges to Shinde rang throughout the Maratha Confederacy due to the courage of Yashwant Rao Holkar.

Escape of Yashwant Rao to Nagpur and his Diplomatic alliances: September 1797-June 1798 C.E.

As it is explained above that many of the followers of Malhar Rao had been killed, the one and the most important leader who saved his life was Yashwant Rao Holkar.

[14] G .S. Sardesai and J. N. Sarkar (ed.), *Poona Residency Correspondence*, Vol. VI, p. 42.
[15] Ibid., p. 46.
[16] Raghubir Sinh (ed.), *Mohan Singh's Waqai-i-Holkar*, f.27a, p. 32.
[17] Hari Holkar- son of Vithoji Holkar, who later ascended the *Gaddi* of Holkar (1833-34 C.E.)
[18] John Malcolm, *A Memoirs of Central India*, Vol. I, p. 195.

Although there are many stories related to the escape of Yashwant Rao to the south. A Muslim soldier was carrying the unconscious body of the soldier, covered with a cloth on his horse. The body was of none other than the younger brother of Malhar Rao –II, Yashwant Rao Holkar.[19] Mohan Singh well explains the journey of Yashwant Rao in *Waqai-i-Holkar*. It says that Yashwant Rao was almost tracked down like a hunted animal. The story of the narrow escape of a 20 year old boy, wandering in disguise, is the most crucial section of the *Waqai*.

This Muslim soldier left Yashwant Rao in a house of a Brahman at Poona. He had received two wounds at Bhambudra. He deeply mourned the death of his beloved brother. Yashwant Rao was worried about his wives and daughter who had been captured by Muzaffar Khan. His younger brother Vithoji also took shelter in Poona, and after some time left for Kolhapur.[20] After spending four days in Poona, Yashwant Rao left the city on 19th September 1797 and marched towards Nagpur to try his luck from the Bhosle territory. Before leaving Poona, Yashwant Rao sent Hari Holkar to Nagpur with some good horses and fine jewellery worth about crores of rupees.[21] Yashwant Rao before leaving for Nagpur prayed to a family deity of the Holkars at Jejuri. From Jejuri he marched towards Nagpur without any adequate cloth. When he reached the village of Kamlapuri, he took a loan of Rs. 5003 from Sunnyasi Gosains. With that money, Yashwant Rao recruited 200 infantry.[22] He was received at Nagpur, but his soldiers clamoured for the payment of five or six-month arrears of their pay. In this situation, Hari Holkar joined his forces, and worked as a loyal soldier and very soon cleared off the arrears. As soon as Yashwant Rao recovered his pain, Daulat Rao became more curious to break any possibilities of reuniting the kin of Shinde. Even Daulat Rao was not quiet, when Yashwant Rao was staying at Nagpur. He requested Raghuji Bhosle to send Yashwant Rao as a prisoner. While Raghuji Bhosle proposed Yashwant Rao that as the soldiers of Daulat Rao were turbulent and made a frequent disturbance; the two battalions of the army of Bhosle should be 'placed under his banners.' Yashwant Rao was very happy for this kindness. However, this was the plan of Raghuji to make Yashwant Rao a prisoner in his camp, but Yashwant Rao was lucky. He broke out of the ring and ran away 60 miles to Karanaja. On 20 February

[19] G. S. Sardesai and J. N. Sarkar (ed.), *Poona Residency Correspondence*, Vol. VI, p. 47.
[20] James Mill, *The History of British India*, Vol. VI, Leadenhall Street, London, 1817, p. 269.
[21] Raghubir Sinh (ed.), *Mohan Singh's Waqai-i-Holkar* , f. 36b., p. 43.
[22] Ibid., f. 30a, p. 35.

1798, Raghuji Bhosle confiscated all the property of Yashwant Rao and also put him under surveillance.

Yashwant Rao met Chimna Bhau, who gave him 300 rupees and advised him to go to Malwa. But Yashwant Rao made alliances with Jujhar Nayak of Khera and adopted a roving and predatory mode of life, justifying his actions on the ground that Kashi Rao was unwilling to grant him an estate legitimately. He recruited 600 Arabs and mercenaries from the pargana of Ali Mohan in Gujarat; he took the first action on Jujhar Nayak and plundered the parganas of Sultanpur and Nandabar.[23]

Now Yashwant Rao was well prepared to give an open threat to Kasi Rao; he started frequent raids and plunders which created fear not only for Kasi Rao but also for an English who was staying in Malwa. The *Pindaris* of Khandwa in the Burhanpur region were lured to his banners by the prospect of plunder.[24] Goverdhana Nayaka of Mekhla with a thousand soldiers entered the service of Yashwant Rao. He distinguished himself by defeating the troops of Kashi Rao.[25] After several months of strenuous activities, Yashwant Rao decided to spend a few days in holidays. Meanwhile, his soldiers began to create a row for the arrears of their pay. Yashwant Rao found that the most convenient way to pay them was to plunder the villages. They started plundering and collected booty of Rs. 60,000 in cash and lakhs of rupees in articles and paid the troops.[26] This time Kashi Rao Holkar was also planning to stop Yashwant Rao; he sent Santaji Holkar, who made a surprise attack, killed Balaji Pandit and took Jamsed Nayak as a prisoner; But Jamsed Nayak escaped from his captivity and arrived at Kurdawa. Santaji Holkar not only recovered his spoils but also brought many of the soldiers of Yashwant Rao. Santaji declared, "if anyone would bring Yashwant Rao as captive, he would be rewarded 'with cash gifts, exceeding his hopes and also with jagirs".[27] After this news, Yashwant Rao left Muhammadpur, released many prisoners after taking Rs. 1600. Tulsaji sent 400 horsemen in pursuit; they did nothing and Yashwant Rao safely reached the village of Khatra in the *suba* of Ujjain.[28] But this kind of offer to sardars could not stop the power of Yashwant Rao.

[23] Y. N. Kelkar, *Holkaranhi Kaifiyat,* p. 76.
[24] Raghubir Sinh (ed.), *Mohan Singh's Waqai-i-Holkar,* f. 46a, p. 53.
[25] Y. N. Kelkar, *Holkaranhi Kaifiyat,* p. 76.
[26] Raghubir Sinh (ed.), *Mohan Singh's Waqai-i-Holkar,* f. 50a, p.58.
[27] Ibid., f. 51a., p. 59.
[28] Ibid., f. 56a-56b, pp. 64-65.

The success of Yashwant Rao Holkar as the leader of brigands drew to his side roving bands of armed robbers, mercenaries, soldiers, ambitious adventurers and some servants of the kingdom of his father. Under the leadership of Yashwant Rao, many showed the hope for the revival of the House of the Holkars. The new officers of Yashwant Rao Holkar were Mir Wazir Hasan, Miharban Singh, Zaman Khan, and Somaji Darpiya.[29] Under the leadership of all these sardars, the exile of Yashwant Rao was over and finally emerged as the most powerful kin of the House of the Holkars.

Re-creation of Holkar Identity under Yashwant Rao Holkar, 1798-1799 C.E.

Yashwant Rao emerged as an influential member of the Holkar family who changed the general identity of the Holkar household, as earlier it was known as a peaceful administrator suddenly transformed its identity and started open recruitment of pindari leaders who mainly believed in plundering. Political uncertainty in Malwa also gave greater space for the emergence of the Pindari power in central India, but under Yashwant Rao, Pindaris became one of the prominent features of the military power of the Holkars.

Mir Khan, the Pathan freebooters, who was born in 1769 became famous for his plundering and crimes throughout Central India, was one of the essential Pindari leaders who joined hands with Yashwant Rao. He spent his childhood in Katihar (Rohilkhand). In the age of 20, he left his home to find a career as a soldier and took a job under Biijay Singh of Jodhpur, then Gaekwad of Baroda, after that he came into contact with the Maratha chief.[30] The attention of Yashwant Rao turned to Mir Khan in 1798, when Bhawani Shankar explained the merits of the Pathan Chief. According to Malcolm, the meeting of Yashwant Rao Holkar and Mir Khan took place at Ranagunj.[31] A secret agreement was made that Yashwant Rao would allow Mir Khan an equal share in all future plunders and conquests. The report of this alliance drew all the mercenary soldiers of the country and ambitious adventurers to the side of Yashwant Rao. In this way, the army of Yashwant Rao rose to 5000 infantry, and

[29] Ibid., f. 59b-60a, pp. 67-68.
[30] *Military Memoir of Skinner*, Vol. II, p. 70. The father of Mir Khan was IIIayat Ali from the tereen tribe. He was a perfect rider, skilled swordsman and fine shot. Mir Khan possessed a great physical power. In the words of Fresher, "He had more of the tiger than the lion-perhaps more of the serpent than of either'.
[31] John Malcolm, *Memoirs of Central India,* Vol. I, p. 203.

2000 cavalry, including Ram Singh Sardar of Kashi Rao, Najeeb Khan of Rampur, Sadr-ud-din Khan with 100 troopers, Ramji Golia Harpha, all of them were earlier working under the different chiefs of Malwa.[32] All these sardars were the new faces in the Holkar administration, and before joining this house, they all proved their ability to plunder in different parts of central India. It was the reason for flying away of Shinde from Indore when these sardars reached around Indore and encamped at Bhandore in the autumn of 1798. Yashwant Rao easily crossed the river, plundered Handia and acquired rich booty. After Handia, they marched towards Khargaon Batisi, and collected Rs. 2000 at Mundi, and Rs. 20,000 at Bhikangaon.[33] This success was a clear sign of serious threat for Kashi Rao Holkar and his supporters in Malwa.

Kashi Rao Holkar was an unworthy ruler. He was not able to maintain the administrative affairs. Instead of consolidating his position at Maheshwar, he waited upon the Peshwa, dependant on the Peshwa for taking every decision of state affairs, due to which he was not able to understand the increasing power of Yashwant Rao, so, he could not pose any challenge to his brother. Peshwa Bajirao-II was taking malicious pressure on Yashwant Rao. Daulat Rao who was helping Kashi Rao was also not able to make any strong step to defeat Yashwant Rao. This was the circumstances which had a clear sign of the downfall of the power of Kashi Rao in the Holkar household. Yashwant Rao and Mir Khan decided to march towards Maheshwar; on the way they defeated a battalion of Durnec. Bharmal Holkar (an old Minister of Ahilyabai) provided a boat to cross the Narmada. When Durnec fell back on Indore, the officers of Kashi Rao gave up all the plan of opposing Yashwant Rao Holkar. Having arrived at Maheshwar, Yashwant Rao ascended the family throne early in January 1799 in the capacity of the Regent.[34] All the usual gifts, appointments, and rituals of the Holkar House took place. During the halt at this capital, his forces were raised to nearly 8,000 horses and 15000 foot.[35] He took almost three lakhs *nazarana* from Maheshwar. Immense resource of money and goods, elephants, horses, guns, family jewels, and forts came now under Yashwant Rao Holkar. He appealed to Moroba Fadnis to persuade Peshwa Baji Rao–II to recognize Khande Rao-II, as the lawful head of the House of the Holkars, with Yashwant Rao

[32] Raghubir Sinh (ed.), *Mohan Singh's Waqai-i-Holkar*, f. 63a-63b, pp.72-73.
[33] Ibid., pp. 72-73.
[34] J. N. Sarkar, *Fall of the Mughal Empire*, Vol. IV, p. 169.
[35] Ibid., p. 169.

himself as his regent and the working head of the state.[36] The question is why Yashwant Rao suggested the name of Khande Rao-II for the head of the family? The reason was Yashwant Rao was acutely aware of the loyalty of the old officers of the Holkars, and he also understood that he would not be able to control the usurpation of the chief authority in the Holkar state. Therefore, he proposed the name of Khande Rao- II who was the infant son of Malhar Rao Holkar- II, and a legitimate heir after Kashi Rao Holkar.[37]

The city of Maheshwar was decorated on the occasion of the accession of Yashwant Rao. He was hailed as the saviour of the power and dignity of the House of the Holkars against Kashi Rao. On this occasion, Yashwant Rao distributed nearly 700 costly robes of honour, Shawls, scarfs, and turbans to his followers according to his rank.[38] Mir Khan was granted the title of *Nawab* and was assigned the pargana of Sironj and he was also rewarded with a *khilat*, with an elephant and jewels. Karan Din Khan and 400 men of his contingent received robes of honour. Saadat Khan, was given a village yielding Rs. 12,000 annually.[39] Yashwant Rao Holkar did many reforms to reorganize the powerful military institution. He classified horseman into three different categories; the first class was the new horses, granted 500 rupees per annum, the second class 300 and the third was 250 rupees.[40] However, the Hindu was allowed only 400, 200 and 150 rupees per annum.[41] The resources of all small states of Yashwant Rao could not possibly support the vast army; he had to make raids periodically to obtain money and supplies. In the course of his action, Yashwant Rao plundered the countries far and wide including places such as Jaora, Tarana, Rampura, Bhampura, Newali, Soodhwara, Rajgad Pattan, Bakaina, Shujawalpur, Ashta, Chandara, and Satambari. At Tarana, he posted Wazir Husain with 500 horses and many others in different plundered places.[42]

This continuous plunder was the essential identity of the Pindaris, which became the critical character of the Holkar campaign under the leadership of Yashwant Rao, thus, provided a new identity for the Holkar House and one of the reasons for the success of

[36] B. B. Thakkur, *Holkarshahichya Itihasachin Sadhnen,* Vol. II, p. 18.
[37] John Malcolm, *Memoirs of Central India,* Vol. I, p. 206.
[38] Raghubir Sinh (ed.), *Mohan Singh's Waqai-i-Holkar,* f. 68a., p. 77.
[39] John Malcolm, *Memoirs of Central India,* Vol. I, p. 206.
[40] B. B. Thakur, *Holkarshahichya Itihasachin Sadhnen,* Vol. II, p. 17.
[41] John Malcolm, *Memoirs of Central India,* Vol. I, p. 207.
[42] Raghubir Sinh (ed.), *Mohan Singh's Waqai-i-Holkar,* ff. 74b-76b, pp. 84-87.

Yashwant Rao. Apart from it, the factors which contributed to his success were the incompetency of Kashi Rao Holkar, the negligence of Daulat Rao Shinde, the alliances of Yashwant Rao with Mir Khan, who individually must occupy a high place among the eminent soldiers of his time. However, despite knowing the ability of Yashwant Rao, the Poona authority, and Daulat Rao were not ready to accept his supremacy which led to open conflicts with the kin of other confederates of northern India.

Contestation for Power amongst the Kin of the Confederates, 1800-1804

The origin of the contestation of power can be traced back since the northern policies of Baji Rao-I. It created internal disputes within the Maratha Empire, weakened the Maratha Confederacy, which led to more open conflicts amongst the kin of the Confederates who were appointed in various regions in northern and western India. It also happened due to the inability of the Poona authority to function as a check and balance center. As a result, the maladministration and illegitimate appointments in the House of Shinde created a more problematic situation before the widows of Mahadji. Thus, in the case of Shinde, the real conflicts were between the sons and mothers (the widows of Mahadji).

There was growing discontent among the subjects of Shinde against Daulat Rao and Saza Rao Ghate. The latter had become supreme in the court of Daulatrao because of the marriage of daughter Baza Bai to those Princes.[43] The Shenvi party headed by Lakhwa Dada relied on the widows of Mahadji Shinde. Sharza Rao Ghatge disrespected Lakshmi Bai, Yamuna Bai, Bhagirathi Bai, and Keshri Bai, who were most influential and highly respectful in the House of Shinde. On 15th may 1798 Ghatge forcefully entered their apartment, and threatened them to send to prison house. The supporters of the widows- Narayanrao Bakshi, Devji Gauli, and Rajaji Patil were arrested by the last week of March. A civil war broke in the House of Shinde because of the ill behavior of Sharja Rao Ghatge. The widows received support from Nana, and the war temporarily ended in August 1799. The city of Ujjain came under the control of the widows. After three months this city again came under the influences of Daulat Rao, when he appointed Bala Rao Ingle (commander of

[43] J. N. Sarkar, *Fall of the Mughal Empire*, Vol. IV, p. 150.

Daulat Rao), Jaggu Bapu and Lakhwa Dada. Baloba Tatya was appointed as his Prime Minister and Sharza Rao was put in prison.

A new war between Daulat Rao and the widows again began in May 1800. Sharza Rao was released on 4th January, Baloba Tatya was arrested on 25th April. Yashwant Rao Holkar had not declared his hostility with Daula Rao. However, the widows begged for help from Holkar; so, he was invited at Maheshwar. Mohan Singh reported that the pact was made between Yashwant Rao and the widows. Yashwant Rao helped with two lakhs loan and also promised them to gain the northern domain of Mahadji.[44]

Yashwant Rao sent Chimna Bhau with one lakh cash. But he openly declared himself on the side of Daulat Rao Shinde when he received through Dharam Ram, the diwan of Ambaji Ingle a tempting offer of five lakhs in cash and he turned against the widows.[45] Meanwhile, Yashwant Rao came to know that the widows were planning to seduce all the troops of Yashwant Rao and wrest from him all the territories which he had conquered by force of arm. Although this was nothing more than rumours but Yashwant Rao took it seriously and decided to attack the widows. The act of Yashwant Rao can be condemned on moral grounds, but he was playing a safe game knowing well that his condition was not stronger. On 1st November 1800, Plumet made a surprise attack on the camp of the widows under the instruction of Yashwant Rao. The widows barely escaped, and all the property was captured, even the followers of Yashwant Rao were chagrined at this act of treachery.[46] Yashwant Rao took strict action against the people of Ujjain. Most of the peasants left the villages and the floors of the houses of rich men were dug up in search of buried hoards and military stores were removed from the Ujjain arsenal to the camp of Holkar. Yashwant Rao after in the way of coming back from Ujjain on 15th November 1800, did plunder in the possession of Shinde in the north of Ujjain.[47] This action shows that the Shinde-Holkar alliances were not permanent and they never concealed their dislike for each other. In the same month, on November 27th, Lakhwa Dada marched towards Rajgardh and defeated the brother of Mir Khan on 27th November 1800 in which 300 Rohillas were taken as prisoners, 11artillery, and 300 horses and other

[44] Raghubir Sinh (ed.), *Mohan Singh's Waqai-i-Holkar*, f. 84b., pp. 96-97.
[45] G .S. Sardesai and J. N. Sarkar (ed.), *Poona Residency Correspondence*, Vol. IX, p. 5.
[46] Grant Duff, *History of Maharattas*, Vol. II, Longman, London, 1826, p. 196.
[47] Raghubir Sinh (ed.), *Mohan Singh's Waqi-i-Holkar*, f. 89a, p. 102.

items fell in the hands of Lakhwa Dada. As Baji Rao-II, under the pressure of Daulat Rao, invested Kashi Rao Holkar with the robes of the head of the Holkar state, Yashwant Rao suspended hostilities against Lakhwa Dada.[48]

Daulat Rao came to Poona on 25th March 1796 to realize the rupees 25,00,000 out of sum 1,25,00,000 promised by Baji Rao –II for rising him to the Peshwaship.[49] Baji Rao –II requested Daulat Rao to return to Malwa to settle the conflict with Yashwant Rao. He left Poona on 5th December 1800, till this time he had secured from the Peshwa around 47,00,000[50] and started negotiation with Yashwant Rao for compromise. Yashwant Rao was strict on his old demands –the handling over him Khande Rao-II, his recognition as *Diwan* in the Holkar state with full authority to manage the Government, the reimbursement of all money that Daulat Rao had collected from the Holkar state and the restoration of every village ever held by the Holkar family.[51] Daulat Rao was marching fast towards Malwa –covered 140 miles between the Tapti and Narmada within 18 days and reached Burhanpur in the second week of February 1801.[52]

Daulat Rao Shinde was not experienced in military warfare and strategy. He sent different English commanders against Yashwant Rao. Gorge Hessing marched against Yashwant Rao, with five battalions on 2nd May 1801, followed by Lieutenant MacIntyre, Filose, and Captain Gautier with two of southern brigades.[53] George Hessing with six battalions of Shinde arrived at Ujjain on 28th May 1801. There was already a scarcity of food and other resources. Yashwant Rao went back to Indore to get fresh strength, and make a proper plan to attack on Ujjain. 18th July 1801, was the most important day to prove the power of both the parties, Shinde and Holkar. As Mohan Singh writes, "from one side Maharaja camp and from another side Mir. Khan delivered charges and made heroic exertions"[54]. No escape was possible from the long spear of Holkar and none was sought. The sepoys of Hessing fought till the last man was killed.

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[48] J. N. Sarkar, *Fall of the Mughal Empire*, Vol. IV, p. 175.
[49] V. V. Khare, *Aitihasik Lekh Sangraha,* Vol. IX, p. 3733.
[50] Grant Duff, *History of Maharattas*, Vol. II, p. 308.
[51] G.S. Sardesai and J. N. Sarkar (ed.), *Poona Residency Correspondence,* Vol. IX, p. xv.
[52] *Ibid., Vol. VI: Poona Affairs 1797-1801,* pp. 386, 389.
[53] Compton, *European Military Adventurers of Hindustan (1784-1803),* p. 254.
[54] Raghubir Sinh (ed.), *Mohan Singh's Waqi-i-Holkar,* f. 92a, p. 105.

A detailed report sent to Baji Rao-II by the *Kamavisdar* of Kukarmundha gives information about the severity of the battle. The defeat of Hessing was complete and out of six infantry battalions and 3,000 to 35,000 horses on the side of Shinde, 2000 men were reported to be killed. The 12 most important officers who were killed from the side of Shinde were Lt. John Macpherson, John Graham, Lt.Edward Montague, Lt. Doolan, Ensings Haddon, Urquhart, Lt, Lany, and Lt. Meadows. Lt. Humpherstone, Cap. Dupont and Major Deridon.[55]

Yashwant Rao took up the residence in a beautiful palace of Shinde at Ujjain. He started *Nadirshahi Style* of extortion and demanded fifteen lakhs from the residents of Ujjain.[56] He favoured the faqirs but took harsh action against many Brahmans and some women were also molested.[57] But in this open loot of the holy city of Ujjain, Yashwant Rao received little from what his men collected "His Government got less than an eight part of what was levied from the citizens, all the rest consumed by his officers".[58] However, the power of Yashwant Rao in Ujjain was challenged by Sharza Rao. He joined Brownrigg on 1st October, 1801. His army consisted of 14 battalions of Southerland, six battalions of Felose, six battalions of Browings, 25000 cavalry.[59]

Yashwant Rao was not interested in understanding the growing power of Sharza Rao, as Malcolm pointed out that he thought that his light troops were sufficient appear to have underrated his enemy after the battle of Ujjain. The decisive battle fought on 14th October 1801. Bhawani Shankar advised Yashwant Rao just before the war – to leave the family and his camp and baggage to some place of safety and then engage in fighting. Yashwant Rao sent his family to Maheshwar. Next day on 15th October 1801, Yashwant Rao was defeated. All the guns of Yashwant Rao numbering more than 100, his camp and store were captured. According to Malcolm,- the poor show of the infantry of Holkar and the treachery of his artillerymen were the real cause of the victory of Ghatge.[60] Sharza Rao took the possession of the city of Indore by defeating Guja Kumbher and Krishnaji Mahadik. Sharza Rao took barbarous cruelty in the city of Indore. The citizens were ready to pay 15 lakhs, but he was demanding more.

[55] Compton, *European Military Adventurers of Hindustan,* p. 250.
[56] G.S. Sardesai and J. N. Sarkar (ed.), *Poona Residency Correspondence,*Vol.IX, p. 58.
[57] B. B. Thakur, *Holkarshahichya Itihasachin Sadhnen*, Vol. II, p. 36.
[58] J. N. Sarkar, *Fall of the Mughal Empire,* Vol. IV, p. 185.
[59] Ibid., p. 186.
[60] John Malcolm, *Memoirs of Central India,* Vol. I, p. 218.

Malcolm says around five thousand people were killed; even Daulat Rao did not approve this action, on the third day law and order was restored after the intervention of Daulat Rao.[61]

Negotiation and Association of two Houses: Politics of Kin and Peshwa

The reconciliation was felt to be all the more necessary in view of the increasing power of the British territorial expansion. The spirit of unity and sacrifice of material interest amongst the kin of these both houses were needed to avoid the clash, which was missing elements in both the parties. Peshwa Baji Rao- II watched this with considerable interest. In fact, the Peshwa was playing a dubious game particularly after the victory of Yashwant Rao at the battle of Ujjain, Baji Rao-II desired to use him against Shinde. As Plamer also hinted in his letter on 2nd October 1801, "he is now engaged in the treaty with Yashwant Rao to support him against Shinde in his pretention to the succession of late Tukoji Holkar in prejudice to the right of Kashi Rao, in consideration of his relinquishing the possession of his family in Deccan amounting 25 lakhs annual revenue".[62] In order to please Yashwant Rao, Baji Rao-II proposed to Shinde that Khande Rao Holkar –II should be set at liberty. However, the Peshwa changed his attitude when Yashwant Rao lost the battle of Indore. On 29 October 1801, he confiscated once again the whole *saranjam* of the Holkar family on the ground that Kashi Rao helped Yashwant Rao against Shinde.[63]

In a letter which was written to Bharmal Holkar on 17th May, 1802, Yashwant Rao Holkar emphasized the importance of co-operation for the sake of national solidarity and strength of the Maratha Confederacy. The demand made against Shinde lacked self-sacrifice. He demanded that Khade Rao-II who had been kept in the Asirgdh fort since June 1801, should be released; all his jagirs should be restored to him; he should be recognised as the head of the Holkar family and given a part of Shinde territory in the north.[64] Apart from this every village and forts in any part of India that had been a part of Holkar should be granted absolutely parity in respect of territory, income, and

[61] Ibid., p. 219.
[62] G. S. Sardesai and J. N. Sarkar (ed.), *Poona Residency Correspondence, Vol. VI: Poona Affairs 1797-1801*, p. 667.
[63] Raghubir Sinh (ed.), *Poona Residency Correspondence, Vol. X: The Treaty of Bassein and the Anglo- Maratha War in the Deccan, 1802-1804,* p. vii; G. S. Sardesai (ed.), *Selection From Peshwa Daftar*, Vol. XXXXI, p. 33.
[64] *Bengal Secret and political Consultations*, 1 February 1802.

allowances of power and resources by their sovereign, the Peshwa. By this demand, all the agreements that had been made between Mahadji and Tukoji were to be confirmed, which was in reality almost impossible for Daulat Rao Shinde to accept.

Kashi Rao soon understood the politics of Shinde and disappointed from his side, indirectly started thinking about the power of his own family which brought closer to his brother, Yashwant Rao Holkar. Each person in the Holkar family desired this union. Although Yashwant Rao tried to persuade his brother since May 1801 to unite his forces to face the challenges which were posing from Daulat Rao, Kashi Rao believed his intention and promises of his brother.[65] Shinde had written to him, "I am informed from Poona that the Khasgi and *Daulat* of the Holkar state are separate and distinct department. The Mother of Khande Rao Holkar holds authority over Khasgi. Please return the right to proper authorities".[66]

This kind of open help to Kashi Rao was not enough, and at this state, he also realised the impact of kin-conflict in the House of the Holkars. Therefore, he wrote to Yashwant Rao:

> "Conflict among the brothers is the cause of public regret and strengthening the enemies. The tragic end of Malhar was due to his fate. It is now desirable that we should act in concert and do what is agreed upon".[67]

Yashwant Rao replied:

> "You are my elder brother, and I am ready to obey you in every matter. If you agree to it, I do not object. Come to Chauli Maheshwar, and after ending the present war in which I am involved, I shall arrive there".[68]

On 14th August 1801, Kashi Rao Holkar along with Khizir Khan, Wahid Ali Khan[69], Acche Singh, two battalions and four hundred troops moved from Sendhwa to Maheshwar, which can be considered as the most significant step for the unity of kin

[65] G. S. Sardesai and J. N. Sarkar (ed.), *Poona Residency Correspondence,* Vol. IX, letter dated 31st May 1801.
[66] B. B. Thakur, *Holkarshahichya Itihasachin Sadhnen,* Vol. II, p. 22.
[67] Raghubir Sinh (ed.), *Mohan Singh's Waqai-I- Holkar,* f. 95. a, p. 108.
[68] Ibid., p. 108.
[69] A military commander of Yashwant Rao Holkar who was later given the title of 'Nawab'.

in the Houses of the Holkars. Because the level of sacrifices was high with both the sides, it was settled between the brothers that Kashi Rao should occupy the throne while Yashwant Rao, acting as his servant, would conduct the war against Daulat Rao Shinde. (only plan not in reality).[70] As soon as Kashi Rao joined Yashwant Rao, the latter wrote to Bharma Holkar regarding providing a faithful guard. But these loyal guards kept Kashi Rao as a prisoner in Sendhwa–Ghat. Yashwant Rao was also requesting Shinde to establish Kande Rao-II as the lawful head of the House of the Holkars. Very soon he realised that the policy of Yashwant Rao was to reduce him to the position of a dependant prisoner; Kashi Rao fled away to the fort of Sendhwa.[71]

The family members and other people prayed for peace among these two brothers. Yashwant Rao was also busy in finding a new way to be more potent in Malwa and Khandesh. Yashwant Rao and his friend had not been inactive but were grinding themselves up for another trial of strength. He was facing financial problems for maintaining the troops but he told his soldiers that he had no money to pay them, but in future, they would have to live on plunder.[72] He collected 20 lakhs of rupees during three weeks of May and this enabled him to spend his cavalry and significantly increase the strength and efficiency of his European trained infantry under Hardinge, Armstrong, and Vickers.[73]

Holkar domination in Deccan

Holkar move towards the Deccan was the turning point not only for the political history of the entire year of 1802 but also for the test of the power of all the Confederates including the Peshwa. Holkar strictly instructed his soldiers to manage the payment issues and decided that his commander should act separately. His instruction was, if payments were refused and troops opposed, the place should be put to the sword, and the chief at the head of the resistance, utterly ruined and destroyed. Fateh Khan, Samat Khan and Mir Khan were the most important officers in the Deccan campaign.

While going towards the Deccan, Yashwant Rao announced that he was going on a pilgrimage to the temple of Jejuri and that no injunction on his part could induce his

[70] Raghubir Sinh (ed.), *Mohan Singh's Waqai-I- Holkar*, f. 95.a, p. 108.
[71] J. N. Sarkar, *Fall of the Mughal Empire*, Vol. IV, p. 191.
[72] Fraser, *Military Memoirs of Skinner,* Vol. I, p. 197.
[73] Raghubir Sinh (ed.), *Mohan Singh's Waqai-I- Holkar,* f. 106 a, p. 122.

adherents to separates from him.[74] The Peshwa doubted Yashwant Rao, so he asked for help from Daulat Rao and also increased the number of troops to 4000 cavalry and 1000 infantry. A letter of *Gulgule Daftar* on 21st July 1802 says, "Holkar's horsemen are in Ahmadnagar. In *Desh*, all the cities have been devastated, and the Peasant is being subjected to extreme oppression".[75] After this Fateh Singh Mane, marched towards Farha Bagh and on the way, he killed many Arab defenders and looted half of the town. Yashwant Rao also ordered Shahmat Khan to be nearer to Mane given the approach of Sadashiv Bhaskar towards Junnar. Junnar was plunder continuously for a week.[76] The clash between Sadashiv Bhaskar and Holkar took place on 5th October 1802 and continued till 8th October. It gave an open challenge to Shinde and the Peshwa forces with close and sharp contest Yashwant Rao proved his warfare superiority. J. N. Sarkar writes, –

> "It was heart-rending scene of village burnt, women ravished, Brahmans insulted, and temple desecrated. It is indeed impossible to exaggerate the miseries which the people were compelled to endure in these iron times. As the peasant lost the fruit of their labor, they abandoned their fields, and nothing green could be seen standing on the face of the earth".[77]

The tactics of Yashwant Rao created much fear for the Deccan Power particularly at the time when the political situation of Poona was already in a worse condition. As a result, the kin interest proved as more significant than the Maratha Confederacy.

Retaliation of Kin and Civil war of Maharashtra

When Yashwant Rao Holkar was advancing towards the south with ruthless action as it is explained earlier, the political environment of Poona was also not well. The policies of Baji Rao –II with his own kin and other Confederates were even in a worse state. The Peshwa opined about Yashwant Rao: "Holkar is a bad man from his heart; he loves disorder, he hates repose… he must destroy".[78] He also had a negative feeling for Daulat Rao Shinde and considered him as a weak and foolish boy who

[74] Raghubir Sinh (ed.), *Poona Residency Correspondence, Vol. X: The Treaty of Bassein and the Anglo- Maratha War in the Deccan, 1802-1804*, p. 12.
[75] *Gulgule Daftar*, Letter dated 21st July, 1802.
[76] J.N. Sarkar, *Fall of the Mughal Empire*, Vol. IV, p. 195.
[77] Ibid., pp. 214-215.
[78] Raghubir Sinh (ed.), *Poona Residency Correspondence*, Vol. VII, p. 233.

himself was faultless but was ill-advised by others. In this situation of the ill-feeling from both sides, there was a little scope of unity and hope that Yashwant Rao could never be reconciled to Baji Rao –II who had ordered the execution of Vithoji Holkar on 16th April 1801.

Vithoji, the younger brother of Yashwant Rao Holkar, was the most disciplined person and loved member of the Holkar family. The beginning of his career as a wayward, young man had provoked the wrath of the Peshwa by his devastation round Pandharpur.[79] Vithoji was involved in the polity and against Baji Rao-II and he was also a strong follower of Amrit Rao,[80] having a belief that he was saving the Maratha state from the approaching ruin. For this purpose, he had called other sardars who had faith in Vithoji.[81] The anti-Bajirao campaign began in 1799 and continued in the ever-increasing violence up to the end of 1802 when it culminated in the treaty of Bassein. These four-year disturbances and outbreaks, clearly disclosed the world that how at the hand of Bajirao no improvement was possible. Therefore, the Peshwa sent two crucial sardars, Bapu Gokhale and Baloji Kunjar were given particular instruction to catch Vithoji Holkar, and they were successful in arresting him alive.[82] Bapu Gokhale captured Vithoji Holkar alive and brought him in chains before the Peshwa. Baloji Kunjar and other sardars advised the Peshwa to give a barbarous mode of execution for Vithoji to provide a strict message to others. Vithoji cried for life and mercy, and several well-wishers of the Maratha state pleaded for a softer measure. But the Peshwa could not tolerate even the slightest whisper in favour of Vithoji. The latter was given 200 stripes on his body, was tied to the foot of an elephant, dragged about in the palace compound and killed in horrid cruelty.[83] The dead body was exhibited for full twenty-four hours before the funeral rites were allowed to be performed on 16th April 1801.[84]

While Vithoji was dragged under the feet of an elephant at Poona, Yashwant Rao was busy in a deadly struggle with Shinde troops on the Narmada. When this news reached Yashwant Rao Holkar, he was drowned in grief and he said that Vithoji

[79] G. S. Sardesai (ed.), *Selection from Peshwa Daftar,* Vol. XXXXI, p. 30.
[80] G.S. Sardesai, *Marathi Riyasat: Uttar Vibghag*-III, pp. 178-179.
[81] Jivaji Yaswant, Yaswant Rao Ramkrishna, and Krishna Rao Modi. Ibid., p. 179.
[82] G. S. Sardesai, *New History of the Marathas,* Vol. III, p. 366.
[83] B. B. Thakur, *Holkarshahichya Itihasachin Sadhnen,* Vol. II, pp. 32, 34.
[84] G. S. Sardesai, *New History of the Marathas,* Vol. III, p. 367.

deserved the punishment as he had desecrated the sacred place, Pundharpur and assured that he would serve him faithfully and to the best of his ability.[85] Secretly he made preparations to take exacting revenge. However, the death of Vithoji gave sufficient motive to Yashwant Rao to take action against the Peshwa, but still, Yashwant Rao took the best way to maintain loyalty with the Confederacy. Yashwant Rao said, "if you wish to avoid the bloodshed, sent to me at once Baloji Kunjar and Dajiba Deshmukh on your behalf, and Baburao Angre and Nimbaji Bhaskar on behalf of Shinde to negotiate the terms".[86] They were directly involved in the barbarous murder of Vithoji Holkar.

Confiscating the Territorial Power of the Kin of Holkar

Peshwa Baji Rao-II was surrounded by many wrong advisors, who suggested him to underrate the power of Yashwant Rao Holkar. As a result, without thinking about the future consequences, Baji Rao–II confiscated the whole of *Saranjam* of the Holkar family on 29th October 1801 because of the simple reason that Kashi Rao helped Yashwant Rao against Shinde.[87] Dhondo Pant Godbole ordered to carry out the order. Yashwant Rao was ready to protect his family *jagir* which was under Ajab Singh. Yashwant Rao sent Praji Pant to Poona to request Baji Rao-II to call back Dhando Pant and release the *jagir* to Holkar. Praji Pant was not successful in his work and Baji Rao was in doubt that Praji Pant and Amrit Rao had some earlier understanding. Later officer of *Darbar*, known as Gopal Rao, arranged the meeting of Praji Pant with the Peshwa but he was strictly warned not to raise any issue of Holkar.[88] The only option for Holkar after this meeting was war with the Peshwa to acquire earlier territorial power and other *jagirs* which were taken away by the Peshwa intervention.

Yashwant Rao troops moved on in excellent order and broke down everything that came in their way. Baji Rao-II asked them not to advance towards the south and promised to find some alternative means of settlement. Through this technique, the Peshwa simply wanted to get more time in his hand to acquire the military power to control the strength of Yashwant Rao. Baji Rao–II asked Yashwant Rao to adopt a

[85] G. S. Sardesai (ed.), *Selection from Peshwa Daftar,* Vol. XXXI, 30.
[86] S. N. Qanungo, *Jashwant Rao Holkar: The Golden Rogue,* p. 96.
[87] Raghubir Sinh (ed.), *Poona Residency Correspondence, Vol. X: The Treaty of Bassein and the Anglo- Maratha War in the Deccan, 1802-1804,* p. vii.
[88] V. V. Khare, *Aitihasik Lekh Sangraha,* Vol. XIII, p. 7413.

peaceful course and return to Malwa, but he did not take any decision about the *jagirs* and Sardars who were responsible for the killing of Vithoji Holkar.[89] Praji Pant (Prashar) made a strong protest saying, "Here I am sitting at your door begging for justice for four months. Have you till now substantiated a single promise? How can I ask my master to return?"[90] The two Nagpur agents of Bhosle were present at this interview and strongly supported Pranji Pant. In this situation Baji Rao almost made his decision in favour of Holkar, but in the meantime, Baloji Khunjar again changed the mind of the Peshwa not to think anything about Holkar who was the main enemy of Kunjar. Baji Rao then again resumed his earlier decision and began preparations for war with Holkar.

The political situation of Poona was not in favour of Baji Rao–II, keeping this point in mind Yashwant Rao was also playing a double role in maintaining the diplomatic relation with the Poona authority. On the one hand, he had given an open order to his freebooter to avenge the territory of the Peshwa, and on the other hand, he was behaving very humble and respectful, begging for justice from the Peshwa. He was sending presents of elephants and horses but did not desist from making raids in the territory of the Peshwa. Once Yashwant Rao had also sent a message to all sardars that his primary purpose was to pay a visit to the temple of Jejuri, which was an impossible fact to believe by anyone in the south. Yashwant Rao Holkar arrived close to Nasik in July 1802. Most of the troops of Bajji Rao –II was involved in conspiracy and rebellions. The Peshwa felt that he stood entirely alone and friendless in his native country.[91] Baji Rao –II did not have much time to understand the political changes; he assembled all the forces to meet Yashwant Rao and also strengthened the fort of Purandhar as a base to fall back. The Peshwa also kept ready for palanquin bearers and detachments of horses for his speedy departure from Poona in case of danger.

In the months of September and October, the armies of both the parties came face to face to prove their power. Fateh Singh Mane reached up to the Nira River, from here they decided to visit Jejuri (30 miles from Poona in South-East) for the worship of the

[89] *Bengal Secret and Political Consultation*, 1803, 21st February.
[90] G. S. Sardesai, *New History of the Marathas*, Vol. III, p. 370.
[91] Amrit Rao was also disgusted by the policies of Baji Rao–II, so he went to Nasik, where Yashwant Rao and his army were having a secret conversation for action on the Peshwa. V. V. Khare, *Aitihasik Lekh Sangraha,* XIV, p. 6399.

Goddess of the Holkar family. Mane reached near Baramati on 8th October 1802.[92] The commander of the Peshwa, Nana Purandhare also encamped at Jalgaon (7 miles of Baramati) to check Fateh Singh Mane to enter Poona. The Peshwa was confirmed that Holkar would not attack *Zari Patakka.* This was a reason to wait till the 50th fire of Puradare Gun, but once the troops of Holkar started firing, all the commanders of the Peshwa, Purandhare, Ganpat Rao Phanse, Pandoji Khunjar very soon realised that they cannot stop Holkar. Through the excellent charge from the side of Holkar, Phanse was badly injured and other commanders were unable to stand before Mane.[93]

The excellent victory of Fateh Singh Mane at Baramati created extreme panic at Poona. Close pointing out about this, observes, "Amidst the general confusion the Peshwa adheres to his dwelling which is guarded about by 2000 infantry and a party of cavalry. Saddled horses are always ready at the different gate and every circumstance indicates that he is under constant alarm".[94] This incident saw the distraction of the Peshwa administration which gave rise to lawlessness. The Pindari forces and its cruelty created great havoc in Poona. The cultivators cut unripe crops, the revenue collectors tried to squeeze everything from the peasants in the name of arrear. The Resident of Poona wrote to the Governor of Bombay, "the Peshwa was not much master of his own will".[95] At the same time, Baji Rao secretly sent his agent Raghunath Rao to the British Resident to enter into a general defensive alliance with the Company.[96] All the jewels and other precious items were packed and the ladies of his family, including the wife of Chimnaji and the widows of Nana Pharnavis were sent to the hill fort of Sinhgarh. There were hardly any supporters of Bajirao-II at Poona. Even in this situation Baloji Khunjar opposed this course and said, "if you run away, who will oppose the invader?"[97]

However, the small action at Baramati was only a small sign of massive danger for the Poona authority. The one point was clear that until the 23rd of October, Holkar had no desire to cause any personal harm to the Peshwa. A large number of the population

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[92] Raghubir Sinh (ed.), *Poona Residency Correspondence, Vol.X: The Treaty of Bassein and the Anglo- Maratha War in the Deccan, 1802-1804,* p. 28.
[93] Raghubir Sinh (ed.), *Mohan Singh's Waqai-I- Holkar,* f. 106b, p. 122.
[94] Raghubir Sinh (ed.), *Poona Residency Correspondence, Vol. X: The Treaty of Bassein and the Anglo- Maratha War in the Deccan, 1802-1804,* p. 27.
[95] S. N. Qanungo, *Yashwant Rao Holkar,* p. 104.
[96] *Bengal Secret and Political Consultations,* 1803, 21st February.
[97] G.S. Sardesai, *New History of the Marathas,* Vol. III, p. 372.

which suffered at the hands of the Peshwa welcomed the move of Holkar. From Baramati, Yashwant Rao sent a final warning to the Peshwa as:

> "You are the master; I have not the least desire to raise any arm against you. … this is last change that I want to give you for a peaceful settlement. … you must remember I am a loyal servant of yours as Sindia. My dispute is with Sindia only, which I am prepared to settle in my own way. You are playing altogether in Sindia hand and running the state. You have only to act the Master, let me act the servant".[98]

The messenger of the Peshwa brought this reply and begged Kunjar to go and meet Holkar. But Diwan rejected and said, 'we will destroy Holkar in the battlefield.' At last on the day of Diwali on 25th October 1802 Yashwant Rao sent words that he would wait for two hours in the morning, and then act as God would guide him.

Yashwant Rao carried his horse to the mouth of a gun and said to his soldiers, "As for me, I have no intention of surviving this day; if I do not get victory where can I fly?"[99] He received three sword cuts in his arms but continued the fight, as a result very soon Shinde and the Peshwa forces were defeated. Baji Rao-II sat on his elephant near the tank of Ghasirani, which was two hours distance from the battle site. Once he came to know about the weak position of his soldiers, he set the first example of flight to his men. Three out of the four European officers including Dawes, Captain Catts, and Ensign Doglas were killed; Sadashi Rao Bhaskar was killed fighting against Mir Khan.[100] Yashwant Rao became the master of the whole of Shinde's baggage, guns, and store. J. N. Sarkar points out, "the last fruit of the civil war is the loss of national liberty, and Holkar's triumph made the Peshwa an English vassal".[101]

Bajirao –II spent a restless night at Wadegaon, left the place the next day to reach Sinhgarh. He spent a month at Birwadi near Mahad spinning out the negations with the English for their support.[102] It was the biggest tragedy that the last fruit of the

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[98] Ibid., p. 373.
[99] John Malcolm, *Memoirs of Central India,* Vol. I, p. 228.
[100] Raghubir Sinh (ed.), *Poona Residency Correspondence, Vol. X: The Treaty of Bassein and the Anglo- Maratha War in the Deccan, 1802-1804,* p. 33.
[101] J. N. Sarkar, *Fall of the Mughal Empire,* Vol. IV, p. 215.
[102] Raghubir Sinh (ed.), *Poona Residency Correspondence, Vol. X: The Treaty of Bassein and the Anglo- Maratha War in the Deccan, 1802-1804,* p. 35.

greatest achievement of Yashwant Rao Holkar was that it drove the Peshwa into the hands of the English.[103] On 30th October he wrote the following letter to Jonathan Duncan, the Governor of Bombay:-

> "My servant Holkar and his party on intrigue and wrongs against me. Much alarm at their base conduct, I have resolved to seek an alliance with your Honour on condition that should any of these rebels demands my person, it should be positively denied. Nor must your Honour tell me to go. Should this proposition meet with your approbation, you must make provision for my expenses".[104]

Baji Rao-II immediately started his negotiation with the Governor for the British help to regain his position at Poona. The treaty of Bassein came to be finally concluded on the last day of the year 1802. This was the suicidal step by the Peshwa and his only advisor, Baloji Kunjar. In the meantime, as soon as Phanse, Purandhre, and other chiefs at Poona, learned that their master ran away and was having negotiation with the British, they tried their utmost to persuade him to return, conciliate Holkar and with the help of Amritrao work out a fresh scheme for regenerating the administration as the only way of saving the Maratha Confederacy. Although, Yashwant Rao also thought of effecting a revolution in the Maratha Confederacy by abolishing the office of the Peshwa and releasing the Raja of Satara and investing him with the former authority of his house.[105] But Yashwant Rao realised that such a step would not be accepted by other Sardars, so did not have any other option except to persuade Amrit Rao to come to Poona and assume the headship of the Maratha Confederacy.[106]

While the Peshwa, during the last month of 1802, was driven by the circumstances to the British arms, the Maratha capital suffered terribly at the hands of Holkar and his lieutenants. Holkar unleashed a campaign of loots, plunder, and atrocity against the supporters of Shinde and the Peshwa. All the scheming politicians and experienced sardars of the old regime, who were undergoing punishment for conspiracies and

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[103] J. N. Sarkar, *Fall of the Mughal Empire*, Vol. IV, p. 215.
[104] G. S. Sardesai, *New History of the Marathas*, Vol. III, p. 379.
[105] Letter from Close to the Governor General, October 30, 1802, Raghubir Sinh (ed.), *Poona Residency Correspondence, Vol. X: The Treaty of Bassein and the Anglo- Maratha War in the Deccan, 1802-1804*, p. 35.
[106] Martin, *Wellesley's Despatches,* Vol. III, p. 5

revolt against the head of the state, were set at large.[107] Amrit Rao, who was received at Poona with great celebration on 7 November 1802, immediately assumed the charge of the Government. All the partisans of the Peshwa were immediately removed from their posts and thrown into confinement.[108]

As Close wrote to Governor General on 16 November 1802, "Amrit Rao still holds out, that the Peshwa will be induced to return to his capital and recommends that nothing should be done at Present towards affecting a revolution".[109] During this interval, Yashwant Rao was also meditating a bold plan for obtaining the possession of the person of the Peshwa. According to Baswan Lal, Amrit Rao was requested by Yashwant Rao to pay two crores of rupees in cash for affecting a revolution favourable to him. It was agreed upon that one crore rupees were to be collected from Poona, and the remainder, Amrit Rao promised to pay on Baji Rao–II's being driven out of Poona or brought to submit in person".[110]

Baji Rao arrived at Bassein on 16th December; the process of intricate negotiation continued between the English and Baji Rao. The moment was severe and urgent; the British were free to make whatever the arrangement they thought for restoring the law and order at Poona. This threat had the desired effect and Baji Rao signed the treaty with the greatest trepidation and reluctance. Some of the primary provisions of the deal were:

1. The two contestant parties agreed that the friends and the enemies of the one should be treated like the friend and enemy of the other.
2. The British should protect the territory of Baji Rao as their own.
3. Forces not less than 600 regular infantry should be permanently stationed.
4. Bajirao should cede to the British, district yielding 26 lakhs of rupees a year.

[107] Y. N. Kelkar, *Aitihasik Sankirn Sahitya,* Vol. II, No. 15, p. 63.
[108] Raghubir Sinh (ed.), *Poona Residency Correspondence, Vol. X: The Treaty of Bassein and the Anglo- Maratha War in the Deccan, 1802-1804,* Nov. 16, 1802, p. 44.
[109] Ibid., p. 48.
[110] Baswan Lal (trans.), *Memoirs of the Puthan Soldiers of Fortune of Nuwab Ameer-ood-doulah Mohummud Ameer Khan,* G. H. Hutttmann, Military Orphan Press, 1832, pp. 176-177.

5. The Peshwa binds himself to engage in no hostilities with other states without previous consultation with the British Government.[111]

Very few treaties in the history of the Maratha confederacy have been the subject of such criticism as the treaty of Bassein. There is no denying the fact that through this treaty, the head of the Maratha Confederacy was brought under the complete control of the Company and later, received the lawful right to take a step for the preservation of the Peshwa authority. The signing of this treaty by the end of 1802 ended all hope of the return of the Peshwa to Poona with his legitimate power. Since all the options and promises of the return of the Peshwa also had been rejected, Yashwant Rao proceeded with a new plan of releasing the widow of Swai Madhav Rao from Raigarh so that she might adopt the son of Amrit Rao.[112] The conduct of Yashwant Rao was very different from other Confederates, during the period of negotiation with different powers. He wrote a letter to Close on 6th January 1803 for bringing different terms for an adjustment with the Peshwa. The following proposals from Yashwant Rao for an adjustment with the Peshwa received on 12th January 1803:[113]

1. Khande Rao –II was to be released together with his relation and department. A *khilat* of investiture was to be given to him, and Kasi Rao was to be delivered up.
2. The country in Hindustan which he had held for a considerable time and was still holding to be deposed of according to the original agreement of a threefold division.
3. In as much as through the evil advice of certain short-sighted people dissension had been excited between both the parties, and had exposed them to mutual loss, it was accordingly proper that the past should not be attended to, and that an adjustment should take place in such a way, as that no retribution should be required for the past.

The Peshwa, on his part, was reluctant to offer any concession to Holkar 'whom he considered being a rebel against the legitimate authority of the sovereign power of the

[111] This agreement was signed by Col. Close and Bajirao on 31st December 1802 and rectified by the Governor General on 18th March 1803. G. S. Sardesai, *New History of the Marathas,* Vol. III, p. 384.
[112] S. N. Qanungo, *Jashwant Rao Holkar*, p. 128.
[113] Raghubir Sinh (ed.), *Poona Residency Correspondence, Vol. X: The Treaty of Bassein and the Anglo- Maratha War in the Deccan, 1802-1804,* Vol. X, p. 62.

Maratha empire.'[114] Baji Rao also warned Amrit Rao on 12th January 1803, "Yashwant Rao is a rank rascal, you must desert his company and come to me at once. Don't offer any excuse'.[115] Having such kind of feeling towards Holkar, the Peshwa sent a reply to Yashwant Rao for his demands as:

1. The Peshwa possessed full ground for large demands against Holkar for having entered his territories and laid them waste without mercy or distinction. Hence, the payment of one crore rupees to Holkar should not arise.
2. Kashi Rao, being the eldest son of Tukoji Holkar, had been nominated by his father as his heir. The *khilat* of investiture from the Poona government had been presented to him during the life of his father. As the conduct of Kashi Rao had at all times been good, there existed no guard for depriving him of his inheritance.
3. Khande Rao–II would probably be adopted by Kashi Rao who had no children. He would, therefore, in the course of time be put in a position so that he might inherit all the possession of his ancestors.[116]

It is essential to understand how the defensive alliances of Baji Rao –II with the English, created a new phase in defining the power for the kin of the Holkars. The family and kinship politics of the House of the Holkars became the only tool for the new settlement of power with Poona and other Confederates.

In regards to the demands of Holkar of the Peshwa, they seemed to bear firmly against Shinde, and to be entirely destructive of the pretension of Kashi Rao Holkar, who had always been acknowledged and patronized, both by Shinde and the Peshwa, as the head of the Holkar family and that adverting to these circumstances, to reconcile Shinde to the general defensive alliances, and at the same time require him to make concessions to Yashwant Rao Holkar, might be attended with difficulties.[117]

Concerning the proceeding of Yashwant Rao Holkar, initially his views were to reform the government of Poona, by making the pageant of the Peshwa, placing Amrit Rao in full authority as his Dewan, and proceeding for himself (Yashwant Rao) the

[114] Martin, *Wellesley's Despatches*, Vol. III, p.76.
[115] G. S. Sardesai, *New History of Marathas*, Vol. III, p. 385.
[116] Raghubir Sinh (ed.), *Poona Residency Correspondence, Vol. X: The Treaty of Bassein and the Anglo- Maratha War in the Deccan, 1802-1804*, p. 74.
[117] Ibid., p. 66.

command of the forces with *Zari Pataka*. And by these settlements, he had convinced that he would be able to recover the whole of the Holkar possession and assert the claim of the Poona state. But this plan failed, because of different reasons, mainly due to destructive politics of the kinship of different Confederates. Yashwant Rao Holkar wanted that Chhatrapati Raja of Satara should give the robes of investiture to Vinayak Rao, for which he wished to march towards Satara. Holkar who was still recovering his earlier cut in his body felt ill but his Lieutenant, Fateh Singh Mane went to Satara in December.[118] Raja first refused but later gave the robes of investiture on 22nd December 1802.[119] Then there was an adoption ceremony without which the installation could not take place. It was proposed to give Vinayak Rao in adoption to Yashoda Bai and to rename him as Balaji Madhav Rao. But the forces which were sent to bring Yashoda Bai from Raigadh failed, and on 5th January 1803, the plan of Vinayak Rao installation was abandoned.[120] After this unsuccessful plan of change of power at Poona, Yashwant Rao Holkar was told by the English that no harm would be done to him if he would not interfere with the British arrangements for the restoration of the Peshwa. Yashwant Rao also thought that it was not possible to change the Peshwas without co-operation of Shinde and Bhosle, particularly at this time when the financial position of Holkar was even in worse condition. In this situation, Yashwant Rao decided to move from Poona. On 25th February 1803, he left Poona.[121]

Major General Wellesley played a vital role in the restoration of the Peshwa. Baji Rao–II reached near Poona on 7th May, and 13th May was declared as a lucky day by an astrologer. The Peshwa backed by the British and accompanied by Chimnaji Appa and a large number of the Maratha chiefs entered Poona.[122] As soon as Baji Rao –II secured his position at Poona, the next major challenge before Arthur Wellesley was to deal with the settlement of Amrit Rao. It was urgent to dissuade him at the earliest from joining a Maratha coalition against the British.[123] In the meantime, the vakil of Amrit Rao (after Poona stayed for some time in Bokhare) visited Wellesley on 15th

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[118] V. V. Khare, *Aitihasik Lekh Sangraha,* Vol. XIV, p. 6525.
[119] J. L. Mehta, *Advanced Study in the History of Modern India* 1707-1813, Sterling Publication, New Delhi, 2005,, p. 618.
[120] V. V. Khare, *Aitihasik Lekh Sangraha,* Vol. X, p xiv.
[121] Pratunacandra Gupta, *Baji Rao –II and East India Company,* Allied Publisher, Bombay, 1964, p. 47.
[122] V. V. Khare, *Aitihasik Lekh Sangraha,* XIV, p. 7675; Forest, *Selection from State Papers,* p. 596.
[123] Gurwood, *Wellington's Despatches,*Vol. I, p. 546.

June and said that his master had received authentic information that Yashwant Rao Holkar had been asked by the Peshwa to seize Amrit Rao, as the latter was in league with the English.[124] Baji Rao–II was also ready to offer the territories of his brother with four lakhs of rupees per annum if he continued to obey the government. On 14th August 1803, a treaty was made with the vakil of Amrit Rao, and it was decided that Amrit Rao and Vinayak Rao would receive seven lakhs of rupees per annum. Later it was increased to eight lakhs, and the Governor General confirmed a treaty with Arthur Wellesley in council in January 1804.[125] This cooperative behaviour of Amrit Rao of accepting permanent provisions from the British Government made him the first traitor to the Maratha State as pointed out by G. S. Sardesai. In fact, G. S. Sardesai[126] was wrong to judge him as the first traitor because Baji Rao-II must be considered as the first traitor and responsible for bringing this situation at Poona not only by giving the open power to the British but also by providing a colossal opportunity to resolve the kin conflict in the family of the Peshwa.

Coalition and Kinship Polity, 1802-1803 C. E.

At the time of restoration of Baji Rao–II at Poona, Yashwant Rao Holkar went to Chandor for revenue collection. He also went to Kuprel and Talhuda and collected 40,000 rupees and marched towards Awan. At Awan Yashwant Rao received a letter from Daulat Rao Shinde 'begging for peace'[127] as he wrote, "if we persist in maintaining our formal mutual attitude, it will only cause our prosperity. It is therefore proper that we should be inclined to friendliness and never act contrary to each other's advice and directions".[128] Baswan Lal informs us that Shinde and Bhosle also sent a pandit to Yashwant Rao who told him, "every true Maratha uniting in heart and hand, and in word and deed ought to endeavor to drive the English out of the country."[129]

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[124] Raghubir Sinh (ed.), *Poona Residency Correspondence, Vol. X: The Treaty of Bassein and the Anglo- Maratha War in the Deccan, 1802-1804,* p. 110.
[125] G.S. Sardesai (ed.), *Poona Residency Correspondence, Vol. VI: Poona Affairs*: 1801-1810, p. 194.
[126] G. S. Sardesai, *New History of the Marathas,* Vol. III, p. 392.
[127] Raghubir Singh (ed.), *Mohan Singh's Waqai-i-Holkar,* f. 117a, p. 136.
[128] Ibid., p. 137.
[129] Baswan Lal (trans.), *Memoirs of the Puthan Soldiers of Fortune of Nuwab Ameer-ood-doulah Mohummud Ameer Khan,* G. H. Hutttmann, Military Orphan Press, 1832, p. 190.

Why Daulat Rao suddenly changed his attitude? It seems that it was mainly because of the English pressure to give consent to the terms of the treaty of Bassein. On 12th June Bhonsle (Raghuji Bhonsle-II) and Shinde had a formal meeting on this issue and sent the final report to Collins on 28th that he and Bhosle were not in a position to come to a final decision unless a full copy of the treaty of Bassein was received.[130] Collins was persistently compelling Shinde to accept the treaty of Bassein. In this situation, he sought the help from Bhosle for having a formal friendly understanding with Holkar, but this was almost impossible because the differences between Holkar and Shinde were so acute that instead of coming together to save the Confederacy they brought their kin interest for alliances with any power.

During June and July 1803, Daulat Rao Shinde and Raghunji Bhosle made a successful appeal to most of the powerful Maratha chiefs due to which Patwardhan, Rastias, and the Vinchukar *jagirdars* refused to work under the Brtish protection.[131] Shinde also advised Gosai Himmat Bahadur and Gani Beg in Bundelkhand to prepare for war against the British. In this political situation, Holkar was alone, and none of the other Confederates knew how to convince him to join the common cause against the British, even in that stage his political policies were surrounded with the issues of the kinship of the House of the Holkars. Having understood the strategic situation, Yashwant Rao was also willing to talk with Daulat Rao Shinde and Bhosle. It was reported by one of the officers of Holkar that "Maharaja Daulat Rao Shinde is preparing for a war against the English, and has written to me offering apologies for the past and begging for peace and alliances. It is, therefore, our most pressing duty to become his partner".[132] Yashwant Rao Holkar replied,

> "I have clearly understood the words that you have written about strengthening the foundations of our friendship. I do now as before, always desire to maintain alliances and concert with you. But my heart is anxious to meet my nephew Khande Rao (The posthumous son of his brother Malhar Rao –II) and other relatives".[133]

[130] Owen, *A Selection of Wellesley Despatches*, pp. 333-336.
[131] V. V. Khare, *Aitihasik Lekh Sangraha,* XIV, p. 6650.
[132] Raghubir Sinh (ed.), *Mohan Singh's Waqai-i-Holkar,* f. 118a, p. 137.
[133] Ibid., f. 117b, p. 136.

After that, Yashwant Rao made specific demands from Daulat Rao. He sent Khande Rao Mane to Shinde and Bhosle with the following four demands:[134]

1. Khande Rao –II and his mother, who were prisoners in Asirgarh, were to be released.
2. All territories belonging to the Holkar families were to be restored.
3. Shinde and Bhosle should choose one part of the field on the day of a battle against the English.
4. All property which had been seized when Yashwant Rao was confined at Nagpur should be restored to him.

However, out of these four demands, the first one, the matter related to his kin was most important, but these demands he made at the most inappropriate time when the power of the Maratha Confederacy was under the threat of the British. Yashwant Rao Holkar also added some new demands, such as Kashi Rao Holkar was to be handed over to Yashwant Rao and whatever documents Daulat Rao might have taken from him must be returned and in the time of Tukoji Holkar and Ranoji Shinde, a partition had been made of annual tribute paid by the Rajas, this partition was to be enforced, and the affairs of Delhi were to be conducted by Shinde and Holkar both with equal division of amount of revenue.[135]

Daulat Rao Shinde had understood that the relatives of Holkar are more important than the saving of the Confederacy. Therefore, Daulat Rao Shinde agreed to hand over Khande Rao-II, Kashi Rao and their other relatives and followers to Yashwant Rao and even secure for Khande Rao the *khilat* of investiture from the Peshwa. He also made very clear that a reference to documents must ascertain the disputed territories. It was apparent that the immediate settlement of specific regions would create more internal dissensions; no hasty step could be taken to resolve this issue.[136] Yashwant Rao received Khande Rao on 10th July where great rejoicing took place, the salute was fired in honour of Khande Rao –II[137] and the minister of Raghuji presented order of all Holkar territory to Yashwant Rao Holkar and requested him not to keep

[134]Baswan Lal (trans.), *Memoirs of the Puthan Soldiers of Fortune of Nuwab Ameer-ood-doulah Mohummud Ameer Khan,* pp. 191-192.
[135] J. N. Sarkar (ed.), *Poona Residency Correspondence: Vol. IX: Daulat Rao Sindhia and North India Affairs,* pp. 321-324.
[136] Ibid., pp. 322- 324.
[137] Raghubir Sinh (ed.), *Mohan Singh's Waqai-i-Holkar,* f. 118a, p. 137.

any enmity towards Kashi Rao Holkar. They also invited them to proceed towards the camp of Shinde and Bhosle to discuss the future state of affairs of the Maratha Confederacy.[138] While this negotiation was going on, at the same time Shinde and Bhosle both were asked to move away from the frontier of the dominion of the Nizam and at once to cross the Narmada. Within a month, Holkar also changed his mind once he received his kin, he too expressed his disappointment in a letter to Bhosle as, "You know how during the last few months I have been begging you for the restoration of the Holkar's territories seized by Shinde. As soon as he satisfied this request, I am ready to join you".[139] From this correspondence, it is clear that his earlier politeness was mainly for the release of Khande Rao –II, and not for unity with the other Confederates. Duff pointed out that most of the Confederates desired that Holkar should join them against the English, but he excluded themselves with an excuse that he would focus on Northern India because most of the Sardars was in the Deccan. Yashwant Rao in his letter on 31st July 1803 made very clear that "Until our horses are set in order, it is no use stand against the foreigner".[140] However, the dream of unity amongst the Confederates was never realised mainly because of the kinship conflict and hunger for power of the Confederates.

Thus, it is clear that the dominant trends of historiography which blamed Baji Rao, Daulat Rao and Sharza Rao for transforming the power of the Confederacy into the hands of the English is neglecting the role of kinship conflict. The personal jealousy of Yashwant Rao with his brothers as well as with the House of the Holkars, the consequences of cruel punishment to kill Vithoji Holkar were the significant causes of the kinship conflict of the Confederates which was ignited by many destructive policies of each of the Confederates and the Peshwa particularly during the last decade of the eighteenth century. The killing of the kin of Holkar, Vithoji at Poona changed the attitude of Yashwant Rao to take a strict step against the Peshwa and Shinde. Although, Yashwant Rao gave one chance to settle the kin issue with the Peshwa with a formal request to the Peshwa to send Baloji Kunjar and Bapu Gokhale who advised to kill the brother of Holkar, Vithoji. The Peshwa could have saved the destruction of the Confederacy only by handing over these two-persons, which he

[138] J. N. Sarkar (ed.), *Poona Residency Correspondence: Vol. IX: Daulat Rao Sindhia and North India Affairs,* p. 325.
[139] Kale and Sardesai (ed.), *Aitihasik Patravabahar,* p. 373.
[140] B. B. Thakkur, *Holkarshahichya Itihasachin Sadhnen,* Vol. II, p. 46.

could not. The situation fell in favour of Yashwant Rao after defeating the Poona forces, the Peshwa was unable to understand the kinship politics of the Confederates and decided to move from Poona.

The decision of Baji Rao-II of leaving Mahad at the end of November 1802 to put himself under the British protection, changed the entire dynamics of the power struggle which was initially amongst Shinde, Holkar, and the Peshwa. It was now transformed into the British-Maratha trial of strength. The Poona administration suddenly cracked for which mainly the Peshwa and his administrative policies were not only the ban for the Maratha Confederacy, but the idea of taking revenge of treasured kin of the Holkars was the most crucial factor to transform the Poona authority into the hands of the British.

CHAPTER-5

Transition from Sovereign Confederates to Princely States: Last Phase of Kin Conflicts in the House of Gaekwad, 1800-1818 C. E.

What was the British strategy to win the support of the Gaekwad family? To what extent the kin politics gave space for the British expansion? How the British made a plan to remove the Arab influences in Baroda; did they mainly focus on curbing the military and financial sources of the Gaekwad state? The answers to these questions can be found in the detailed analysis of the correspondence between the Gaekwads and the British Residents who were planning to achieve all these targets through the close intervention in the kin politics and internal family disputes of the Gaekwads. This chapter shows how the British converted the sovereign domain of the Gaekwads into the British controlled territory through the help of the kin of the Gaekwad family. The first step of the British to curb the power of the Gaekwad House was to change the military strength of the Gaekwads through the introduction of the subsidiary forces and the reduction in the Arab forces. How this strategic plan of the British to change the military and financial structure of the Gaekwads that helped the British to open the intervention in the family affairs of the Gaekwads, are the main focuses of this chapter, which is explained through various correspondences of the British Residents and the family of the Gaekwads. So, this chapter shows the way through which the British created complete domination on the sovereign domain of the Gaekwads.

The treaty of 1802 with the British by the Gaekwads opened a bleak chapter in the history of the sovereign status of the Confederate and the Gaekwads particularly. Raoji and Duncan signed a convention which was ostensibly a means for the security of the dominion and the Gaekwad government.[1] Through this treaty, the Gaekwads accepted certain terms of the British against which the entire Confederates were fighting since the last decades of the eighteenth century. Raoji not only agreed to pay the expenses of the British forces but also took the guaranteed expenditure with 3% additional interest rate. The dual purposes of the Company to provide such timely

[1] C. U. Aitchison, *A Collection of Treaties, Engagements, and Sanads relating to India and Neighbouring Countries,* Vol. VI, Government Printing, Calcutta, 1892, pp. 106-109.

help was first, to reduce the domination of the Arab forces at Baroda and second, to determine the affairs of the Gaekwads at Poona. Finally, the agreement already made by Raoji, that the share of the Gaekwads of the *Chauth* of Surat and Chaurasi pargana was confirmed. Thus, through this way, the Company granted the Gaekwad rulers 'its countenance and protection in all his public concern, respecting in which he was to listen to the advice.' The conclusion of the treaty was soon followed by the signature of Anandrao on 29th July 1802.[2] Immediately after the conclusion of the treaty, the British diplomat, Jonathan Duncan set out to entrench the position of the British in the Baroda state. Maj. Walker was appointed as a Resident at Baroda. On 11th July 1802, he arrived at Baroda. The perfect harmony which existed between Duncan and Maj. Walker facilitated the task of the latter at Baroda.

However, the reduction of the domination of the Arab troops at Baroda was not an easy task, which required urgent steps by Duncan for different reasons because the British knew that the Arab influences at Baroda were sure to pose a severe challenge to the British supremacy. Another reason was the charges of the British subsidies forces were to commence from the day of the reduction of the Arabs *Shihabandi*[3]as the Baroda treasury was not in the position to pay both the military establishment simultaneously. Besides, Duncan planned to make the Gaekwad government more dependent on the British subsidiary forces. Raoji, however, unwilling to take up the task even with the British support due to various reasons such as – the Arab force, though it cost the state treasury 36 lakhs per year, was useful for *mulkgiri* services in Kathiawad and the payment of the Arabs was coming from different creditors, and the Arabs were utterly dependent on them in all financial aspects. Arabs were also posted at strategic forts and were in a position to injure the interest of the relatives of Raoji who held the *mamlat* of the wealthy district of the domain of the Gaekwad.

How the British made a plan to remove Arab influence in Baroda, did they mainly focus on curbing the military and financial sources of the Gaekwad state? The answer

[2] If any evil disposed persons attempts anything unfair or unreasonable against my person, the English government should interfere, *The Gazetteer of the Baroda State*, Vol. I, p. 492.
[3] The term *Sibandi/Shihabandi* was used for the band of soldiers employed in various parts of Gujarat in the eighteenth century. It necessarily denotes the mercenary and temporary nature of employment, there were many such employed but the Arabs in the Gaekwad administration were most important and powerful. Rashmi Batchu, 'The Arab "Sibandi" at Baroda and the British Policy towards them: 1800-1803, *Proceeding of Indian History Congress,* Vol. 68, Part-One (2007), pp. 539-546.

to these questions can be found in detailed analysis of the various correspondences between the Gaekwad and the British, who were planning to achieve all these targets through the close intervention in the kin politics and internal family matters of the Gaekwads. In fact, the only option that the British had to take full control of Baroda was through the gains of the political and diplomatic dominance in the families of different kin of the Gaekwads. To gain control over Gaekwad kin first, the British had to damage the military and financial bases of the Gaekwad family. This was the primary motive of the British Residents of Baroda. This idea of Residents became an urgent step of the British. As a result; Maj. Walker tried to prevail upon the Arab Jamadars and their paymaster to acquiescence in the proposed reduction to one-third of their number. The proposition roused a deep discontentment in the Arab rank and file, as they realised that the British move was aimed at annihilation of their power; so, they defied the order and assumed a threatening attitude in November 1802.

The issue became complicated when Maj. Walker pressurised Anandrao to send an order to the Arab Jahmadars to hand over the charge of Kanhoji and the forts of Baroda to the British subsidiary forces. The Arabs realised their position and tightened the hold on the Gaekwads, allowed Kanhoji to escape from his confinement and threatened to release another vital prisoner, Aba Selukar. After ten days of bombarding the Arabs capitulated, and were ultimately ready to evacuate not only Baroda forts but all the forts they had. On 6th December 1802, information in the measure of progress at Baroda for disbanding the Arab soldiers, was given to Bombay which notified that the terms of the surrender of the Arabs was "fresh overtures were made by the Arabs, which terminated in capitulations, by which they bond themselves to set the Raja at liberty, to evacuate the forts, to avoid all connection with domestic enemies of the Gaekwad government, and quit Gujarat after liquidation of the arrears".[4] By the end of January 1803, the entire amount was paid to the Arab soldiers, and they left to different parts of India. A small section of the Arabs joined Kanhoji under the leadership of Abaud, to take arms against Raoji and the British allies. The British also advanced the loan of 19,67,131 for discharging the arrears of the Arabs and the rest of the amount required was raised from Baroda Banker on the

[4] G. H. Gense and Banaji (ed.), *The Gaikwads of Baroda,* Vol. V: Anandrao Gaikwad 1802-1803, p. 209.

security of the British.[5] Thus, within a year of the British entry in Baroda, the Gaekwad ruler was fleeced of a territory worth Rs. 11,70,000 on the pretext of protecting the Gaekwad territory, all this was done when Gaekwad was suffering from a massive financial crisis.

Apart from this Anandrao also requested for the reduction in various departments, for which first he wrote to the British on 29th July 1802 in the fifth article as, "As it seems impossible that I can retrieve myself or my country from its present embarrassments without reforming and reducing the expenses in every department, I do hereby promise and agree to make the necessary reduction by degree".[6] As a result, the British gave detail order of reduction. The Arab force was to be reduced according to the agreement. The Silahdar and Paga establishment was Rs. 20,00,000 now that after the English troops in Baroda, one–half would be sufficient. Therefore, these expenses would be 10 lakhs. The expenses of fortification were 15 lakhs, reduced to 7.5 lakhs. The charges under the head of modikhana expenses, house expenses, women, swari, charity feasts, and presents was 17 lakhs; it should be reduced to 8 lakhs.[7]

The British domination in the Gaekwad family was increased not only in the matter of state expenditure but, they also got the right of *Bahendari*. After the removal of the Arabs, the Company took over the *Bahendari* obligation which was held by the Arabs.[8] This was one of the essential systems in Gujarat which means that a guarantee afforded for the financial and other commitment made by the party. The Arab Jamadars at Baroda had given their *Bahendari* to the Gaekwad bankers and creditors for a loan extended by a letter to the Gaekwad government. After the Arabs, the British occupied this position and the entire loans raised by the Gaekwad government were on the British *Bahendari.* The Gaekwad soon realized their 'benefactor and protector' proved much more domination in public affairs.

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[5] Ibid., p. 295, says the amount of the arrears paid to the Arabs at 17½. The original plan of was to reduce the Arab forces to 1/3 of its strength and as such arrears were at first calculated at 17.5 lakhs and it was proposed to take loan of 20 lakhs from the Company and bankers, 29th July 1802, p. 156.

[6] Ibid., 29th July 1802, p. 154.

[7] Ibid., No. 03, pp. 156-157.

[8] Bahendari is a Gujarati word which means guarantee. The Company authority was equally resolved to curb the unrestrained influences the bankers exercised on public affairs. This would be achieved by the liquidation of the arrears, the reduction of the Arab forces, the introduction of the minor economies, in the administration and enlistment of local financiers to the English control system. Lakshmi Subramanian, *Indigenous Capital and Imperial Expansion: Bombay, Surat and the West Coast*, Oxford University Press, Delhi, 1996, p. 268.

While the British were engaged with the Arabs, the news flourished that Kanhoji fled from Ranpur, followed by Malhar Rao from Nadiad to join Kanhoji liberation, to fight against the common enemies, Raoji and the English. However, after Kadi war[9], Duncan had kept Malhar Rao free at Nadiad because he was not dominant. In such a situation, the flight of Malhar Rao from Nadiad on 4th December 1802 caused grave anxiety to Raoji and Maj. Walker because of the coincident with the other threat of the British dominance at Baroda such as the Arab dominance and Kanohoji marched towards eastern dominance of Baroda. Malhar Rao, after leaving Nadiad went to Kutch and gathered 10,000 strong forces at Kathiawad in May 1803. Babaji was sent to suppress Malhar Rao, who was ordered by Raoji to suspend Malhar Rao work of collection of tribute and direct his operation against Malhar Rao. Babaji successfully defeated him in some engagements. He was arrested along with his son Khanderao in November 1803 by Babaji.

The Gaekwad government wanted to keep Malhar Rao either at Sankheda or Ranapur. However, the Bombay government insisted on keeping him under the British control. It is interesting to note that the British were anxious to secure the person of Malhar Rao in their hand, with a view to using him as a tool against the Gaekwad government at a proper time. With this purpose the Government of Bombay, after the direction of Governor-General, forced the Gaekwad government to provide Malhar Rao with an annual pension of Rs. 15000.[10] These incidents reflect the crooked diplomacy of the British, which were their primary weapons of vanquishing the Gaekwad House and the Maratha kin during the first decade of the nineteenth century.

[9] On 23rd April 1802, a strong British force under Sir. William Clarke joined Col. Walker. Immediately a final warning was given to Malhar Rao, asking him to fulfill the British demands forthwith. When it failed to produce the desired result, an attack was launched on Kadi. Malhar Rao was not able to resist the heavy force of the British, so, he surrendered unconditionally to British Col. Walker on 3rd May and was taken a captive to Cambay. H. Gense and Banaji (ed.), *The Gaikwads of Baroda,* Vol. V: Anandrao Gaikwad 1802-1803, pp. 350-355.

[10] The politics of pension and allowance was important issue of various Kins, it was changed many time by British to gain political benefit in the family of Gakwad. S. V. Kothekar, *The Gaikwards of Baroda and the East India Company, 1770-1820,* p. 101.



Map: 3 This map draw from the help of Cover Page of Fatesinghrao P. Gaekwad, *Sayajirao of Baroda: Prince and the Man,* Popular Prakashan, Bombay, Reprint, 1997.

Kin as a Tool of British Supremacy: Politics of Pension

The British were eagerly thinking about the main opposition of the Gaekwad kin, and tried to use them against their own family. The simple tactics adopted by Baroda Residents was to support and favour the illegitimate demands of the Gaekwad kin who were not happy with the policy of Anandrao. The first and most important was Malhar Rao. Once Malhar Rao was brought to Bombay, Duncan started pampering him to keep him contented at Bombay and make him loyal to the British.

The position of Malhar Rao and power were also used to create larger conflict for the power and status of the post of Minister in the Gaekwad administration. The conspiracy against Malharao was the direct result of the Ministerial supremacy of Raoji Appaji. The fall of Kadi and the unconditional surrender of Malhar Rao gave greater power and space to the Baroda Minister.[11] Nevertheless, the early action of the British against Malhar Rao could not satisfy the dream of Minister. He was bent on bringing to book those who had sided against him during the ministerial faction fight. Malhar Rao for all practical purposes was a state prisoner in the Rampur fort; Ganpat Rao, a petty chieftain, whose territorial domains, consisted of a small fortress town, called Sankheda. Raoji Appa took arms against him because he was not ready to surrender unconditionally. Ganpat Rao had sought safety in flight; Kanhoji Rao was a prisoner in the Rampur fort; and other members of the Gaekwad family; inimical to the Baroda Minister, were likewise refugees in unknown territories. For the diwanship had been made hereditary in his family, his other relatives were provided for, and the Company had pledged to protect the proprietary right and political claims of Raoji Appaji and his descendants. So, "Raoji Appa was the virtual ruler of the country."[12] With this step, the British were almost successful in their plan of creating more conflicts among the kin of the Gaekwads.

In 1805, the night sentries watching Malhar Rao was removed, and some personal space was given. The Bombay government not only allowed him an extra expenditure at the cost of the Gaekwad government but also blatantly pressed the Gaekwads to increase the pension of Malhar Rao to Rs 35000. Malhar Rao, meanwhile, appealed to

[11] G. H. Gense and Banaji (ed.), *The Gaikwads of Baroda,* Vol. V: Anandrao Gaikwad 1802-1803, p. vii.
[12] Ibid., p. vii.

the King of England, the Court of Director, and the Peshwa to increase his pension. In a letter Alexander Walker on 20th June 1807 to the Governor says, –

> "An extension for the provision for Malhar Rao formed no part of the project for the reductions in the expanses of the Gaekwad State (No.03). ……While, however I state general circumstances of the Gaekwad administration as they have been communicated to me in different conferences, yet I have also the honor to intimate their compliance with the measure, which the liberality of the British Government has suggested for the promotion of the comfort of Malhar Rao, and consistency with their security and reliability to bestow.....according to the principles this Government had consented to allot 50,000 Rupees per annum from the commencement of the present Mrigsal or 1st June for the expenses of Malhar Rao and his family".[13]

Although these allowances may be appropriate from the commencement from June 1807, yet there were certain circumstances which included the politics of territorial transfer among the other kin of the Gaekwads. Not only this, the British purposefully created confusion in among the kin of Malhar Rao Holkar, because it was not mentioned, that his brother, who was not actively engaged in politics, would get the share in this allowance or not. This became the issue at the Baroda court, and the Alexander Walker wrote to Francis Warden:-

> "It is now some time since Devirao Gaekwad, the brother of Malhar Rao, has been at Baroda; and my attention has been directed to obtain a settlement for him and his brother Apparao Gaekwad. …..i have been able to obtain for each of them a provision of Rs. 100 per month. When this Government made an assignment of Malhar Rao, it was intended to cover the expenses of himself and his connection. If therefore the allowances, purposed to be given to Devi Rao and Appa Rao, could be increased from this fund to the amount of 200 rupees each per month, it would be sufficient to cover the expenses, and provide them with the means of livelihood, by which the benevolent

[13] G. H. Gense and Banaji (ed.), *The Gaikwads of Baroda*, Vol. VIII, 1809-1814, Letter from Alexander Walker to the Governor dated on 20th June 1807, pp. 37-38.

> intention of the Hon'ble the Governor-in-council, in respect to providing for the members of the Gaekwad family, will be realized"[14]

However, the British in Bombay resolution, Maj. Walker was advised not to give new fund to Malhar Rao brothers but deduct Rs. 200 from Malhar Rao and his family allowances 4800 (5000-200), and the fund in question may accordingly be debited to the amount by the Resident at Baroda.[15] The British were also involved in the financial matter of other Gaekwad kin, who were not a part of the Baroda administration but they had been playing a very crucial role in passing out the family information to the British. Mukundrao Gaekwad, son of Govindrao by a mistress and Murrarao, another son by a different mother, were also invited to Baroda, after Maj. Walker requested Kanhoji. The British assigned them Rs.5000 and Rs. 4000 respectively. The only Gaekwd kin, who was not in touch with the British, and was living far away from his family, was Ganpat Rao, the *qiledar* of Sankheda. Ganpat Rao was in a state of idiotism and living under the protection of his relative at Dhar. His wife and family, however, were supported at Baroda at the expenses of the Baroda government.

Duncan was planning to restore the *jagir* of Kadi to the son of Malhar Rao, Khanderao. This was considered desirable by Duncan due to the 'utility in Khanderao's branch', which was a collateral branch of ruling Gaekwad family, hence could be used as a check on the untried disposition of Fatesing.[16] The Gaekwad government expressed a desire to receive Malhar Rao and his son in Baroda, with a purpose to keep vigilance on Malhar Rao to destroy the British game of kin politics to use them at the appropriate time. However, before the matter could be finalised, Khanderao died on 9 September 1812. After his death, the pension and allowance were again changed. Fatesing remarked that there were other members of the family of Malhar Rao whom he felt bound in duty to support. The following table shows the statement of those persons of the family of Malhar Rao Gaekwad and Himat Bahadur, earlier who were not getting any maintenance either from the Gaekwads or the British were living in a state of indigence. It also shows the details of how much they proposed, how much they approved, and what exactly they finally got.

[14] Ibid., 14th October 1808, Letter from Alexander Walker to Francis Warden, p. 46.
[15] Ibid., 14th October 1808, Bombay Resolution, p. 47.
[16] Ibid. p., 43.

Table-1 Amount of Pension and Allowance[17]

Name of the family member	Amount proposed	Bombay minute proposed on 11th December 1812	Amount
The widow and daughter of late Himat Rao Gaekwad, a brother of Malhar Rao	Rs. 150	Dispatch order of the Resident of Baroda – pension proposed to be given to person belonging to the family of Malhar Rao Gaekwad, which amounted to Rs. 550 rupees per month	Rs. 550x12=6600
Gopika Bai, widow of late Malhar Rao Gaekwad	Rs 100	Governor –in council proposed a further pension of Rs. 200 per month to settle the widow of Khanderao; or Rs 250 if she preferred remaining to stay in Bombay	Rs. 250x12=3000
The widow of TrimbakRao and Prataprao, was living in indigence in the Cutch country	Rs. 200		
Ramaji Gaekwad, a chela of late Khanderao Gaekwad	Rs 100		
Total	550	Total	9600

[17] Ibid. p., 51.

Table -2 Division of Pension in the Families of Malhar Rao and Khanderao [18]

The total amount paid as a pension to the kin of the Gaekwads to settle the British domination in Baroda and Statement of allowance to Malhar Rao and his relations, after the death of Khanderao Gaekwad:

Malhar Rao at 1250x12= 15000 Allowance of Husanbhai =2400	Rs. 17400
Widow of late Khanderao	Rs.3000
Devirao and Apprao Rs. 300x12=3600	Rs. 3600
Ganpat Rao at Rs. 100x12=1200	Rs 1200
Allowance to the person of Malhar Rao family dated 11 December 1812 Rs. 550x12=6600	Rs 6600
Total	31,800
Saving from Rs. 50,000 the original pension to Khanderao and Malhar Rao	Rs. 50,000 -31,800= 18,200

The caste of the widows was also essential to fix the amount of the pension. The Resident proposed that the widows of Khanderao should get more pensions because she belonged to the higher caste. However, the politics of caste could not be used as a tool to gain control on the kins of the Gaekwads; it was mainly the pension and allowances through which the British won the support of the non-political members of the Gaekwad family. After five years in 1819, the British Government again made a financial demand on the Gaekwad rulers to pay off other expenses incurred by Malhar Rao. This time Sayaji Gaekwad, the in-charge of the administration, plainly told them that the Gaekwad government could not hold themselves responsible for the extra amount expended by Malhar Rao. It seems that the British understood that their political agenda on the name of Malhar Rao would not work for an extended period.

Kanhoji (illegitimate brother of Anand Rao) started a military uprising against the British. He fled from Ranpur fort in November 1802 and had taken shelter with the chief of Rajpila, collected a large number of the Kolis and Bhils. It was apprehended

[18] Ibid., James R. Carnec Letter to Francis Warden on 9th March 1813, p. 52.

that he would become a rallying point for all the disaffected, anti-British members of the Gaekwad family and that Shinde and Holkar would use him to dislodge the British from the Maratha Confederacy. Rumors were also spread that Amritrao (an elder brother of the Peshwa) was encouraging and upholding the cause of Kanhoji against the British.[19]

The British officers were in immediate action. Lt. Governor asked to forbid the partisans of Kanhoji residing in Surat. Maj. Holmes dispatched to join the Gaekwad contingent led by Sitaram against Kanhoji. Maj Holmes succeeded in driving away Kanhoji from the Gaekwad border, and later took refuge in the Shinde territory in Ujjain. Kanhoji was getting help from the Arab Jamadar, Abdul and Shivram Gardi[20] who earlier worked under the Gaekwad administration. With all these support Kanhoji decided to end the British domination. In this situation, the British decision of war against Daulat Rao came as a blessing because Dalat Rao was the most potent enemy of the British. The next year 1804, Kanhoji was joined by Murrarao and Mukundrao Gaekwad, the illegitimate brother of Anandrao and also by Balchand, the officers of the Holkars. At this time Kanhoji refused to accept the peace terms offered by Maj. Walker.

Despite all these support, Kanhoji, like Malhar Rao was not able to give a challenge to the British power. As a result, the large number of followers deserted him within two years. He also received help from Holkar, but Holkar too signed a peace treaty with the British. Ultimately, under the direction of Maj. Walker a peace treaty was prepared to impose on Kanhoji, and after a prolonged discussion a settlement was reached in 1808. As a result, Kanhoji was made to renounce all the claims to the high post in the Baroda administration, and he agreed to receive an annual amount of Rs.

[19] G. H. Gense and Banaji (ed.), *The Gaikwads of Baroda*, Vol. V: Anandrao Gaikwad 1802-1803, 6th January 1803, p. 90.

[20] C. V. Joshi, 'Life and Fortunes of Sevaram Jagadeesh' in *Indian Historical Records Commission*, Vol. XVIII, January 1942, pp. 316-320. Shivram Gardi- His full name was Shivram Jagdeesh Kumedam. He was a Brahmin of the Sultanpur pargana of Awadh. He was appointed in the Gaekwad service after the recommendation of the Peshwa. From 1794-1800 he ably discharged the task of Mulkgiri in Kathiawad. Jonathan Duncan describes him as 'native of Benaras formerly said to have been English services."

40,0000 under the guarantee of the Company and to reside at Padram, a place 12 miles west of Baroda.[21]

On 28th April 1808, a memorandum between Anandrao and Kanhoji Rao Gaekwad was signed which said- "Article 1: The Gaekwad Sarkar shall give to Kanhiji Rao, yearly provision consistent with his character. Kanhoji Rao has no claim on the state of Gaekwad, so long as it is Senakhaskhel, or Fatesing Rao or Sayaji Rao, or their respective heirs, surviving through the favor of God".[22] Thus, most determined and intractable of the opponents of the British at Baroda were settled. Therefore, the whole course of the struggle of Kanhoji and the settlement process of the aggressive kins of the Gaekwads, entirely planned by the Baroda Residents in consultation with the Bombay government, the kin of the Gaekwads were forced to put the seal on the British plan. In the case of Kanhoji, the British acted in conformity with their usual crooked diplomacy. They branded him as the rebel against Anandrao and the Gaekwad state, which in fact he was not, and on the pretext of protecting Gaekwad against him, they fought against him and brought him into submission. Thus, the able Gaekwad prince, whom British well knew to be anti –British, was eliminated from the Baroda political power. The British not only directly interfered in the family of the Gaekwads but also provoked different small chieftains to revolt against the inherent power. North Eastern part of Gujarat offered an excellent opportunity for the British, as the chiefs of Baria, Lunawada, Dungarpur, and Bawara requested the Company's agent to protect them from Kanhoj. A deputy, Mahadaji Konddeo was sent in 1803 by Maj Walker to meet those chiefs and assured them the support of the Company if they revolted against Kanhoji. Their acceptance of the British support was significant for the political benefit to the British. The territory of the Gaekwad was also disturbed by the penetration of Pindaris of Holkar and Shinde. It was also rumoured that at this time Dault Rao also wanted to acquire the lease of Ahmadabad suba of the Peshwa,[23] then held by Gaekwad, transferred in his name. Due to this news, Bombay Governor, the Poona Resident, and Governor General started exerting diplomatic pressure on Daulat Rao, warning him not to start hostilities against the Gaekwad government.

[21] G. H. Gense and Banaji (ed.), *The Gaikwads of Baroda,* Vol. VIII, 12 May 1808, Letter from Bombay to Gilbert Lord Minto, p. 92.
[22] Ibid., 1809-1814, 30 April 1808, Letter from Alexander Walker to Jonathan Duncan, p. 90.
[23] G. H. Gense and Banaji (ed.), *The Gaikwads of Baroda,* Vol. V: Anandrao Gaikwad 1802-1803, 10th August 1802, p. 297.

Debt and Diwanship: Question of Prosperity and Kinship Polity

The financial situations of the Gaekwads were at a low ebb in 1802 and continued to be so in the following coming three years. During the period of 1802-03 the expenditure of the Gaekwad government, as per the amount submitted to the Resident, exceeded the income by an amount about Rs. 23 to Rs. 26 lakhs. The yearly deficit was met by raising loans at the high rate of interest ranging between 9 to 12% and as per the calculation of Maj. Walker practically all the fertile districts were mortgaged to creditors to clear the debts.[24] Maj. Walker said to clear off the debt of Gaekwad earliest. He considered that it was advisable to clear off the claims of Daulat Rao.[25] The solution finally evolved was that the Company should receive the installment of the war expenses from the Gaekwad Government through the banker, Prabhudas as scheduled, but the payment of the second installment due in January 1803, should be put off by one year and this amount should be utilized to clear off the debt of Daulat Rao. As a security of its payment, Maj. Walker obtained from Raoji a general assignment of the revenue of the entire Gaekwad domain.

> "The general aid and support of the Government of Raja Anandrao, now becoming near and intimate connection and ally of the British power in India; in marked consideration to which and as the strongest manifestation of the wish we very sincerely entertain to afford as well as to the Raja and Raoji Appaji, his minister, the most effective proof of our goodwill, we have acquiesced, under the pledge offered to the Resident by Raoba of the amplest security of the Hon'ble Company on the entire revenue of the Gaekwad State, to postpone the demand of the on account of the second installment of the war expenses, to whatever sum it may amount, from 5th January 1803; interest being allowed for such an extended period at the rate of 9% per annum".[26]

The financial adjustment of Shinde could not solve the British problems; the Peshwa also became extremely distressed by the news of Gaekwad treaty with the Company. The Peshwa was fully aware of the British scheme of establishing their influences

[24] S. V. Kothekar, *The Gaikwads of Baroda and the East India Company 1770-1820,* p. 123.
[25] G. H. Gense and Banaji (ed.), *The Gaikwads of Baroda,* Vol. V: Anandrao Gaikwad 1802-1803, 8th October 1802, p. 334.
[26]Ibid., 8th October 1802, Letters of Jonathan Duncan to the Marquis of Wellesley, p.336.

over the Gaekwad government. Therefore, he wrote many times to Anandrao and Raoji, pressing them for early payment of the huge amount and also invited Raoji to Poona for the financial settlement. Maj. Walker was not happy with the plan of the Peshwa of the settlement of revenue share of Poona and Baroda. This situation gave another opportunity to the British to exploit the kinship power and diplomatic bonds of the Peshwa and the Gaekwads. In this case, the British were not only busy in creating conflicts amongst the kin of the Gaekwads, but also they were determined to the policy of isolating the Gaekwads from the Peshwa. Walker opposed Raoji to visit Poona. At the end of 1802, the treaty of subsidiary alliances was imposed on the Peshwa, which reduced the supreme head of the Maratha state to the helpless rulers with increasing domination in the entire Maratha Confederacy. This was happening despite the assurance of Governor General that treaty of Bassein would not disturb the constitutional form of the Maratha state.[27] In reality, it snapped off all direct relation between the Peshwa and the Gaekwads to do a direct intervention in the family of the kin of the Gaekwads.

Raoji Appaji who was the most important mediator of the British in the family of the Gaekwads died on 17th July 1803. His 20 years of political life in the Baroda administration had commenced with great promises, but ended in ignominy. As a confidant of Nana Phadnis sent to assist Govind Rao Gaekwad, he had most extensive power. It had whetted his ambition and made his attitude overbearing towards others. After the death of Govind Rao, the overpowering ambition of Raoji warped his judgment and goaded him to contend with Kanhoji for ministerial power and call for the British aid to maintain the Diwanship and the reign of administration in his hands. He tried to maintain the Diwanship in his family with the help of the British, sacrificing the interest of his master, but his selfish and secret dealing with the British did not pay his family for long. Within three years of his death, his benefactor violated their pledge and divested his son Sitaram, of his legitimate authority.

Raoji did not have any children, he had decided to adopt either of his two nephews, namely Sitaram and Sakharam. However, this adoption option was decided by Maj

[27] C. U. Aitchison, *A Collection of Treaties, Engagement and Sanads relating to India and Neighbouring Countries*, Vol. VI, pp. 52-59.

Walker and Gangadhar Shashtri who recommended the name of the elder brother, Sitaram.[28]

The reason for favouring Sitaram was, he was better qualified, and he was inclined towards the British. The ritual for the adoption of Sitaram took place on 22nd May 1803 and Sitaram was raised to the office of Diwan.[29] Alexander Walker wrote to Jonathan Duncan:

> "I have the pleasure to inform you, Hon'ble Sir, that this ceremony (adoption) took place yesterday in the presence of Raja and full Darbar. The commanding officers, the gentlemen of the residency and several other officers attended on this occasion. It was also honored by a salute, and I made suitable presents in satisfaction of an event which provide for the tranquilities of this country and will, I have no doubt, be found in its consequences favorable to the British interests".[30]

Raoji had a brother, named Babaji Appaji, who wished to secure the position of his brother. He was not happy with this adoption and Sitaram was appointment as Diwan. It was also feared that Babaji might create problems, but Babaji accepted the British intervention in the family matter and expressed his readiness to give full support to Sitaram to maintain the administration. Maj. Walker was confident that Sitaram acquired Diwanship because of the British, and out of the sense of gratitude, would allow the resident to interfere in all the administrative matters. He also assumed that the British support to Sitaram would create more enmity of all those who were opposed to the British dominant at Baroda, and in such situation, Sitaram would always need the protection of the British.

Since the British were inseparably connected with the existing Gaekwad Government, the central plank of their policy was to extend as much as the British aid as was necessary to maintain the weak ruler, Anandrao and the pro-British Diwan through

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[28] G. H. Gense and Banaji (ed.), *The Gaikwads of Baroda*, Vol. VI: Anandrao Gaikwad 1803-05, pp. vi-vii. The grandfather of Raoji Appaji was Prayagi Anant Phanse, who was the subedar of the fort of Satara and Parli in the region of Shivaji, the Great.

[29] G. H. Gense and Banaji (ed.), *The Gaikwads of Baroda*, Vol. V: Anandrao Gaikwad 1802-1803, 23rd May 1803, p. 448.

[30] Ibid. p. 448.

controlling the state policies and directing the British interest to take over the charge of the Gaekwad domain.

Through this idea of kin politics and family intervention, it was not easy to promote the British at that point of time, because within three months of the assumption of Diwanship by Sitaram, Maj Walker started finding a new option for creating more kin conflicts and looked 'Babaji as next possible alternative of Sitaram.'[31] The idea of Maj. Walker of preferring Sitaram than Sakharam was because of the administrative experience and excellent performance which did not help him to fulfill the British purposes of Kin politic. Soon Maj Walker became interested in Babaji. Although Sitaram did not take any administrative decision, but specific incidents occurred which roused strong doubts in the mind of Maj. Walker. The one incident was the arrival of the strong Holkar forces under the Pathan commandant in June 1803, along with Fatesing Gaekwad and his mother, which had been seized by Holkar during his depredation in the Deccan in 1802.

Residents thought that Fatesing might be used by Holkar to subvert the existing Gaekwad government. His first concern was, therefore, the release of Fatesing. Walker took an important initiative and instructed the commander of the Songad fort to allow Fatesing to enter Gujarat only with a small escort and fix an amount of Rs 5000.[32] Before this order reached to the commander, Fatesing was freed on the promise of paying Rs. 5000[33] and he was about to reach Baroda with the Pathan forces led by Jamal Khan. The messenger of Fatesing hurried to inform Sitaram and the Resident about this agreement with the Pathans. He also requested them to pay this amount within 10 days.[34] Maj. Walker directed Col. Murry to detain the Pathan escort at Bardoli or to divert it to Surat, but again by the time this order reached, Fatesing had already reached in the vicinity of Baroda and on 2nd October Fatesing

[31] G. H. Gense and Banaji (ed.), *The Gaikwads of Baroda,* Vol. VI, 1St November 1803, pp. 12-14.
[32] G. H. Gense and Banaji (ed.), *The Gaikwads of Baroda,* Vol. V: Anandrao Gaikwad 1802-1803, 8th June 1803, p. 378.
[33] Ibid., p. 371, Letter from Balaji Lakshman, commander of Songarh to Raoji Appaji dated 21st June 1803.
[34] G. H. Gense and Banaji (ed.), *The Gaikwads of Baroda*, Vol. VI, p. 48.

reached the city and stayed with Gahnabai, while the Pathans encamped outside the city.[35]

The only option left with the Resident was to have the negotiation with the Pathans, in which he succeeded for little of the demands of the Company.[36] As soon as an agreement signed, the Pathans got the order to leave Baroda. The departure of the Pathans was urgent because one of the wives of the Gaekwad ruler, Takhtabai, was framing a conspiracy to overthrow the government of Baroda by the help of the Pathans. The Resident found a secret correspondence of Takhtabai with Kanhoji in which it was planned to remove the Diwan and the Resident from the power.[37]

Once this information reached Maj. Walker, soon all the conspirators were seized and kept in the Sankheda fort. The Residents also decided to remove Takhtabai from the palace. Her house was searched and some papers were seized related to the payment of different military officers. The Residents wanted to keep her imprisoned but at last, she was allowed to live with Anandrao once Takhtabai signed a bond and promised to be kind towards the British in the future.[38] However, even after knowing the ambition of Takhtabai and her influence on her husband, it was decided by the Resident that the Company needed her goodwill and to use her position for promoting the British object. It is also important to understand that Anandrao was implicated into the conspiracy; no steps were taken against him. Therefore, it is clear that it was the British diplomacy to maintain the weak Anandrao in power.

Next year in 1804, the issue of conflict occurred because of the payment of ransom amount to the Pathans. Sitaram placed into the hands of Walker the amount of Rs. 38000, which he did not transmit into the hands of the Pathans. At the same time, the participation of the Gaekwad contingent in the second Anglo-Maratha war on behalf

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[35] Ibid., 7th October 1803, p. 61.

[36] The Resident opened the negotiation with the commander of the escort party. The Pathans demanded not only the amount of ransom but also the appointment in Baroda as promised by Fatesing. They demanded Rs. 107,650 for their expenses. G. H. Gense and Banaji (ed.), *The Gaikwads of Baroda*, Vol. VI, 21 November 1803, p. 65.

[37] F. A. H. Elliot, *The Rulers of Baroda*, First published in 1834 and reprint by Baroda State Press, Baroda, 1934, "A women of intensely ambitious and intriguing character, who had gain completer ascendency over the feeble mind of Anandrao, had plan to upset the Government by seizing the person of Resident and of Sitaram with the aid of some cavalry she had who she bribed", p. 80.

[38] G. H. Gense and Banaji (ed.), *The Gaikwads of Baroda*, Vol. VI, 17th December 1803, p. 77.

of the government of the Company against Shinde-Holkar created circumstances which created more conflicts between Sitaram and Walker. In August 1803, when the British declared war against Shinde, Arthur Wellesley was appointed as commander-in-chief of the Company forces in the Deccan and the charge of Gujarat campaign was given to Col. Murray. Orders were immediately issued to the Baroda Residents to direct the Gaekwads, to dispatch their own contingent to join Col. Murray.[39]

Maj. Walker expressed his feeling of the danger of taking military help from the Gaekwads, because of the threat of the invasion by Kanhoji and Malhar Rao. So, from the security point of view, he wrote to the Bombay Government that the participation of the Gaekwad troops in the British war in Gujarat proved injurious for the British interest in Gujarat. However, Maj. General Wellesley disagreed with Walker and this opinion was accepted. As per the order of Wellesley, a contingent of 850 horses first dispatched from Baroda under the uncle of Raoji, also known as Kakaji after a few months other contingent sent under Sakharam, the younger brother of Sitaram. Thus, the Gaekwad forces with three artilleries joined the British forces under Col. Murray.[40] Through these policies, the British made the situation of not only fighting one Maratha with another but also incited conflicts between father-son and other kin of the Gaekwads. Although Cap Col. Murray observed the unwillingness to fight on behalf of the offensive British power against their own kin like Kanhoji, and other Marathas as Shinde and Holkar. Even Walker feared that Kakaji would retire from the field in December 1804 because of the war with Holkar.[41]

Raoji had written a letter to Kakaji in which he expressed all the pain and difficulties of fighting against his own kin. The reasons for the unwillingness of fighting were not only due to the wrong policies of the British but also because of no payment of the troops. Sitaram expressed his difficulties in a letter written on 8th December 1804 as:

> "Kaka Saheb, your ostensible reasons for returning to Baroda are grounded on Colonel Murray's refusal to make good your payments; and because he had plainly said, did you not move forward, he would plunder your camp. But your return, Kaka Saheb, would interrupt the

[39] S. V. Kothekar, *The Gaikwads of Baroda and the East India Company 1770-1820,* p. 114.
[40] G. H. Gense and Banaji (ed.), *The Gaikwads of Baroda*, Vol. VI, pp. 164-168.
[41] Ibid., G. B. VI, 8th December, 1804. See the letter from Sitaram to Raghunath Mahipatrao Kakaji, p. 301.

> public welfare and give rise to sensation more painful than death[42]…..my suffering Kaka during late Dharna, how can I describe to you? I had fasted six or seven days, and for the same time, day and night were confined to one spot without washing my body. Thus I was situated without any other dependence than Maj. Walker, reduced to the necessity to giving my life, or submit to any advantage that might be taken. [43]

Such was the situation of the Gaekwads, who were helping the British against their own kins. This letter shows that they were regretting with the British. This situation could have given the opportunity to bring back the Pathans and Kanhoji, but even they did not use the right diplomacy with the kin.

While Maj.Walker was passing through a period of high anxiety due to the anti-British conspiracies and the non-co-operative attitude of the Diwan. He was directed by the Bombay Governor to compel the Gaekwad ruler to conclude a fresh agreement with the British on the lines laid by the Governor General in his letter dated 15 December 1802.[44] This step aimed to consolidate the political and military ascendancy of the Gaekwads further.

The draft of the proposed treaty was presented by Duncan in collaboration with Maj. Gen. Wellesley and sent to Maj.Walker in April 1804, with strict instruction of many changes without impairing its spirit. Maj. Walker gave some valuable suggestions such as to withdraw the demands of employing the cavalry of the Company in the service of the Gaekwads; the Gaekwads should be assisting the British in Mulkgiri collection. After discussing these changes with the Governor-general, Maj. Walker started the negotiations with the Gaekwad diwan in August 1804.[45] Sitaram had not agreed with the new terms and had begun to feel the excessive domination of the British at Baroda. So, he was aversed to grant any new concession to the British. Sitaram raised many objections to the proposed terms, and the discussion continued for about eight months.

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[42] Ibid., p. 301.
[43] Ibid., p. 303.
[44] G. H. Gense and Banaji (ed.), *The Gaikwads of Baroda*, Vol. V: Anandrao Gaikwad 1802-1803, 15th December 1802, pp. 436-438.
[45] G. H. Gense and Banaji (ed.), *The Gaikwads of Baroda*, Vol. VII, 26th April 1804, pp. 16.

The explanation of the procrastination of Sitaram is to be found in his strong resentment against the domineering attitude of Walker and his strong hope for securing support from Holkar. In early 1804, it was also known that some eminent person in Baroda were in secret league with Kanhoji and Holkar in order to replace the British. The successful war of Holkar against the British had roused great expectations at Baroda. The fact that Sitaram gave a reluctant assent to finalize the terms of the treaty after the retreat of Holkar in his contest with the British was certainly not a coincidence.

Finally, the terms of the treaty were finalized on 21st April 1805. It was comprised of seventeen articles with a view to confirm the former British gains and to further tighten the British string around the Gaekwad government. The following were the principal articles of this treaty.

1. It confirmed the stipulation of the former engagements on 15 March, 6 June and 29 July 1802 and was to bind the contracting parties, their heirs and successors forever. (Article 1)
2. To provide the employment of the British subsidiary forces for Mulkgiri services whenever they needed, of which the British were to be the judge.(Article 4)
3. Anandrao Gaekwad, hereby, engaged that he would not entertain any European and American or any native of India, subject of Hon'ble Company, without the consent of the British Government. (Article 9)
4. The contracting parties hereby bound themselves to take into consideration hereafter the commercial relation between their respective territories and to settle them in due time by commercial treaties. (Article 17).[46]

Sitaram demanded that the treaty should make the provision for the Company's guarantee to his position as Diwan, as his father granted in 1802, which was rejected by the Bombay governor on the plea that the guarantee given to his father, Raoji should suffice his purpose. The reason for not securing his position was that the British knew that he would not be a useful instrument in the hands of the British and the Resident was also planning to remove him from power.

[46] Ibid., pp. 10-11.

This treaty of 1805, was described as Definitive treaty or agreement of friendship between the two equal powers, but in reality, it fulfilled all the imperialist objects of the British with the Gaekwads and in Gujarat. The treaty severely curtailed the sovereign right of the Gaekwad rulers. The provisions of the employment of the British forces on the Gaekwad expenses turned Baroda as a military center of the British in the heart of Gujarat. Financially, the Gaekwads were forced to give the annual revenue of Rs 11,70,000 in the form of gifts and permanent assignments for the maintenance of subsidiary forces. In addition to this, the burden of the huge debt carrying an exorbitant interest of 9% was imposed upon the Gaekwads. The British were actively engaged in forming the fiscal and revenue policies since the beginning of the nineteenth century, which were approved in 1805; till that period the Resident well understood the benefit of the kin conflict and politics of the distribution of revenue of different parganas. The following table shows how they fixed the allowance of maintaining the subsidiary forces and how much the British demanded from revenue and exactly how much they received.

Table -3 Details of the British demands in Memorandum to provide for regular payment of the subsidiary troops:

British Demands[47]		**Gaekwad Approved**[48]	
Name of the paragana	Amount of revenue	Name of the Pargana	Amount of Revenue
Pargana of Nadiad	2,25,000	Pargana of Dholka	4,50,000
Mondeh (Mahudda)	1,10,000	Nadiad	1,75,000
Matar	1,30,000	Vijapur	1,30,000
Dholka	4,25,000	Mater	1,30,000
Vijapur	1,30,000	Mondeh	1,10,000
Kadi	25,000	Kadi	25,000
Modassa	58,000	Kimkathodra	50,000
Bhavnagar	70,000	Varat on Kathiawar	1,00,000
Village of Guddasar	4,000		
Total	12,27,000		
Deduct payable to the holders of Dumali grants on the parganas mentioned above	57,000		
Total	11,70,000	Total	11,17,000

The treaty of 1805 brought about a complete subjugation of the Gaekwad government. Maj. Walker started an open intervention in both internal and external affairs of Gujarat. The Resident acted as the ruler and Diwan; using both of them as a vital tool to expand the British imperialist plans in western India. After this treaty, the prime focus of Maj. Walker was to secure the complete control over the administrative machinery of the Gaekwads. Maj. Walker did a detailed study of the political condition of Baroda and understood that with the feeble Anandrao in power,

[47] G. H. Gense and Banaji (ed.), *The Gaikwads of Baroda*, Vol. VII, 1805-07, pp. 42-43.
[48] Ibid., p. 48.

the British could control the administration of the Gaekwads with the help of the kin of the Gaekwads. The various steps were taken by Maj. Walker to gain the power in the Gaekwad territory.

First, Maj. Walker made essential reforms in the army. He proposed the two-third reduction of Arab Shibandi, and the reduction in the expenditure of Shiledar and Paga establishment from 20 lakhs to 10 lakhs. The civil charges including the *Modikhana,* house expenses of the Gaekwad family members, charity, etc. were also to be reduced from 17 to 8 lakhs.[49]

Table- 4[50]

Reduction in Expenditure after British Instruction

Before 1802		**After 1802**		**Saving**
Arab Paga and Silahdar	20,00,000		10,00000	10,00000
Fortification	1500000		750000	750000
(No. 4 p. 157) Expenses of the Sibandi on the list of two Parekhs Rs. New Sibandi Total	3,00,000 1,00,000 4,00,000	Reduction From the Parekhs New Sibandi entertained by Babaji + Further reduction order from Babji Total	150,000 41,250 45,000 2,36,425	Note: By this account the total saving per annum will be 28,37,100.

Maj. Walker compelled Sitaram to submit the account of total receipts and disbursements of the preceding two years and after carefully studying those, concluded that if all the debts were paid off and the mortgaged districts were freed, the Gaekwad government, with strict economy, would be left with a surplus.

[49] G. H. Gense and Banaji (ed.), *The Gaikwads of Baroda,* Vol. V: Anandrao Gaikwad 1802-1803, 30 July, 1802, p. 156.
[50] Ibid., pp. 156-157, No.3 & 4.

However, the total income of the Baroda state was 64,00,000 and the expenditure was 64,06,050 (-6050). The details of the income and expenditure are shown in the following table:

Table – 5: Income and Expenditure of Gaekwad [51]

Income		**Expenditure**	
Name of the Territory	Total Revenue	Name of the Department	Total
The territory of Anandrao Gaekwad	52,00,000	Annual liquidation of debts to the Company and the Merchant who had the Company's Guarantee	17,00,000
Kadi and Dehgam	6,00,000	Civil establishment or Darkara Salary	2,71,000
Mahi Kantha and Kathiawar Mulkgiri	6,00,000		
Total	64,00,000	Gaekwad family, charity, presents and other expenses of household + infantry (4000)	4,23,200 +288,000 +96,000 =807200
		For Cavalry	14,94,000
		Military officers and Sardars	1,63,850
		Religious expenses and pensions	5,50,000
		Subsidy and Inam to the Company	14,20,000
		Total	64,06,050

Throughout the year 1804, Maj. Walker continued to put pressure on Sitaram to make a drastic reduction in the expenditure and the Bombay governor assured the latter of full British protection in carrying out the scheme designed by Maj. Walker. The boldest and most radical feature of the Resident's plan of reform was an administrative council under the Resident which had extensive power to conduct the administration on the excuse that Anandrao was of an 'indolent and facile disposition'

[51] G. H. Gense and Banaji (ed.), *The Gaikwads of Baroda*, Vol. VII, 1805-1808, pp. 196-197.

and was 'exposed to evil influences of design men', by which the Resident meant the influence of the anti- British party existing in Baroda.[52]

Next year 1806, was the perfect time for Maj. Walker to use the British plan in a calculated manner. Walker was waiting for the moment when the clamor for the Gaekwad army for arrears would force Sitaram to make overtures to him for financial help. He had expected that Sitaram would approach him for the loan to pay the arrear of the army. Maj. Walker strongly warned Gaekwad that no further loan would be granted unless he was prepared to introduce the proposed changes in the administrative system of Baroda. Maj. Walker handed over the new demands of reform scheme and demanded his consent to it. It provided a formation of an administrative commission with the Resident as head; Babaji was to be appointed as *Khasgidiwan* and in that capacity was to prepare all the *Yadis* to which the Diwan was to put his signature and lastly, the Gaekwad ruler was to put his sign and signature. (Makhalashi).[53]

Babaji arrived at Baroda in October 1806; the Resident arranged a meeting with Sitaram. After making sure of the subservience of Babaji, Walker decided to divest Sitaram from all the power of his office and leave him only with the hallowed title and its emoluments. The Residents charged Sitaram with lavishness, defalcation, and lust of power and held him mainly responsible for the stupendous financial burden of the state. Fatesing was to be included in the commission and his political training was to be entrusted to the pro-British Madhav Rao Tatya Majumdar.[54] Babaji was appointed as Khasgidiwan; an administrative commission was also installed with the Resident as its head consisting of the Khasgi diwan, Majumdar and Fadnis and the young Fatesing Gaekwad as the Regent. Anandrao Gaekwad was prevailed upon to appoint Fatesing as *mutaliq* immediately after he completed his 15th years, but he was invested with the robe of office on 6th May 1807. The British were not only keeping

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[52] Ibid., 1st Jan. 1806, p. 223.

[53] G. H. Gense and Banaji (ed.), *The Gaikwads of Baroda*, Vol. VII. 11th January 1807, Dispatches from the Residents at Baroda. Art. 1 says, "I concluded my last dispatches in this department with apprising you of Sitaram having executed the Makhlasi of the appointment of Babaji Appaji to the office of Khashi Diwan to the Raja, Anandrao, and had also consented to the first of Push or 9th January being fixed for the termination of the arrangement necessary in the impending reforms. Yadi– memorandum of the decisions taken by the Government, Mahalashi- signature of the authorizing party, affixed to government grants, or orders, pp. 272-274.

[54] Ibid., 1St Feb. 1807, p. 287.

the eyes on the political activity of Fatesing but were also deeply engaged in his personal life, such as his marriage proposal, and the expenditure in wedding and family status of the bride.

Alexander Walker wrote to Francis Warden on 9th February 1806 about the wedding plan of Fatesing in which he explained all kinds of gifts, warning the limitation of the expenditure on the wedding, and also about the family background of the bride, Yamunabai.

> "The advanced age of Fatesing, the elder brother of Raja Anandrao, has long rendered his settlement in marriage a subject of anxious consideration to his family and the administration….A variety of events, which have attended the progress of this young men life, have delayed the celebration of his marriage. The Hon'ble, the Governor in council, will observe with regret that this necessary ceremony must unavoidably be attended with expenses, and that it is impossible to celebrate the marriage of Fatesing without adding the burden of the state. I have the honor to enclose an estimate of the expenses with which this ceremony will be attended, amounting to rupees Rs. 2,91,045".[55]

What is most interesting here is the British were not only worried about the wedding expenses but also recorded all details of the gifts received on the day of the wedding and informed all the details of the family of the bride and their role in the political administration of the House of the Gaekwads.

> "That His Highness Fatesing Gaekwad shall receive in marriage the daughter of Girjoji Dhamdhare, Her Highness the aforesaid Yamunabai. The grandmother of intended bride is Yeshubai, given in marriage to Wagholikar Jadhavrao, who had an issue a daughter by name Baijabai, the mother of the bride, and the junior sister of another daughter, by the same parents, who was given in marriage to His Highness Anandrao Gaekwad, being his first wife in low and caste. The bride is nine years old".[56]

[55] Ibid., 1805-1808, p. 78.
[56] Ibid., 1805-1808, p. 79.

After the detailed information about the family of the bride, now the British were busy in calculating the total expenditure and amount of gifts for the occasion of wedding because Anandrao did not have the freedom to expand as much as he wanted. So the King was also expecting to borrow some amount for this occasion.[57] After the marriage, the British were keeping the close eyes on the everyday activity of family affairs of the Gaekwad kins, and it was realized that Fatesing Gaekwad could be used for fulfilling the British plan in the House of Baroda. The British decided to appoint him as the Regent.

It was announced that as the Regent he was to serve as the representative of the Gaekwad rulers and guardian of the interest of the latter, but in reality, according to the statement of Walker, the appointment of Fatesing was meant to provide a cover for the appropriation of power at Baroda by the British Residents.[58] Walker explained to Jonathan Duncan about Fatesing in his letter dated on 9th April 1807 as:

> "As presumptive heir to Gaekwad principality, no person can be more interested in preserving the integrity and guarding its interest than Fatesing. It is also extremely desirable that this young man should be early introduced into the transaction of the business of the Darbar and be enabled to acquire that knowledge in the affairs of the future inheritance, the want of which has been caused of so much determent to the Gaekwad concerns. Under the eyes and participation of Fatesing, every arrangement will acquire that weight and consideration which he countenances of the presumptive successor; the disinterestedness of the British Government will appear, and intrigue and suspicion will silenced in the evidence that the welfare of the Gaekwad state is the object of our views".[59]

A new set of rules and regulations was applied for the transaction of public business in the court. All orders were to be passed by Fatesing, and those were to be unquestionably obeyed by all and the officers of the Company had to attend the court every day and all the financial matters were to be transacted by the Regent. All

[57] Various articles required on the occasion of marriage:, Jewellery Rs. 61,100; Goldtoy 19,800; Silver toy 5870; for Brahman 5000; dancing girl 3000; oil and candle 5000 paper 1000 etc., ibid., p. 79.
[58] Ibid., 9th April 1807, p. 309.
[59] G. H. Gense and Banaji (ed.), *The Gaikwads of Baroda*, Vol. VII, p. 309.

accounts were to be submitted to the Darbar for scrutiny. At the same time, Walker also forced to reduce the numerical strength of the Gaekwad army. The reduction of the army was highly in the British interest, mainly for the purpose of making weak military of the Gaekwads, to impose the British subsidiary forces, and thus, removing the danger of Gaekwads ever raising their heads against the British in the future.

Administration and Politics of Kin

With the introduction of radical changes in the various department of administration, Maj. Walker expressed a hope that if the scheduled broadly followed, the government would be free from the entire financial obligation by the year 1812. The claim of the British that they had introduced reforms to free Gaekwad from the financial crisis, was completely falsified when it was discovered in 1820 that, instead of showing any improvement, the financial position of the Gaekwad Government had worsened and that they were burdened with a massive debt of about a crore rupees.[60]

Capt. Carnac, who succeeded Maj. Walker as the Baroda Resident in 1810, further divested the Gaekwad ruler of his highest judiciary authority by setting up a central court of justice at Baroda. This court was comprised of a member of the royal family, two people of high moral character, one Hindu shashtri, a Muslim Maulvi and a man having intimate knowledge of the mahal administration.[61] Yashwant Rao Bapuji Godbole, a close relation of Gangadhar Sashtri and favourable to the British was appointed as the Chief Justice on the monthly salary of Rs. 400.[62]

The structural changes in the administration of Baroda were undertaken by the British with the avowed object of eradicating the evil in the administration and improving the governmental machinery. The sanction of Anandrao to the proposed measures was considered necessary to provide a cover to the British initiative. When Anandrao put his seal upon the wishes of the Resident, without any opposition, he was acclaimed as wise and prudent, but when he dared to act against the wishes of the Resident, he was branded as an imbecile, and the need for keeping a check on his activities.

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[60] S. V. Kothekar, *The Gaekwads of Baroda and English East India Company,* p. 136.
[61] G. H. Gense and Banaji (ed.), *The Gaikwads of Baroda,* Vol. X, 11 October 1813, p. 124.
[62] S.V. Kothekar, *The Gaikwads of Baroda,* p. 137.

Takhtabai, the favourite wife of Anandrao, was persuaded to exercise her influence on him to make him concur with the views of the Resident. When she secured his sanction for the investiture of Fatesing Gaekwad as the Regent, her utility was brought to the notice of the Bombay Governor, and her action was declared as commendable, but when she acted against their interests, she was subjected to extreme humiliation.[63] Maj. Walker said Babaji as the most suitable person for the British purposes. He had ignored the suggestion of Sitaram made in 1803 to consider Babaji for the post of Diwan[64] because Babaji had then appeared to him highly ambitious, but soon Babaji became more important than Sitaram. The result of convincing Babaji to the British sides was to deprive the Gaekwad government of its army commander and to drive a permanent wedge between Babaji and Sitaram, whose united effort at running the Gaekwad government might have posed a serious threat to the British at Baroda. For the next Resident, Capt. Carnac who reached Baroda in 1810, enjoyed the favourable situation of the family of Gaekwad for a short period. The same year Babaji died in November 1810, his son Viththal Rao was appointed as *Khasgidiwan* only due to the insistence of the Resident because Viththal Rao thought inferior to Babaji in talent was found loyal to the British. In fact, the appointment of Viththal Rao was opposed by an influential group at Baroda including Anand Rao who desired the reappointment of Sitaram in power.[65]

Maj. Walker also understood the significance of kinship polity; accordingly he selected person from the Gaekwad administration as per the requirement of the British motive. Babaji and Madhavrao Tatya as the most serviceable genets, the person who were not in favour of the British and acted as the enemy, for Maj. Walker wanted Raghunath Mahipat Rao, popularly known as Kakaji, the uncle of Raoji and Sakharam, the younger brother of Sitaram. The British were fully aware of their anti-British attitude and strongly suspected that they instigated Sitaram against him.[66]

> "Beside the Diwan and his brother, there are still several others of the family of Raoba living, who has never been in Gujarat, continue to reside in his native village in the Deccan. The next surviving brother is Babaji Appaji, the present subedar of Kaithiwar. Raghunath

[63] G. H. Gense and Banaji (ed.), *The Gaikwads of Baroda*, Vol. VII., 17th April 1807, p. 370.
[64] Ibid., 1st January 1806, p. 226.
[65] Ibid., Vol. VIII, 10th December 1810, p. 174.
[66] Ibid., Vol. VII, 1st Jan 1806, p. 224.

> Mahipat Rao Kakaji, the Sursubedar of Ahmadabad, is the son of Mahipant Rao Bundaji, the uncle of Raoba, who is still living in Baroda. The other members of the family of Raoba are either too young or too distantly concern to be of any material consequences in the present detail".[67]

Sitaram was targeted by the British since 1805 as soon as Maj. Walker understood that, Sitaram instead of serving the British motive, he became an impediment. In this situation, Sitaram willing to get justice from a higher British authority, requested the Bombay Governor, who refused to entertain the appeal of Sitaram. He was informed that the Diwanship was assured permanently to Raoji alone and was not made hereditary.[68]

> "Sitaram surely can never intend to dispute the right of his sovereign to impose these retrains or to call his councils the assistance of any of his servants that he deems necessary. He cannot convince that the British government would guarantee to Raoba or his descendants the right of injuring the territory and resources of their ally".[69]

As soon as the resident perceived that Sitaram was not serviceable for carrying out the British plans that he began to level grave charges against him in order to prepare a ground for divesting him of all the administrative power.

The chains of the British control were fully tightened around the Gaekwads after 1805, in consequences of the successful fulfillment of Walker's plan of reform. The British had not acquited this kind of control till then at any of the confederates regions of the Maratha state. This was possible only because they understood the significance of the conflict of the Gaekwads kins who were directly or indirectly became the tool of the British plan, so-called Maj. Walker's reform.

What was the Peshwa reaction on all these changes? Why did the Poona authority not take any action against these moves? How were the British gaining legitimate domination over the Gaekwads? These are the few questions that we need to answer in order to understand the whole process of transition. The period 1813-1817 was a

[67] Ibid., No. 120, p. 225.
[68] Ibid., 26th December 1808, p. 667.
[69] Ibid., p. 667.

period of ominous storm over the court of the Peshwa, still, functioning as the nerve center of the Maratha Confederacy. There were many issues that need to settle between the Baroda and Poona courts. The first and foremost was the decision regarding the Ahmadabad suba, of the Peshwa. This suba was given on a lease to the Gaekwads in October 1800 for the period of 5 years at an annual rent of Rs. 5 lakhs. On receiving the news of the Gaekwad-British alliance of June 1802, the Peshwa had become extremely restive and had expressed his intention of canceling the lease and resuming the administration of the subas, to stop the British gains.[70] In 1804, when the lease of Ahmadabad suba was about to expire, Col. Close prevailed upon the Peshwa to renew the lease. The lease was renewed in the name of Bhagwant Rao Gaekwad for a period of 10 years, at an annual rent of rupees 4½ lakhs. As soon as the lease was renewed, the British acquired control over the leased territory, by making it obligatory on the Gaekwad government to pay the annual rent to the Peshwa through the agency of the British at Baroda.[71] The tenure of lease renewed in 1804 was to expire in 1814, during these periods the British had secured full control over the Baroda court, and the Baroda Resident was acting practically as the *de facto* rulers of the Gaekwad domain. What are the most important causes of such dominant position at Baroda, it seems that the most of the scholars believe that it happened due to the absence of the Peshwa power in the territories of the Confederates; but this was not the case with the Gaekwad territory, it was mainly due to political gains of the British in the family of the Gaekwads and open intervention in kin polity which led to the waning of the Peshwa influences on the Confederates.

The other issue under consideration in 1813 was the long pending pecuniary claims of the Peshwa on the Baroda court. The origin of the claim dates back to the year 1752 when the Peshwa had humbled Damaji Gaekwad and forced him to acknowledge his supremacy as the deputy of the Chhatrapati and agreed to the payment of an annual tribute and other dues at Poona. The last settlement between the Gaekwads and the Peshwa was effected in 1798, according to which the balance dues to the Peshwa

[70] G. H. Gense and Banaji (ed.), *The Gaikwads of Baroda,* Vol. VII, Accounts of the revenue of the shares of the Peshwa of the Taluka of Ahmadabad for the year 1784, 1785, and 1786 were Rs. 15,99,777 ; Rs. 16,14,871 and Rs. 15,04,586 respectively. No.3-5; 15th March 1804, pp. 109-10.
[71] Ibid., 31st August 1805, p. 124.

were 2,982,789. Since then no payment had been made.[72] With a view to satisfy the Peshwa, the Bombay Government instructed the Baroda Resident in 1806 to dispatch a Deputy of the Gaekwad Government to Poona for negotiation.

The British first decided to send Madhavrao Tatya Majumdar to Poona in June 1807, but he died in 1808. The following two years none was dispatched. When the Bombay Government urged the Resident again in 1810 to solve the matter, Ramchandra Mairal, also known as Bapu Mairal, was at last dispatched to Poona in January 1811 to settle the issue with the Peshwa. Why did the British delay in sending the deputy to Poona? The only reason was that the British wanted to have full control on the Gaekwad government, and till 1810 the British had fully tightened his hold on the Gaekwads. Bapu Mairal reached Poona in April 1811. A year elapsed but no settlement was done. Next year in September 1812, Cap. Carnac, the Baroda residence, conveyed the Bombay Governor the wish of Fatesing to remove Bapu Mairal and to send Gangadhar Shashtri to Poona to solve the claim of the Gaekwads and the Peshwa.[73] Madhav Rao Tatya was a close friend of Raoji Appaji and was loyal to the British, while Bapu Mairal was evidently a right-hand man and a close confidant of Babaji, who had played a significant role in the British dominance in the family of the Gaekwads in the post-1806.[74] However, Shashtri, who was more talented and a zealous servant of the British was considered best suitable person for negotiating with the Peshwa.

The decision to assign the settlement work to Shashtri was accepted by both, the Gaekwads and the British, as the anti-British group at Baroda headed by Sitaram and Takhtabai was happy with this move. In November 1813, Anandrao Gaekwad issued an order, appointing Shashtri as the accredited agent of the Gaekwad Government at Poona and Ahmadabad lease and the adjustment of the settlement of the dues of the Peshwa.[75] This diplomacy proved that despite having control on the Baroda

[72] S. V. Kothekar, *The Gaikwad of Baroda and English East India Company*, p. 182.
[73] G. H. Gense and Banaji (ed.), *The Gaikwads of Baroda,* 1814-1819, Vol. IX, 14th September 1812, p. 162.
[74] G. H. Gense and Banaji (ed.), *The Gaikwads of Baroda*, Vol. VIII, 13th September 1806, p. 375.
[75] Ibid., Vol. VII, pp. 448-454; The hope and ambitions of Shashtri were to obtain an *inam* of land under the jurisdiction of Satara; and his merit and service in my opinion entitled him to a reward, which is most honourable in the eyes of his countrymen. Walker requested for his reward later which was accepted on 18th November 1803. After three years in 1807, he was

administration, the British were not able to prove their legitimate right, or we can say that the British were not able to gain the power on the territory which was under the direct control of the Peshwa. This can be seen in the case of Ahmedabad because the British could have established domination without waiting for renewing of the ledge from Poona. However, this did not happen. To get the proper settlement of the Ahmedabad suba, the British again played kin politics replacing some vital family members of Gaekwads with other kin of the Gaekwads as the diplomat of Poona.

As a result of the kin politics, the Peshwa refused to do any settlement with Shashtri, as he was considering him as the British agent. Because he was directed by the British, instead of proceeding directly to Poona he first went to Bombay, where he received detailed instruction of diplomatic deal with the Peshwa and the Gaekwads. By 1814, the settlement of account was not the main concern of the Peshwa because by that time he had a large fund at his disposal. His real intention was to reopening a sincere dialogue with a trusted, faithful deputy of the Gaekwads in order to wean them away from the British and enlist their cooperation in the final struggle that he was planning against the English. Another reason for opposing the agency of Shashtri was the appeal of the agent of Sitaram, Govindrao Bandhuji to restore Sitaram to power at Baroda and to release the Gaekwads from the British thralldom.[76]

After the insistence of Elphinstone, the Peshwa agreed to receive Shashtri as a Gaekwad deputy, but on the condition that it did not imply his recognition of Shashtri as the Gaekwad Diwan.[77] Through this condition, the Peshwa refused to accept his right of appointing a Gaekwad Diwan, (Shashtri was appointed by the British, so the Peshwa could not accept it) because the recognition of such a right would have enabled the Peshwa to restore Sitaram to power and interfere in the Baroda administration. This step would have removed the British dominance at Baroda. When Elphinstone was planning to remove Bandhuji from Poona, Bhagvantrao Gaekwad, the half brother of Anandrao arrived in Poona in January 1815. Bhagwant Rao enjoyed the confidence of the Gaekwad ruler and a good image with Rani

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gifted a plankeen and a Rs. 100 monthly allowance and said, "Shashtri has in his employment in the transition of the orders of Resident Walker evidence the most approved zeal, diligence and fidelity", 13th February 1807, p.450.

[76] G. H. Gense and Banaji (ed.), *The Gaikwads of Baroda*, Vol. VIII, p. 220.

[77] G. S. Sardesai (ed.), *Poona Residency Correspondence: Vol. XII: Poona Affairs Elphinstone's Embassy,* Part-I 1811-1815, Popular Press, Bombay, 1950, 5th January 1814, p. 309.

Takhtabai, and Gahnabai. After Anandrao was prohibited by the Resident to leave for Poona, Bhagwant Rao left Baroda in the name of a religious function. However, he was directed by the Gaekwad ruler as a personal envoy to meet the Peshwa. Fund for this mission was arranged and provided by Rani Gahenabai. Elphinstone became upset with this move and immediately gave an ultimatum to the Peshwa that if he did not put a stop to his negotiation with Bandhuji and Bhagwant Rao, and give up his claim of sovereignty over the Gaekwads, Shashtri would be sent back to Baroda and the British would not arbitrate in the affairs.[78]

In May 1815, when the issue was still unsettled, Elphinstone set out with the Peshwa on his pilgrimage to Nasik along with Shashtri and allowed the latter to pursue the talk with the Peshwa. He also came to know about the plan of matrimonial alliances of Shashtri, that Shashtri was offered a Ministerial post at Poona, that the hands of the sister-in-law of the Peshwa was offered in marriage to the son of Shashtri and that Shashtri was elated by this offer. There was a clear indication of the fact that Shashtri was slipping out of the British hands and was acting under the direction of the Peshwa.[79] Elphinstone became angry beyond measure. He was extremely annoyed with Shashtri for the failure in keeping him well informed about his negotiation with the Peshwa. Consequently, the marriage of the son of Shashtri which was to take place at Nasik and the preparation for which was already much advanced was postponed indefinitely. However, the result of this pressure was that Shashtri start making the distance from the Resident. While waiting for instruction from Baroda to proceed with the proposed formula for settlement, he set out with the Peshwa on 6th July on a pilgrimage to Pundharpur. According to the account of Elphinstone, he disallowed Bapu Miral to accompany him to Pundharpur.[80]

While they were going to Pundharpur, they held many meetings and reached Pundharpur on 11 July. On 20 July when Shashtri was returning from a temple a couple of armed men fell upon him and cut him into pieces. The news of the brutal murder of Shashtri spread like a wildfire.[81] The Peshwa was also stunned by the tragic

[78] Ibid., 19th February 1815, p. 351.
[79] Henry T. Prinsep, *History of the Political and Military Transactions in India during the Administration of Marquess of Hastings,* Vol. I, 1813-1823, London, 1825, p. 287.
[80] G. S. Sardesai (ed.), *Poona Residency Correspondence: Vol. XII: Poona Affairs Elphinstone's Embassy,* Part-I, 1811-1815, 16th August 1815, p. 393.
[81] Ibid., 16th August 1815, p. 390.

incident; tightened his security arrangements, as there were strong rumours of the possibilities of killing of the Peshwa. So, he reached Poona quietly on 9th August. It seems, that Shashtri already had an inkling of some untoward incident, because of which he denied going to the temple that day, as it was recorded by one of the eyewitnesses of the assassins- Bapu Mairal (record translated by Captain Pottinger) says:

> "In the course of half an hour one Lakshman Punt came on Trimbakji Dungha's behalf to invite him to join the devotions and he said- 'I am unwell and I will not go today'. Shortly after Trimbakji send the second messenger to acquaint the Shashtri that the Peshwa was to go to the temple next morning that the crowd was therefore cleared away and that he out to attend the prayer, but not bring any attendants. Again Rowjee Mahratta came back to the house occupied by the Shashtri to and three different messengers sent; therefore he agreed to go".[82]

After a week of the arrival of the Peshwa at Poona, Elphinstone advised Bapu Mairal, to leave the city and to leave near the Residency. Elphinstone also accused Trimbakji of assassinating Shashtri and demanded his arrest, on the excuse that the British had guaranteed the safety of Shashtri at Poona. Elphinstone continued to press the Peshwa for the arrest of Trimbakji. The Peshwa gave an open challenge to prove Trimbakji guilty; finally, Trimbak Rao was handed to the British on 19th September.[83]

While Elphinstone at Poona was engaged in securing the imprisonment of Trimbakji, the Bombay government was endeavouring to secure the custody of Sitaram, Cap. Carnac further instructed to remove Sitaram from Baroda and to keep him confined at Surat under the British. When Carnac asked Fatesing, Fatesing declined to send Sitaram as a prisoner to Surat. A long charge sheet was prepared against Sitaram similar to the one prepared by Elphinstone against Trimbakji. He accused Sitaram of being a traitor to the Gaekwad government and the British and claimed a right to punish him.[84] At the end of April 1816, Sitaram was removed from Baroda and taken to Bombay, but on his way, he fell ill at Nevasarai, and could not succeed further.

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[82] Ibid., 16th August 1815, p. 395.
[83] G. H. Gense and Banaji (ed.), *The Gaikwads of* Baroda, Vol. IX, 1814-1819, 19th September 1815, p. 236.
[84] Ibid., 18th October, 1815, p. 312.

Thus, the British, using the murder of Shashtri as a weapon, succeeded in securing the custody of all the kins of the Gaekwads, who were the main ring leaders of the anti-British parties both at Poona and Baroda.

However, after the murder of Shashtri, the deputy of Sitarma at Poona was pursuing the matter of reinstating Sitaram to power with the full support of Anandrao, Gahenabai and Takhtabai, and covert the compliance of Fatesing. This step was vital as it was the last chance for the Peshwa to get full support of the Confederacy because if Sitaram was placed at the power at Baroda, the Peshwa could secure the Gaekwad support in his proposed war with the British.

Elphinstone, proved Trimbakji guilty on the basis of three charges- first, on the night of the murder, Trimbakji sent three repeated messages to Shashtri, inviting him to the temple; second, Trimbakji despite being a responsible minister of the Peshwa, made no inquiry and took no steps to arrest the criminals, and lastly, belief in the guilt of Trimbakji was universal.[85] The third logic of Elphinstone that the public voice was unanimous in holding Trimbakji guilty is exceptionally absurd. Elphinstone did not explain what he meant by 'public opinion; did not produce the person whom he said he had heard branding Trimbaji as guilty, except the pro-British men like Mairal. So the direct charge against Trimbakji is baseless, without having a detailed investigation of the incident.

It seems very strange that all three persons of the Gaekwad kin, working for the Gaekwad mission at Poona, met with sudden death within a short period of one and a half year. Shashtri was violently murdered in July 1815, Bhagwant Rao died in the British custody in December 1815, and Mairal also died after a short illness, in February 1817, when he was very close to the Residency. Khersetji Modi who was serving in the Poona Residency also met a violent death in mysterious circumstances in February 1815, a few months before the murder of Shashtri.[86] What we need to explain is that can we find the diplomatic win, through the killing of these kin of the Gaekwads or it can be generalized as pure coincidences. It is almost more than 200 years, despite the number of correspondence on these killings, historians are not moving beyond the simple chronological explanation of the incident. However, in

[85] G. S. Sardesai (ed.), *Poona Residency Correspondence: Vol.XII: Poona Affairs Elphinstone's Embassy,* Part-I 1811-1815, 16th August 1815, p. 384.
[86] S. V. Kothekar, *The Gaikwad of Baroda and the East India Company,* pp. 216-217.

reality, these incidents are one of the most important reasons for isolating the Gaekwad House from the Maratha Confederacy. So, through the killing of these kin, the British were able to gain more control in the family of the Gaekwads and their territory.

In September 1816, Trimbakji escaped from the Thana fort. The Peshwa increased his effort to further close contact with Fatesing. One of the agents of the Peshwa, Fattia Furnawees, arrived at Baroda and stayed there in October 1816, for releasing some dues from the Gaekwad government. The Peshwa's sursubas of Ahmadabad requested Vithalrao Devaji, the Gaekwad Commander in Kathiawad, to assist him in recruiting new levies in Gujarat. However, the Resident appointed Vithalrao, feigned friendship towards the officers of the Peshwa; gave information about the secret activities of the Peshwa to the Baroda Resident.[87]

The Peshwa continuously wanted to win over the Gaekwad kin to his side, preceded a significant change in the attitude of Fatesing towards the British. At the same time the British also started an operation against the Gaekwad kin, and arrested the eminent members of his family like Kanhoji and Bhagwantrao, and those who were loyal to Sitaram, Anandrao and Takhtabai were also humiliated, coupled with the constant dominantion and intimidation of the Resident in all state matters. This had filled Fatesing with deep resentment against the British. In these circumstances, Fatesing was encouraged by the Peshwa to defy the British Resident openly.[88] He conducted state affairs without consulting the Resident, expended huge money, and declined to pay any amount of money for the British Poona affairs. Due to the open challenge of Fatesing to the British, the Resident started his repressive tactics, so Fatesing resigned from the Baroda administration. The British knew that they could get full control on Baroda and the Gaekwad kin only after removing Fatesing, the most essential anti-British. However, after a few moments, Fatesing changed his mind to resign.

The detail information of the plan of the Peshwa of forming the Confederates against the British reached Elphinstone. The British realized the need for curbing the power of the Peshwa at the earliest in order to gain control in all over the Maratha Confederacy. In May 1817, the British troops surrounded Poona and under a threat of

[87] Ibid., p. 220.
[88] G. H. Gense and Banaji (ed.), *The Gaikwads of* Baroda, Vol. X, 27th July 1816, p. 4.

war, Elphinstone forced the Peshwa[89] to sign the treaty of Poona on 13th June 1817[90], whereby he was made the head of the Maratha Confederacy. Three articles of the Poona treaty were related to the claims of the Peshwa on the Gaekwad government and his possessions in Gujarat. In Article Vth, the Peshwa renounced his claims of sovereignty over the Gaekwad rulers and agreed to accept an annual payment of 4 lakhs in lieu of his pecuniary demand on him. Article XV was related to the grant of Ahmadabad farm excluding Kathiawad to the Gaekwad Government in perpetuity at an annual rent of 4½ lakhs. This low rate policy was opposed by Moro Trimbak, the minister of the Peshwa, who said it was only a half of what the Peshwa was receiving, but the British told him that it was a sort of compensation to the Gaekwad government for the loss of Shashtri.[91]

Through the treaty of Poona, the Company not only brought the radical changes in political power in Gujarat but also its excluded the authority of the Peshwa from the province by divesting him of his territorial possessions and break his ties with the Gaekwads by making him renounce his sovereign right over all the Maratha chiefs. It also averted the possibility of the Gaekwad members joining the Peshwa and of Gujarat being used as a solid base for military operations against them in impending conflicts.

The period in which the treaty of Poona was signed was also the significant phase in which the British got fully prepared to raise the final war against the Peshwa and to remove his power all over the Maratha Confederacy. In a minute of Governor-General on 10th May, a resolution to that effect was passed, by the Governor General in

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[89] Mohan Sinha Mehta, *Lord Hastings and The Indian States,* D. B. Taraporevala, Bombay, 1930, pp. 87-88.

[90] G. S. Sardesai (ed.), *Poona Residency Correspondence: Vol. XIII : Poona Affairs Elphinstone's Embassy,* Part-II, 1816-1818, Government Central Press, Bombay, 1958, No.52, pp. 186-187. The treaty between Honourable East India Company and his Highness Bajee Rao Raghunath Rao Pandit Pardhan, his heirs and successors, concluded at Poona on the 13th of June by Honourable Elphinstone on the part of the Company, and By Moro Dixit and Balaji Lakhsman on the part of Rao Pandit Pardhan by the virtue of full power by their respective Governments. This treaty consisted of eighteen article. Article 1 is related to Trimbak ji and the murder of Shahstri, and the process of judiciary and the punishment for the murderer. Article 2: all the articles of the treaty of Bassein, and the supplementary articles concluded at Poona, which are not contrary to the tenor of the present engagement, are hereby confirmed.

[91] G. H. Gense and Banaji (ed.), *The Gaikwads of* Baroda, Vol. IX, 4th June 1817, p. 276.

Council; very soon the Peshwa was denoted as 'Public Enemy'[92] Soon after the conclusion of the treaty of Poona, the Bombay government formulated the plans for further tightening the territorial, economic and military hold over Gujarat at the cost of the Gaekwad government. On 25th June 1817, the day on which the Peshwa signed the Sanad of the perpetual lease of his Ahmadabad suba in the name of Gaekwad, the Bombay government made a number of excuses for reducing the Gaekwad army and imposing upon the Gaekwad an additional subsidiary force. They alleged that the Gaekwad army had proved inefficient and useless in defending the enemy domain; the British also claimed that they expended Rs. 12 lakhs in suppressing disturbances in Kutch and Kathiawad.[93]

Fatesing opposed the British move of the large reduction in the Gaekwad army. The British also took another quick action. The Gaekwad rights of Ahmadabad farm were, therefore, transferred to the British on a condition that the British should pay the rent to the Peshwa. After this development, Cap. Carnac considered it desirable and advantageous to have complete control over the city of Ahmadabad and so, he demanded from Fatesing all the rights and privileges arising from the Gaekwad share in Ahmadabad city and Daskorai villages in its vicinity in exchange for the British possessions of the Parganas—Dabhoi, Bahadurpur, and Savli. The Gaekwad haveli in Ahmadabad and Daskorai parganas remained with the Gaekwads, mainly because of the strong opposition of Fatesing to this possession.[94]

However, Cap. Carnac continued to exercise increasing pressure on Fatesing to accept the British demands, which was impossible to accept. The tussle continued till the end of October 1817, when the Governor General, in view of an imminent war against the Peshwa, instructed the British Residents at Gwalior, Nagpur, Indore, and Baroda to impose severe restrictions on the Maratha chiefs so as to weaken their military power and prevent them from joining the Peshwa against the British. Within a month on 5th

[92] G. S. Sardesai (ed.), *Poona Residency Correspondence: Vol. XIII: Poona Affairs Elphinstone's Embassy,* Part-II, 1816-1818, 7th May 1817, p. 158.
[93] G. H. Gense and Banaji (ed.), *The Gaikwads of* Baroda, Vol. X, 25th June 1817, p. 65. The strength of the Gaekwad forces was fixed in 1808 at (Horse and foot) 11,645 which was maintain at the expenses of 24,000,23. For the security of the Gaekwads, they maintained a military establishment, including subsidiary forces, at an annual charge of rupees 42,00,000. According to the British these are totally insufficient for the protection of the Country.
[94] G. H. Gense and Banaji (ed.), *The Gaikwads of Baroda*, Vol. X, 16th August 1817, p. 74.

November, Daulat Rao Shinde was compelled by the British to sign a treaty,[95] which made him helpless to take arms against the British, the next day on 6th November 1817, Fatesing Gaekwad force to accept the British demand through a new treaty officially called a supplement to the Definitive Treaty of 1805, which consisted of 11 articles.[96] This treaty forced to increase the subsidiary forces, and also made the provision that the Gaekwad Government should allow any number of troops for Gujarat. The British also gave an assurance that no more demands for the exchange of territory would be made on the Gaekwad rulers in the future. For getting an approval of these demands, the Resident put lots of pressure on Fatesing. The British stated that it was signed on the 'principals of free and optional negotiation with Gaekwad.'[97] Despite the beneficial treaty for the British, the Bombay Government was not happy with this deal. They ordered soon to acquire the Gaekwad haveli in Ahmadabad and one district, Daskorai.

After the surrender of the Gaekwad haveli and Daskorai, Fatesing died suddenly on 23rd June 1818.[98] With his demise, a person antagonistic to the British was removed from the helm of the Gaekwad administration. After his death, his younger brother Sayaji, then only 19 years old was appointed as the Regent, while the prominent members of the family were opposing this decision such as Radhabai, widows of late Fatesing, and Rani Takhtabai. However, the British were keeping close eyes on Sayaji since his childhood, and in 1807, a provision of Rs. 1250 was made for the maintenance of his education. The purpose of this allowance to Sayaji was to make him the most favourable to the British, now after becoming the Regent, against the will of the Gaekwad ladies and the minister, Vithoba Babaji, the British found a golden opportunity to make him dependent on the British for support and permanently

[95] Colonel Gurwood, *The Dispatches of field Marshal the Duke of Wellington during his various Campaign in India from 1799-1818,* Vol. I, John Murray, London, 1831, p. 571. The treaty of Surji-Anjangao was signed on 30 December 1803 between the British and Daulat Rao Sindhia. It was revised twice, once in November 1805 and finally, on 5th November 1817. C. U. Aitchison, *A Collection of Treaties, Engagement and Sanads relating to India and Neighbouring Countries*, Vol. V, p. 408.

[96] G. H. Gense and Banaji (ed.), *The Gaikwads of Baroda*, Vol. X, p 83; C. U. Aitchison, *A Collection of Treaties, Engagement and Sanads relating to India and Neighbouring Countries*, Vol. VI, pp. 134-138.

[97] G. H. Gense and Banaji (ed.), *The Gaikwads of Baroda*, Vol. X, 12th November 1817, letter from James R. Carnac to Francis Warden, p. 83.

[98] Ibid., James R. Carnac to Francis Warden letter on 24th June and 30th June 1818 gives the details of the resolution of his favourite wife, Radhabai Gaekwad, pp. 139-140.

make him a British supporter.[99] Anandrao Gaekwad also died on 2nd October 1819 and Sayaji became the ruler of the Gaekwads on 17th October 1819.[100] So, what we see that the year of 1818 was the most crucial year for the British expansion, the only significant reason for the British success was the benefit of the politics of kinship in the House of the Gaekwads. Therefore, these transitions of power from the hands of the Peshwa and Confederates to the hands of the British should be seen as a direct result of kinship conflict and the achievement of kinship diplomacy.

During the period from June 1818 to October 1819, the British had played a very important role in the family politics or kin conflict of the Gaekwads. On the death of Fatesing, his wife Radhabai was dissuaded from becoming sati by the Resident. He assured her the British support and assisted her in adopting the eight years old son of late Ganpatrao Gaekwad of Sankheda. On the occasion of this adoption, the resident drew up a memorandum specifying the annual allowance of Rs. 288,000 to be paid to Radhabai by the Gaekwad government. After the opposition of Sayaji, the British added a new provision that the adoption would not entitle the boy to the succession as the Gaekwad ruler but that he would only retain his right to the Gaekwad dominion which he enjoyed by birth.[101]

However, this allowance could not impress Radha Bai, and she refused to take any kind of maintenance allowance until the claim of her son was accepted. The matter was referred to the Bombay Government, who assured Sayaji the British help but instructed to be liberal with Radhabai. The British advised Radhabai to accept the allowance.[102] Another conflict emerged in the Gaekwad family, which became a vital kin conflict for the political stability of Gaekwad House. This was after the death of Anandrao, Takhtabai pushed for the claim of her 15 years old son, Balwantrao. She also claimed the right to the property and jewels of the late Gaekwad rulers and

[99] Ibid., 19th August 1818, p. 147.
[100] Ibid., 21 October 1819, p. 160.
[101] Ibid., p. xi-xii, On the occasion of the adoption of Govindrao by Radhabai a nemnuk had been drawn up, in which it was stated that the adopted boy had no claim on the masnad. This was objected by Radhabi and by the Bombay Government, but for different reasons. Radhabai contended that by virtue of the adoption Govindrao had a bitter right to the masnad than Fatesingrao; while in Bombay it was pointed out that Govindrao, independently of his adoption, was the third legal claimant to the masnad. Radhabi refused to sing the nemnuk.
[102] Ibid., 29th September, 1819, p. 168.

refused to give keys of the *Jamadarkhana* into the hands of Sayaji.[103] In this kin conflict within the Gaekwad family, in which the British Regent was also actively engaged, gave the best opportunity to the British to take full control over the Gaekwad House. The Resident prevailed upon Sayaji to endow on the family of the deceased Gaekwad rulers an annual allowance of Rs. 130,600 under the British guarantee and urged Takhtabai to hand over the key of *Jamadarkhana* to Sayaji who was to hold it as a deposit till the issue was finally settled.[104] Takhtabai agreed to accept the proposal of the Resident but Radhabai did not accept it. This quarrel between Radhabai and Sayaji Rao continued for a few years. However, this kin conflict was the main reason for the defeat of the Gaekwad rulers, who ultimately separated from the Maratha Confederacy and became the part of the British power.

What we see during the last two decades of the nineteenth century that, the British were not only openly engaged in internal kin conflict with the Gaekwad House, but this was a general trend in most of the ruling families of the Maratha Confederates and other ruling families. The situation was same even in the House of the Chhatrapati of Satara, after the death of Shahu in 1749. It not only became the nonentity in the Maratha politics but was gradually reduced to the position of a prisoner in the hands of the Peshwa. The successor of Shahu, Ramraja also died in 1777, after adopting Vithoji, the eldest son of Trimbakji Bhosle of Wavi, as heirs now known as Shahu-II. This family lost power in the Confederacy. Shahu –II died on 4th May 1808.[105] He had three sons from his Rani Anandibai, viz. Pratapsing, Ramchandra Bhausaheb, and Shahi Appasaheb. Pratapsing became the successor of Shahu-II. His uncle (Shahu-II brother) Chhatarsing was against Pratapsing and started a war against the English and Anandibai. Elphinstone kept a close eye on each family member of the ruling class. He remarked about the mother of young Prataprao, Anadibai-"an intelligent lady, a woman of talent and address possessing good manners and good qualities."[106] The detailed information of the ruling family was vital for kinship polity, in which the Britishers never failed. Bajirao ordered Trimbakji Dengle to put down his rebel Chatarsing by any means possible. Chatarsing reached

[103] S. V. Kothekar, *The Gaikwad of Baroda and the East India Company,* p. 230.
[104] Ibid., p. 231.
[105] Sumitra Kulkarni, *The Satara Raj 1818-1848: A study in History, Administration and Culture*, Mittal Publication, Bombay, 1995, p. 13.
[106] G. S. Sardesai, *New History of Marathas,* Vol. III, p. 504.

Baroda in 1810 and then sought an advice from Gangadhar Shashtri. On 10th February 1811, Trimbakji invited him on dinner, and arrested him, later kept him in the fort of Malegaon where he died on 15th April 1818. He was also one of the patriotic members of the Satara family who understood the British motive and their kin policy. So, he asked help from Shinde, Holkar, and Gaekwad to give a last challenge to the British to stop the intervention in their family matters, but he was also removed from the politics by his kin.

Why did the Gaekwads not understand the hidden motive of the British? A reason cannot suffice to understand the question but we need to examine the multiple political dimensions of the Confederacy. The most important outcome of these tactics, which was mainly neglected by the Indian historians, understood the power of the opposition, through understanding the opposition within the family of the kin. None of the kin of the Confederate ever thought about the question of legitimacy while they were changing the structure of power of the Maratha Confederacy. So, the overall results of the kin-conflict of the Confederates and the British involvement in the open conflict of the Confederates ultimately gave a golden opportunity to the British to gain full control over the Maratha Confederacy.

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
NANDAJI
KEROJI
1.DAMAJI (D.1721)
2. PILLAJI (D.1732)
YASHWANT RAO
3. DAMAJI (1732-1768)
KHANDERAO (KADI)
MALHAR RAO
ANANDRAO
PRATAPRAO
KALOGI
GABAJI
BHIKAJI RAO
4 &8- GOVINDRAO (1793-1800)
5. SAYAJI RAO (1768-1778)
6.FATEHSING 1778-1789
7. MANAJI (1789-1793)
MURA RAO
RARARA MRAO
JAISING RAO
BHAGWANT RAO
KANHOJI (ILLIGITIMATI
9. ANANDRAO (1800-1819)
FATEH SING REGENT D. 1818
GOVINDRAO
10 SAYAJI RAO DIED 1847
DAMAJI RAO
11. GANPAT RAO D. 1856
GAYAJI
12. KHANDE RAO D. 1870
ANADRAO
13. MALHAR RAO DEPOSED 1875
YASHWANT RAO
2. SONS DECEASED
14. SAYAJI RAO ADOPTED
VINAYAK RAO
JHINGOJI
2. PILLAJI ADOPTED BY DAMAJI
MALOJI OF SANKHEDA
MAHIMAJI
GOVINDRAO
MALOJI
DAULAT RAO
GANPAT RAO
GOVIND RAO ADOPTED SON OF FATEHSING
GANPAT RAO
GANPAT RAO
KHANDE RAO
GABAJI RAO
BABURAO
KASHIRAO
OKHAJI RAO
SAKHARAM
BITHORAO
ACHYUTA RAO
ANAND RAO
14. GOPAL RAO ADOPTED NAM EOF SAYAJI
SAMPAT RAO

KINSHIP, POWER AND LEGITIMACY: A STUDY OF MARATHA CONFEDERATES IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

Thesis submitted to Jawaharlal Nehru University

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DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

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CONCLUSION

The study of kinship, power, and legitimacy of the Maratha Confederates, makes it clear, for instance, as explained in the introduction of the present work, is the exploration of the history of the social and political phenomena of the Maratha Confederacy based on kinship and family politics. It is the socio-historical and anthropological investigation of the three Maratha families, viz. the Shindes, Holkars, and Gaekwads, who strengthened their power in central and western India during the eighteenth century. This has been explained in a way that reflects a new modus operandi of constructing and representing the history of the Maratha Confederacy. The existing understanding of historical narrative makes it clear that no historians cover every family/kinship who had played a significant role in the expansion and consolidation of the Maratha Confederacy. Therefore, despite the lacking of chronology in the present study and the inclusion of only three families—the Shindes, Holkars, and Gaekwads, this research brings to the fore many historical figures who were ignored by historians even though they played a significant role in power politics of the longest functioning of the Maratha Confederacy.

It also shows a serious thought about the primacy of written texts on the lives of many ruling families and it was realised that it is important to understand the dynamics of the Maratha Confederacy through kinship and family politics which was pivotal in giving a definite shape to the Maratha history. Therefore, the study of the Maratha kinship is done in a way through which the various social and political relations are expressed, in which the families of the Shindes, Holkars, and Gaekwads are considered as the basis through which the political and economic functions of the Maratha Confederacy in northern and western India were manifested. It is not entirely based on the anthropological perspective which deals with the issue of reproduction and genetics, sexuality and other biological aspects rather it highlights the lives and careers of the Maratha kin of the Shindes, Holkars, and Gaekwads and their personal economic and political power relationships within and outside of the Maratha Confederacy.

The power of individual members of these ruling families has been explained in a way to show the level or extent of the power of these Maratha families and the capacity of their kin to influence the behaviour and decision of the other Maratha administrators.

The examination of the various sources reflects three phases of the power structure - first, when these Confederates - the Shindes, Holkars, and Gaekwads and their kinship were entirely under the control of the central authority at Poona i.e. under the Chhatrapati (with the consent of Chhatrapati). The Peshwa directed this phase through his expansionist vision of the Maratha Confederacy in different parts of India. The kinship of these Confederates was mainly functioning under the Maratha administration and even the kinship polity of the families was by and large under the control of the central authority at Poona. The second phase, when these three families were equally powerful in terms of financial and military resources. The third and final phase of power relation was when the kin of these three Confederates were more potent than the Peshwa or the Chhatrapati, and at the same time, within the Houses of the Shindes, Holkars, and Gaekwads many family members were also claiming equally powerful status for becoming the head of the House. In this phase, the families of these Confederates were openly violating the directions of the Poona authority and challenged the power of the Peshwa in the field of the political diplomacy of the Maratha Confederacy. Hence, this was the phase which contributed to the central cause of the decline of the Maratha Confederacy and also gave more space to expand the British domination in Northern and Western India.

The first phase of kinship polity and power of the Maratha Confederacy is mainly the period of origin and settlement of these families in the Malwa and Gujarat. The political career of Malhar Rao Holkar (1731-1766), Ranoji Rao Shinde (1731-1745), Pilaji Gaekwad (1721-1732), and Damaji Gaekwad (1732-1768) and their close kin were working most of the time under the direction of Poona. It was possible mainly because the families of these Confederates originated in different parts of south India and gradually migrated and settled in various regions of northern and western India under the direction of the Chhatrapati or the Peshwa. Malhar Rao Holkar, born in 1693 in a village Hol near Poona, became the most powerful Confederate in the Malwa and received *Jaripatka* in 1735. Shinde came from Kunneir Khed village in Satara district, appointed as Saranjamdar in the Malwa, and developed Gwalior as a power center. Gaekwad came from village Dadvi near Poona and strengthened himself in Gujarat. During the governorship of Sarbuland Khan (1726-1730), the *chauth* of all the parganas in the north of Mahi River was granted to Gaekwad. Despite refusing some orders of the Peshwa by these Confederates to form alliances

with the regional powers such as the Rajputs, Afghans, Rohillas, the kinship polity, and power of these families were mainly decided by the Chhatrapati and the Peshwa till 1761. The most important fact is that the kinship politics and family conflicts of the close blood relatives did not play any significant role until the third battle of Panipat.

The second phase of kinship politics and power of the Confederacy shows that the families of the Shindes, Holkars, and Gaekwads too emerged as compelling in their respective regions and ruled more or less independently and open jealousy forced them to work against each other for personal gains without caring for its consequences on the Maratha Confederacy. It can be clearly seen in the case of the policies adopted by Shinde and Holkar to deal with the Jaipur-Kota conflict which was about the succession dispute which arose between Madho Singh and Ishwar Singh after the death of Jaisingh. Malhar Rao took the side of Madho Singh, and Shinde went with Ishwar Singh who later committed suicide, and Malhar Rao got a bribe of one core form Madho Singh to get the throne.

Why this incident is noteworthy because the Peshwa warned Shinde not to help Ishwar Singh against Holkar as he said, "If Shinde takes up the cause of Ishwar Singh, this will go against our interest." But Shinde continued with his decision and neglected the advice of the Peshwa. However, the Peshwa was too powerful and he could have forced Shinde to accept the order. Gradually this gave more space to the families of these Confederates to form the political alliances independently. The similar attitude of these Confederates can be seen in the case of the conflict between Bakht Singh and Ram Singh in Marwar (1746-1766).

First, Ram Singh was defeated by Bakht Singh on 22 June 1751, and then Ram Singh approached Holkar with one crore rupees for help. Holkar himself suggested him to take help from Shinde. The next year 1752 Holkar took a bribe of 1 crore from Bakht Singh, but he died on 22 September 1752. After that Bijay Singh succeeded him and the coronation took place on 31 January 1753. Bijay Singh deputed Gosain Bijay Bharti to open peace talks with Shinde. On 24 July Gosain visited the camp of Shinde, but during the discussion, Shinde became angry and started using abusive language for the Rathore chief, Bijay Singh and threatened to collect the tribute by the stroke of his shoes. The envoy of Rathore lost his temper and murdered Shinde instantaneously.

After the death of Jayappa, Dattaji and Jankoji took up the cause of Ram Singh and conducted a war with full zeal. Raghunath Rao also invaded Marwar. At this time the party feeling between Shinde and Holkar was so high that there were reports that Holkar instigated the murder of Jayappa. This was the time when the Peshwa should have intervened in the families of these Confederates to stop the internal conflicts and to utilize the power of the kinship for strengthening the Maratha Confederacy.

In the case of Delhi, most of the time, Shinde and Holkar acted in a united manner. But they failed to form a strong alliance with any of the northern Powers. The main drawback of the diplomatic policies and alliances of the families of the Sindhias, Holkars, and Gaekwads was the continuous change in policies and allies. The people of Upper India became suspicious and lost their confidence to have any long terms alliances with any of these Confederates, particularly the changing behaviour of Shinde and Holkar became the cause of the loss of sympathy of the Rajputs, the Jats, the Nawab of Awadh, and the Rohillas. The result was that there were no real and constant allies in the north to further their aims. These Confederates did not miss any opportunity to maintain their own policies particularly with the Jat and Raohilla chiefs which were not in accordance with the diplomatic policies of the Peshwa. It resulted in severe disputes amongst the families of the Shindes, Holkars, and Gaekwads.

The third phase of kinship polity of these Confederates was the period when each of the Confederates considered themselves as the most potent and sovereign Confederates. In this period, the conflict of kin and kinship and the question of succession became the turning point for the power of the families of these Confederates. In such conflicts, the Peshwa was openly involved in the use of one kin against the other to gain support for the personal benefit. In the second half of the eighteenth century, the Marathas, initially, witnessed various internal and external difficulties in re-occupying the Malwa, Bundelkhand, and parts of western India but later almost curbed the Jats and Rohillas, also occupied Delhi and established the fugitive Emperor on his throne in which Mahadji Shinde played an important role, and emerged as the most dominant Confederate of the Maratha Confederacy.

The rise of Mahadji as a dominant Confederate and his appointment as the Regent of the Mughal Empire became the threatening cause for other Confederates. This was the moment when the family of Shinde became more powerful, but the other

Confederates did not realise the growing strength of Mahadji Shinde. By the time the influence of Mahadji on the Mughals and other northern powers was understood by the Holkar and Gaekwad families, the Shindes became too strong to be challenged by any power in the last quarter of the eighteenth century. The equilibrium of power of the Maratha Confederacy was also disturbed due to the absence of the Peshwa in the actual ground of military activity in Hindustan to balance and reinstate the unity amongst these Confederates. The kinship conflict in the House of the Peshwa, the murder of Narayan Rao, and other domestic problems of the Deccan compelled the Peshwa to concentrate on southern India which provided a greater opportunity for these Confederates to dedicate their attention and to pursue their own political interests in Hindustan. It also gave an opportunity to Mahadji Shinde to become the most potent and dominant leader in Upper India with the help of the modernised army of French General De Boigne.

In the same phase, the House of the Gaekwads went through a tremendous change. Fatesing (1778-1789) gave a new identity to the Baroda House. His successors Manaji Rao (1789-1793) and Govindrao (1793-1800) seemed to be weak rulers. They involved themselves in internal kin conflicts which resulted in the passing of all the real power into the hands of the ministers. The passing of power in such a manner is similar to that of, as V. S. Kadam says the shifting of power from the hands of the Chhatrapati to the hands of Karbhari. The situation became more complicated when rivalries and personal ambitions of the kin of the Gaekwads were used by the Peshwa for his own interests. This kind of politics of the Peshwa in the House of Gaekwads proved more injurious to the Confederacy particularly after the death of Damaji (1768) when the rivalries among the kin of the Gaekwads became the important tool of power politics. Later, a similar policy was adopted by the British also, who took a keen interest in creating more conflicts among the kin of the Gaekwads in which son strove against father, brother against brother, cousin against cousin, while wife and mother pushed the interests of their husbands and sons with utter disregard for justice and legitimacy.

This became the most crucial factor for the Gaekwads to lose their sovereignty and power to the British so much so that within a decade, after the treaty of 29 July 1802 the state of Baroda became a full-fledged princely state under the British government.

This whole process of the transition resulted in the isolation of the Gaekwad territory from the Maratha Confederacy.

However, the most interesting fact that should be known of this transition is that the English officers were also divided among themselves. There was one group of the English officers who were willing to support the Gaekwad sovereignty without harming their own power, and the another group of the British officers followed the direction of the Governor General and purposefully intervened in the conflicts of the family of the Gaekwads, and they were actively engaged to understand their personal life to make them loyal to the British.

The family of Raoji was the one who received more power in the Baroda House through the private negotiations with the British, particularly after the agreement of 8 June 1801 which approved that the *Diwanship* of the Baroda state should be hereditary in the family of Raoji Appaji. The treaty also approved to provide protection to the family of Raoji Appaji but it was given only in those cases where the British interests were served. It is important to note that such an offer was never given to any other administrator. Therefore, these secret agreements created treacherously selfish consciousness among the other kin and administrators of the Confederacy who also began to vie for such offers. This clamour for the British concessions spelt doom for the Gaekwad independence and isolated them from the Confederacy. Although the Peshwa expressed his strong disapproval of the Gaekwad cession to the British and warned the Poona Resident and Gaekwad that such alienation of territory would mean a violation of the treaty of Salbai and infringe upon the right of the Poona authoritry, and also emphatically asserted that no Maratha chief had the right to enter into a treaty with any foreign power independently of the Peshwa, but neither the British nor the Gaekwad paid any heed to the concerns of the Peshwa.

However, such a warning was necessary to show the potential of the Poona authority. This was also an old rule that none of the Confederates could isolate power without the consent of the Peshwa. But the Peshwa failed to understand that since the last decade of the eighteenth century, each of these Confederates was considering themselves as a sovereign power which was reflected in their political pursuits particularly when the kin of these families behaved as more powerful than the Poona authority.

We also come across a similar situation in the House of Shinde after the death of Mahadji. This family was divided into two groups: one was of Daulat Rao and the second consisted of the widows of Mahadji. The administrators of the House were also divided into groups where some officials supported the policies of Bhagirathi Bai, Yamuna Bai, and Lakshmi Bai (the three 3 widows of Mahadji) and others were with Daulat Rao. The adopted Daulat Rao became so powerful that even the Peshwa was not able to take any decision without the consent of Daulat Rao, particularly during the period of 1796-1800. The internal conflicts within the families of the Confederates became a complicated political crisis not only for the families of these Confederates but also for the House of the Peshwa. The result of such conflicts and, kinship politics became the key feature of most of the treaties which were signed during the first decade of the nineteenth century. This was the major weakness of the Maratha Confederacy that was deeply understood by the British and used it to fulfill the policy of isolation of the kin of these Confederates to break the power of the Confederacy. Due to this the Maratha state developed a weak Confederacy of the powerful chiefs and had all along been administered by individuals without any settled constitution to which the various elements could remain bound. For this situation, only the policies of the Confederates cannot be blamed because the decisions of Baji Rao-II were equally responsible. Instead of keeping a distance from the British, Baji Rao-II advised the Poona authority to stay away from Yashwant Rao and other Confederates and warned Amrit Rao on 12 January 1803 that Yashwant Rao was a rascal, and he (Amrit Rao) must desert his company.

The politics of Baji Rao-II for the successor of the House of Holkar was also noted by Maj. Close, the Resident with the Peshwa, who informed the Secretary to the government of Bombay on 20 January 1803 that the vakil of Holkar brought request from their master who says, “his highness to present Khande Rao-II with a khillat of investiture as heir and representative of the Holkar family”. The Peshwa in his reply to their demands stated that – rather than Khande Rao-II, Kashi Rao should be appointed because his relation with the Peshwa was good, so he could not be deprived of his inheritance, and this was decided during the life of his father. But the Pehswa also insisted that Khande Rao-II (son of Malhar Rao-II) would be adopted by Kashi Rao who had no children and he would inherit all the possessions of his ancestors. The most important aspect of all of this correspondence was passing through a close

examination by the British officers, so the issues of the kin conflict and the question of a new successor were well known to the British. It was happening mainly after the defensive alliance of Baji Rao-II with the English. It created a new aspect in defining the power of the kin of the Holkars, and this moment of kin conflict became one of the vital tools for the British to carry out the settlement and redefine the power of the Confederates and their kin. Each of the Confederates and their kin understood the British tactics but instead of removing the British interference from the family matters, and joining hands together to remove the British, these Confederates remained continuously involved in power politics of kinship.

The Shinde-Holkar relations worsened when Holkar refused the offer of friendship by Shinde to fight against the English. Yashwant Rao preferred kin interest and stated that he always had desired to maintain an alliance with Shinde, but he first wanted to meet his nephew, Khande Rao (the posthumous son of his brother, Malhar Rao –II) who had been kept as a hostage by Daulat Rao Shinde. Despite the promise of Shinde of releasing Khande Rao and his mother soon, these Confederates could not take a proper initiative to stop the growing influence of the British; rather they showed more urgency for the release of the nephew. It indicated that the unity among these Confederates had become impossible because of their kin conflict and hunger for power both within and outside the House of these Confederates.

Although the policies of Baji Rao-II created dissensions among the Confederates, he had also lost influence to resolve these issues. The Poona authority had weakened after 1800 compared to the Confederates. Furthermore, the Peshwa committed a big mistake; despite knowing that Shinde and Holkar had became more potent, he killed Vithoji who was the brother of Yashwant Rao Holkar. This episode changed the entire fate of Baji Rao-II. The killing of Vithoji changed the mind of Yashwant Rao Holkar. He decided to take revenge from the Peshwa but agreed to give a chance to Baji Rao-II if he sent two people, namely, Baloji Kunjar and Bapu Gokhale who had advised the Peshwa to kill the brother of Holkar. The Peshwa did not hand over them which resulted in a serious war between the Peshwa and Holkar. Finally, Baji Rao-II had to take shelter with the British towards the end of 1802. So, the killing of Vithoji became the turning point of power struggle of the Maratha Confederacy which changed the dynamics of power politics from the family of the Peshwa and Holkar to the British-Maratha contest.

In the contest for power against the Marathas, the British adopted the policy of isolating each Confederate and overwhelming them later. First the British engaged openly with the House of Gaekwad to change the mentality of the kin of the Baroda House. After 1805, the chain of the British control was fully tightened on the Gaekwads through the Resident of Baroda, which became the first Confederate where the British started intervening in every matter of the family affairs. It was to such an extent that even small family gatherings, special occasions and marriage ceremonies were deeply analysed by the British to understand its cultural and political impact on the politics of kinship of the Maratha Confederacy. The British intervention made deep inroads after 1805 and that they began to decide the best suitable person for adoption, the expenditure on family functions and the amount of pension and allowances. With this method, the British successfully isolated many of the kin of the Gaekwad House.

Those kin who were not in favour of the British were silently killed. Indian historians are generally silent on these killings or they considered it as a coincidence, which in reality was not the case. It could not have been a coincidence because of a series of killings of those Maratha administrators who were against the British. For example, Shashtri was murdered in July 1815, Bhagwant Rao died in the British custody in December 1815, Mairal died in February 1817. Khersetji Modi, serving in the Poona Residency was killed in mysterious circumstances a few months before the murder of Shashtri. With these killings, the British successfully isolated the Gaekwad from the Maratha Confederacy, and gained full control on the Gaekwad family and their territory.

Thus, it can be seen that the kinship conflict of the families of these Confederates was one of the leading causes of the decline of the Maratha Confederacy. Each of the powerful families of the Maratha Confederacy degenerated because of the kinship conflict which became beneficial for the British who ultimately brought the sovereign territories of these Confederates under their control. Had the Peshwa understood the power of these Confederates and the impact of kin conflict and had taken the initiative to control the power of the Shindes, Holkars and Gaekwads to maintain the political structure of the Maratha Confederacy, the situation would have never been arisen for the Peshwa to throw himself into the English arms to save his life from his own Confederates.

Once he left Poona and took help from the British, the prestige of the post of the Peshwa deteriorated into *Oligarchy* (few ruled for self-interest) and the *Aristocracy* (few ruled for common interest) at Poona as well as in the House of these Confederates particularly during the first decade of the nineteenth century. The burden of the law and administration of the most of the part of the Confederacy fell on the kin of these Confederates whose interest was mainly to gain personal power at any cost even if they had to join the British hands.

The Shindes, Holkars, and Gaekwads, the three most powerful pillars of the Maratha Confederacy in northern India, were jealous of each other, and the quarrels between the brothers of the same family for the succession made the situation even worse. This destroyed the social structure of the Maratha Confederacy and its institutions where the environment was not favourable for the growth of patriotic kinship, particularly after the end of the eighteenth century.

These changing circumstances of the Maratha Confederacy make the understanding of the question of the legitimacy of the ruling kin of the Confederates more complex. The reason why the Maratha Confederacy was so difficult to achieve and define as a legitimate confederacy outside the Swarajya territory where these Confederates were ruling was because of a number of factors. The power of these Confederates or their kin was highly problematic to be called legitimate because the supreme lawmaking and enforcing institutions of the Maratha Confederacy at Poona legitimized all the power in accordance with the administrative policies of the Chhatrapati and the Peshwa to guarantee its own rule and to strengthen and exercise the sovereign power. Therefore, the Confederates should have devoted their power to promote the interest of the people residing in their respective territories, and their policies should have satisfied the general societal needs for security and economic sufficiency in a way that should not have been biased against the non-Marathas. The legitimacy of the Maratha Confederacy was comprised of legally established and valid rules for the organization and the distribution of power which, however, was not possible in the non-Maratha territories.

The primary ground for the legitimacy of power was that it was obtained and exercised according to the established rule. However, in the case of the Maratha Confederacy and its power relations with these Confederates and their kinship shows

the absence of a fixed rule for defining power or distributing the resources (Economic/territorial) among the kin of the Shindes, Holkars, and Gaekwads; even if some rule was brought in by the Peshwa at times, it could not be implemented uniformly in the non-Maratha territories. The power of these Confederates was itself based on the rule of exclusion, no matter how close or who were in the opposition. Therefore, for them it was an alternative mode of legitimacy at variance with that of the Peshwa.

Other factors which proved that the functioning of the Maratha Confederates was not legitimate, were the nature of the occupancy of the property, the appointment, and the promotion of particular kin of the Confederates which occurred through the forcible exclusion of others which took place in violation of the existing rule. Such acts of usurpation cannot be called legitimate. The Maratha Confederacy cannot be singled out on the issue of legitimacy for nearly all political powers of India resorted to such conflicting sources of legitimacy during this period.

The power relation of the families of the Shindes, Holkars, and Gaekwads was characterized by exclusion, restriction and compulsion. The relationship amongst the kin of the Peshwa and these Confederates were involved with the restriction of their freedom; they were following the orders, instructions, decrees, directions, and commands and showed the obedience to the Peshwa only till these Confederates were less potent than the central authority of the Maratha Confederacy. It is considered as the first phase of the power relationships among the kin, Confederates, and the Maratha Confederacy in the present work. This can be observed at the time of the transfer of power (resources /opportunity), for these Confederates from subordinate to dominant which was essentially based on the politics of exploitation, subservience and compulsion, and thus, they created a self-legitimising ethos for their authority.